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ABSTRACT 
The present t~esis is an attempt at developing a new understanding of 
the p;ychology of C.G. Jung by means of an original metatheoretical 
approach which reveals a central problematic in the Jungian opus: the 
problematic of the Other, the essence of which is the pivotal phenomenon 
of the composit~on and dissociability of the psyche. 
Initially, the problematic of the Other is set in its broad cultural 
and psychological perspectives before an historiographical account 
of its treatment is attempted. In this, the Heraclitean, Platonic, 
and Hegelian theories are investigated and their respective positions 
on the Other are developed and distilled in an original discussion 
which particularly focuses on their fundamental dialectical approach. 
Jung's life and work are examined in depth as a coherent whole in 
their developmental evolution. The present approach reveals the 
progressive refonnulations of Jli"ng's problematic of the Other in the 
chronological periods which mark his theoretical development. This 
investigation enables an original understanding of (among other issues) 
the Freud-Jung controversy, the epistemological meaning of Jung's 
obscure period between the years 1912-1917, and the gradual construc-
tion of his unique epistemological system. The Self is finally 
accepted as the dialectical synthesis of all opposing Others. A 
series of original diagrams is designed to illustrate the complete 
development of Jung's reformulations of his problematic and demonstrates 
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their dialectical texture. 
The first three theorists are subsequently revisited and their views 
are compared to Jung's fonnulations in an analysis highlighting the 
implications of the attempted approach. Finally, a tentative 
f onnulation of the dialectic of the Other in terms of language is 
advanced and explored. 
This thesis constitutes a metatheoretical investigation in that it 
approaches the Jungian thought from a position outside the framework 
of his theories, in order to seek the meaning not only of his 
theoretical formulations themselves, but also of their metatheoretical 
significance within the.framework of his life and work. Thus, a num-
ber of Jung's usually neglected texts are here re-exanined and 
located within their broad historical, epistemological and develop-
mental perspective in an attempt to illuminate 
of the Other. 
his central dialectic 
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PREFACE 
The polymorphous nature of the present study does not lend itself to 
the adoption of a uniform referencing and bibliographical system. 
Each section had to be treated, as far as possible, according to the 
rules of its respective tradition. Above all, the main consideration 
was to ensure the maximum efficiency in the most straight forward manner. 
For this reason a short explanatory note to this effect is necessary: 
l. When referring to the fragments of Heraclitus a simple cardinal 
system of numbering was used, according to the or~er of their appear-
ance in this investigation. This enables an easy and unambiguous ref-
erence to the fragments in the text. At the end of each quoted fragment 
the source text appears. The choice of the source from which the 
particular fragment was taken was based on what was considered to be 
the best translation fitting into the language of the arguments presented 
in this study. 
2. In the case of Plato the accepted Stephanus pagination was retained. 
As far as the choice of translation is concerned, the grounds on which 
the extracts were chosen were the same as in the case of Heraclitus. 
However, by and large the Jowett translations were preferred. The 
Greek text comes from the Standard Edition which was edited by J. Burnet. 
3. All quotations from the works of Freud and Jung come from their 
authorized editions, viz. the Standard Edition (S.E.) and Collected 
Works (C.W.) respectively. The date after the quotations in the text 
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refers to the year of publication of that particular work. In turn, 
in the References section at the end of the study the reader may find 
the exact location of that particular in the S.E., or C.W. In the case 
where there is more than one work published in the same year, the second, 
third, fourth etc articles/books are identified as ]?_, _£, ~' etc respect-
ively. For example Jung 1948; 1948b; 1948c; etc. The reader's 
attention is drawn to the fact that no a denotation is used. The 
principle of ordering follows their order of appearance in the text. 
4. As far as the rest of the references are concerned, the accepted 
standards of the American Psychological Association have been followed 
as far as possible. 
It should be noted that in the case of translations from texts not in 
the English language, if no mention of a translator is made either in 
the main body of the study or in the References section at the end of 
the study, the translations were done by myself. 
In order to facilitate the coherence of the material, certain nodal 
points appear in the study under the title Transition. These may also 
include the sub-titles Above, and later Below. Although at times they 
do summarize preceeding arguments and findings, and gradually introduce 
forthcoming ones, the reader is warned not to accept them as distilled 
summaries as such. They cannot replace the reading of the sections 
that they cover as they might not necessarily include all the salient 
points in the study. Their function is merely to facilitate reading 
and thus they should not be taken in isolation. 
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I N T R 0 D U C T I 0 N 
-----------------------
Teiresias, the grand old wise man of Greek antiquity, told Leiriope, 
the blue nymph, that her newborn would "live to a ripe old age, provided 
that he never knows himself!" (Graves 1960, p.286). The baby's name 
was Narcissus and the prophetic words of the blind seer found tragic 
fu 1f i llmen t : Not only did he not live to an old age, but Narcissus 
in his full youth terminated his own life. He transgressed the implied 
connnand in the prophecy by knowing himself, and moreover, fell in love 
with his own image. 
This powerful myth is full of typical Greek ironies: The 'seer' is 
blind. He does not need eyes to become wise. It is precisely 
Narcissus' eyes that tempt him and finally bring him to his own de-
struction. One of Narcissus' lovers is the nymph Echo who, once, 
while in a forest secretly following her beloved, desperately tried to 
call him out; but, alas, she was condemned to merely r~peat what ·he 
would say first. She is destined to be only the acoustic image of 
others without any of her own individuality. Narcissus rejects her. 
Is it perhaps too painful for him to see in her the ultimate exempli-
fication of his o'wn condition, i.e. in herself she is nothing more 
than everybody else's image. 
Freud saw in this mythical predicament a useful tool to illustrate his 
theory of evolution of choice of sexual object. Narcissism in psychology 
'\ 
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today refers to more or less the same phenomenon: Preoccupation with 
one's own self and "self-love" (English and English 1958, p.336). 
But perhaps the myth also/only indicates something else. Teiresias' 
ominous warning was against self-knowledge. This might indeed seem 
paradoxical. Teiresias' credentials are unquestionable. He was not 
just any old man who professed to having prophetic abilities. He was 
the same person who appeared in other crucial circumstances in Greek 
mythology, such as guiding Odysseus and foretelling Oedipus' royal 
parents of the painful fate of their son. He could not have contra-
dieted the Delphic oracle 'Know thyself' so blatantly. His warning 
reminds us of a similar foreboding: God's prohibition on Adam and 
Eve not to eat the fruit of the tree in the "mist of the garden" 
' (Genesis, 3:3), the tree of "knowledge". Here again, why should God 
prohibit his human creatures access to knowledge? 
The answer to both situations might lie in the specific kind of know-
ledge that was ref erred .·to in these two instances. After the first 
human inhabitants of the garden of Eden ate from the fruit, we read 
that "the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were 
naked" (Genesis, 3:7). The first thing that that particular kind of 
knowledge enabled them to grasp was neither the mysteries of creation 
nor their own nature, but their own external appearances. In fact, 
the Old Testament does not refer to any ·other kind of· knowledge that 
they gained by eating the forbidden fruit. So, what they found out 
about was nothing else than their own image. Our Greek hero was 
punished for precisely the same thing: Seeing his image. Well, 
admittedly he went a little further and even loved his own image, but 
- 3 -
that was after he had already committed the forbidden act which was 
merely to look at himself. 
The tragedy in both the biblical and the old Greek positions lies in 
the fact that the obtained "self-knowledge" led to self-destruction. 
It is a tragedy because self-knowledge is a desired and much praised 
achievement. People in their effort to gain 'true knowledge' some-
times fail and the effects are harmful. The path towards self-
knowledge is slippery and dangerous and can easily lead to annihilation 
rather than liberation. 
Is there perhaps a misunderstanding of the term 'self-knowledge'? 
Without entering here into any detailed discussion of this highly 
intricate issue, it may be observed that what the heroes of both the 
above examples actually achieved was a certain type of 'knowledge', 
viz., knowledge of their external appearance, of their external images. 
No special expertise is needed to distinguish between this sort of 
'self-knowledge' and the one that was preached at Delphi. The dis-
tinction is perhaps clearer in the scriptural predicament. Man was 
created according to Lord God's image. This is overemphasised in the 
first chapter of Genesis: "And God said, Let us make man in our 
image, after our likeness" (Gen., 1:26), "So God created man in his 
~image, in the image of God created he him" (Gen., 1:27). Man's 
task is to discover this divine image. Instead, Adam and Eve first 
became aware of their own external images, they became preoccupied 
with them and became 'self-conscious' of themselves, i.e. their 
nakedness. The Bible starts with man's punishment for disobeying 
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God's orders by achieving that incanplete and distorted 'self-know-
ledge•. Whereas the myth of Narcissus stops with his punishment, 
the scriptures start with it. Thus, in a sense, all the rest of the 
Bible may be accepted as illustrating various ways and attempts at 
correcting that first mistake and developing instead 'true knowledge', 
which could not be about the external appearance of a person, but 
should concern the kind of knowledge which would make comprehensible 
the 'inner image' • 
It is this duality (or even multiplicity) of 'selves' with its 
corresponding kinds of knowledge which, in broad terms, sketches the 
theme of this study. Man decides to pursue a particular kind of 
'self-knowledge', and as many myths and artistic works show, he in-
variably discovers that he was searching in the wrong direction. The 
tragedy of this blindness or ignorance (avi<Jya) suggests the existence 
of an other, somehow inaccessible self, and an other, somehow elusive 
kind of knowledge. This highly complex topic, with implications for 
many disciplines, may be examined from a variety of different perspec-
tives. The present investigation will focus on the examination of this 
issue as undertaken by the Swiss psychologist Carl Gustav Jung. 
However, because the subject matter is of such extensive scope, in 
order to achieve an adequate degree of comprehension it is necessary 
to locate·it within a context which would provide not only its 
historical perspective but also some of its crucial conceptual and 
psychological dimensions. Heraclitus', Plato's and Hegel's treatment 
of this central problematic were thus chosen in order to construct 
this basis which in turn would place Jung's formulation of the same 
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question in relief. 
As the sub-title suggests, this investigation is metatheoretical. In 
general terms, it does not arise from within the frameworks of any of 
the theories discussed in the thesis, but constitutes a connnent on them. 
Theoretical studies investigate the internal consistency of a parti-
cular theory (e.g. how certain parts relate to others within the same 
framework), whereas metatheoretical approaches discuss the theory from 
a viewpoint which does not incorporate the basic premises of that 
theory. 
The great majority of studies dealing with the work of C.G.Jung come 
from 'within' the Jungian system. Even the current trend of revived 
interest in Jung has not altered significantly this state of affairs. 
It is rather unfortunate that after a great man's death his followers 
tend to stare in adoration at his pointing finger rather than trace 
the implications of the pointed direction (to paraphrase Alan Watts' 
expression). 
A notable example of the few metatheoretical studies in this field are 
the works of Drs Rauhala (e.g. 1969; 1973; 1976) and Rychlak (e.g. 
1968; 1973; in press). The former author clarifies that the "source 
and point of departure" of a metatheoretical approach (his particular 
one is Hermeneutic metascience) is 
" ••• the realization that not only is the matter to 
be investigated a problem, {}Ju(/ the investigation 
itself is also problematic" (1976, p.50). 
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Similarly, the present study attempts an inquiry primarily into Jung's 
investigations. In other words, his writings will be examined with 
a view to illuminating his choice of the particular areas which he 
selectively studied, the meaning of his interpretations and their 
implications in the development of his subsequent direction. The 
metatheoretical approach adopted here would thus fall into the her-
\ 
meneutical tradition, and it will attempt to provide an appropriate 
metatheoretical structure within which the Jungian contribution will 
be meaningfully located. 
Since no unified theory of the Other exists, this study will modestly 
attempt to construct such a theoria. Not a theory according to the 
rigid methodological criteria of a systematic cluster of laws and 
hypotheses, but a theoria, after the verb ~Ewpw = "to look at, to 
view, behold, observe" (Liddel and Scott 1901), which would offer a 
meaningful and comprehensive view of the problematic under discussion. 
Such an approach is essentially hermeneutical insofar as it attempts 
to re-create the meaning of the texts treated here. As Robinson 
(1'941) aptly argued 
"The purpose of an interpreter ••. is to make himself 
and others rethink the very thoughts that were thought 
by some one long ago •.•• Interpretation is recreation 
of that thought" (p. 4). 
It is for this reason that this study will no·t take the form of either 
a polemical dissection of the Jungian opus (as well as of the works of 
Heraclitus, Plato, and Hegel), or a glorification of their contributions. 
Instead, it will essentially represent a re-reading of these authors 
in the light of the problematic of the Other. The terms reading or 
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re-reading come from the French structuralist tradition which em-
phasizes the "active reconstruction of meaning" (Hawkes 1977, p. 157). 
Such a reading should reveal Jung's own problematic - the manner in 
which he posed questions, as well as the direction of his search in 
answering them. 
Jung's personality and certain aspects of his life history will form 
an integral part of this investigation, together with the conceptual 
analysis of his writings. Although an inclusion of personal history 
and other subjective factors would have no place in studies of a 
purely logical nature, in investigations of the type of the present 
thesis this is an accepted procedure (cf. Mannoni 1971; Rychlak 1973). 
Guntrip (1973) maintains that "personal factors" can never be "neg-
ligible" as 
11 the estimation of their influence is essential to 
the evaluation of all psychodynamic theories. In no 
other branch of s·cience is it so important to know what 
sort of person the scientist is. This simply extends 
to the psychodynamic theorist a criterion already applied 
to the psychotherapist" (pp. 4 7-8). 
Atwood and Tomkins (1976) argue this position in even stronger terms. 
In their article "On the subjectivity of personality" they propose the 
institution of a "new discipline" which they call "psychology of know-
ledge" and which should include, in addition to the "psychobiographical 
investigation" the study of "subjective factors in the structure of 
man's knowledge in general " (p. 177). It is therefore essential to 
include as many relevant dimensions as possible in order to obtain a 
more complete re-construction of the meaning of Jung's problematic: 
' 
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Accordingly, in addition to his theoretical writings, excerpts from 
his correspondence (particularly with Freud), biographical anecdotes, 
and his 'non-scientific' book "Septem Sermones ad Mortuos" will also 
be discussed here. 
In psychological and philosophical terminologies as well as everyday 
language there is an abundance of concepts of the 'other', e.g. in 
the 'inner daimon', the 'significant others', the 'other minds', 
'divided self', 'alienation', etc. One may classify them into groups, 
such as intrapersonal- interpersonal, cognitive-affective, psychological-
social and others, or according to a) moral, b) epistemological, 
c) ontological d) physical criteria and so forth. This, however, 
does not suffice. Pedantic classifications are not the best pro-
motors of knowledge and even less of understanding. What is necessary 
is a comprehensive framework where all these concepts could be 
meaningfully located and inter-related, implicitly or explicitly. 
In undertaking such a task, a historiographical study of the Other 
becomes imperative. Only a broad spectrum reading of the meanings 
and interpretations given to this term by thinkers of diverse cultural 
and temporal backgrounds can provide an adequate mapping out of this 
territory. But the vastness of this pursuit imposes severe limit-
ations. In order to avoid superficiality by rapidly scanning through 
many authors and ideas, Heraclitus, Plato, and Hegel were here chosen 
and studied in relative depth. The inevitability of history being 
a selective process is an accepted fact (Carr 1961; Klein 1970). 
Thus, the selection criteria employed were a) their particular histor-
ical presence, and b) the content of their contribution. 
I 
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Part One of the thesis conmences with a general overview of the concept 
of the Other in various theories and approaches. This furnishes a 
broad background to the discussions in the subsequent sections. Since 
Greece is often referred to as the 'cradle of civilization' it would 
be of particular importance to a psychological investigation to 1ob-
serve the 'infantile' functions and behaviours, as f~r as the problem-
atic of the Other is concerned in their first inception as shaped in 
Greece in the early times. Heraclitus is said to have been the first 
western philosopher in whom Logos and Physis were inextricably united 
(cf. Heidegger 1953; Seidel 1964) and it will thus be instructive to 
follow his thought. It may also be argued that this unity represented 
possibly the earliest articulation of the Other in the Western world. 
Oriental formulations will not be examined. Only sporadic allusions 
to them will be made. This is indeed regrettable, but the space and 
-
conceptual limitations of this thesis could not possibly have accom-
modated any meaningful treatment of the enormous wealth of material 
on this topic which the old and modern Eastern thinkers have presented. 
Such a study should form a separate piece of research on its own. 
In Plato, and especially Hegel, where their writings, in comparison to 
those of Heraclitus, are so voluminous, the task of restricting the 
arguments only to formulations of the Other presented a number of 
. 
complications and dilemmas. Considerations of economy of space 
prevented the intended elaboration. Concise passages from existing 
sources were freely used if they aptly conveyed the de.sired meaning in 
support of the relevant argument. Not only in the section on Jung, 
but with Heraclitus, Plato, and Hegel too, a new reading of their 
positions was ventured. Building mainly on accepted interpretations 
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of their pivotal theses, the new reading introduced the dimension of 
the problematic of the Other through which their work was examined. 
Part Two constitutes the main thrust of the thesis and consists entirely 
of an examination of the problematic of the Other in Jung. The un-
folding of this problematic is followed in five main developmenta~ 
periods (Childhood and Prepsychiatric; Psychiatric; Psychoanalytic; 
Break/Breakdown/Breakthrough; Years of Individuation) which represent 
five relatively distinct stages in the development of both Jung's 
theories as well as his personality. The fourth chapter is in fact 
a trilogy: The Break, The Breakdown, The Breakthrough. In this 
period, which receives special attention, a new understanding of the 
break between Jung and Freud is articulated in terms of the central 
problematic of the Other. 
In Part Three, a final integration between the treatment of the Other 
in the first three theorists and in Jung is offered. 
the first time that such an integration is included. 
This is not 
Throughout the 
section on Jung wherever necessary such comparative references are 
made. It therefore remained in this section to briefly sum up the 
overall implications and similarities. One of the main issues dealt 
with here is the fundamentally dialectic nature of all the fonnulations 
of the Other examined in this thesis. Heraclitus, Plato, Hegel and 
Jung appeared to be able students (if not masters) of the dialectic. 
The advantages of dialectic approaches to the problematic of the Other 
are traced, and their relevance in the context of recent moves towards 
a dialectical psychology 'is highlighted 
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Before the closing remarks, a brief excursion into the implications of 
viewing Jung's formulations of the problematic of the Other in the 
light of modern theoretical trends is taken. Here, a tentative 
conception of viewing the Other in terms of language is suggested. 
The issue of language is a theme that runs through this study, but 
due to the scope of this thesis no further development and discussion 
of it have been afforded, although it does remain as a secondary 
implication. This thesis remains primarily focused on the construc-
tion of an understanding of Jung's formulation of the problematic of 
the Other, within an adequate perspective. It represents just one 
expedition into this territory, with the task of mapping it out. 
As all explorers are well aware, no single attempt can be sufficient 
in achieving a complete and systematic coverage of any domain. The 
value of the territory itself, as well as the success of the expedition 
may be judged from the new vistas that it unfolds: their benefits and 
their consequences. Thus, the present reading of Jung should be 
appraised in terms of the amount and worth of the new elements which 
are introduced in the established understanding of his work, and the 
implications that this new understanding has in relating Jung's 
psychology to other efforts of human thought that venture to puzzle 
out the riddle of the meaning of human life. 
PART ONE 
Chapter One 
The Other: an overview 
'I carved this statue in the stone' - he said -
'not with a hammer; with my bare fingers, with my bare eyes, 
with my bare body, with my lips. Now I don't know 
who is I and who's the statue.' 
He hid behind it, 
he was ugly, ugly - he embraced it, lifted it holding it 
around the waist 
and they walked together. 
And then he'd tell us that supposedly 
this statue (marvellous, indeed) was he; or even 
that the statue walked on its own. But who believes him? 
Yannis Ritsos 
Selected Poems Tr. N. Stangos (p.113). 
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The term 'other' does not have a self-evident connotation. Its meaning, 
moreover, depends upon the specific theoretical framework within which 
it is defined, as is the case with' many technical terms. However, the 
concept of the 'other' lacks even an 'obvious' general meaning, a clear 
connotation in everyday language. The precise definition of the term 
'personality', for example, is determined by the theoretical affiliation 
of the theorist who defines it. Nevertheless, there is a concensus 
concerning the meaning of the term, whereas in the case of the 'other', 
this facility is absent. In everyday language the 'other' merely denotes 
'not this, but the other'. Thus, the 'other' is located by what is 
.referred to as 'this'. It falls into the category of words which Gilbert 
Ryle names "index words": 
"... they indicate to the hearer or reader the . 
particular thing, episode, person, place, or 
moment referred to" (Ryle 1949, p.179). 
Other words in this category are distinguished by Ryle as 'today', 'now', 
'I'~ 'you', all of which depend upon the referred context, without 
which·-they have no substance by themselves. 
Conversely, the word 'other', by virtue of its dependency on a 'this', 
could be seen as an index word of a higher order, because it refers to 
something other.than that referred to by the index word. It is therefore 
tempting to call the 'other' a 'counter-index word' but this would 
inevitably force a meaning in which the 'other's' relation to 'this' will c' 
always be that of opposition. Linguistically such a meaning would be unjust-
ifiably restrictive as the 'other' can also be complementary to 'this'. The 
only restriction language dictates over the relationship between 'other' and 
'this' is that they should belong to the same genus. So the 'other' of 'this' 
table cannot be the dog which is also present in the room but the 'other' 
table; or, the chair would be an-'other' piece of furniture in the room. 
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In Greek there are two words for the 'other' : 'allos' and 'heteros'. 
Liddell and Scott (1901) regard 'heteros' as "better Greek" whereas 
Barber (1968) as well as Chantraine (1968) maintain that 'heteros' is the 
Attic form of 'allos'. Both of these words are to be found in modern 
English, e.g. in 'allotheism - Worship of strange gods', 'heterogenous .-
Diverse in character; composed of diverse elements' (Fowler and Fowler, 
1964). Strauss, in his phenomenological analysis of the 'other' , prefers 
using 'allon' (the neuter form of the male 'allos') in order to "avoid 
confusion" (Strauss, 1961,p.268) which surrounds the nuclear meaning of the 
English word 'other' • 
The 'other' has deep roots in the Indo-European languages. 'Allos' is 
related to the latin alter, alius, alienus (Liddell and Scott 1901). 
Alienus i~, of course, the root of alienation - otherness, estrangement. 
In Hebrew acher means other, different, foreign. 'Allos' belongs to the 
same family as the Sanskrit ant-aras - other 1'of many with a sense of 
difference'' (Benfey 1866). Other meanings of ant-aras are: ''the interior, 
the main substance, difference''. Benfey in his Sanskrit-English Dictionary 
relates, in turn, ant-ara to the latin interior, alter, ulterior, ultra. 
Chantraine (1970) finds that'heteros' relates to the sanskrit eka-tara -
one of two. Other relevant meanings are: eka-tas - on one side, eka-ta -
harmony, conjunction, eka-ka - solitarily, sam~ and finally, eka-chitta~ta -
fixing one's mind only on one object: unanimi~y. Benfey again relates the 
sanskrit root eka to the latin aequus - equal. 
This brief linguistic excursion indicates that the family of the 'other' 
includes some seemingly contradictory me~nings: separation, difference, and 
yet also, unity, harmony; inner core, main substance, same, as well as alien, 
alter, other. It seems there is a basic duality of meanings here. The 
dichotomy of meanings will be examined later in the context of various 
- 15 
theoretical frameworks. The following phrase from Plato may temporally 
bring about some clarity. In the ~' he writes about I r1 aA.l..ri <J;uxfi 
(88d) 1'alle psyche" which could be translated as "the other soul". Barber 
(1968) correctly renders it as ''the ~ of the soul 11 • Here the other 
cruld either mean separate, alien or the main one, the inner core. This 
will naturally depend on how this soul is understood. But it can safely 
be given a neutral translation as the ''rest'' which implies that there is 
still some other part of the psyche which constitutes the rest of the one 
already mentioned. Thus, the inherent duality of meaning in the 'other' 
can be comprehended as follows: if the rest is added to the existing part, 
then a wholeness, a totality will be achieved. But if the rest is not added 
then there will be a separation, a division. So, the very act of realizat-
ion of an existing other in the psyche creates a separation into a me and 
an other. When that separation is overcome then there will be a unity, 
wholeness, and harmony.· 
The Oxford English Dictionary lists among other meanings of the word 'other' 
the following: 
as an adjective: 
1) one of the two. 
2) that one of the two which remains after one is taken, 
defined or specified; the remaining of the two, 
three or more. 
3) that follows the first, second. 
4) existing besides, or distinct from that already mentioned 
or implied. 
5) not this, not the same. 
6) different in identity. 
7) further, additional 
and as a pronoun: 
1) one of the two (Latin alter). 
2) that which follows the first, the second. 
3) one besides. 
4) in philosophy, in particular: that which (in relation 
to something already mentioned) constitutes the other 
part of the universe of being, and is thus the counter-
part or double of the former; e.g. the non-ego is the 
"other" of the ~· 
The last definition provides the philosophical context and the best 
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working definition of the 'other' and will thus be used in this study. 
The 'this' will refer to the 'subject' , · the 'me', and, therefore, the 'other' 
(the pronoun 'other' ) will refer to the 'other me' , an opposite me, another 
~' a second me. In the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 'Alter' 
(Other) is defined as: 
"An individual's thought of another self as such." 
It is further clarified that: 
"the term is generally used as correlative with Ego and· 
emphasizes the distinction seen in the term Altruism, 
between 'self and other' within the individual's 
consciousness." (Baldwin 1901, vol.I,p.35). 
This outline is intended to demonstrate that the 'other' , with which we 
are dealing, is a very familiar concept. It is the little horned figure 
in comical cartoons who urges the he~o to do something naughty. It is also 
the other little figure with a halo who counteracts the bad influence with 
saintly advice. But apart from the good-evil dichotomy, the other is 
experienced in everyday life as any part or parts of the personality 
which is/are relatively separated from, or even in conflict with, the main 
and central body of the personality. 
The question then arises: could any tendency in one's self, which raises 
its voice above the aggregate noise level of the personality, be named as 
'other'? The following example might clarify this issue: I sit in my room 
undecided whether I should 1) go outside and work in the garden, 2) stay 
indoors and study, or 3) go to the club to meet my friends. First of all it 
is clear that I experience my 'me' as the undecided person who tries to 
solve this three-pronged puzzle. Are these three tendencies three 'others' 
in myself? A closer examination is necessary: if they are fleeting, super-
ficial thoughts which do not stir anytiling in myself, if they are indifferent 
momentary indecisions, such as choosing between a red or a green balloon 
(excluding, of course, any possible complex implications in this choice) 
they would then not fall within the definition of the 'other'. But if, 
- 17 -
on the other hand, these three thoughts cause an emotional turmoil, and I 
experience them as manifestations of familiar tendencies in myself which 
I have observed operating time and again, in a fairly consistent manner, 
then they could be referred to as 'others'. In this case, the urge to go 
and do some gardening might be coming from the 'other', the 'peasant in me' 
whom I know well for 'his' stong attachment to the earthy and simple life; 
'I' have repeatedly felt the conflict 'he' creates in 'me' by longing for a 
life outside of town, on a farm, to be closer to the natural cycles. 
secondly, the 'intellectual in me', who attempts to rationalize everything 
and has high intellectual ambitions can also be distinguished. Finally, I 
encounter the 'sociable me' who enjoys the company of other people and is 
considered by them as a jovial and merry character. These three tendencies 
qualify as 'others' since they are distinguishable and considerably independ-
ent of each other. Their inter-relationship could be either complementing 
or, as in this case, in opposition. 
Thus far then, in everyday life terms, the 'other' is understood to be a 
permanent or semi-permanent structure within the personality which has some 
degree of autonomy. In addition, as in the above example, the 'other' also 
has a certain continuity, and is usually experienced as 'a person within a 
person', distinct, to some extent 9 from the 'experiencing personality'. It 
might seem that this characterisation of the Other (='other') does not intro-
duce any novel notion into psychology. A number of other terms seem to denote 
similar phenomena. Would then, proposing a new term, the Other, complicate 
and overburden unriecessarily the already overloaded arsenal of psychological 
terms, concepts and phenomena? What clarity does such introduction aspire to 
achieve? An answer to these questions will be attempted at the end of this 
section after an historial and theoretical survey of the topic. But a brief 
discussion of similar terms, as an elucidation of certain underlying issues 
I 
might, by way of introduction, facilitate this survey. 
I 
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Instinct In most cultures the potentially dangerous autonomy of the 
biological instincts is well known and overt or covert rituals are devised 
to ensure a workable coordination between these urges and the other 
functions of the individual. Entire chapters in Psychol~gy deal with the 
dynamics of this coordination as well as the actual relationship between 
the biological, psychological and social aspects of human nature. 
Every psychological theory is coloured by the explicit or implicit stand 
it takes on this issue. The importance of this relationship cannot be 
emphasized enough. It should be remembered that it is an aspect of the 
eternal mind-body controversy. 
Rollo May has recently revived this issue in a manner directly relevant 
to the present discussion of the Other by introducing the term daimonic 
into Psychology. The daimonic is: 
"any natural function which has the power to take over 
the _whole person" (May 1972,p.123). 
As examples he cites sex, eras, anger, rage and the craving for power. 
The 11 daimonic", then, is what is usually referred to in everyday language 
as 'the animal' in a person. 
The daimonic has provided a popular theme,.particularly in literature as, 
for example, a well-integrated and cultured individual inadvertently 
discovers 'the savage in himself'. A classical example is Robert Louis 
Stevenson's 11 The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde" (1886) where the 
charming Dr. Henry Jekyll discovers with horror that there is an untamed 
monster in himself, Mr. Edward Hyde, but nevertheless admitting, 'This, 
too, was myself' (p.51). The dual nature of man, animal and human is a 
very old theme. 1Tragici , after all, comes from the word 'tragos; (=goat) 
and was first used in the early stages of the Greek theatre where the 
actors were dressed as half goats to celebrate the festivals of the gods,, 
Pan and Dionysus. One of the intentions of these religious festivities, 
among other aims and meanings, was to bring about harmony between the 
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human and animal natures of man. 
Roles Another source of possible conflict stennning from autonomous 
parts of the personality arises from a clash between contradictory roles 
or between a single role and instinct. Roger Brown defines a role as: 
"a scenario prescribing certain actions and a script 
prescribing the lines to be spoken. Roles in society 
are prescribed actions and words rather than persons" 
(Brown 1965, p.152). 
Swensen (1973) distinguishes between ''ascribed roles'' which are permanent 
and "achieved roles'' which ''people acquire through their own efforts" 
(p.413). Examples of the former are: age, sex, race, and nationality, and 
of the latter: the role of a doctor, the role of an educated person, etc. 
Thus, role is a mode of behaviour which is externally prescribed and which 
we assume in order to be accepted as part of the society. In the effort 
to play a role as adequately as possible the person can so intensely 
identify with the role that confusion and conflict result. 
Both types of roles can become autonomous and distinct from the rest of 
the personality and thus create a division between a 'me' and an 'other' • 
Salvatore Maddi (1967) has suggested a kind of neurosis, termed ·'existential' 
as the condition in which the individual, lacking any coherence and 
continuity, becomes merely an "'embodiment of biological needs'• and ••a 
player of social roles''. Characteristics of the "existential neurosis" are, 
for Maddi, chronic alienation, aimlessness and meaningless. The case of 
existential neurosis is, of course, an advanced state of such incoherence 
between the biological, psychological and social functions of the person. 
The conflict of roles as a source of human tragedies has ~een frequently 
portrayed in literature. Antigone refuses to compromise her role as sister 
of Polynices who was killed in battle(and according to King Creon's order 
his body was not to be buried as punishment for his political aspirations). 
Her role as good citizen obeying the orders of the state is secondary to 
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her duty to her own brother. She chooses to bury him, an act which finally 
leads to her own death. 
A similar concept to that of a rol~ is what might be called the 
'personification of a value system' • A person tries to become a living 
example of a state he aspires to reach. A good Christian will try to 
'imitate Christ'. This category seems to differ in some ways from that of 
a role as it refers mainly to a state of being rather than following any 
explicitly prescribed rules of external behaviour. In addition to the 
conscious goals, an individual might also unconsciously strive to fulfill 
certain ideals. The superego, for Freud, was the sum of the external values 
which the child had internalized. Freud stressed the separateness of the 
superego from the rest of the personality and many disturbed states in the 
individual were attributed to conflicts between these different 'little men' 
within the person. Edgar Alan Poe's story ''William Wilson" is a typical 
treatment of this issue in literature: an arrogant and nasty William Wilson 
becomes tired of the constant critical eye of an-other person who looks 
exactly like himself, and even has the same name. This 'other'; is always 
around when William does any mischief. The 'other' William Wilson is good 
and gentle. One day William Wilson kills the other, only to realize that he 
himself is stabbed. The other William Wilson was obviously a personification , 
of William Wilson's conscience. 
Artists and authors in particular have illustrated another phenomenon 
which could fit these variations of the Other. This phenomenon consists in 
(i) attributing 'real' existence to an artistic creation, for example -
a fiction.ii character, (ii) in recognising it (him) as part of the author's 
own self, and (iii) then relating to 'him' as if he was indeed a real 
person. The Greek novelist, poet and playwright, Nikos Kazantzakis, who wrote 
the 33333-verse epic ••odyssey - a modern sequel" (1938), spoke very 
'dramatically about his strong need to free Odysseus from his own 
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(Kazantzakis') self. It is not accidental that he rewrote the ''Odyssey'', 
the longest poem of the western world, seven times! For him, Odysseus 
was a real 'other' person stemming from himself and their relationship was 
very complicated. In his autobiography (Kazantzakis 1961) and letters 
(Helen Kazantzakis 1968) he writes how he wanted to follow Odysseus in 
his journeys and how he watched him with envy, admiration and repulsion. 
Kurt Vonnegut Jr, half-way through his book 11 The Breakfast of Champions" 
(1975) wants so much to relate directly to the characters in the novel 
that he himself enters the narrative in the dual role of both author 
and fictitious personality. 
At times the artist experiences his creativity as the work of an 'other' 
in himself. He perceives his conscious self who eats and sleeps as a person 
. 
sepaFate from the artist 'other' in himself. Whereas in the above examples, 
the artistic creation was seen as the Other, here, the source of artistic 
creativity is compared with the Other. The modern composer Karlheinz 
Stockhausen says: 
"first you must make music ( Something in me works it out ) 
and then the music changes you" (Cott 1974, p.46) , 
Amy Lowell writes about her poems: 
"I meet them where they touch consciousness and that is 
already a considerable distance along the road of (their) 
evolution" (1930, p.109). 
The great Argentinian author, Jorge Luis Borges, candidly begins his 
short story, entitled .ttBorges and I'', with this sentence: "Things 
happen to him, the other one, to Borges.'' A 1i ttle further he adds: 
"It would be an exaggeration to say that our relationship 
is a hostile one; I live, I go on living, so that Borges 
may continue his literature; and that literature justifies 
me." 
He ends this beautiful piece as follows: 
"I shall subsist in Borges, not in myself (assuming I am 
someone), and yet.I recognise myself less in his books 
than in many another, or than in the intricate flourishes 
played on a guitar. Years ago I tried to free myself from 't 
1' 
;it 
•!, 
,L 
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"him, and I went from the mythologies of the city 
suburbs to games with time and infinity, but now 
those games ·belong to Borges, and I will have to 
think up something else. Thus is my life a flight, 
and I lose everything, and everything belongs to 
oblivion, or to him. 
I don't know which one of the two of us is writing 
this page." (Borges 1972,p.171-172). 
This long quotation illustrates eloquently the complex relationship 
between the 'artist-self' and the 'everyday-life-self' • It illustrates 
the difficulty of distinguishing the ''me' from the 'other' • 
The discussion of instinct, role, personification of values, as well as 
the various aspects of the 'other' in artistic creativity aimed at providing 
a perspective to facilitate the understanding of the 'other' by juxtaposing 
it to familiar concepts and phenomena, thus contributing towards a denotation 
of the Other. Now, following the same approach, an identification of some 
underlying issues will be attempted in order to move closer toward a 
connotation of the Other. 
A vital observation emerges from the above discussion: the person is 
not always aware of the existence of the Other. There is a strong possibility 
that he will become aware of it once he experiences a conflict between a 
'me' and an 'other' • The separation between 'me' and 'other' becomes 
forcibly evident during such conflict. A conflict, after all, presupposes 
a separation; conflict, in a sense, is a painful separation. So, once a 
conflict is experienced, the other will show its face; it will definitely 
be felt. Now, is it possible that the Other may be 'dormant' and not be 
experienced? Or is it the mere act of experiencing the separation that 
creates the Other? In other words, could one say that if there is no 
experience of separation then there is only a 'me' and no 'Other' ? 
In which case the 'me' and the 'Other' must always exist in conflict? 
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These questions touch fundamental issues in Psychology - the unity of 
consciousness and the cohesion of the personality. Psychology has by and 
large now accepted at least two layers of the psyche: the conscious and the 
unconscious. The above questions could then be rephrased: is there any 
unconscious Other? Or is the very unconscious the only Other? Is it possible 
to have a conscious Other? If yes, a person would be aware of two 
'personalities' in himself. Is this then the pathological state of double 
or multiple personality? 
There is no reason to monopolize the Other for either the conscious or the 
unconscious. With respect to a previous example, (the 'peasant in me' , 'the 
intellectual in me' and the 'socialite in me' ) it is clear 
that the Other can be at least partially conscious. The person is aware of 
the occasional urges from a particular Other and he can identify 'him' be-
cause of the coherence of the demands and their circumstances. Whether 
this condition will lead to a pathological double, or even to a multiple 
personality, will depend on the strength of the central, coordinating 
agency, the Ego. It will depend on the degree of autonomy the Other will 
gain, or be allowed to gain by the Ego. Whereas the psychotic condition 
of multiple personality is relatively rare in our culture today, a similar 
1phenomenon attracts a great deal of attention: alienation. 
In Social Psychology alienation is usually understood as man's estrange-
ment from the others, from his social unit (e,-g. Seeman 1959). Artists 
and philosophers (following a celebrated lineage from Jean Jacques Rousseau -
''Social Contract''l762, via H.D. Thoreau -"Walden or life in the Woods" 1854) 
use the term alienation to refer to man's distance from nature (e.g. Read 
1967). Psychologists tend to see alienation as the estrangement of a 
person from one's own self. Erich Fromm's definition provides an apt 
example: 
"By alienation is meant a mode of experience in which the 
person experiences himself as an alien. He has become, one 
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"might say, estranged from himself .•• The 
alienated person is out of touch with himself as 
he is out of touch with any other person" (Fronnn 1955,p.74). 
In adopting such a definition of alienation we see that the Other is a 
constituent element of this phenomenon. We should also be reminded of the 
actual synonymity of the Other and Alien. 
There is an abundance of examples of alienation in literature and it is 
a difficult task to select the most appropriate one. It has now become 
fashionable for most artistic media to depict alienated characters in 
alienated environments. At least three studies on this topic, from the 
psychological point of view,should be mentioned: Professor Hallman's work 
on ''Psychology and Literature" (1961), Professor Sypher' s study "Loss 
of the Self in modern Literature and Art'' (1962), and Rene Girard' s 
''Deceit, desire, and the novel; Self and Other in Literary Structure" 
(1965). We must acknowledge Albert Camus' novel "L'etranger" (1942) 
as a milestone in literature and philosophy. A more recent example is 
I 
Robert M. Pirsig's exceptional novel-autobiography - philosophical treatise 
entitled "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenanceu (1974). This is an 
odyssey of a rehabilitated schizophrenic ex-college lecturer who painfully 
tries to piece his life and personality together. he gradually recalls 
his previous 'other' personality which led him to the mental hospital. 
He persistently traces his 'other' with alternating fear, fascination and 
calm purpose, until he finally succeeds in bridging the gap and achieving 
wholeness. 
The concept of alienation is helpful in this discussion because it can also 
indicate another underlying issue in the study of the Other: the role 
of the actual other person. Alienation is not only the inability to relate 
to one's own self, but also to others, the other people in the person's 
life. Estrangement from one's self, (dividing the self into a 'me' 
and 'other'), is followed by estrangement from other human beings. These 
two conditions are so closely related that there are theorists who argue 
that they cannot: be divorced, (e.g. Laing 1960, 1961; Ruesch an,d Bateson 
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1968). Perhaps the most prominent theorist of this approach is George 
Herbert Mead who in his "Mind, Self and Society" (1934) was the first to 
emphasize how the interaction with others represents the formative process 
of the self. Some interpersonal theorists argue that the intrapersonal 
alienation is a result of an interpersonal estrangement (e.g. Laing and 
Esterson 1964). 
TRANSITION 
ABOVE 
Ihe concept of the Other, although it is meaningful 1n many theories and 
many contexts, has no precise theory of its own. In this section an 
attempt will be made to provide the groundwork for such a theoria. 
1) In the brief linguistic analysis, the basic meanings of 
the Other were traced and a duality of meaning was discovered - The 
Other as unity and as division. 
2) Concepts and phenomena related to the Other were 
discussed in order to locate the Other in a broad perspective. Instinct, 
role, personification of values, artistic creation and source of creativity 
were examined. Illustrations from literature were cited to serve the 
following three functions: i) to vitalize the conceptual issues discussed 
by placing them in a human context, ii) to indicate that the issues 
concerning the Other are relevant and not at all unusual phenomena, and 
iii) to demonstrate the treatment of the Other in one sphere of human 
culture, viz., the Arts, thus anticipating its treatment in Philosophy and 
Psychology. 
3) Two fundamental issues were isolated by the above investigat-
ion. Those concerning a) the unity of consciousness, and b) alienation 
(interpersonal and intrapersonal). 
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BELOW 
The following historical introduction will concentrate primarily on-_ three 
theorists: Heraclitus, Plato and Hegel. Only those aspects of their 
writings th
1
at are relevant to a theory of the Other will be examined here. 
In so doing a second major focus of the present study will be elucidated, 
namely, the Dialectic. 
The choice of these three major thinkers requires some justification. 
It may well be asked why it is necessary to connnence this examination 
with a philosopher as remote in time as Heraclitus? In textbooks on the 
history of Philosophy, a line is usually drawn to indicate that Western 
Philosophy begins with Socrates and Plato (e.g. Russell 1961; Copleston 
1950). This demarcation can be rationalized in terms of the following 
three relevant points: 
1) Before Plato there was no separation of the various 
scientific disciplines. Philosophy, science, mathematics, poetry, 'ethics 
and religion were included in one and the same activity: the 'love of 
wisdom' (philo-sophia). 
2) Philosophical discourse as such connnences with Plato. The 
pre-Socratic period is characterized by 'mythical' thinking; self-
centred, undifferentiated from the wishes, needs and fears of the thinker 
and lacking logical and conceptual clarity. There was also no clear 
distinction between subjective and objective (Wheelwright 1959). 
3) The language itself is said to have been grannnatically and 
syntactically different from ours. Even Plato's language did not different-
iate between individuality and consciousness, ~and verb. Therefore it 
is of great value to observe how the problem of the Other was seen and 
treated in such an undifferentiated state of human thought. 
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Heraclitus belongs to the 'prelogical' , 'mythical' epoch of 
philosophy; in Plato we witness the first coherent theoretical steps. 
Heraclitus has been recently 'rediscovered' • Contemporary philosophers 
often cite Heraclitus' thought with a sense of precious discovery, 
particularly his views on change and becoming (e.g. Popper 1972). Jung, ' 
moreover, made frequent use of the Heraclitean principles of fire, water 
and the opposites. Plato's position is very crucial. He is the first 
philosopher at the threshold of the .,written tradition" which followed 
the ''oral tradition'- (Russo and Simon 1968). In Plato we register the 
actual turning point from 'prephilosophy' to philosophy. Hegel, twenty-
two centuries later, talces philosophical thought to a culminating peak and 
lays the foundations for the intellectual adventure of the 20th century. 
Hegel's positive relevance to contemporary philosophical and psychological 
endeavour has continually been re-emphasized (e.g. Findlay 1963, Kojeve 
1969, Steinkraus 1971, Macintyre 1972). Hegel also offers a sophisticated 
theory of the Other and the Dialectic. Before focusing on Jung's position, 
an excursion into Hegel's thought is imperative as he provided Jung's 
immediate intellectual background. 
/ 
PART ONE 
Chapter Two 
Heraclitus 
~vaL~ xpvn~to~aL ~L~£t 
(Nature loves to hide) 
Heraclitus 
Tr. Kahn (1979, p.33). 
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Heraclitus lived between the 6th and 5th centuries B.C. in the Ionic 
city of Ephesus. Wheelwright (1959) reminds us that about the same time 
Lao-tse in China and Zoroaster in Iran produced their remarkable works of 
wisdom and the Upanishads were written in India. Some early Greek 
commentators, experiencing difficulties in attempting to decipher 
Heraclitean ideas labelled him -'The Obscurei. and 'The Riddler' • These 
characterizations did not seem to surprise Jung who felt that Heraclitus 
had a very deep understanding of the psyche and his words were "not meant 
for grown-up children" but for those 11who have ears to hear" (1952,p .196). 
It appears that Heraclitus did not write any treatise as such. What 
survives today is a number of fragments, aphorisms which are considered 
to ha'\l'e been oral apophthegms rather than excerpts from any written 
discourse (Kirk and Raven 1971). Although Ephesus is very near to Miletus, 
the birthplace of Thales, and the centre of his school, there is no evid-
ence that Heraclitus ever belonged to the Milesian School - or any other 
for that matter. He was an independent eccentric who followed no master 
and left no disciples behin~ him. For a member of an aristocratic, some 
claim royal, family, he did not live an easy life. He appears to have led 
an unconventional existence which roused the suspicions and contempt of 
his contemporaries. Even the circumstances of his death are obscure and 
bizarre. lt is said that he died having been buried in either sand or 
dung (Kirk 1954). 
Heraclitus' basic contributions to philosophy are his doctrines on change, 
and oppqsites. These are based on the crucial concepts of fire and logos. 
A formulation of an Heraclitean theory of the Other, based upon an examinat-
ion of these pivotal notions, is developed below. 
Professor Ferrier regards the work of Heraclitus as a special milestone. 
Philosophy before Heraclitus, according to Ferrier, could be described as 
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a 1'philosophy of Being'1 ; with Heraclitus, a "philosophy of Becoming'' 
is launched (Grant and Lushington 1881, p.110). The prevailing problem 
in philosophy at the time was to find an adequate "first principle", 
(arche), an element, indeed, the constituent element upon which the 
universe is based. Heraclitus rejected the "static description of the 
universe" (Frankfort and Frankfort 1946, p.256) and instead adopted a 
dynamic understanding derived from a principle of constant change, 
eternal flux; in his -words: 
Fragment 1. "Everything flows and nothing abides; everything gives way 
and nothing stays fixed" (Wheelwright 1959, p.29). 
Fr. 2. "All things are in process and nothing stays still, 
and likening existing things to the stream of a river · 
• • • you would not step twice into the same river" 
(Kitk and Raven 1971, p .197). 
Fr. 3. "Sun is new each day" (Kirk and Raven 1971, p.202). 
Sir Karl Popper also sees the problem of change as the central problem 
in Heraclitus' philosophy: 
"How is change possible? How can a thing change without 
lo~ ing its identity - in which case it would be no 
longer that thing which has changed1'·(Popper 1972, p.159). 
Popper formulates the solution presented by Heraclitus as follows: 
"There are no unchanging things; what appears to ·us 
as a thing is a process. In reality a material thing 
is like a flame; for a flame seems to be a material thing, 
but it is not; it is a process; it is in flux; matter 
passes through-it; it is like a river" (Popper 1972, p.159). 
The illustration of the flame was not, of ,course, introduced by Popper; 
Heraclitus himself spoke of the Fire as the basic principle. Traditional 
textbooks of Philosophy often treat Heraclitus' principle of Fire in the 
same manner as the "primary substance" of the other presocratic philosophers 
(e.g.Russell 1961).Thales considered water to be such a substance,Anaximenes 
advocated that it was air, etc. Such treatment is erroneous as it fails 
to observe a vital difference between Heraclitus and the other Ionians. 
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The Heraclitean Fire represented a dyrtamic principle of the world and 
it was not a static element, the constituent and ;single material' the 
'world was ultimately derived from' (Kirk 1974, p.297). Heraclitus did 
not argue that the world ultimately consisted of fire, as Thales said of 
water. According to Heraclitus the world is in a constant dynamic change, 
flux, and Fire was both the agent and symbol of this change. Some of 
his relevant fragments read: 
Fr. 4. "Thunderbolt steers all things that it directs; 
thunderbolt ••• means the eternal fire; ••• this fire is 
sagacious and cause of the management of the universe" 
(Kirk 1954, p.349). 
Fr. 5. "All things are an equal exchange for tire and 
fire for all things" (Kirk 1954, p.345). 
Fr. 6. "This (world-) order ••• is and shall be: an 
everliving fire, kindling in measures and going out 
in measuresi• (Kirk 1954, p. 307). 
lt seems very likely that the language of the time permitted Heraclitus 
to use the word fire metaphorically, symbolically and literally. Kirk 
and Raven, stressing the aspect of Fire as an agent, call it an 
"archetypal substance" (1971, p. 433). Helm develops an original interpret-
ation claiming that what Heraclitus meant by fire was nothing but the 
"hearth-fire" which was invoked at all ceremonies of family transitions 
(e.g. births, weddings, deaths), explaining that: 
"the private religion. of the aristocratic household 
centers around the hearth" (Helm 1964, p.565). 
This view was criticised by Constance Smith (1966) who saw fire as the 
symbol for the "eternal ordering principle'' (p .125) of the eternal flux. 
Heraclitus, according to her, did not draw this symbol from the household 
hearth, which is associated with the "rites of normal human passage'' (p.127), 
but from his own terrifying personal experiences during the political 
upheaval of his time. 
"Out of the suffering of social experience was born the 
idea of the transitoriness of all things" (Smith 1966, p.126). 
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Bertrand Russell, who interprets the Heraclitean Fire literally as the 
''fundamerttal substance", not surprisingly considers Heraclitus as a 
t•mystic, but of a particular kind'' (1961, p.59). Nevertheless, h~ correctly 
remarks that Heraclitus' preoccupation with fire anticipated the mediaeval 
alchemists. Indeed, these similarities did not escape Jung's attention in 
his extensive studies of alchemy and he duly acknowledges Heraclitus 
throughout his writings (e.g.19'i~,p.120·;1954,p.310). Moreover, Jung, 
en passant, cites Heraclitus as one of the forerunners of synchronistic 
thought (195·2b~p. 485; 1957 ,p. 57). 
Shibles interprets Heraclitean Fire exclusively in a symbolic way, as a 
''Delphic-like sign for the underlying reality" representing a''dynamic 
strife" (1971, p. 42). Kirk, finally, distinguishes three kinds of 
applications of Fire in Heraclitus: 
1). "The world-order as a whole", 
2) "The unextinguished fire in cosmological changes", and 
3) "the motive and directive of fire" (1954,p.365). 
Thus Fire seems to suggest: 
a) a principle of constant change, and 
b) a transforming agent. 
This principle implies an underlying 'plan' or 'pattern' without which 
perpetual flux would amount to unbearable chaos. And certainly for the 
Greeks and Heraclitus the world, the universe, 'cosmos' (the word includes 
also people) was not chaotic. On the contrary, the Greek word 'cosmos' 
strongly implies an order, even adornment (as implied by the English 
word 'cosmetic''). Heraclitus had another almost synonymous term for this 
cosmic order, the fateful term, in our civilization, logos, with all its 
multiplicity of modern connotations. He was in fact the first who introduced 
it to philosophy. He made explicit connections between Fire and logos: 
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Fr. 7. " ... Fire, by the Logos and God which arranges 
all things, is turned by way of air into moisture, the 
moisture which acts as seed of the world-forming 
process". (Kirk 1954,p. 325). 
Here again, there is controversy as to whether logos should be literally 
or metaphorically understood. Burnett argues that Heraclitus' logos is 
simply his own word, his own discourse (1952). It seems that this would 
be a very narrow interpretation, especially if one seriously considers 
the following fragment: 
Fr. 8. "Listening not to me but to the Logos it is wise 
to agree that all things are one" (Kirk 1954, p.65). 
For Minar, logos is the "true account", the "meaning of things'' (19 39, 
p.341). Frankfort and Frankfort (1946) as well as kirk (1954) see in· 
logos the crucial element in the Heraclitean philosophy because with the 
concept of logos he introduced a new chapter into philosophy: 
"here for the first time, attention is centred not 
on the thing known, but on the knowing of it" 
(Frankfort and Frankfort 1946,p.255). 
Human thought added to its material preoccupation a genuine philosophical 
concern. The introduction of logos could also be seen as a marriage of a 
physical principle (Fire) with a human one (Logos). Truly, Fire and Logos 
do not have such clear boundaries for Heraclitus, although they originally 
stem from these two different realms. Human beings, by attaining wisdom 
(logos), become part of the cosmic principle. In the following fragment 
(with which T.S. Eliot very aptly introduces his 'Four Quartets', 1944), 
the above thesis becomes evident: 
Fr. 9. "But although the logos is common the many 
live as though they had a private understanding. 
This is nothing other than an explanation of the 
way in which the universe is ruled. Therefore in 
so far as we share in awareness of this, we speak 
the truth, but in so far as we remain independent 
of it, we lie" (Kirk 1954, p.57). 
I 
I. 
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The individual, therefore, has to ~tune into' logos otherwise he will 
develop an individual or 'idiotic' (=private) opinion. (Idiotes, which 
in Greek means a person with a private understanding, is the primary 
connotation of the word 'idiot'). Logos is "common'1 and thus people can 
only communicate through this collective, universal 'structure' • Another 
characteristic Greek word for an individual who does not partake in the 
common logos is barbaros (=barbarian) - the person whose language consists 
of a repetitive 'bar-bar-bar ••• ' • Sharing the common logos is, in a 
sense, an act of some measure of self-abandonment. An. idiot or a barbarian 
is basically self-centred, and this 'autistic' preoccupation with one·' s own 
self brings about a feeling of arrogance, hybris. Heraclitus gave an early 
warning concerning the destructive consequences of hybris: 
Fr.10. "One should quench arrogance (hybris) rather then 
conflagration" (Sambursky 1963, p. 229). 
Later, the great Greek dramatists Euripides, Sop~ocles and Aeschylus used 
the theme of hybris and its catastrophic results as one of their funda-
mentalleitmotives. Edinger (1973) stresses the relevance of this concept, 
and relates it to the Jungian process of inflation. 
In short, Fire was the symbol of change and Logos the ordering principle 
underlying change. How was change possible in the first instance and what 
were the dynamics of this ordering principle? The following fragments from 
the Heraclitean discourse will serve as basic references and will thus · 
introduce the discussion on the principle of opposites. In this discussion 
an attempt will be made to answer the above questions. 
Fr.11. "War is father of all and king of all" 
(Kirk 1954, p.245). 
Fr.12. "It should be understood that war is the 
common condition, that strife is justice, and 
that all things come to pass through the compuls-
ion of strife'' (Wheelwright 1959, p.29). 
• 
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Fr.13. "And the same thing there exists in us living 
and dead and the waking and the sleeping and young and. 
old: for these having changed round are those, and 
those having changed round are these" (Kirk 1954,p.135). 
Fr. 14. "Of the logos which is as I des.cribe it men 
always prove to be. uncomprehending, both before they 
have heard it and when once they have heard it. For 
although all things happen according to their logos 
men are like people of no experience, even when they 
experience such words and deeds as I explain, when I 
distinguish each thing according to its constitution 
and declare how it is - but the rest of men fail to 
notice what they do after they wake up just as they 
forget what they do when asleep" (Kirk and Raven 19 71, 
p.187). 
Fr. 15. "Things that are cut in opposite directions 
fit together. The fairest harmony is born of things 
different, and discord is what produces all things ••• 
Let us unite wholes and not-wholes, convergence and 
divergence, harmony and discord of voices" (Stokes 
1958, p. 78). 
Constant strife is the driving force of change. Change is a result 
of the Hcompulsion of strife11 (Fr.12). War or strife are the fundamental 
principles. But both tertnS presuppose tw_o conHict_ing sides. In the 
process of change opposing positions change place (Fr. 13). Opposite 
states, such as sleep and waking, may produce fragmentation. What is 
necessary is awareness of the continuity underlying the apparent diverse 
states in the process of flux. 
We may now consider Popper's position outlined above, and 
conclude that the question of a,ppearance and reality with regard to things 
may be reformulated with reference to persons. The law of change renders 
~ impossible any adequate description of being, as a static entity,as the 
clash between opposite states is an inherent condition in the process of 
change. T~us, continuity must be taken into account. The reality lies in 
the 'becomingi rather than'. in the 'being' . The becoming unites all opposites 
occurring in the continuum of change, such as the transition between 
sleep and waking state (Fr.14). Therefore, Ferrier' s emphasis on Becoming 
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as ultimately representing the'most substantial contribution of 
Heraclitus can now be evaluated as a very appropri~te remark. 
' . Coples ton echoes this by stressing that Heraclitus' original contri-
bution to philosophy was: 
"• •• the conception of unity in diversity, difference 
in unity ••• " (1950,p.40). 
For him the conflict of opposites, so far from being a blot on the unity 
of the One (logos) is essential to the being of the One. In fact, the 
One only exists in the tension of opposites:" this tension is essential 
to the unity of the One" (1950, p.40). Emlyn-Jones (1976) qualifies this 
claim by noting that Heraclitus himself was not fully conscious of the 
connection between his theory of unity of opposites and his general 
cosmological ideas. 
Kirk concludes that Heraclitus developed: 
il ••• a systematic interpretation of the world that had 
many of the elements of philosophy ... it only lacked 
systematic logic to be philosophical" (1974,p.301). 
This might be so. lt might also be true that his work still belongs to 
'mythical' thought and that his 'style' and content seem obscure. 
The way Heraclitus characterised the language of the Delphic oracle 
may aptly be used to describe his own language: 
Fr.16. "It neither speaks out nor conceals but gives 
a sign" (Kirk and Raven 1971, p. 211). 
It is, nevertheless, evident that even this brief account of his theories 
makes possible an understanding of the Other. Man, as a member of cosmos 
is also in flux and perpetual change. His relationships to the physical 
and social environment continuously undergo changes. But at the same time, 
a similar process takes place within himself since his relationship to his 
own self also continuously changes. Heraclitus was clear that there is no 
such thing as a static being. Instead, it is a process of becoming -
becoming something other than what already is.The process of becoming 
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is a perpetual movement towards an otherness: an unending renewal of 
the being by the Other. Heraclitus' principle of change is in the main 
understood as: 
" ••• a passage from some quality to its opposite" 
(Wheelwright 1959, p.32). 
Fr.17. "Cool things become warm, the warm grows 
cool - the moist dries, the parched becomes 
moist" (Wheelwright 1959, p.29). 
Thus under a sharper focus. the process of becoming should look as a 
perpetual interchange between being and its opposite other. 
"Heraclitus' world is of adjustment, and of a kind 
which is not only compatible with contrariety, but 
can only exist through the latter: and since it is 
all in change the contrariety it exhibits is that 
of changes proceeding in opposite directions" 
(Vlastos 1955,p.350). 
In Fr.15, we read " ••• The fairest harmony is born of things different •• " 
(vide p. 35). !£we do not unite the opposites we shall be unable to 
grasp the continuity between opposite states, as in the case of sleep 
and waking. (cf. Fr.14). This unity can be brought by accepting the 
process of change - otherwise an uncomfortable 'fixation' on a static 
point may result. 
Fr.18. "It is weariness to keep toiling at the 
same things so that one becomes ruled by them" 
(Wheelwright 1959, p.83) 
Fr. 19. "Even the sacred barley drink separates 
when it is not stirred'.' (Wheelwright 1959, p.58). 
Thus an inability to follow change, a 'fixation' to a static state might· 
lead to a condition where the otherwhich is in an immediate opposition. 
to the 'me', takes over and establishes 'himself' as an absolute ·'ruler' 
over the 'me''. But the moment we accept that both 'me' and 'other' are 
transitory and become reconciled to the inevitability of change, we 
facilitate the process of change and become part of it - we then acquire 
(their) logos. Unless an individual is established in the Logos of the 
phenomena of his irmnediate experience and thus gradually the Logos of 
the Universe, he will remain within what Heraclitus described as a 
- 38 -
loathesome understanding and which he termed private ('idiotic'). 
Nor:mal: everyday awareness is not sufficient. That precisely constitutes 
the private and not'connnon understanding. (cf. Fr. 8 and Fr. 9). Professor 
Vlastos makes this distinction clear: 
" ••• the 'common' is not the connnon run, nor the 
individual the 'private' ; what is 'common for all' 
is not what all, or almost all~ happen to think, 
but what all should think, and would, if they had 
sense" (Vlastos 1955, p.347). 
How then is man to acquire the wisdom of Logos? How is he to relate to 
the cosmic Other? Heraclitus replies: 
Fr.20. 0 If one does not expect the unexpected one 
will not find it out" (Kirk and Raven 1971, p.195). 
Normal everyday consciousness will not lead to the Other, Logos 
(cf. Fr.14). We can now understand how Heraclitus' teachings must have 
irritated the wealthy merchants of Ephesus, thus making him an outcast. 
Private understanding is wrong, as is the consensus ("·the common run") -
the way out is waiting for the unexpected. "Unexpected" in the sense that 
if it were expected then it would be a product of the existing 'private' 
consciousness. It seems that T.S. Eliot was alluding to the same paradox 
with the following verses from East Coker (1944): 
"I said to my soul, be still, and wait without hope. 
For hope will be for the wrong thing." 
The basic issue here is to find a way to become attuned to the Other, 
true, cosmic awareness in which change is accepted and accounted for ahd 
the opposites do not exist in their individual fragmentary positions. 
To achieve this one has to realise the necessity of conflict and its 
illusory transient character: 
Fr. 21. "To god all things are beautiful and good and 
just, but men have supposed some things to be unjust, 
others juse• (Kirk 1954, p.180). 
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By working through the polarities one comes to the realisation of their 
inner connectedness: 
Fr. 22. "They do not apprehend how being at variance 
agrees with itself: there is a back-stretched 
connection, as in the bow and the lyre" (Kirk 1954, 
p.203). 
Therefore, if one is in a positive position he will tend to view the . 
negative position as an opposite, but in fact that is the Other of this 
first position. By grasping their unity in the rhythm of change he will 
develop their logos, he will be entrenched in their logos which in turn 
is the Other of his previous mode of being, the fragmented one. 
Two kinds of Other may now be distinguished: an 'internal Other', a 
product of the division of human consciousness into opposites and another 
Other, referring to the general principle of the universe, which could 
be termed the 'external Other' as it is (or could be) common to all. 
The 'internal Other' is the opposition to the 'me' , the other being 
which in the chain of becoming and change~takes the place of the given 
being. If a person perceives this as Eermanent opposite, he has not yet 
acquired the logos behind it, and his understanding is private. The 
'external Other' , on the other hand, is the ~ _!ligher state of being 
achieved once the person moves from a private understanding to logos, 
the 'connnon' understanding which is wisdom and accounts for the chang.es 
and tmion of opposites. 
The internal Other could be seen as an illusory Other as it is a transitory 
state. The 'external' Other is the only reality, true existence. 
But: 
Fr.23."Wisdom consists in speaking and acting the truth, 
giving heed to the nature of things" (Wheelwright 1959, 
p.19). 
Fr.24. "The real constitution of things is accustomed 
to hide itself" (Kirk and Raven 1971, p.193). 
·• 
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Therefore, as the "common run" understanding amounts to a 'private' 
understanding, and as the real nature of things is hidden, the way to 
reach this Other, 'real' state is through one's own self: by unifying 
and overcoming the opposites in one's own existence and seei_ng the endless 
line of changes in becoming. Heraclitus could afford to speak about this 
Other because, as he admitted: 
Fr.25. "I have searched myself" (Wheelwright 1959, p.19) 
This was not an arrogant statement. •Arrogance (hybris) is an insistence 
on and boasting of the mistaken truth of private understanding. The 
distinction might not be visible to a person who has not attained 
the 'external' other. That is why, again, Heraclitus was an unpopular 
figure and later was called "Obscure" and "Riddler". His language, 
as Jung noted (vi de supra p. 29 ) , was comprehensible only to people who 
had surpassed private understanding. / 
The above discussion has shown that what we termed 'external' Other is, 
irt fact, the inner core, the 'real' nature of everything in the universe, 
including, of course, the person who realises this. Thus, after closer 
examination it becomes evident that what seems at the beginning to be 
external, is, in fact, the true inner Other as opposed to the illusory, 
transitory other. That is why Heraclitus' language is full of riddles. 
To speak in the_language of 'private' understanding about the 'common' 
logos amounts to a paradox. That is why Heraclitus,the Riddler,spoke the 
language of the Other! 
/ 
PART ONE 
Chapter Three 
Plato 
"'l'he safest general characterisation of the 
European philosophical tradition is that it 
consists of a series of footnotes to Plato"! 
Alfred North Whitehead (1929; p.63) . 
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Whitehead's famous saying might be exaggerated; nevertheless it contains 
a truth with which very few philosophers would disagree - that Plato was 
the first to formulate and ask most questions concerning the nature of 
man which are still central to western thought. Plato's stature, both 
physical and intellectual, led to the erroneous speculation that the name 
Plato, which in Greek means broad, was actually a nickname (Notopouios 
1939). Indeed, the breadth of his genius embarrasses modern academic 
attempts to classify him. Plato considered himself a philospher but 
according to our modern categories of disciplines, he was also very much 
a psychologist, a theologian, an historian, a poet, a dramatist, a natural 
scientist and a politician. Armstrong thus justificably considers him as: 
"the philosopher of beginnings, the source and originator" 
(1965, p.33) 
Plato's life is significant for the history of philosophy for two particular 
events: his association with Socrates and the establishment of Academy. 
Plato (427 - 347 B.C.) was born at the end of Pericles' Golden Age into an 
aristocratic Athenian family who were descendants of Solon, the famous 
statesman and reformer. he became a pupil of Socrates in his early 
twenties, at a time when the great master was in his sixties. After the 
trial and execution of Socrates, Plato left Athens to avoid any harrassment. 
Later he travelled twice to Sicily to advise first King Dionysius and then 
his son Dionysius II who succeeded him. These visits were not successful. 
In one of them he was even sold as a slave, and friends had to buy his 
I 
i 
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freedom. On his return to Athens, he established a school of his own in the 
orchards of a rich Athenian called Academus, the famous Academy. 
Academy was perhaps the first university. Gymnastics were taught together 
with dialectic and mathematics, poetry together with rhetoric and astronomy. 
Among the prominent pupils of Academy was Aristotle who studied there for 
twenty years before establishing his own achoo!, the Lyceum, after his 
Master's death. Plato, besides doing Philosophy by being with his pupils, 
performed other duties, such as writing the Dialogues! Fisher (1966) 
convincingly argues that Plato's main activity was being a philosopher; 
writing was a peripheral task similar to ''sitting in committees'1 for 
modern academics! The significance of this distinction will be discussed 
later (vi de p. 70 ) • 
In reading Plato, the student is faced with three principal difficulties: 
1) How to distinguish between Plato's own views and the teachings of 
Socrates. 
2) How to account for the development of the Platonic thought. · 
3) How to extract a clear theory from a Dialogue, written in a dramatic 
form. 
1) Approximately two-thirds of the surviving Platonic Dialogues are centred 
around Socrates. They are in the form of records, of Socrates' own dialogues 
which he allegedly held with his own pupils and other prominent men. _In a 
sense, then, these Dialogues could be seen as Socratic and not Platonic, 
i.e., expounding the doctrines of Socrates and not those of Plato. 
Following this view Plato would appear as only an industrious pupil who 
patiently and faithfully minuted his Master's teachings. Such an understand-
ing of the role of Plato would, of course, be erroneous. We cannot be 
certain whether those dialogues actually took place at all, although most 
..,.1'-
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of the characters in them are identifiable as contemporary figures in 
Greek life. Thus, all Platonic scholars accept that the Dialogues represent 
Plato's device to express his own philosophy. Naturally, his ideas were 
strongly influenced by Socrates. It'is, however, inevitable that Plato 
would indeed at times have recorded Socrates' own teachings. Therefore, 
lacking any other records of Plato's own lectures at the Academy and/or 
other dialogues, the Platonic Dialogues are considered by all commentators 
as Plato's philosophical corpus. A certain development of thought can be 
traced throughout the Dialogues, culminating in a period which definitely 
transcends the Socratic teachings. 
2) There is no cortsensus among classicists as to the exact chronological 
order or grouping of the Dialogues. The controversy extends to include 
even the question of authenticity of some of them, but there is general 
acceptance that Plato is indeed the author of twenty-seven Dialogues, 
although six were written by others. The authorship' of another six Dialogues , 
is disputed. In this study only the undisputed Platonic Dialogues will 
be used. Nevertheless, the student who wishes to trace Plato's theory on 
a particular topic will not find this an easy task. Like the children's 
game with letters, Plato's philosophy changes depending on the order in 
which the Dialogues are arranged. 
3) Perhaps the greatest difficulty the modern reader - accustomed to 
explicitly formulated textbooks - faces in approaching Plato, is how to 
extract a philosophical theory out of a written dialogue. Plato never 
' 
appears as a character in any of his Dialogues, and thus his doctrines 
are interwoven in the subtleties of dramatic interaction. The reader 
must be constantly alert: is an author's message one of despair if he 
writes about a character in despair? ls the literary text in 'isomorphic' 
(to use an early Gestalt term) relationship to the personality of its 
creator? 
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Plato's Philosophy encompasses such a vast field that it is not possible 
to sketch its total scope as was done in the case of Heraclitus, before 
proceeding to formulate a Platonic theory of the Other. Here, it will 
be necessary to be selective from the very beginning, and therefore 
only these highly pertinent Platonic theories are considered: 
A) The theory of Ideas or Forms, B) The structure of the Psyche, and 
C) The Dialectic. These are perhaps the central themes of Platonic 
thought. The first two will be considered as Plato's attempt to articulate 
his underst~nding of the Other, and the third, the Dialectic, as the 
crucial process of realizing and coming to terms with the Other. 
A) The Forms. 
Plato 1 s term '' ideai 11 is usually translated in English as 'ideas'·. Some eminent 
classicists, such as Jowett (1892),Robinson(l941),and Guthrie(l967), 
have followed this tradition .. Guthrie maintains that there is an apt 
similarity between 11 ideai" and 'ideas' in that they both refer to a 
"conunon ground of meaning'' as in the sentence "we have an 'idea' of 
goodness or equality" (1967, p.89). Modern Platonic commentators, on the 
other hand, have argued a good case for substituting ''Forms"for -"Ideas". 
as the proper translation of ''ideai''. In English 'idea' refers mainly to 
something personal, a private product. In the Concise Oxford Dictionary 
we read: 
"Idea = Notion conceived by the mind, way of thinking, vague 
belief, fancy" (Fowler and Fowler 1964, p. 601). 
Such meaning is certainly contrary to Plato's understanding of the word 
(Armstrong 1965, p. 37; Lee 1955, p. 234n). For Plato 11 ideai 11 had an existence 
of their own, independent of things and people. Of special interest is the 
connection between Forms and archetypes. Wild, referring to Jung's 
concept of the archetype, explains an early Socratic understanding of the 
t 
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Forms as follows: 
"The forms are models or archetypes which exist somewhere 
in nature by themselves" (1946, p.214). 
The first meaning of the word Idea is given by the Concise Oxford 
Dictionary as 'Archetype, pattern'. Bozonis (1974), in stressing the 
relevance of Platonic philosophy to modern thought, equates the Forms 
with the Jungian archetypes. Jung, an able classicist himself, makes 
extensive reference to Plato throughout his writings. However, Jolande 
Jacobi, in a much quoted passage, finds that Forms and Archetypes do not 
have the same meaning, although they have certain similarities (1968,p.42). 
This question will be examined in detail in Part Three. 
Plato arrived at this theory of Forms by means of three contributing 
factors: 1) the legacy of the Heraclitean theory of eternal· flux, 
2) his reaction to the, Sophists, and 3) his sharp attack on con temporary 
artists and poets. These seemingly unrelated reasons may be moulded into 
a coherent argument. 
1) There is no doubt that we constantly observe changes in the world 
around us as well as in our own selves. But if everything remains in 
perpetual change then knowledge is impossible (Cornford 1960). This 
question troubled Plato. He was eager to find some 'Archemeidian point' 
outside of, beyond the flux; a constant which might be used as a measure 
of knowledge. The cosmogonies of pre-Socratic philosophers, expressed in a 
vague 'illogical' manner, contributed very little towards such an answer. 
Indeed Heraclitus spoke of an ordering principle, Logos, but this was far 
from a concise logical theory, and needed further elaboration. Guthrie 
interprets Plato's solution: 
" •.• whatever of quasiexis tence our changing world 
possesses; it owes to an imperfect participation in 
the full and perfect existence of the other" (Guthrie 
1967, p.90). 
this 'other' world was nothing else but the world of Forms(cf. Irwin 1977). 
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2) Sophists, the villains in the Platonic Dialogues, constituted a very 
peculiar establishment in ancient Greece. They were wandering teachers 
w~o taught, at a good fee, an assortment of skills necessary for a citizen 
to survive and succeed in the Greek 'polis' (city-state). Their main 
concern was the practical applicability of their teachings. General 
ethical issues were of no concern to them. Their speciality was Rhetoric and 
they would instruct a pupil how to argue from any point of view and win. 
Plato's great Master, Socrates, was particularly distressed by this 
phenomenon, and his entire philosophy could be seen as a reaction to the 
destructive relativism of sophistry. Hegel goes so far as to describe 
him as "The Inventor of Moralityw, explaining that Socrates objected to a 
''customary morality" by advocating that: 
"the moral man is not he who merely wills and does that 
which is right but he who has the consciousness of what 
he is doing" (Hegel 1872, p. 281). 
Socrates' main themes were self-examination and self-knowledge along 
with an unshakable committment to moral principles. Plato inherited his 
teacher's concern for firm moral values which would not change according 
to the . expe_dient needs of people but would stand by themselves outside of 
any utilitarian grasp. For both Socrates and Plato, philosophy was not an 
abstract activity, but closely interlinked with action. The lovers of 
wisdom and truth (philosophers) had to live in truth in their everyday 
circumstances (Versfeld 1972). Thus the Forms would provide the foundat-
ions of morality; being unchangable and absolute, they would provide 
points of reference upon which people might fashion their lives. 
' 3) Plato had a similar regard for artists and sophists; he regarded them 
as masters of illusion. Art, for him, was essentially 'mimesis' (imitation) 
of something noble and eternal, of Beauty and Good. If an artist was not 
in touch with the reality he was supposed to imitate, his artistic 
creation would, according to Plato, be false: 
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" for if he does not know what is the character 
and meaning of the (artistic) piece, and what it 
represents, he will never discern whether the intent-
ion is true or false" (Laws 11668, trans. Jowett). 
Moreover, the artist: 
".. • if he really knew about the things he 
represented, he would devote himself to them and 
not to their representations" (Republic 599, tr. Lee). 
Therefore, Plato had no respect for artists and poets and he banished 
them from the ideal Republic he devised. At best, they represented reality 
removed three times from itself, as in the example of the bed (Republic 
597-599). There, the artist painting a bed is seen as imitating the bed 
which was built by a carpenter, who in his own turn imitated the Form 
of the bed. The Form of bed was created by God. Thus, artists and poets 
deal with "shadows and not realities 11 and their products are "representat-
ions at the third remove from reality" (Republic 598,599, tr. Lee). 
These three points show that Plato was very keen to grasp the immutable 
essences or absolutes which are immune to the relativism of 1) change 
(Heraclitus), 2) knowledge and morals (Sophists), and 3) diverse 
representations (artists and poets). In each case, he was dissatisfied 
with the insta~lity of relativism. It is,of course, a rather thorny 
argument whether Plato arrived at the theory of Forms through his 
attitude towards the sophists, poets and artists or whether his actual 
theory of Forms was responsible for his negative feelings towards them. 
The above enumerated illustrate his aversion towards any form of relativism, 
but furthermore, there is clear evidence that he disliked sophists and 
artists: sophists, following Socrates' well known rejection of them, and 
artists because a) of their specific political involvement at the time, 
and b) his conviction that the Arts were in a great decline during his 
life (Jowett 1892, vol.3, pp.clvii-clxv, Moutsopoulos 1974, pp.15-16). 
All phenomena and objects in the world of our sensory perception are in 
flux; are in a process of constant becoming. But Plato saw another world, 
I 
, I 
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the world of being, the world of Forms, which are universal objective 
entities. They are not simply elusive states in our minds and are not 
subjective in character. They have existence beyond the perceptible. 
Plato has Socrates explain: 
"Parmenides Tell me now, was this your distinction 
between forms in themselves and the things which 
partake of them ••. ? and do you think that there is 
an idea of likeness apart from the likeness which 
we possess, ~nd of the one and many, and of the 
other things.which Zeno mentioned? 
I think that there are such forms, said Socrates. 
Parmedides proceeded: And would you also make 
absolute forms of the just and the beautiful and 
the good, and of all that class? 
Yes, he said, I should." (Parmedides 130,tr. Jowett) 
Thus Plato rejected Protagoras' "man is the measure of all things" 
(Theaetetus 152). Verbal ability could not determine the truth. Words 
could not be manipulated to suit the speaker. They are not empty shells. 
Words are images, imitations, eikonai of the things named (Cratylus 439A) 
and ·these things behind the facade of the words would naturally be immune 
to the flux of the world (439D-E). Similarly, A.N. Whitehead argued that: 
11 the very purpose of Philosophy [ii/ to delve 
below the apparent clarity of connnon speech" (1942,p.257). 
Forms are the real essences of things and it is the,philosopher's task 
to seek their nature. Copleston attributes two characteristics to Forms: 
Immanent and transcendent.A Form is: 
" ••• innnanent for phenomena embody it, 'copy' it, 
partake in it, manifest it, in their varying degrees; 
but it is also transrendent, for it is said to transcend 
even being itself .•• Absolute Beauty, for instance, 
does not exist outside us in the sense in which a 
flower exists outside us .•. on the other hand, it 
cannot be said to be inside us in the sense that it 
is purely subjective, is confined to us, comes into 
being with us, and perishes through our agency or 
with us" (Copleston 1950, pp.174-175). 
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Stevenson distinguishes four aspects of the Forms: i) logical, 
ii) metaphysical, iii) epistemological, and iv) moral (1974,pp.24-26). 
i) The logical aspect is the account of the Forms as "general words'', 
the "problem of universals" - the Form of Good as a "general word'' which 
refers to all particular things which are "good"· 
ii) The metaphysical aspect regards Forms as "more real than material 
things for they do not change and decay'' (p.24). 
iii) Epistemologically, true knowledge is considered as knowledge of 
Forms only. 
iv) The moral aspect deals with the Form as "objective moral standards" 
(p. 25). 
To these four, the artistic aspect should also be added. As was shown 
above, Plato saw the Forms as the "real essences" which the Arts attempt 
to imitate. Thus the artistic image should represent the Form as closely 
as possible. 
There is controversy concerning the multiplicity of forms implicit in 
Plato's philosophy~ For example 
., the just, beautiful and good par-
took of the Forms of Just, Beautiful and Good, b~t a little further, in 
the same Dialogue, Socrates was uncertain as to whether there were Forms 
of mud, hair and dirt. Stenzel (1940) observes a transition in Plato's 
thought concerning this question. At the beginning, Stenzel claims, 
Plato accepted only positive Forms, moral and aesthetic; later he had 
to admit Forms for all class-concepts. This claim is very firmly 
grounded. The first Forms to be mentioned by Plato were those of Virtue, 
Beauty and Good. These come almost directly from Socrates' own teaching. 
As was mentioned above, Plato's early work is focused chiefly on his 
Master's moral Philosophy. The main concern was that of a virtuous life. 
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~hilosophy, Ethics and life were closely linked. Stenzel's 'discovery', 
in a sense, pinpoints the beginnings of the differentiations between 
various disciplines. Plato was forced to change his theory of Forms 
and to include all concepts. This was necessitated by logical thinking 
I 
and argumentation. Moreover, Stenzel maintains that Plato was unaware 
of this change in his theories; so smooth and inevitable was the develop-
ment from a singular Form to a multiplicity of Forms. This led to a 
detailed study of the various Forms and their inter-relationships, thus 
laying the foundations of separate disciplines like Ethics, Philosophy, 
Religion, Physics, etc. 
The pertinent question for this study is, naturally, whether there was 
any Form of man? Did Plato suggest any Ideal Man whose paler or brighter 
imitations would be the ordinary people in this life? Does man have in 
himself a greater or lesser 'portion' of an Ideal Man? Before taking up 
this difficult question we might consider Robinson's summary of Plato's 
position and follow his lead: 
"Plato's whole theoretical philosophy is largely a 
condenmation of images and a struggle to get away 
from them. Man, he holds, has the misfortune to be so 
circumstanced that he inevitably begins life by 
taking shams for realities. The world revealed by 
the senses, which engross all of us at first, is 
only a half real image of the true being; and 
wisdom lies in the progressive subs ti tu ti on of 
the pure for the adulterated, looking forward to 
the day when 'we shall know through ourselves 
all that is pure'(Phaedo 67)" (Robinson 1941, pp.232-233). 
The sentence from the Phaedo implies that man is capable of knowing 
the pure, the Forms, and the method indicated is to know one's self. 
This was precisely Socrates' message: The Delphic "Know thyself''· As 
Hegel remarked (vide supra P27 )the "real" morality (as opposed to 
''customary• morality) was, for Socrates, based on self-knowledge. 
Should then the ''know thyself If be rephrased as 'know thy Form'? 
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The implicit duality in 'self-knowledge' has long been observed and 
stressed by philosophers. The duality consists of one self, to be known,~ 
and an-other self, to arrive at that knowledge. Professor Ballard, in 
his study on Platonic self-knowledge, suggests a possible solution to 
this puzzle by introducing a Form of Man. This implies that: 
" the self which refers is the concrete embodied 
self, whereas the self to which reference is made is 
the universal Man. Consequently, self-knowledge, 
considered as the possession of the embodied self, 
could take as its object the ideal self. 'i'he two, 
being on different levels, are not identical; they 
are the same, but only in a sense that an instance 
is the same as the form instantiated. Then the 
knowing subject (the instance) would no longer 
be its own object (the form man). Thus a paradox 
would be avoided ..•. The Platonist would then be 
able to say with Pindar, 'Become what you are', 
for the 'what you are' refers to the real self, Man, 
the Form (Ballard 1965, p.116 - emphasis added). 
Although Plato admitted with Socrates (in the Parmedines 130) that he 
was uncertain as to whether there was a Form of Man (in the same way 
that he was not ready to accept Forms for mud, dirt and hair), in the 
Phaedrus he builds a strong argument for the existence of a Form of the 
Psyche of Man. 
1'he brief account of the Platonic Forms has revealed some striking 
similarities between the Heraclitean state of 'common understanding', 
or Logos, which, in this study, was termed 'external Other', and the 
Forms. As was mentioned earlier, it was Plato's aim to develop further 
that part of Heraclitus' theory which accounted for the stability (Logos) 
of the changing cosmos. Thus, the Forms could be seen as an elaboration 
of Logos. Logos was an abstract general ordering principle whereas Forms 
are specific, they refer to certain entities, e.g. the Form of Beauty. 
The Form of Beauty could be seen as accounting for the Logos of particular 
beautiful objects. Beautiful objects, despite the changes they undergo 
and the differences between them, nevertheless partake in the universal 
Form of Beauty, if they are rightly called 'beautiful'. Therefore, 
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the earlier ·discussion concerning the Otherness of Logos could be useful 
in examining the Otherness .of Forms also. 
Forms are the 'real counterpart' of everything in this world which is but 
a world of shadows (cf. Plato's simile of the cave in the Republic VII 
514 ff). The unchanging essence of a being, the Form, or Other of that 
being, is in a special relationship to this being as it is in it 
(innnanent) and yet beyond it (transcendent).The closer the being comes · 
. 
to its Other, its 'true' substance, the more perfect will it be. Simone 
Petrement in her book "Le Dualisme chez Platon" emphasises that Plato's 
fundamental doctrine was: 
" ••• the idea of a separate truth, a truth which 
exists by itself and does not depend on us" (1947, 
p. 309). 
Moreover, this: 
u ••• truth is the other (autre), and this other is 
preferred to the me" (J?.310). 
The Form is 'truer' than the particular being which partakes in it. 
The truth lies with the Other. 
Before considering the full implications of viewing the Form as the 
... 
Other, it will be necessary to examine another closely related issue, 
the division of the Psyche. 
B) The Structure of the Psyche. 
Plato gives an original and imaginative account of the inner division 
of the Psyche,, in the Phaedrus (:¥. 6 - 257), by using the model of a 
''winged yoke of horses and a charioteer''· The charioteer, who controls 
the vehicle, is the logisticon. (reason, spirit, rational apprehension). 
He tries hard to coordinate the two temperamental horses; each one pulls 
in a different direction. The 'base', 'bad' horse (epithymeticon 
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appetitive) has a very limited vision and is only interested in ''childish" 
\ 
affairs and the •charms of love''; it is governed by desire (epithymia). 
The other, the "noble'' horse, which has a much broader vision is the 
thymoedes or affective part of the Psyche. (Wilford 1959, suggests 
self-assertiveness as a better translation of thymoedes). He exercises 
''a restraining influence over his companion'' and has a ''more distant 
goal'' (Wild 1946, p .150). This noble horse is a "lover of sophrosyne" 
(wisdom) (Republic 253D), and is governed by higher emotions. Even 
without the mediating intervention of the charioteer the noble horse 
is capable of compensating for the imbalance created by its undisciplined 
partner. The wings represent an important part of this model of the Psyche. 
Wild correctly remarks that: 
" the wings are attached to the horses and possibly 
the charioteer himself, but they are not mentioned 
in the separate description of the two steeds. Hence 
we are led to infer that they belong rather to the 
united power of the whole vehicle as the living being 
aspires or loves with ~he whole of his being (psyche), 
rather than with any particular part" (1946, p .149). 
Thus, the winged-chariot model of the psyche (more commonly known as 
the tripartite model) makes a distinction between two conflicting 
emotions, the higher and the lower, and reason, the third principle, 
which plays a coordinating role. Plato-considered reason alone to be 
immortal, therefore creating a further sharp distinction between di vine 
reason, on the one hand, and the assertive and appetitive on the other, 
the latter representing elements of the particular mortal psyche of the 
individual. In addition, Plato suggests the potential of upliftment, 
provided that all parts are harmoniously coordinated. The wings are 
useless as long as the conflict between the rivalling horses is not 
contained so that both of them may fulfill their roles without obstruct-
ion by the other. 
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The striking similarities between the Platonic tripartite psyche and 
the Freudian model of the mental apparatus have received considerable 
attention and even led to a proclamation (by Muller-Braunschweig) 
that Plato was the Father of Psychoanalysis (in Simon 1973 , 'p.10)~ 
Particularly illuminating are the three studies by the Harvard 
Psychoanalyst, Dr. Bennett Simon (1972, 1973 , 1973b) in which, inter 
alia, he examines the correspondence between the appetitive and rational 
parts of the psyche and the id (instinctive, primary process, unconscious) 
and ego (secondary process, conscious) in Freudian Psychology. These 
comparisons seem to have scandalized another North American psychoanalyst, 
Dr. Hanly, who attempted to settle the issue by stating ca~egorically 
that whatever similarities might exist: 
"Plato constructed a 'moralised psychology' whereas 
Freud built a scientific psychology" (1977 ,p.140). 
To return to the structure of the psyche, the same theory appears in 
the Republic, but this time the three parts of the human soul correspond 
to the structure of the 'politeia' (state). The three main classes 
in the state, i.e., philosophers, guardians, and artisans play similar 
roles as the charioteer with his two horses. So the following parallels 
could be drawn: 
Psyche 
Rational (logisticon) 
Affective or assertive 
(thymoedes) 
Appetitive (epithymeticaon) 
State 
Philosopher-kings 
Guardians 
Artisans, connnon citizens, 
etc. 
(Simon 1973a, p.8) 
It might be interesting to note, en passant, that Ernest Jones (1949) 
also used the correspondence between the structures of the personality 
and the State by comparing the Super Ego with the King, the Ego with 
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the Parliament and the Id with the citizens. Freud himself drew' 
similar parallels (1897, p.255). It was only natural for Plato that 
if the state was to offer the optimal conditions for the overall well-
being of its citizens, it had to cater for the unity of their personal-
· ities, the individual winged chariots. The state was itself a large 
winged chariot, as it were, comprising all its relevant members. 
"We are bound to admit that the qualities 
that characterize a state must also exist in 
the individuals that compose it" (Republic 435, 
tr. Lee). 
The objective of the Republic was not merely to maintain law and order, 
but to promote what we would today call 'mental health'. It was the 
duty of the philosopher-king to nurture the psychae of his citizens, as 
he was capable of knowing the Forms and had achieved himself the 
internal harmony (Versfeld 1972). The term for this harmony was 
dikaiosyne translated as justice (or virtue).Professor Sinclair in 
his classic study on "The History of Greek Political Thought" says: 
"A just man is he who performs his own function; 
in an inj ust man the parts of the soul are at war 
with er.ch other. Justice is a right order, a healthy 
condition within the soul of man or the state" (1961, 
p.154). 
Thus, justice refers to ~balance and resulting unity between all parts 
of the human psyche as well as the State. This is no mere analogy. 
Socrates in his famous prayer to God Pan asked: 
" .•• may the outward and inward man be at one" 
(!'ha~drus 2 758, trJmvett). 
The integrity Socrates prayed for was the totality of the individual, 
in thoughts, speech, actions, desires. A man cannot be just with his 
fellow citizens alone. In order to deal justly with other people a 
man must first be capable of being just with the Others in himself. 
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Hall (1959) drew a distinction between what he termed "personal justice" 
and justice of the polis (State). Hoerber (1960) went further to 
differentiate these two types of justice basing his argmnent on the 
interpretation that justice equals knowledge of the Forms. Conversely, 
only the philosopher-rulers of the Republic, who were the only ones 
capable of the knowledge of the Forms, were in a position to bring 
about 'inner harmony' in themselves, i.e., justice. The ordinary 
citizen would have to rely on the second-hand knowledge of the Forms 
as dictated to him by the philosopher and therefore the implication 
is that their justice would also be 'second rate'. Skemp considers 
the above arguments overdrawn. Justice for Plato, according to him, 
was one and the same for "man in all possible worlds"(l960, p.38). 
This is no implicit inference. Plato emphasised that the Republic's 
" ••• real concern is not with external actions, but 
with man's inward self ••. The just man will not 
allow the three elements which make up his inward 
self to trespass on each other's functions or 
interfere with each other, but by keeping all 
three in tune, like the notes of a scale (high, 
middle and low, or whatever they be), within the 
truest sense set his house in order, and be his 
own lord and master and at peace with himself. 
When he has bound these elements into a single 
controlled and orderly whole, and so unified 
himself, he will be ready for action of any 
kind o o •II 
and a little further, 
" .•• the knowledge which controls such action 
[is calleql wisdom" (Republic 443, tr. Lee). 
The above discussion points out two kinds of desired states for man 
to achieve: a) justice, which is a workable coordination of all parts 
of the psyche, and b) knowledge of Forms, an even higher state of 
wholeness, which implies a 'direct' relationship with the transindividual 
realm of Forms. Everybody is capable of reaching the state of. justice 
but only the philosophers have the means for the ultimate knowledge, 
knowledge of the Forms. 
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Once the harmony within the psyche is achieved, the chariot is capable 
of rising to higher states, beyond the 'petty' conflicts between the 
rival horses. But if this harmony is lacking, a state of 'incongruency' 
results. Plato's term for this state was ''mania" which Pieper (1964) 
renders as "being-beside-oneself". A person in mania, according to 
Pieper, loses it command over oneself" (p.49). This is: 
" .•. a condition of being carried away out of the 
centre of one's own being" (Pieper 1964, p.50). 
Other conditions with similar consequences were, for Pieper, enthusiasm 
and metanoia, both having in connnon the element of 1' decentredness 11 , 
a shift from one's own "true" and "real" centre to an-other one. 
In enthusiasm (=being filled with the god, divine madness) the locus 
of the personality has shifted to the divine (Other). It is as if the 
charioteer, through some error ascends, with the assistance of the 
wings, whilst the rival horses have not necessarily come to a harmonious 
resolution of their conflict. In metanoia (repentence): 
" .•. a man abandons the complacency of a mind 
which imagines itself autarchic" (Pieper 1964, p.62). 
The salvation of a 'decentred' person lies in reestablishing his 'real', 
'natural' centre, which is a position of 'inner harmony' and justice 
to all parts of his psyche. This readjustment might appear to 
represent a further 'decentredness' in that a new shift from the 'false' 
centre to the 'real' centre will be required. Pieper cites Jung as 
adopting a similar approach to Plato as far as this process is concerned: 
"He {;JuniJ too, like Plato, speaks of the necessity 
for submitting to a state of being outside oneself 
for the sake of healing wholeness. To strengthen 
his case he quotes the 'ancient motto of the Mysteries': 
'Let go of what you have; then you will receive'" 
(Pieper 1964, p.61). 
It is now easier to ascertain the strong similarities between the 
Heraclitean and Platonic theories. In the case of Heraclitus, ''private 
opinion" was contrasted with the "common Logos ' 1 which was seen as its 
=i 
-I 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
I 
-1 
-1 
I 
-I 
I 
I 
I 
-1 
1 
-I 
-1 
-I 
I 
I 
-1 
=1 
I 
I 
-1 
I 
-'1 
-1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
-1 
.i 
I 
~1 
- 59 -
'true Other'. Therefore, a 'decentredness', i.e., an emphasis on one 
particular aspect or part of the psyche at the expense·of the whole, 
would correspond to the neracli tean state of 11 pri vate opinion '1, whereas 
'true centredness', which is the state of "justice'1, i.e., harmony 
between all the parts of the psyche would be equivalent to the establish-
ment of, and in the common Logos·. Now, Plato offered a finer 
differentiation of the common Logos by proposing two kinds of 
'wholeness'. One, justice, which was defined within the boundaries of 
the individual psyche (harmony of all its parts) and another, knowledge 
of Forms which included an essential transindividual element - the 
Forms themselves. In the case of the former, the wholeness embraces 
all 'personal Others', whereas with the latter a further requirement 
is demanded - that the harmonious totality of the individual psyche 
establish a 'direct relationship' with her 'true Other' (the 'external' 
or'transpersonal' Other) which at the same time is her own 'true nature'. 
In both situations again, the achieved state is of a 'higher level', 
beyond the conflicting state of opposing polarities. 
Heraclitus was vague about the means of achieving this desired state. 
However, he warned against any exploration which was motivated and 
designed by man's ~rivate opinion . Man had to wait for the unexpected 
and the solution had to come from an inner search. Plato agreed with 
these positions but could not afford to stay unclear as to the way of 
reaching perfection; the sophists and artists were quite specific in 
their instructions. Plato's answer to the techniques of sophistry, 
rhetoric and image representation was the Dialectic. 
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C) The Dialectic. 
Plato consistently avoided offering a final definition of the Dialectic, 
with the result that there is still controversy concerning the precise 
meaning of this much abused term. Robinson goes so far as to say that 
Plato applied the term 'dialectic': 
" ••• at every stage of his life to whatever seemed 
to him at the moment the most useful procedure" 
(1941, p. 74). 
This might be somewhat exaggerated. It is true that a number of fairly 
distinct periods in Plato's treatment of the Dialectic may be delineated, 
but this does not mean that Plato was indiscriminate in his use of the 
term. It is also true that Plato himself was at times uneasy about 
the use of Dialectic: 
" ... and if I find any man who is able to see 
'a One and Many' in nature, him I follow,·and 
'walk in his footsteps as if he were a god.' 
And those who have this art, I have hitherto 
been in the habit of calling dialecticians·; 
but God knows whether the name is right or not" 
(Phaedrus 266, tr. Jowett). 
Nevertheless, there was only one aim of the Dialectic: The search for 
Truth! Plato never changed this aim and all varieties of Dialectic 
throughout his work have Truth as their goal. The following passage 
offers an apt illustration. Socrates, referring to the Dialectic, 
asks: 
"Socrates In good speaking should not the 
mind of the speaker know the truth of the 
matter about which he is going to speak? 
Phaedrus And yet, Socrates, I have heard 
that he who would be an orator has nothing 
to do with true justice, but only with that 
which is likely to be approved by the many 
who sit in judgement; not with the truly 
good or honourable, but only with opinion 
about them, and that from opinion comes 
persuasion, and not from the truth." 
(Phaedrus 259-260, tr. Jowett). 
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In other words, the main commitment is to the Truth. However, it is 
obviously insufficient to define the Dialectic as the sear~h for Truth, 
as another question naturally follows: what is the Truth? The sophists 
also proclaimed that they were speaking the truth. But what they were 
not doing, according to Plato, was to talk about the essence of things 
because they simply did not know it. Their arguments were peripheral 
to the real nature, the essence of the issues they debated. 
Thus, the Dialectic is more precisely defined as: 
" .•. the only activity which systematically 
sets about the definition of the essential 
nature of things" (Republic 533, tr. Lee). 
As was shown above, the ''essential nature of things" according to Plato, 
was closely inter-linked with the Forms. Therefore, the Dialectic is 
the: 
" ••• procedure [whicq? involves nothing in the 
sensible world, but deals throughout with Forms 
and finishes with Forms" (Republic 5ll, tr. Lee). 
The search for Truth culminates in the knowledge of Forms. This final 
Stage is beyond the realm of opinion and persuasion, and it entails a 
just and moral attitude towards oneself and others. The moral and 
intellectual aspects of the Dialectic were given differential emphasis 
by Plato at different times during the development of his thought. 
Stannard points out that: 
"As Plato came to recognize the significance of 
his dialectical method the notion of the goal 
of philosophy was modified accordingly" (1959, 
p. 123nl). 
The same author identifies three such periods: 
1. The early period during which the emphasis 
was on ''moral betterment'', 
2. The middle period, where Plato's explicit aim 
was the discussion of a single Form, e.g., 
the Good, or Beauty, and 
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3. the later period which combined the goal 
of the first period (moral betterment) 
with a new, 3iditional aim, the 
"knowledge of a plurality of Forms and 
their inter-relations" 
(Stannard 1959, p.123nl). 
The by now familiar trend of moving from the Socratic.emphasis on 
moral life to a more 'detached' intellectual and philosophical dis-
course on Plato is again readily observable here. The main link 
between the moral and the intellectual is maintained throughout Plato's 
theories of the Dialectic, although there is a trend towards different-
iating them and emphasising the intellectual. Robinson regards the 
Platonic Dialectic as: 
"a moral and intellectual excellence" (1941, p. 75). 
Could these three periods of Plato's philosophical goals, as outlined. 
by Stannard, be taken to correspond with a similar development of the 
Dialectic? This will surely depend on the exact relation between 
Philosophy and the Dialectic. 
In the Sophist (227) Plato characterized the Dialectic as: 
" ~ µ{~060~ 'tWV A.6ywv" 
which, translated literally, means: The method of logoi.Two problematical 
issues arise out of this famous saying: 
I) How are the words 'method' or 'procedure' to be understood? 
II) What interpretation,in this context, must be given to 'logos'? 
I) Cornford maintains that: 
although: 
"Dialectic is not what is now known as 
'Formal Logic'" (1960, p.264). 
"the whole ••. discussion of the 'combination' 
or 'blending' of Forms is usually called 
1 logical'" 
Therefore 9 as the aim of the Dialectic is to: 
- 63 -
11 yield the knowledge needed to guide us to 
true affirmative and negative statements about 
Forms, of which the whole texture of philosophic 
discourse should consist" (1960, p.264), 
it will be an erroneous interpretation to view the Dialectic as a mere 
logical instrument. Robinson adamantly affirms this conclusion: 
"Dialectic was not a tool that you might or might 
not choose to use in philosophizing. It was 
philosophy itself, the very search for the essences, 
only considered in its methodical aspects" 
(Robinson 1941, p.75, emphasis added). 
The last qualifying sentence is important. Dialectic was not a methodology, 
or Logic, but the methodical aspects of philospphy. The difference is of 
great significance. A Sophist could not simply apply a dialectical tech-
nique within a philosophical framework which was utilitarian, lacking 
respect for the Forms, and not totally committed to Truth. In other words, 
Plato refused to accept the feasibility of using 'good means' to achieve 
'bad goals'. Means and goals were inseparable. Any separation would 
endanger the Dialectic and denigrate it to a technique without any 
foundations. Indeed when this separation occurred in the Aristotelian 
Dialectic, it became 'nothing but' a method, and, according to Robinson, 
it was reduced to "a dubious game of debate"(l941, p.76). No wonder that 
Plato considered the Dialectic as a "di vine gift'' (Phi le bus 16), implying 
both its healing effects as well as the respect men should have for it. 
What, then, were these ''methodical aspects" which distinguished the 
Dialectic from a mere method? 
i) Plato made extensive reference to Diacriteke (Separation, Division) and 
Synkriteke (Combination, Collection). Although there are cerrain misgivings 
concerning the identification of Division with the Dialectic (Trevaskis 1967), 
there is consensus among Platonists that Division and Collection comprised 
one major characteristic of the Dialectic. According to Lloyd: 
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"Dialectic meant always ti1e discovery of the One 
in the Many, and in the later Dialogues this 
consisted of Collection and Division" (In Trevaskis 
1960, pp.42-43). 
Collection, according to Plato, was: 
" ... the comprehension of scattered particulars 
in one idea" (Phaedrus 265, tr. Jowett) 
Cornford explains the meaning of Collection as follows: 
"Collection is a survey of specific Forms having 
some prima facie claim to be members of the same 
genus" (1960, p.186). 
Division was the separation: 
" ..• into species according to the natural 
formation, where the joint is, not breaking 
any part as a bad carver might" (Phaedrus 265-266, 
tr. Jowett). 
And, according to Cornford, Division: 
" exhibits Forms arranged in systematic 
classification, spreading downwards from a 
single genus, through a definite number of 
specific differences, to the indivisible species 
at the bottom" (1960, p.186). 
Making generous allowance for obvious discrepancies, Collection and 
Division might be compared to Jung's methods of amplification and 
analysis. Jung's amplificatory method consisted of the collection of as 
much material as possible which was related prima facie to the image, 
word, or dream element under investigation. This provided the working 
context so that he would: 
" ..• know what tissue that word or image is 
embedded in" (Jung 1935, p.84). 
Then a methodic process followed which consisted essentially of identifying 
the various archetypes involved, so that the analysand, with the assist-
ance of the analyst, could successfully integrate them. This is one possible 
way of looking at Jung's analytic method. This matter is further discussed 
below. 
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To return to the methodical aspects of Collection and Division, 
it may be concluded that they cannot be seen as mere 'methods' , 1 
separated from the understanding and whole philosophy of Forms (in the 
same way that Jung's methods cannot be considered in isolation from his 
theory of archetypes). Thus, the Dialectic studies: 
" ••• the structure of the real world of Forms. 
Its technique of Collection and Division 
operates on that structure. It is a method for 
which some rules are laid down; but these are 
rules of correct procedure in making Divisions; 
they are not laws of inference or laws of 
thought" (Cornford 1960, p.265, emphasis added). 
ii) a second "methodic aspect" could be introduced with Plato's 
following passage: 
"Dialectic in fact is the only activity whose 
method is to challenge its own assumptions 
so that it may rest firmly on first principles" 
(Republic 533, tr. Lee). 
This is a rather neglected aspect which is nevertheless of great importance 
for a proper understanding of the Dialectic in Plato. It is related to 
the ''unexpected'' of Heraclitus, in that an individual cannot rely on 
his own assumptions , or private opinion to reach the Truth. Such 
an endeavour will be condemned to failure from the beginning, as the very 
premises from which he will set off will be inadequate (private opinion) 
and will inevitably lead to false conclusions. The solution lies in 
challenging his own assumptions. Such self-questioning will have the 
liberating effect of Plato's phrase: 
"we shall know through ourselves all that is pure" 
(Vi de supra, p. 51 ) 
The awareness of "first principles '1, then, would correspond to a higher 
level of awareness of n connnon Logos''• 
The same ''methodic aspect'' also relates to the Socratic ignorance. 
Socrates' confession of ignorance was more than a gesture of humility; 
it had a solid epistemological foundation. Man could not achieve self-
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knowledge before abandoning his starting assumptions, i.e., firstly 
acknowledging the limitations of his capacity for knowledge. Ballard 
clarifies: 
"The Socratic ignorance is not merely the remediable 
ignorance of individual detail which follows from 
having only a definitional knowledge of one's general 
type; rather it is the paradoxical understanding of 
the indefinite or a-rational factor within the very 
constitution of the soul" (1965, p.154). 
The paradox is central to this issue as only after an individual under-
stands the limitations of his own understanding will he be in a position 
to achieve a proper understanding devoid of any fancy. Plato had a special 
term for those who fancied themselves as wise. He called them dokisophoi • 
In short, Dialectic cannot be seen as a technique, independent from the 
subject matter of investigation. Dialectic is philosophy itself, although 
two methodic aspects could characterize it: i) Collection and Division an~ 
ii) a constant examination of the assumptions from which an inquiry is 
about to begin; such self-questioning would lead to the first principles , 
the Heraclitean logos , the knowledge of Forms, and their inter-relation-
ships. 
II) The second problematical issue concerning the Dialectic is the 
interpretation of logos in the Platonic phrase "method of logoi '1 
(vide supra, p.62 ). Xenakis (1959) interprets the logos aspect of the 
Dialectic as a I' logical ' 1, rational process as opposed to 1' disputation" 
or"argumentation" (p. 40). Stannard elaborates on the same point as 
follows: 
"The truth dialectic seeks to uncover is rooted 
ultimately in the ability to discriminate the real 
from the apparent ••• and to understand the logical 
implications of the vocabulary of Forms. Hence truth 
and rational conviction t;o hand in hand" (1960, p.55n2, 
emphasis added). 
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This argument does not contradict the previous contention that the 
Dialectic is not Logic but Philosophy. Logic is a tool of thought which 
can be applied to any scientific discipline. Although Plato considered 
the Dialectic as an essentially logical process, he did not equate it 
with the discipline of Logic. By that he meant that it had an intrinsic 
rational character. Sophistry and rhetoric were based on persuasion by 
using disputation and argumentation. Plato frequently contrasted the 
Dialectic with what he termed Eristic , a category containing all of the 
above methods which were contrary to the Dialectic. The Dialectic, to 
paraphrase Vlastos' words on Heraclitean Logos used above, was logical 
inasmuch as people cared and had the sense to perceive its rationality. 
Thus, the 'logical' aspect of the Platonic Dialectic was in more than 
one way related to the Logos of Heraclitus. The awareness of wfirst · 
principles '1, which were concerned with the existence and inter-relation-
ships of Forms was, in a sense, the knowledge of ''common Logos''. Moreover, 
the investigatory process involved in the search for such knowledge was 
essentially 'logical' and within the grasp of every person with sense 
and commitment to Truth. 
Another meaning of logos is the obvious reference of the Dialectic 
to Dia-logos (=dialogue), verbal interaction between two interlocutors. 
As shown above, an aspect of the Dialectic was the questioning of the 
basic assumptions of any inquiry. Such questioning is more effective 
when conducted with the help of another person. This was the role Socrates 
I 
saw for himself in his interactions with his pupils: to help them reach 
the Truth by themselves, by simply questioning their assumptions. He 
called this art midwifery: 
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"Come to me, who am a midwife's son and myself a 
midwife, and do your best to answer the questions 
which I will ask you. And if I abstract and expose 
your first-born, because I discover upon inspection 
that the 'conception which you have formed is a 
vain's shadow, do not quarrel with me on that 
account, as the manner of women is when their child-
ren are taken away from them. For I have actually 
known some who were ready to bite me when I deprived 
them of a darling folly; they did not perceive that 
I acted from goodwill ••• " (Theaetetus 151, tr. Jowett). 
Real knowledge is beyond the ''darling folly", which, corresponding to 
Heraclitus' "private opinion'' usually represents one's preliminary 
'conception' or assumptions. A great deal of subsequent exploration 
is necessary in order to achieve real knowledge. Such exploration is 
impossible without strong commitment on the part of the pupil in order 
to withstand all the pains of conception and separation from the "darling 
folly''· Flexibility, openness and preparedness to await and accept the 
"unexpected'' is imperative for this kind of dialogue. Professor P lochmann 
emphasises the cooperativeness of the Dialectic: 
"LJ:>ialecti<J conversation requires some kind of joint 
contribution, some sort of agreement, even if the 
conversation be quarrelsome, for at least the subject 
matter has to be jointly explored though in opposite 
ways" (1973, p.106). 
In a sense, the teacher becomes the alter ego (to use a psychodramatic 
term) of the pupil. In a close relationship of total trust the disciple 
'drops his defences' and allows the Master to question any of his (mis) 
conceptions. This does not imply that the disciple's attitude is that of 
absolute passivity. The Dialectic enterprise is cooperative. The Master 
becomes the disciple's Other and together they carry on their search for 
Truth, the pupil relinguishing his feelings of possessiveness attached to 
his "private opinion". This approach could be termed cooperative opposition , 
a most pertinent characteristic of the Dialectic as opposed to the 
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Eristic methods of inquiry. In the ~atter, as shown above, argumentation 
and disputation were the main colouring ingredients, and the pervading 
spirit was one of antagonism rather than cooperation. 
Before concluding this part, it is necessary to focus on the spoken 
as opposed to the written word. Robinson (1941) gives three main reasons 
for Plato's insistance on the superiority of the spoken word as the proper 
means for the Dialectic: 
i) The written word acquires a kind of independence of its 
own and people tend to give it more credence than their own 
memory. 
ii) The written text cannot answer questions the reader 
might like to pose, and 
iii) The written word is the same for all readers, so that 
there is no guarantee that it is properly understood, 
and no adjustments can be made to match the reader's 
level of comprehension. 
An explicit indication of Plato's mistrust of the written word is the 
myth of the invention of words which he has Socrates narrate in the 
Phaedrus. According to this myth, when the Egyptian sage Tammuz brought 
king Thoth the alphabet, his proud discovery, he claimed that it was the 
"medicine for memory and wisdom". To this the wise king replied that the 
new discovery would 
"create forgetfulness in the learner's souls, because 
they will not use their memories; they will trust to 
the external written characters and not remember 
of themselves" 
and he expressed concern that the written word 
" is an aid not to memory, but to reminiscence, 
and you give your disciples not truth, but only 
semblance of truth; they will be hearers of many 
things and will have learned nothing; they will 
appear to be omniscient and will generally know 
nothing" (Phaedrus 275, tr. Jowett, emphasis added). 
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Moreover, those who read much would become mere 'dokisophoi' (individuals 
who fancy themselves as being wise). It is obviously significant that 
Plato attributed this discovery to the Egyptians and not to the Greeks. 
Greeks had the 'live word', the spoken word, the Dialectic, and they 
did not need any fossilized forms of the Truth. Further, in the same 
Dialogue, writing is considered a "pas time '~11for the sake of recreation 
and amusement "(276) and no serious teaching, it is claimed, could be done 
by means of the written word, which serves merely to remind (hypomnesis) 
those whq already know. The earlier reference to Fisher (1966) (vide supra, 
p. 43) may be evaluated in the context of this discussion. There is an 
apparent contradiction in Plato's views on the written word. Socrates 
remained faithful to his conviction and never wrote anything. But Plato 
was quite a prolific writer. Fisher claiIII'3 that Plato's writing was 
indeed a sort of pastime, an additional duty he had to perform. his main 
duty was '~oing philosophy', "doing the Dialectic'' in actual dialogues with 
his students, thus fulfilling all of the conditions of the 0ialectic as 
outlined above. 
To summarise, the proper Dialectic was basically an interpersonal verbal 
activity of cooperative opposition firmly entrenched within the rational 
realm of Logos, and aiming at discovering the real nature of things. This 
real nature was for Plato firstly related to moral betterment, then to 
the nature of a single Form, and finally to the knowledge of many Forms and 
their interrelationships. 
Now, once the Dialectic brought forth its fruit, tile individual would 
achieve the state of internal (intrapersonal) and external (interpersonal) 
justice, i.e., a fairness and harmonious balance without any violence 
towards the other parts of his psyche or the other people around him. 
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Plato's connection between the 'internal' and 'external' other in the 
concept of justice is noteworthy. Also, the exploration which would lead 
to justice was much facilitated through an active interaction with the 
Other person. 
In conclusion, Plato elaborated and developed the lieracli tean concept of 
Logos, which was seen as the true Other. The Platonic theory considers the 
individual as an essentially divided being who, in order to achieve 
wholeness, must first bring harmony between the Others in himself. Dialectic 
is the means for achieving such a state of unity and an essential require-
ment is the cooperative opposition with his external Other, his Master. 
The resultant unity lifts the person to a higher realm of knowledge and 
awareness (Logos), beyond the world of the senses and of constant change, 
thus establishing him in his tru¢ centre which is a harmonious unity of all 
the Others. 
The initial theme of this study dealt with the concept of the Other 
as both unity and division. The discussion of Heraclitus and Plato provided 
a wealth of material against which this theme could be examined. Both of 
these great thinkers saw man as a divided unit. Heraclitus considers that tne 
process of the eternal flux creates opposites both outside the person, in 
nature, as well as within him. The Platonic theory is more elaborate and 
accounts for three parts in the human psyche. It also relates these . 
internal Others to external Others (psyche and State). This internal division 
engenders a state of opposition between a 'me' and an 'Other'. 
Apart from this division, both Heraclitus and Plato postulated a realm of 
being and understanding higher than the ''common run'' of ordinary everyday 
life, The controversial Ephesian equated this level with the acquisition 
of the ''common Logos", an understanding of the inevitability of change 
achieved by searching one's own self: once established in this higher order 
I 
/ 
- 72 -
the individual then realises his true nature. Thus, by relating to his 
Other (encountered 'outside'), the desired unity may be acquired. Plato 
expounded a similar theory where the external, but at the same time 'real 
internal' Other is the Form. Plato also attempted a 'set of instructions' 
as to how one could achieve this real unity, and establish oneself in one's 
own natural centre of existence, viz., the Dialectic. In this enterprise, 
the guide (Master) adopted the role of the disciple's Other, and a common 
cooperative pursuit (dialogue) took place between the searcher and his 
Other. The division between 'me' and 'Other' was gradually eliminated as 
the conunon source of these superficially opposing poles was approached. 
A notable contribution has been recently made by Professor Jarrett who 
argued that there is 1'no rest from the dialectic", there is ''no static 
state'1, no end state of the dialectic (1974, p.85). The harmonious balance 
may be achieved by the process of the dialectical activity. Jarrett 
compared this formulation of the Platonic dialectic with Jung's theory 
of the 'individuation process' which he viewed as a continuous dialectical 
process without a static end-state. 
PARt ONE 
Chapter Four 
"O Uf'e-g:tving sun, off-spring of the Lord of 
creation, solitary seer of heaven! Spread thy 
light and withdraw thy blinding splendour that 
l may behold thy radiant fotm: that Spirit far 
away within thee is my own inmost Spirit'' 
Ftom the 'tsa Upanishad', 
Tr • .J. Mascaro • 
.... '73 
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Plato's Dialectic remained an inseparable and integral part of his entire 
theory. He vehemently refused to al.low it tn take the shape of any particular 
tool in the service of thought; Plato preciously guarded the Dialectic 
lest it might lose its di vine character and become a secular tecimique. 
This is precisely the aim of Aristotle: 
I 
" ••• to correct Plato and free dialectic from 
ontologyii (Evans 1977,p.51). 
Immanuel Kant, twenty-two centuries later, continued the Aristotelian 
tradition in this respect. He began the section of ''Transcendental Dialectic'' 
in his monumental work9 Critigue of PureJleason"(l781), with the following 
revealing sentence: 
"We call Dialectic in general a logic of illusion 
(eine Logik des Scheins)" (p.238). 
Thus, the Kantian Dialectic is the free and unrestricted manipulation of 
concepts by the intellect, independently of empirical principles. The 
•i transcendental dialectic" deals with the '"improper and fallacious application'' 
of the a priori concepts (Korner 1955; p.45). Located solely in the 
abstract and illusory realm of the intellect, Kant's Dialectic lost all of 
its 'therapeutic' properties which Plato had firmly established and was, 
moreoever, interpreted as "absolute reason's jugglery" (Heiss 1975, p.36). 
However, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) has perhaps contributed 
most to our modern understanding of the Dialectic whilst• at the same time, 
advancing an original theory of the Other. A contemporary of Kant, Fichte 
and Schelling, Hegel is legitimately considered as one of the greatest 
systematic philosophers of all times. It is doubtful whether there are 
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many philosophical systems which can match Hegel's colossal structure 
which includes articulated philosophical approaches to Art, Religion, 
History, Right, Nature, Mind, as well as systems of Logic and Phenomenology. 
As with most great thinkers, Hegel's positions have been interpreted .. in 
almost diametrically opposite ways. He was seen and followed by some as an 
arch-conservative, and by others as a liberal and radical thinker (Kora~ 
1975). The di vision between ''right" and '1left '1 Hegelians (Jay 1973) still 
persists. Moreover, Hegel's contribution is constantly subject to reappraisal, 
(e.g. Findlay 1963, Avineri 1972, Hyppolite 1968, Macintyre 1972, Kaufmann 
1972, Prior 1972, Habermas 1972). 
When one undertakes to investigate only certain segments of a particular 
philosophical system, criticisms concerning the legitimacy of such an 
undertaking are inevitable. A philosophical system, being a network of 
meaningfully interrelated theories, should not be dissected and compart-
mentalized, as it then loses its cohesion wherein its strength resides. 
Considering a concept in isolation deprives the investigation of its 
contextual meaningfulness. This reasoning (which was also shared by hegel 
himself), however sound and rational it might appear, contradicts the 
validity of countless short essays and studies of limited scope about 
specific aspects of philosophical systems. Moreover, Solomon (1972) 
pondering the same issue in his essay on ''Hegel's Concept of 'Geist' ... , 
realised, with an obvious sense of liberation, that Hegel himself was guilty 
of such transgression, despite his sayings to the contrary. 
"What we must do for hegel, therefore, is to read his 
work not as he insists that we read it, but as he reads 
the work of his predecessors" (Solomon 1972, p.134). 
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The Dialectic of the Other in·Heg&l 
It might be' appropriate to start this section with an interesting remark 
concerning the original Hegelian conception of the dialectic. Professor 
Heiss (1975), correctly realised Hegel's 
" ••• desire to unite the whole of Western thought 
into one unified, yet at the same time many-branched 
. system" (p . 5) • 
This desire was based on a conviction that 
" ••• it is this whole~ not the particular of it -
which is the truth" (p.5). 
Yet, paradoxically, Heiss argues that Hegel's motive for developing the 
Dialectic was rooted in an inner 'split' in Hegel's own personality. 
"He always saw, so to speak, with two different eyes, 
one seeing the sic, the other the .!!E.!l' the Yes and 
the No" (p. 37) .--
Professor Heiss goes as far as to categorically deny any other roots of the 
Dialectic in Hegel stressing that this very 'split' in Hegel's personality 
was solely responsible for his passionate attraction to this celebrated 
approach: 
" I do not believe that it was historical emp1ric1sm 
through which tlegel gained dialectical experience and a 
dialectical point of view. He saw things dialectically, 
the dialectical experience was more deeply rooted in his 
nature and the dialectical method as he later ingeniously 
elaborated it was far more essential to him than at first 
meets the eye" (p.38). 
Professor Heiss' claim is based on (a) reports of Hegel's pupils about 
a "dark side", a'\iemonic streak in (Hegel's) being''anc!, in particular 
(b) on a totally neglected document from Hegel's early writings. This 
contains an unusual description of a dissatisfied God, angry 
" ••• with himself over his· otherness, over being 
fixated here as the fallen Lucifer" (In Heiss 1975,p.40). 
As a result God destroys what He had created. But by so doing and thus 
overriding His own manifestations: 
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" at the same time this constitutes a going-
into-himself (In-sich-selbst-gehen), indeed an 
act of 'becoming a focal point'" (p.40). 
In this peculiar document, unusual in that it was penned by Hegel at a 
time when he had only recently completed his theological training, Professor 
Heiss sees the first manifestation of a strong dialectic experience. The 
essence of this experience lies in the conception of the so-called 
dialectic triad - thesis, antithesis and synthesis. 
"God split himself asunder by becoming enraged with 
himself, His rage, the negation of himself, did not 
however lead to his destruction, but to a new unity .•• 
this process of annihilation was both a retreating 
into himself and a genesis of the 'middle point' ••• 
out of the antithesis ••• 'consumed Nature rises up ·in 
a new, ideal form'. But this cycle does not happen 
only once. It recurs. Thus systematic knowledge is 
also un~,ers toad as a self-devouring process which at 
the same time leads to new formations" (Heiss 19 75, p. 43). 
And in Hegel's own words: 
"If God i$ the al !--sufficient, the unrteeding, why 
does he decide on something plainly unequal to 
himself? The divine Idea is precisely this, to 
resolve to put this Other out of himself and take 
it into himself again, so as to make it subject·-
ivity and spirit" (In Heiss 1975, p.120). 
It might be unwise to unconditionally accept this psychological evidence 
as the ~ explanation for the origin of the Dialectic in Hegel. The 
majority of authors have argued that Hegel, a keen observer of the contemp-
orary political scene and a scholarly student of History, collected his 
evidence and formed the idea' of the Dialectic from these fields (e.g., 
Prior 1972, Avineri 1971). Nevertheless, Professor heiss' valuable insight 
offers a new perspective in understanding Hegel which is of particular 
relevance for this study. 
Having accepted that Hegel derived the idea of the Dialectic through a 
personal struggle to overcome his own 'other' side, the 'dark side' 
as ivell as by observing the dialectical developments in the historical and 
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political arenas, we may now proceed to investigate the actual meaning 
of the Dialectic in the ttegelian system • 
. The traditional interpretation of Hegel's Dialectic is that it is a 
method, the Hegelian method par excellence. This view has, however, been 
seriously challenged by a number of eminent Hegelian scholars. Dove (1971) 
maintains that Ivan Iljin in 1946 first suggested that "Hegel in his 
philosophical method was no dialectician'' (Dove 1971, p.35n). This claim 
is obviously incorrect as Alexandre Kojeve emphasised that very point in 
, 
his celebrated lectures on Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind at the Ecole 
,, 
Pratique des Hautes Etudes during the academic year 1934-35. Kojeve, who 
admttedly understands the Dialectical method as narrowly as: 
" ••• nothing but the method of dialogue - that is 
of discussion" (Koj~ve 1969, p.179). 
developed his argument in the following way. 
He first describes tb:e history of the Dialectic, commencing with the 
function of myths which he -saw as essentially representing an opinion. 
The innovators of new myths had to forcefully change the minds of people 
concerning the old myths, by means of war, if necessary. This "method'' 
was gradually replaced by an attempt to convince the believers of the old 
myths concerning the superiority of the new ones. This, according to 
Kojeve, was the period of dialogue with Plato and Socrates as the major 
exponents of this method. liy 11destroying each other" a ''synthetic'' truth 
emerged from the series of theses and antitheses so that a 'single One' 
was reached which was "not in opposition to an Other" as it was a: 
" ••• Whole - the Idea of the Ideas, or the Good" (p.180). 
In addition, Kojeve sees a 11parallel line" to ·this history: the introduction 
of the Divine. Certain myths were valid and were accepted solely by virtue 
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of being'revealed' by God., not after persuasive discussions with the men 
of the city. A 'revealed truth' had absolute validity and was beyond any 
argumentative dialogue. Some men (such as Abraham) 'managed' to in fact 
strike up a 'conversation' with God, thus entering into a dialogue with 
the 'creator' of those 'truths'. As a further development, Saint 
Augustine had 'dialogues' with his own 'soul', an activity which could 
also be called 'meditation'. Through the 'method' of 'meditation' the 
great systems of the 17th and 18th century Philosophy became possible 
(notably the Cartesian Meditatio11s) .• This was achieved by an internal 
dialectical methbd in which the author would present to himself theses, 
oppose them with antitheses, derive certain synthetic conclusions which 
would then· in turn serve as further theses to be opposed by fresh anti-
theses and so on. 
Hegel, in Koj~ve's view, exactly observed this dialectical movement of 
human thought, which essentially is the origin and history of human 
consciousness, and systematically described it after having captured the 
essence of the dialectical process in it. Hegel's system is thus not 
another thesis which may be negated by an antithetical system. The 
Hegelian Philosophy is imtnune to this cycle as it is itself the· description 
of these cycles: 
. " ••• therefore we see that this (Hegelian) discourse 
is not dialectical, in the sense that it is not a 
'thesis' that can be 'dialectically overcome'" 
(Koj~ve 1969, p.194). 
Hegel, being the 1'first auditor-historian-philosopher" (p.183), had 
discovered 11 the dialectic of the Real" (p.184) as manifested in History. 
Koj~ve thus concludes that Hegel's method is: 
" ••• nothing but the method that we nowadays call 
'2henomenological 111 (p.195, emphasis added). 
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Moreover, Kojeve maintains that: 
". . . If the tho'ugh t and the dis course of the Hegelian 
scientist or the Wise Man are dialectical, it is only 
because they faithfully reflect the 'dialectical 
movement' of the Real of which they are a part and 
which they experience adequately by giving themselves 
to it without any preconceived method" (pp.178-9). 
Thus, the Hegelian phenomenological method amounts to total absorption 
in the subject matter without any method as such. 
Husserl, normally accepted as the founder of Phenomenology, was thus 
wrong in claiming to have innovated Phenomenology, thereby rejecting 
Hegel's contribution. Kojeve dismisses Husserl's arguments as based on 
a misunderstanding of Hegel. 
Kojeve's basic arguments are accepted by the majority of serious Hegelian 
scholars of today: Hegel is considered to have accurately presented the 
actual dialectical movement although his own method of presentation 
was not dialectical. Dove (1971), for example, referring to the method 
of Hegel's central work, the Phenomenology of Mind (1807), emphatically 
denies that it is dialectical and adds: 
"Insofar as it can be characterised in a word, 
it is descriptive" (Dove 1971, p.35). 
Botll tieiss' insight into he gel's personal psychology and l<ojeve 's content-
ions indicate that ilegel's iJialectic was not a superficial metnodological 
technique but had far deeper roots. 'l'nis position might be contradicted by 
the very existence of studies on tne degelian Dialectic al i..ogic. If suc.h a 
Logic can be legitimately constructed, tien surely this supports the claim 
that the Dialectic represents a tecnnique, a logical technique. but the 
argument is not so simple. K.osok reasons as follows: 
11 The formalization of Hegel's Dialectic logic rests 
upon the contention that Hegel's intuitively generated 
system can be represented as a meta-language structure 
in which a·given set of elements on one level are capable 
of being analysed from a meta-level which refers to the 
original elements from a perspective of reflection, 
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thereby bringing out and expressing properties 
about that level not capable of being formulated 
within the original level itself" (Kosak 1966,p.596). 
And a little further the same author argues that such: 
" ••• unique dialectic logic ••• is inherent in 
Hegel's Phenomenology and Encyclopedia as the 
basic 'generating' principle governing the 
intuitive movements of his structure as it 
evolves increasingly complex levels of inter-
relation" (p.596). 
Therefore this meta-language structure represents the generating principle 
of the actual dialectical movement, the dialectic of the Real and is not 
a mere technique such as when formal logic is employed as a correcting 
tool in the thinking process. 
Mure has captured the core of this argument: 
And: 
"Hegel's logic is not formal but ontological" 
(Mure 1965, p.110). 
"Dialectic is the only philosophical method because 
it is one with its content" (p.33). 
Having anticipated some potential objections to the broad framework 
of the Hegelian Dialectic, it is now possible to examine the actual 
nature and development of that Real Dialectic. 
The following two characteristics of the Hegelian Dialectic can be 
extracted from what has been said thus far: 
1. The Dialectic has three 'moments': thesis, 
antithesis, and synthesis. 
2. The dialectic of the Real refers to the 
dialectical movement which can be illustrated 
by its manifestation in the development of human 
thought. 
The common element in the above two characteristics is motion, movement. 
Perhaps the very first expression of a dialectical thought, 
anticipating even Plato, is contained in Zeno's famous puzzle 
concerning the explanation .of motion (Zeller 1885; 1892). The 
puzzle lies in the 'realisation' that at every given 
\ 
' 
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moment a moving arrow is in fact at rest. Debrock uses a similar 
description of a waterfall given by Hegel in the diary of his hiking 
trip through the Alps to suggest that the impact of that image 
"provides a very expressive model of the dialectic of all reality'' 
(1973,p.287). The diary entry includes such a suggestive description: 
" ••• every moment it is pushed away by a new image, 
and in this fall, the spectator sees eternally the 
same image, and sees at the same time, that it is 
never the same" (In Debrock 1973, p.287). 
Hegel was well aware of the centrality of motion in the Dialectic: 
"The reason why dialectic first seizes upon motion 
lies in the fact that dialectic is itself this 
motion; or, put another way, motion is the dialectic 
of all that is" (In Gadamer 1976,. p.13). 
The motion is expressed in the Dialectic by the famous term Aufheben 
translated in English as sublation (e.g., in Baillie's translation of 
the Phenomenology of Mind, Stace 1955, Mure 1965) but also as overcoming 
(e.g., Nichols' translation of Koj~ve's lectures), transition (e.g., 
McTaggart 1896), and superc eding (e.g., Navickas 1968). This notion is 
at times confused with transcendence which also implies a movement to a 
state further beyond. But transcendence, as advocated by Kant in particular, 
refers to an existence totally beyond the realm from which the enquiry 
is made, and it is thus based upon the hypothesis of an a priori existence. 
The Aufheben may perhaps be more accurately described by comparing it to 
a spiralling ascent (Mure 1965), rather than a linear or disconnected 
movement. 
The following passage from Kojeve might serve as a convenient point of 
departure for a deeper understanding of this aspect of the Hegelian system: 
"The Hegelian Dialectic is entirely summed up by a 
single fundamental category, which is that of 
dialectical Overcoming (Aufheben). For what is to 
be 'overcome' is precisely the Irmnediate, and the 
'overcoming' itself is Mediation through negating 
action which creates the Mediated, this latter 
being nothing but the Immediate taken, or posited, 
as dialectically 'overcome'" (Koj~ve 1969,p.208). 
I 
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This movement can be illustrated as follows: 
Immediate 
x 
dialectical 
overcoming 
---;;> 
negating action 
mediation 
Mediated 
x 
This can be taken as the general formula of the Hegelian Dialectic, and 
it can be analysed in the example of the Dialectic of Self-consciousness: 
The Inunediate state of Self-consciousness, according to Hegel, is 
* "simple existence for self" (Phenomenology of Hind, tr. Baillie , p.231), 
or in Koj~ve's rendering, ''simple''or11 undivided Being-for-itself" (p.10). 
This Being-for-itself is immediate as it essentially lacks any conscious-
ness of itself. But this is not entirely true. Hegel qualifies it by 
suggesting that this state is the mode of consciousness that has ''not 
risen above the bare level of life'' (:eh.M.-B., p.231), that is "autonomous 
concrete-form, Consciousness submerged in the given-being of animal-life'' 
(Kojeve 1969,p.10). This undivided and immediate state consciousness is 
'self-identity' which excludes any other which is not included in the 'I'. 
In other words, one might say that there is a kind of Self-consciousness 
comparable to that of the non-reflecting animal, which is of an immediate 
nature. This 'pure' state cannot endure. With the first encounter of 
another human being this immediacy is inevitably challenged and threat-
ened. In Hegel's words, such an encounter results in a situation where: 
''Each is indeed certain of its own self, but not 
of the other, and hence its own certainty of 
itself is still without truth" (Ph.M.-B. ,p.232). 
The lack of 'truth' would be a consequence of the essentially 'autistic' 
state of each human being in such an encounter. If each one's own 
consciousness is unable to account for, or to include any other but is 
* Hereafter referred to as Ph.M.-B. 
totally absorbed in itself, then :i.t will be obvious that there will be 
no recognition of the Other. Recognition, however, will not .be possible: 
11 
••• except in the form that as the other is for it, 
so it is for the other; each in its self through its 
own action and again through the action of the other 
achieves this pure abstraction of existence for 
itself" (Ph.M.-B., p.232). 
Thus recognition is the outcome of the negating action of overcoming one's 
own immediacy. It is negating, as such action of recognition negates the 
'I' as the sole subject and object of consciousness. Self-consciousness 
is achieved once the earlier form of 'self-consciousness' is sub.lated, 
overcome. Prior explains: 
" man begins his (self~conscious) life only when 
he realises that others are also capable of self-
consciousness. Unlike animals, man can come 'outside 
himself'; he can recognise that he himself is not the 
only subject with a world of its owrt - oth.~-r· subjects 
also possess worlds of their own. Man can grant that 
the other is not necessarily an object in his world 
but a subject ~..ti th a world of his own: 'Self-conscious-
ness had before it another self-consciousness; it 
has come outside itself'i' (Prior 1972, p.56). 
Once Self-consciousness finds itself face-to-face with another self-
consciousness and ''comes outside itself'' then Hegel sees two things 
taking place: 
"First it has lost its own self, since it finds 
itself as an other being; secondly, it has thereby 
sublated that other, for it does not regard the 
other as essentially real, but sees its own self 
in the other" (Ph.M.-H., p.229). 
This state may be described as one of 1 fusion' between the self and the 
other, but could perhaps be better depicted as one of a mirrored image. 
Professor Hyppolite, the distinguished Hegelian scholar and trans lat or 
of the Phenomenology i'.'l.to French, characterised the dialectic of self-
consciousness: "Self~consciousness as a mirror play" (Hyppolite 1971, p.61). 
/ 
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He admits that this phraseology has the strong influence of Dr. Jacques 
Lacan, the French psychoanalyst, who suggested a crucial 'mirror phase' 
('stade du miroir') in the development of consciousness. Hyppolite 
explains further: 
"Self-consciousness, exists as Ego only if it sees 
itself in another self-consciousness; phenomenology 
presents us here in abstract terms the scheme of 
otherness, where the 'mirror' relationship is 
essential. We might say that the double (Hegel says 
'duplication') is fundamental in self-consciousness. 
Understand by this that self-consciousness is not 
confined somewhere within a biological organism. It 
is a relat_ion, and a relation to th_e other. But it 
is related to the other on condition that the other 
be l; related to me on condition that I be the other. 
This is what Hegel calls the Infinite, characterized 
by a double meaning, which is expressed in the contra-
diction of the double, the alter ego, with alter and 
with ~go." (1971, p.62). 
Thus, the original state of itnmediacy of Self-consciousness is altered 
by the mediation of the negating action which is aptly portrayed in the 
mirror relationship and the contradiction of the alter ego. Moreover, 
Hyppolite stresses ti1at 11 H.egel 's real discovery'' was that: 
"there is no sense in speaking of an Ego outside this ['me' -
'Other~ relationship" (1971, p.63). 
The French interpreters of iiegel have implicitly and explicitly emphasised 
the interpersonal or social nature of this dialectical relationship, 
giving the Other a meaning of an external, other, person. Kelly (1966), 
acknowledging the validity of such exegesis, adds ti1at this Hegelian 
relationship should be primarily considered as an internal process dealing 
with internal Others. Kelly's remark is of particular significance to the 
following discussion. 
So far, the dialectical overcoming of the immediacy of Self-consciousness 
has been examined. The resultant state was that of a mediated selfconscious 
hess, in a mirror relations11ip with itself, hut this doubte consciousness 
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cannot be the end product as it is "a.t variance within itself" (Ph.M . .,.B., 
p .251). Hegel calls this consciousness the Unhappy Consciousness. 
"Hence the Unhappy Consciousness, the Alienated Soul which 
is the consciousness of self as a divided nature [is] a double 
and merely contradictory being" (Ph.M.-B.; p.251). 
I 
There is an illusory understanding that this consciousness is a unity, 
but in fact it is divided and double; the relationship is both alienated 
and negative. What has to take place is another negation which will not 
restore the previous state of affairs (which after all is not possible) 
but will result in an ascent on the dialectical spiral, to a point 
further ahead whici1 at the same time represents a synthesis of the previo_us 
two positions. 
Hegel's own terms for the dialectical movement are: Immedi.acy, Mediation, 
and Overcoming (Kofeve 1969, pp.20?.-9). In the Immediate state there is 
a.n identi t:L: of being, as there is no consciousness of anything but itself. 
Mediation is: 
" .•• nothing but self-identity working itself out 
through an active self-directed process; or in other 
words, it is reflection into self, the aspect in which 
the ego is for itself, objective to itself. It is pure 
negativity, or, reduced to its utmost abstraction, 
the process of bare and simple becoming. The ego, or 
becoming in general, this process of mediating, is, 
because of its being simple, just immediacy coming to 
be, and is immediacy itself11 (Ph.H.-B., p.82, emphasis 
added). 
The second state then is one of a negative Negativity, where the being 
becomes the Other while at the same time retaining its first identity. 
Thus, it is essentially a double consciousness. The third state, which 
comes about through the overcoming, which K.oj't=ve attributes to a 
nositive Negativity, is the Unity of the being and the Other, the synthesis 
of absolute self-consciousness which has in it both the self and the other, 
I 
and of course does not represent the mere sum of the two earlier states. 
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hegel summarises this process as follows: 
"Since we started from the first immediate unity, and 
return through the moments of form-determination, and 
of process, to the unity of both these moments, and 
thus again back to the first simple substance, we see 
that this reflected unity is other than the first. 
As opposed to that immediate unity, the unity expressed 
as a mode of being, this second is the universal unity, 
which holds all these moments sublated within itself" 
(Ph.M.-B., p.224). 
"Thus, in spite of the Negativity which it encloses 
and presupposes the final Totality is just as much 
one and unique, homogeneous and autonomous, as the 
first and primordial Identity" (Koj~ve 1969, pp. 202-3). 
Having outlined the central process of the Dialectic; the following 
three relevant issues will now be examined. 
1. Negation. The basic movement of the self towards the Other and then 
back to itself after having been enriched by the Other is nothing but 
a series of negatiorts. Seen in this context negation loses its negative 
connotation and is understood in a positive way as a necessary step 
(in Hegel's terminology, ''moment 'I) in the entire dialectical process. 
Hegel states that one should 'look at the negative in the face and 
abide with it'', as ''this abiding is the magic force which transforms'' 
(In Heiss 1975, p.56) the superficial negative appreciation into an 
acceptance of the totality in which negation is but a necessary moment. 
Heiss calls this principle 1' creative contradiction" (p.16), the emphasiJ 
being in accepting the contradiction in a creative, positive manner, 
in the knowledge that the potentiality of the Dialectical overcoming 
lies dormant in the contradicto.ry process. Another issue related to _/ 
this interpretation of the negation is the union of opposites. The Other, 
as an opposite and negation of the being should not be seen as a 
permanent isolated negative entity but as a step, a moment in the proce~s 
of achieving totality. As such it can only have a 'positive' value 
because it facilitates the dialectical movement. 
\ 
\ 
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2. The collective nature of consciousness. One of the significant 
implications of the Hegelian Dialectic of Self-consciousness is its 
essentially collective nature. As has been shown above, Self-
consciousness cannot be developed unless there is an active participation 
of an Other. The dialectic of recognition indicates that one cannot 
achieve self-consciousness before one recognizes the Other's self-
consciousness. The universal unity , which is the final product of the 
dialectic, enables Hegel to arrive at statements such as: 
"Ego that is 'we', a plurality of Egos, and 'we' 
that is a single Ego11 (Ph.M.-B., p.227). 
Or, in Smith's translation: 
"The 1 which is we and the we which is I" (ln Gadamer 1976, p.58). 
Seen in this context, Hegelis Phenomenology of Mind is the exposition of 
the development of this 'universal consciousness'. The Hegelian Mind 
(from the German term Geist, which is also translated as Spirit) refers 
precisely to th:i.s consciousness. 
"Geist is simply the underlying unifying principle 
of consciousness and, at th~ same time, the under-
lying rational will 'behind' all practical reason 
and action'' (Solomon 19 72, p .148). 
Solomon compares Hegel's position to Strawson's "no-ownership theory 
of consciousness '1 admitting that both Strawson and the later Wittgenstein: 
"took this conclusion as a reductio ad absurdum 
argument against any ••• first-person-oriented 
theory of consciousness, while Hegel took the 
argument to establish an interesting and true 
proposition" (p.149), 
The collective nature of self-consciousness can be better understood 
when it is remembered that the essential nature of Mediation is 
conceptual. Hyppolite, who refers to the Geist as "L'esprit supra-
individuelle" (1968), remarks that the problem of liwe'1 can he solved 
only in language (1971, p.69). This is no speculation - Hegel himself 
:::. 
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made extensive reference to the pivotal role of language in relation 
to this 'collective nature' of the Geist. 
I 
"We see Language to be the form in which spirit finds" 
existence. Language is self-consciousness existing 
for others; it is self-consciousness which as such is 
there inunediately present, and which in its individuality 
is universal" (I>h.M.-:S., p.660). 
And further: 
liLanguage, however, comes forward merely as the 
mediating element only between self-consciousness 
independent and recognised; and the existent self 
means immediately universal recognition, means 
manifold recognition and in this very manifoldness 
simple recognition" (Ph.M.-_B., p.661). 
Thus, in achieving a mediated consciousness the being enters a realm 
which is universal and through this universality, can realise, recognise 
itself. By means of the mediation of conceptual thought and language, 
the subject establishes itself in the ~eist whose existence is manifold 
ifl language (Die Sprache [is(} das Dase in ·des Geis tes). 
Mure (1965) distinguishes three phases in the Dialectic of the Spirit. 
1. Spirit undivided and positive (being) 
2. Spirit self-negating (thought) i'othered '1 and 
"alienated it 
3. Spirit self-reconciling or returning upon 
itself (unity of thought and being). 
The fl.nal synthesis, unity of thought and being, represents a conscious-
ness of the individual being seen through the lenses of the universal, 
cbllective structure of language, a return to itself with collective 
validity. the being then achieves an objective recognition of itself 
which at the snme time is a collective recognition. 
Seth in his classic study liH_~gclianis_n1 a_nd ,Personality" (1893), attacked 
what he understood as 1-legel 1s 0 unificat::ion of consciousness in a single 
Self'' (p, 226), Accepting that individuals, a) share a common world, and 
b) are "all embraced within one keality", a necessary prerequisite for 
the possibility of communication; he objects to any further conclusions: 
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"But it is a great step further to 'say that this 
universal attitude of the Self, as such, is due 
to the fact that it is one universal Self that 
think~ in all so-called thinkers" (Seth 1893, p. 227). 
This rather extremist interpretation of Hegel could be corrected once 
the notion of language is introduced •. The individual achieves self-
consciousness through the mediation of the relationship with the Other, 
an activity which is conceptual in character and located in language. 
The means through which the final self-consciousness is reached is a 
collective structure, language. 
Debrock, in his perceptive article on the ''Silence of language in Hegel's 
Dialectic'' expresses this function as follows: 
"Language, at least in its most fundamental form which -( 
is speech, is that mode of consciousness wherein the 
individual realizes himself by becoming other, an other 
that is his opposite, and through this process of self-
negation, gives itself universal content" (1973, p.292)..:-; 
Now, considering that: 
"•••all speech is utterance, a giving away of the 
inner self, but this utterance is the condition 
for the possibility of self-perception" (p.292), 
the conclusion that: 
"Hegel shows his growing fascination with the property 
of alienation which is inherent to the act of speech" 
(p.291), 
can be understood. 
Therefore: 
"In the moments of consciousness, Aufhebung was always 
Auf_h_ebung of words, but in self-consciousness, 
Aufhebung means Aufhebung of existence" (p • 298). 
Which means that: 
•i, •• the truth which is here obtained is not conceptual, 
but ex~stential truth'' (p. 298 emphasis added). 
As: 
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"Consciousness in its innnediacy, and language as the 
expression of that consciousness, must perish in· 
order for the true word, i.e., the word of the 
Spiritlt;eist), to arise" ~ .295). 
3. '£he relationship between the 1me' and the Other, the subject and 
the object. Hegel considered all opposition not static and final, but 
dynamic and dialectical. Navickas crystallizes this position in the 
following sentence: 
"!n Hegel's view there can be no radical either-or 
between subject and object" (1968, p.90). 
The essential interdependency between subject and object has also 
been observed in the process of mutual recognition in the Dialectic of 
self-consciousness. 
"Strange as it may seem, the universalizing action, 
negativity, and self-mediation of the subject supply 
the link connecting subjectivity and objectivity. Here 
lies the niain reason for Hegel's contention that the 
subject is both one term of the cogrtitive relation-
ship and also the whole relationship" (Navickas 1968, p.90). 
Butler clarifies this issue: 
"The other self is as a self a means of self-realization 
~
but as gtl:l~_r it represents the alienation of orte; s own 
self. One finds oneis self, as it were, beside oneself. 
Since one previously knew no self besides one's own, it 
will seem in the recognition of another self that one's 
own self has gotten away from oneself ••• Seeing the 
self as 9~h~~' the originillly simple distinction between 
the self and the non~self is upset, and one is no longer 
certain that one 1 s self is indeed one's self" (Butler 
1976, p • .512). 
One may add that it is alsb no longer certain that the Qther is indeed an 
other. 'these relationships are nb sophistry and should not lead to a total 
confusion t-lith regard to the nature of the self and Other. The essence of 
what they irtdicate is the basic interrelationship between self and Other 
and its meaningfulness in the process of etMtgertt self-consciousness. 
J 
! 
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Thus, seemingly paradoxical statements like "Je est un autre", by 
Rimbaud, and "Everyone is tile other and no one is himself", by Heidegger 
(both in Wilden 1972), should be understood in this context. Hegel, 
in his celebrated essay on Love, (1797) in the 1iEarly Theological Writings~ 
again underlines this interrelationship. Referring to the subject and 
object he writes: 
u ••• Nothing carries the root of its own being in itself ••• 
[subject.and object] each is only rel~tively necessary; 
the one exists only for the other, and hence exists in and 
for itself only on the strength of a power outside itself" 
(Hegel 1948, p.304). 
And in the"f_ragmet1t o:f_na System 11(1800) he puts this relationship in a 
broader perspective: 
"_Absolute opposition holds good [in the realm of the deac!l. 
Therefore: 
One kind of opposition is to be found in the multiplicity 
of living beings. Living beings must be regarded as organ-
itations. The multiplicity of life has to be thought of 
as being divided against itself; one part of this mult-
iplicity (a part which is itself an infinite multiplidty 
because it is alive) is to be regarded purely as something 
related, as having its being purely in union; the second 
part, also an infinite multiplicity, is to be regarded 
as solely in opposition, as having its being solely through 
a separation from the first. Therefore the first part[the 
unity] can also be defined as having its being only by 
means of separation from the second one. The unity is 
called an organ:b:ation or an indi vidual'i 
"It is self-evident that this life, whose manifold is 
regarded purely as being related and whose very exist-
ence is exactly this relation, can also be regarded as 
being differentiated in itself, as a mere multiplicity, 
because the relation between the separated is not more 
intrinsic to it than the separation between that which 
is related" (Hegel 1948, p. 309). 
Thus, Hegel's entire system is governed by the principle of universal 
interdependence. Life is a multiplicity of irtdi~idual organisms, separated 
and yet united. 
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TRANSITION 
The purpose of including a reading of the works of Heraclitus, Plato 
and Hegel, in the light of the problematic of the Other has already 
been presented in the Introduction , the Transition of the first 
chapter and at the end of the third chapter. However, a brief over-
view is here indicated in order to facilitate reading. 
Heraclitus is usually considered the true and authentic doer of 
philosoJ>hia , in that logos and being were in him still united, and 
the line of development after him is interpreted as a gradual estrange-: 
ment of logos from being. According to Heidegger (e.g. 1953), this 
lineage, which leads iogos to legein (speaking) and then to logi.c is 
ofie of a gradual loss of vigour. The preceedirtg three chapters were 
intended to illuminate this issue. In Heraclitus, the Other is not 
a static and identifiable entity. It has been argued that it was a 
constantly changing opposition. That is what was termed 'internal 
Other'. Common logos was understood as being the 'external' and true 
Other. External is a rather unfortunate term, but nevertheless it 
conveys the intended meaning of its relation to the commonness of logos 
which suggests an external and public quality. Yet, according to 
Heraclitus, common logos is the true and authentic state of being, 
and it has, in that sense, an interior quality too. It is this 
_read,ing of the Ephesian Riddler that reveals the meaning of the unity 
of logos and being; within the problematic of the Other. 
Plato develops the Heraclitean positions £urther. His theory of 
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Forms, in conjunction with his tripartide model of the psyche, offers 
a more sophisticated understanding of the Other in terms of its 
implications for philosophical thought as well as for other disciplines 
and activities (e.g. Art, politics,etc). Yet, the Other is now an 
identified entity outside. The Forms, despite their intrinsic re-
lation to being (and this relation should be strongly emphasised), still 
belong to a realm "higher up" and beyond the being. Plato went a 
long way to analyse the inner division of the psyche and the virtues 
of overcoming them through convergence into a unity. The state of 
unity represented again an higher, Other state of being. The gap 
between the being and its Other is, however, so large that Plato 
introduces the Dialectic to account for, as well as deal with the 
inner disharmony. Thus, again, the new reading of Plato unites 
these aspects of his teaching (viz. the Forms, the division of the 
psyche, and the Dialectic) in a novel integration which at the same 
time illuminates the problematic of the Other. 
Hegel is located further along this lineage of separation of logos 
frOIIl being. His grand system ventures to encompass almost all 
philosophical questions. Yet, a re~qing which extracts his formu-
lation of the Other appears to bring the salient aspects of his thought 
into one coherent whole. The dialectic assumes in Hegel dimensions 
of a universal principle; while through its expression in the 
development of consciousness, a more advanced theory of the Other is 
obtained. It is perhaps the first time that the external, psycholo-
gical, social; cultural and environmental Other is accounted for. 
Without recognition of the external Other, no authentic self-conscious-
ness can be achieved, In the intricate Hegelian analysis a series of 
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relevant nuances are illtuninated. Among them is the collective 
nature of consciousness which might be accepted (with discretion) as 
the descendent of the Heraclitean cotnillon logos and the Platonic Forms. 
It may appear as a paradoxical phenomenon that the more removed the 
lineage is from Heraclitus. and the greater the division between logos 
and being, the more elaborate the attempts at grasping this condition 
(of unity) are. Plato and Hegel may represent a progression in this 
direction. The concise apophthegms of Heraclitus on connnon logos 
\ 
captured the essence of this problematic, and yet in Plato, and 
especially in Hegel, the complex theories and many discriminating 
terms needed to achieve the same aim, paradoxically achieve the oppo-
site. They further estrange logos from being and in turn in order to 
re ... unite them conceptually, have to develop even more refined ex-
plartations, which again in their turn contribute towards even further 
estrangement etc. This direction might be perceived as an endless 
and futile excercise which could lead to a disheartening state, re-
sulting in an abandonment of the pursuit of unravelling the problematic 
of the Other. In the chapters to follow, it will be shown that Jung 
actually followed the same path but with the significant difference 
that he found a resolution of this seemingly Sisyphean endeavour, in 
his understanding of the psychological totality of the Self. 
The new reading of Jung in the following pages will therefore fall 
in the perspective of the preceeding chapters. 
' ' 
PART TWO 
Chapter One 
C.G. Jung: Childhood and prepsychiatric period. 
"My 1 f e is a story of the self-
real sation of the unconscious" 
Jung (1963, p.17). 
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An examination of Jung's childhood is imperative, not only because such 
an investigation is a legitimate procedure in understand'ing any person-
ality, i.e., by placing the interests and achievements of that person in 
the developmental perspective of his childhood, but for a particularly 
pertinent reason: it was during his childhood that Jung first recognised 
the existence of an "Other "in his own self. That Other played a significant 
role in his life and served as a primary motive for most of the crucial 
moves in his professional career, theoretical researches and personal 
inner development. In· his autobiographical work ''Memories_, Dreams, 
Reflections"* Jung writes explicitly about his early awareness pf the 
Other, which Marie-Louise von Franz terms a ii second living psychic presence'' 
(l.975,p.38). Jung called it !ig.n2 personality which he distinguished from 
No. l, the "ordinary" personality of Jung the schoolboy. 
Carl Gustav Jung was born on the 26th of July 1875 in Kesswil, Switzerland, 
to Pas tor Johann Achilles Ju~g (1842-1896) and Emilie Jung (1848-1923). 
Soon after his birth the family moved to Laufen, 0 the castle and vicarage 11, 
near the falls of the Rhine. lie spent his early childhood in the country, 
'close to nature, without any playmates and absorbed in his own fantasy 
world interwoven with intense e~periences with his paren~s, whom he later 
regarded as belonging to the ''medieval times". Jung refers to tnis period 
as rather Gothic, with his sickness of upseudo-croup accompanied by choking 
fits'' (M.D~R., p.34), his recurrent nightmares,haunting memories of funerals, 
under the constant shadow of an austere church which evoked fear rather 
than awe in the boy Jung. 
Yet it would be wrong to consider this period as traumatic and without 
any positive value for Jung's development, because, at the same time, 
* l:fereafter referred to as uM. D.R. ii 
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he managed to derive some extremely illuminating insights about himself 
and human nature in general. 
The isolation of Jung's early childhood was broken when he first went to 
school. 
"One 'of my reasons for liking school was that there 
I found at last the playmates I had lacked for 
so long" (M.D.R., P• 33). 
Going to school was a big step because Jung $oon became aware that his 
playmates were not only a source of joy: 
"I found that they alienated me from myself. 
When I was with them I became different 
from the way I was at home •.• It seemed to me 
that the change in myself was due to the 
influence of my schoolfellows, who somehow misled 
me or compelled me to be different from what I 
thought I was. The influence of this wider world, 
this world which contained others besides my 
parents, seemed to me dubious if not altogether 
suspect and, in some obscure way, hostile'' 
(M.D.R. ,pp.34-5). 
This ''splitting" of himself due to the alienating influence of the ~wider 
world'' was not a permanent state. Jung, in his childhood world of 
imagination found three ways of healing that 11 split" and reestablishing 
his 11 inner security" which "was threatened" (M.D.R., p.35). 
First, through his game of making a fire at a particular spot in hisgar-
den)he developed a particular 'relationship' with 'his' fire. Ottier 
children had their own fires; 
;; ••• but these fires were profane and did not 
concern me. My fire alone was living and had an 
unmistakable aura of sanctity"(M.D.R., p.35). 
Another game which seems to have been of greater importance to Jung was 
sitting on a stone in his garden: 
"Often, when I was alone, I sat down on this stone, 
and then began an imaginary game that went something 
like this: 'I am sitti11g on top of this stone and it 
is underneath.' But the stone also could say 'I' and 
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think: 'I am lying here on this slope and he 
is sitting on top of me.' The question then 
arose: 'Am I the one who is sitting on the stone, 
or am I the stone on which he is sitting?' 
This question always perplexed me, and I would 
stand up, wondering who was what now" (M.D. R., p. 35l 
The split· was clearly manifested in this game, and, in a sense, external-
ized. Despite the lack of definite identification of the boundaries of 
his personality, revealed by the primitive question "Am I this stone or 
this body?'1, the actual stone was not a source of fear or anxiety for 
Jung. On the contrary, he cherished that stone and his relationship to it 
very much: 
11 there was no doubt whatsoever that this 
stone stood in some secret relationship to me. 
I could sit on it for hours, fascinated by the 
puzzle it set me" (M. D.R. , pp. 35-6). 
Perhaps the most significant of all of Jung's childhood 11imaginary games", 
and which at the same time represented the 1' clima:it and conclusion" 
(H.D.R._, p.38) of his childhood, was associated with a carved manikin 
and a pebble from the Rhine. Without really being aware of what it meant, 
Jung had carved a little manikin at the end of his scnool ruler ''about 
two inches long, with frock coat, top hat, and shiny black boots '1• he 
coloured the manikin with black irtk, sawed him off the ruler and placed 
him in a yellow, varnished pencil-case. He had also made him a bed in the 
case and a coat made out of a bit of wool. 
;'In the case I also placed a smooth,· oblong blackish 
stone from the Rhine, which I had painted with 
water colours to look as though it were divided into 
an upper and lower half, and had long carried around 
in my trouser pocket. This was hi__s stone" (M.D.R., p.36). 
This innocuous child 1 s game had an e~tremely powerful meaning. he hid the 
pencil-case with the manikin and stone in one of the beams under the roof 
in the attic which was hardly accessible due to the "worm-eaten and rotten" 
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floorboards, and visited it, secretively, when he was unhappy and in 
some way "unsafe11 • The entire ritual, which was carefully kept secret 
from his family, had a profoundly soothing effect on Jung. Being with the 
manikin and the stone would restore the feeling of security in the 
frightened boy. MoreoveL, every time he went up to the attic to look at 
' the contents of the case, he: 
'' ••• placed in the case a little scroll of paper 
on which I had previously written something during 
school hours in a secret.languageof my own invent-
ion. The addition of a new scroll always had the 
character of a solemn ceremonial act. Unfortunately 
I cannot remember what I wanted to communicate to the 
manikin. I only know that my 'letters' constituted a 
kind of library for him. I fancy, though I cannot be 
certain, that they may have consisted of sayings 
that particularly pleased me" (M. D. R~, p. 37 emphasis added). 
There is an implicit similarity in all of the three imaginary games • 
They all involved a fascinating ''secret relationshipit with· an "object'~ 
(fire, stone, manikin and pebble) which somehow represented an Other in 
Jung's own personality. It is also clear from his descriptions that those 
Others were in such close relationship to himself that there was even a 
confusion of the boundaries of his own personality which at times, included, 
or was totally absorbed in, that Other. It is very significant that Jung 
related these games to ,a state of inner split • Their function and purpose 
was to res tore the threatened unity of his being. Referring to the game...1. 
ritual of the manikin and pebble, he wrote: 
"My disunion.with tJ1yse1f and uncertainty in the world 
at large led me to an action which at the same time 
was quite incomprehensible to me 11 (M.D_.R., p. 36 emphasis 
added). 
1;he ''disunion •1 with himself referred to a number of situations. One, the 
"alienating influence" of his fellow-pupils; has already been discussed. 
two more factors can now be mentioned: first, the 
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inconsistencies of his parents' character and behaviour, and second, his 
own religious questioning. Jung repeatedly described the unsettling and 
at times frightening effect that his parents had on him. The 11 unpredictabil-
it1'of his mother made him develop a mistrustful attitude towards women: 
"The feeling I associated with 'woman' was for a 
long time that of innate unreliability" (M.D.R. ,P .23). 
As far as his father i'S concerned, the picture was more complicated 
because, being a pastor, he represented at the same t~me both a family 
(social, secular), as well as a religious authority. Jung remembers him 
as a ''reliable'' but ''powerless" person (M.D.R., p.23) with an ''irritable'1 
temperament. The Christian religion that he represented created many 
conflicts in his son: 
" ••• often it seemed to me a solemn masquerade, a kind 
of funeral at which mourners put on serious or 
mournful faces but the next moment were secretly 
laughing and not really sad at all. Lord .Jesus seemed 
to me in some ways a god of death, helpful, it is 
true, in that he scared away the terrors of the night, 
but himself uncanny, a -crucified and bloody corpse. 
Secretly, his love and kindness, which I always heard 
praised, appeared doubtful to me, chiefly because the 
people who talked most about 'dear Lord Jesus' wore 
black frock coats and shiny black boots which reminded 
me of burials. They were my father's colleagues as well 
as eight of my uncles - all parsons. For many years 
they inspired fear in me ••• " (M.D.R., p.28) 
In these situations Jung felt "alienated'' and ''disunited'' because he 
experienced both his inner and outer worlds as unsafe, insecure, 
unpredictable and contradictory. 
The imaginary game-rituals can then be seen as a symbolic attempt to 
restore the unity of his personal experiential t.rorld. The objects as such, 
fire, stone and ruler, were in no realistic relationship to him. There 
is no mention at all whether that fire was used for any particular purpose, 
or whether that very stone was associated with any specifically pleasant 
circumstances. Their function, it could be said, was solely symbolic. 
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Thus, a hypothesis could be advanced that they symbolically represented 
the Other in Jung's own personality in an externalized form, so that by 
being involved with them, the little boy would achieve a unity with 
himself which would reinstate his sense of security. 
"In all difficult situations, whenever I had done 
something wrong or my feelings had been hurt, or 
when my father's irritability or my mother's 
invalidism oppressed me, I thought of my carefully 
bedded-down and wrapped-up manikin and his smooth, 
prettily coloured stone" (M.D.R., p.37). 
Such consolation produced the following results: 
"I fe 1 t safe, and the tormenting sense of being 
at odds with myself was gone" (M.D. R., p. 37). 
And a little further it is remarked that: 
"The meaning of these actions, or how I might 
explain them, never worried me. I contented 
myself with the feeling of newly-won.security 
and was satisfied to possess something that no 
one knew and no one could get at. It was an 
inviolable secret which must never be betrayed, 
for the safety of my life depended on it. Why 
that was so I did not ask myself. It simply was 
so" (M.IJ.R., p. 37 emphasis added). 
Having examined these objects as convenient figures upon which the Other 
was projected, a further observation can be made: the sequence of the fire, 
the stone, and the manikin and pebble could be considered as a progression 
in the development of a clearer articulation of the Other, from a~ 
undifferentiated natural presence to a well defined figure with human 
shape and characteristics. 
Jung's particular fire which ''had to burn forever", t1was living and had an 
unmistakable aura of sanctity", as was noted earlier. Fire, apart from all 
its symbolic significance, is a natural phenomenon which offers a basic 
comfort, its warmth. Jung's special relationship with that fire could 
represent a primitive attempt to obtain warmth and security. Jung clearly 
attributed to the stone, also a natural object but of a more concrete and 
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permanent nature than fire, an anthropomorphic character when he expressed 
his uncertainty as to whether "he4' was actually the stone. The stone was 
capable of saying "I'' and also thinking (vi de supra, p. 98). Jung 
emphasised that undoubtedly he had "some secret relationship '1 to that 
stone. The issue here is of a relationship, not of a passive presence 
as with the fire. 
Finally, the critical disunion with himself culminated in the elaborated 
representation of his Other in the carved manikin and the painted pebble. 
Here, the stone is transformed by himself and is not any more in its 
natural state. It is not accidental that it was painted 11 into an upper 
and lower half'', portraying a unity of division. Jung stated that: 
" •.• the little wooden figure with the stone was a 
first attempt, still unconscious and childish, to 
give shape to the secret" (M.D.R., p.37 emphasis added). 
That most important secret, the exact nature of whi.ch Jung was unaware, 
was associated with a) his realizations that he had his own understanding 
of religion, his parents and the world around him, b) the intense feelings 
of disunity which resulted from these insights, and c) his efforts to 
restore a unity in himself. Jung's internal conflict, insofar as its 
resolution was achieved by .relating to the fire, the stone, the manikin 
and the pebble, could be seen as a disunity with his Other as projected 
onto those objects. Giving shape to that secret could then be seen as an 
active attempt to relate to his Other. In other words, to objectify the 
conflict and work it out in the imaginary world. This is the essence of 
the process which he later called ''active imagination it, 
As far as the manikin is concerned, it is evident that Jung considered it/ 
hitn as an Other. The pebble belonged to the manikin, it "was his stone". 
' 
Moreover, as von Franz (1975) correctly observes, the clothes of the 
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manikin are identical to identifiable people, the parsora and others 
associated with the Church and funerals, all of whom were central to 
Jung's conflicts. The manikin was the last development of a primitive 
representation of the Other. Thereafter Jung clearly distinguished an 
Other personality in himself, whom he called No. 2. 
Before proceeding to investigate No. 1. and No. 2 personalities, three 
further points concerning the manikin and pebble ritual should be 
emphasised. 
Almost twenty years after this childhood experience, when Jung was 
researching for his book 11Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido ~1 he came 
across descriptions of strikingly similar ''soul-stones near Arlesheim, 
and the Australian churingas"(M.D.R., p.38). At this time he had an 
image of the manikin as: 
11 
••• a little cloaked god of the ancient world, a 
Telesphoros such as stands on the monuments of 
Asklepios and reads to him from a scroll. Along 
with this recollection there came to me, for the 
first time, the conviction that there are archaic 
psychic components which have entered the. individual 
psyche without any direct line of tradition" (M.D.R. ,p.38). 
Jung further identifies the pebble with the '' life-foJ"c:e'' its elf. It is 
therefore very noteworthy that his early childhood episode with the manikin, 
his first articulated relationship with his Other, was instrumental in 
discovering the notion of the archetypes, as components of a collective 
psychic structure. 
Another characteristic issue is that part of the ritual in which J~ng 
placed those little scrolls in the pencil case. The inscriptions on them 
were in "a secret language" of his 11 own invention". This childish game 
reflected perhaps the need to communicate vitally important issues 
concerning one's existential security in a language that is adequate. 
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Common everyday language was obviously inadequate for Jung to express 
those secret messages upon which the safety of his life depended. 
One might say that the little scrolls represented Jung's first attempt 
to develop the language of the Unconscious having recognised that our 
ordinary conceptual language is inadequate. 
Finally, it should be remembered that the book'Wandlungen und Symbole 
der Libido: upon which Jung was working when he discovered the idea of 
the collective Unconscious is usually considered as one of the main 
contributing factors in his break with Freud. Jung's main innovation which 
was not tolerated in the Freudian camp was precisely the Collective 
Unconscious. Although there is no indication that Freud ever knew about 
Jung's manikin, one might speculate that Freud might have interpreted 
it as representing Jung's own father. Such an interpretation might have 
been reinforced by the fact that the manikin even had the same clothes 
as Jung's father, 11 black frock coat and shiny black boots'1• Jung, i10wever, 
associated it with a much more 11 collective'1 figure, a Telesphoros, a 
figure full of"a supply of life-force'' (M.D.R., p. 39). 
In summarising what might be called the 'prehistory' of the Other in 
the life of Jung, the following can be said. 
Jung experienced some insecurity in his early childhood due to the 
personalities of his parents, his loneliness which was interrupted by a 
more alienating influence of his. schoolmates later, and his own religious 
conflicts. This insecurity was dealt with in a successful manner by 
devising certain imaginary games/rituals. He thus achieved a state of 
security and inner unity. These games were related to a) a fire, b) a 
stone, and c) a manikin and a. pebble. All of these may be seen as his 
I 
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Other because, by relating to them, he experienced peace and unity 
with himself. As there is a progression in terms of differentiation and 
conscious activity in these three games, one could hypothesise that they 
represent three steps towards a more elaborated differentiation of the 
Other; the Fire, being the most primitive representation of the Other 
(is it 'accidental' that this study commenced the discussion of the 
Other with the Heraclitean principle of fire?), and the human figure the 
most advanced of the three. This last development in the representation 
of the Other, the manikin, was also associated with Jung's discovery 
of the archetypes and the necessity for a special and unique language 
to adequately communicate tinconscious material. 
Soon after the episode with the manikin and the pebble, Jung, during 
his twelfth year, had two important experiences which led to his real-
ization that he 11 was actually two different persons" (M.D.R., p.50). 
One day, after school, a boy pushed Jung and he fell and hitting his 
head against the kerbstone, almost lost consciousness and was carried 
to a nearby house. As a result of this, he began having: 
", •• fainting· spells whenever I had to return to 
school, and whenever my parents set me to doing 
my homework" (M.p.R., p.46). 
The fainting spells kept him away from school for more than six months 
and caused his parents much concern. One of the medical diagnoses given 
to his condition was epilepsy. During this time Jung seemed to enjoy his 
solitude, freedom and life without any responsibilities: 
0 I was free, could dream for hours, be anywhere 
I liked, in the woods or by the water, or draw ••• 
Above all, I was able to plunge into the world of 
the mysterious. To that realm belonged trees, a 
pool, the swamp, stones and anim~ls, and my father's 
library. But I was growing more and more away from the 
world, and had all the while faint pangs of conscience • 
••• I had the obscure feeling that I was fleeing from 
myself" (M.D.R., p.46-7). 
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Then, overhearing a conversation of his father, Jung realised the 
financial difficulties of his family. This dis tress~d him. 
"I was thunderst·ruck. This was the collision with 
reality. 'Why, then, I must get to work!' I thought 
suddenly. From that moment on I became a serious 
child" (M.D.R., p.47). 
He gradually mastered his attacks and shamefully reflecting on his 
"disgraceful'' and ''neurotic'' condition, he studied overconscientiously 
and desperately tried to compensate for what he saw as overindulgence 
during his "illness". Moreover: 
" ••• the neurosis became another of my secrets, 
but it was a shameful secret, a defas. t" (M.D.R., p.48). 
The second incident occurred while he was returning home from school: 
" •.. and suddenly for a single moment I had the 
overwhelming impression of having just emerged from 
a dense cloud. I knew all at once: now I am 
myself! It was as if a wall of mist were at my 
back, and behind that wall there was not yet an 
'I'. But at this moment I came upon myself. 
Previously I had existed too, but everything 
had merely happened to me. Now I happened to 
myself. Now I knew: I am myself now, now I exist" 
(M. D. R. , p • 4 9) • 
If these two incidents are placed in the perspective of Jung's previous 
experiences, one might observe a continuity starting with the three 
imaginary games and culminating in the awakening of his self-conscious-
ness. In this light, the "fainting neurosis'' could be understood as an 
expression of a pressing need in Jung's personality to remain in a state 
of permanent unity within himself. ·He· temporarily reached this unity 
by excluding all outside responsibilities. Such responsibilities triggered 
off disunity within him and were a cause of great suffering. Jung soon 
discovered how "un-realistic", ultimately false and dangerous was the way 
he attempted to achieve that unity • He acknowledged that in fact it was 
"defeat", a ''shameful" "neurosis", as it essentially did not solve the 
problem, but merely covered it with the seductive veil of denial. His 
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determination to accept his predicament and to come to grips with his 
suffering and its causes, naturally led to a richer realization of his 
own being. He left behind the realm of natural existence with its non-
conflicting flow (the swamp, the trees, stones and animals), and his 
consciousness moved to differentiated maturity where life did not just 
1
'happen'' but became a result of his own actions and thoughts, and of him-
self as an active agent. This development, which amounts to nothing else 
but the first dramatic awareness of the differentiation of his Ego, had 
to make explicit the disunity within himself. 
It is therefore not surprising that the subsequent passages in "Memories, 
Dreams, Reflections" deal precisely with Jung's first reference to the 
Other in himself: 
"Then, ••• it occurred to me that I was actually . 
two different persons" (M. D.R., p. 50). 
One was the schoolboy with all its weaknesses, and the 'Other' was an 
1
'old man" with authority. Jung also refers to this Other as 'tNo. 2", 
and 1'second personality". No. 1 was: 
u ••• the .son of my parents, who went to school and 
was less intelligent, attentive, hard-working, 
decent, and clean than many other boys" (M.D.R., pp.61-2). 
No.2 was: 
" ••• grown up - old, in fact - sceptical, mistrustful, 
remote from the world of men, but close to nature, 
to earth, the sun, the moon, the weather, all living 
creatures, and above all close to the night, to 
dreams, and whatever 'God' worked directly in him11 
(M.D.R., p.62). 
Although at times Jung thought of the Other as a concrete representative 
of the eighteenth century, even down to the specific details of his attire, 
he generally considered him as a figure beyond time. This Other, second 
personality belonged to a realm: 
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" like a temple in whicl:t anyone who entered was 
transformed and suddenly overpowered by a vision of 
the whole cosmos, so that he could only marvel and 
admire, forgetful of himself" (M.D.R., p.62). 
The magical quality that No.2 possessed, along with his ''timelessness" 
(M.D.R., p.110) had a profound effect on Jung. Whenever he was overwhelmed 
by excessive suffering he would actively seek refuge in the world of 
No.2 Such experience would result in feelings of ~peace and solitude" 
(M.D.R., p.62), as well as confidence in his own worth. He no longer sat 
by his fire, or contemplated his stone, neithe.r did he run to his manikin 
and pebble - the Other he sought was now in his own self, a recognisable 
part of his own personality. 
Thus, the ''second personality 11 which Jung distinguished in himself can o,nly 
be partly understood as an internalization of the Other which was earlier 
manifested in the fire, stone, manikin and pebble - partly because this 
new development added the following characteristics to the rather primitive 
original formulation of the Other. 
Firstly, Jung acknowledged a division within himself which was not only a 
source of suffering, but also of potential unity. Since that Other was now 
located within, Jung was no longer a lonely, frightened boy, but had the 
resources to heal his condition. 
Secondly, he started observing similar divisions in other people. This made 
him aware of the complexities of the human personality and he ceased to 
see people in terms of unidimensional, childish divisions of good 
and bad. He applied this mature perception first to his own mother, 
distinguishing a No.I and No.2 personality in her. Again, No.l was her 
ordinary personality, a ''loving mother" (M:,D._R., p.67), ''innocuous and 
human" (p.66), and No.2 was 11 uncannyi•, "archaic and ruthless; ruthless 
as truth and nature ii (M.D.R., p.68). Jung noticed that his mother's .No. 2 
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was an: 
11 embodiment of what I have called 
'natural mind'" (M.D.R., p.68). 
This bnatural mind" was described by Jung as springing: 
"from natural sources, and not from opinions 
taken from booksi it wells up from the earth 
like a natural spring, and brings with it the 
peculiar wisdom of nature" (M.D.R., p.68n3). 
Thirdly, Jung realised that one significant implication of the division 
\ 
between No.1 and No.2 personalities was the strong relationship 
between man and a) his fellow human beings, and b) nature. Since all men 
have ttvo personalities they share a personal and at the same time, a 
suprapersonal secret • Moreover, all people's second personalities 
have their roots deep in nature and it is therefore possible for them to 
communicate through that channel • Jung referred to this kind of 
perception as "insight" and considered it as: 
11 
••• based on instinct, or on a 'participation 
mystique' with others. It is as if the 'eyes of 
the background' do the seeing in an impersonal 
act of perception" (M.D.R., p.68). 
Such understanding of human nature enabled Jung to appreciate a very 
profound unity within the entire cosmos. 
Fourthly, the division between a first and a second personality within 
the same individual represents a decisive step towards Jung's mature 
conception of a transpersonal domain. Insofar as No.2 was, in a sense,. 
common to all men, one might say that there is a supraindividual element in 
everybody's personality. Moreover, Jung was fascinated at the thought that 
even other people came to a similar realization as far as the division 
between No.l and No.2 is concerned. For example, he interpreted Goethe's 
Faust as portraying this very issue and suggested that Faust himself was 
"the living equivalent of No.2 ii• This insight: 
.. · .... · .. · 
'•,' 
11 
••• was not only comforting to me, it also gave me 
an increased feeling of inner security, and a 
sense of belonging to the human community. I was no 
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longer isolated and a mere curiosity, a sport 
of cruel nature" (M.D.R., p.107). 
·At this stage Jung,naturally, did not have either sufficient experience 
or an adequate theoretical background to formulate this important insight 
with more psychological sophistication. The distinction was rather crude 
and the precise functioning and dynamics of the dualistic psyche remained 
undefined. Jung, nevertheless, had a sound grasp of many significant aspects 
of the Other, and during his school and student years, he developed a 
fairly comprehensive understanding or the Other. 
Jung realised that the Other had no 11 pied-a-terre 0 : 
He: 
11
••• in him I was lifted beyond the here and now, 
in him I felt myself a single eye in a thousand-
eyed universe" (M.D.R., p.94). 
n ••• had no definable character at all; he was 
a v_i~a :per_a.cta., born, living, dead, everything 
in one; a total vision of life" (M.D.J:l. pp.106-7). 
Despite all the virtues of the Other, which were more evident in times 
of crises, the second personality created many conflicts with No.1 
personality. No.2 was of a passive nature and lacked any realistic 
motivational impetus. He was: 
" ••• incapable of moving so much as a pebble 
upon the earth. No.1. rebelled against this 
passivity; he wanted to be up and doing, but 
was caught in an insoluble conflict. •. " {M.-D._R.,p.94). 
Furthermore: 
" •• , though pi ti less ly clear about himself, 
he was unable to express himself through the 
dense, dark medium of No.1 , though he longed 
to do so. When No.2 predominated, No.l was 
contained and obliterated in him, just as, 
conversely, No.1 regarded No.2 as a region of 
inner darkness" {M.D._R., p.107). 
Thus, the "insoluble conflict 0 was centred around the passivity of No.2 , 
and 11 his'1 inability to adequately relate to the external reality. No.l , 
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on the other hand, had to respond to the demands of the social reality, 
1
'study, money-making, responsibilities, entanglements ••• '' (M.D.R., p.108), 
and his struggle was not at all eased by the obscurity of No.2. After a 
crucial dream in which Jung succeeded in protecting a tiny light in a 
powerful storm, he had a "great illumination": he realised that ''No.l was 
the bearer of light" (M.D.R., p.108). The ''light" was his consciousness, 
and however1 limited, "small'1 and ''fragile" it was, he began to value it 
since it represented his only source of survival. The insoluble conflict 
was not really insoluble. Jung found a solution: 
"My task was to shield the light and not look 
back at the vita peracta ••. " (M.D.R., p.108). 
As in the case of his earlier resolution not to give in to his 11 fainting 
neurosis'' but to "go forwardit, Jung realised the dangers of neglecting No.l 
personality, the bearer of consciousness .and the sole agent who could 
negotiate the physical as well as social survival of himself. But this did 
not mean that No.2. had to be totally supressed: 
"I must leave No.2 behind me, that was clear. But 
under no circumstances ought I to deny him to myself 
or declare him invalid. This would have been a 
self-mutilation •• ," (M.D.R., p.109). 
The depth, richness and wisdom of No.2 were too well known to Jung ·since 
his childhood for him to fall into the trap of banishing f'him''· He aptly 
characterized such a step as 0 self-mutilation 11 • No.l and No.2 were, after 
all, one person and they had to coexist. Both of them were necessary and 
beneficial in their own separate and yet interrelated spheres. Referring to 
this inter-relation and dialogue, Jung candidly described it as his: 
"profoundest experiences: on the one hand a bloody 
struggle, on the other supreme ecstasy" (M.D. R., p. 65). 
Jung's distinction between No.1 and No.2 personalities within himself 
was widely misunderstood. Being aware of this, Jung in his autobiography, 
clarified that this separation had: 
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"nothing to do with a 'split' or dissociation 
in the ordinary medical sense" (M.D.R., p.62). 
On the contrary, he considered it as a natural and typical phenomenon 
which resides within each person. The Other, although in everybody, is 
only ''perceived by the very few'': 
"Most people's conscious understanding is not 
sufficient to realise that he is also what they 
are" (M.D.R. ,pp.62-3). 
Barbara Hannah compares Jung's understanding of the Other to the use of 
the term 'Self' in Eastern philosophies and religions, particularly Hinduism. 
Interpreting No.l as the Ego and No.2 as the S~lf (an interpretation 
which was very strongly implied by Jung himself), she gives the following 
quotation from the Brihad~ranyaka Upanishad which aptly illustrates 
the striking similarities between these two exegeses: 
11 He who dwells in the seed, and within the seed, 
whom the seed does not know, whose body the seed 
is, and who pulls (rules) the seed within, he is 
the Self, the puller (ruler) within, the immortal; 
unseen, but seeing; unheard, but hearing; unperceived, 
but perceiving; unknown, but knowing. There is no 
other seer but he, there is no other hearer but he, 
there is no other perceiver than he, there is no 
other knower but he. This is thy Self, the ruler 
within, the immortal .•• " (In Hannah 1976, p. 4 7). 
Jung repeatedly underlined the "timeless" character of the Other, and in a 
typical passage he almost paraphrased the description given in the 
Upanishad: 
"fNo. 2. was]never clearly defined but yet [was] 
definitely present" (M._D_!R., p.110). 
Every individual has the Self within himself as the pivotal agent for 
meaningful living. It is usually "unperceived''· Jung, according to Hannah: 
" .•• at the age of twelve, to his own great 
consternation, did see, hear, perceive, and 
know this figure" (1976, p.48) •. 
Moreoever, he studied and described this Other, not only in himself 
but, one might claim that he made it his life task to relentlessly explor~ 
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the various manifestations of the Other in as many spheres of human 
culture as possible. Jung's scientific contribution might be seen as a 
stubbornly continuous effort to refine and elaborate his understanding 
of this Other, and "his" relationship to the Ego, commencing with the 
imaginary games of his childhood through to the mature definitions of 
the collective unconscious and the archetypes. He admitted that: 
II 
No.l 
the play and counterplay between personalities 
and No. 2 , • . . run through my who le life .. , 11 
(M.D.R., p.62). 
It is, therefore, a legitimate claim that Jung's awareness of this 
division played an invaluable role both in his personal life and his 
scientific research. 
After the fainting neurosis Jung's explicit wish was to reinforce his 
No.l. as much as possible. The task was not easy, as the Other was very 
much needed. Jung slowly came to a solution to his big dilemna·, and 
between his sixteenth and nineteenth years, managed to give full expression 
to his No.1. During this period his behaviour changed noticeably and from 
a" shy, timid, mistrustful 11 person he became ''more accessible and more 
communicative'• (M.D.R., p.89), Along the way, he also associated No.l 
with science, and No.2 with the humanities and religion. Thus, dur'ing 
this period his No.1 was absorbed in the scientific materialism which 
was predominant at the time, and No.2 , with its idiosyncratic tendencies, 
was experienced as an embarrassment. As far as the choice of studies was 
concerned, Jung wanted to study natural science. Yet, there was a strong 
inclination towards archaeology. He had a special interest in "everything 
Egyptian and Babylonian 11 • Obviously the first choice was from No.1 and the 
second from No. 2. This dilemma was solved by a •i sudden inspiration" to 
study medicine. Jung did not perceive this decision as representing a 
middle solution between No.1 and No.2 , but only as a relative triumph 
for No. l : 
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"I had definitely opted for science" 
(M.D. R., p.105). 
The hard reality of the financial situation of his family was one of the 
main reasons that compelled him to study medicine. Although there was the 
possibility of a wide choice of specialization after the initial studies, 
Jung, nevertheless, understood that his enrollment for medicine was 
basically a ''compromise'' with the demands of the external, social reality; 
a compromise which was painful but at the same time also very necessary. 
During his studies he became very interested in philosophy and he followed 
with great enthusiasm the intellectual currents of his time, He delved 
into the works of Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Kant, and was also attracted 
by the literature on ''spiritualistic phenomena" which he felt exemplified 
the"objective behaviour of the human psycheil (M~D.R.,119). 
ln 1898 he started thinking seriously about his future career and the 
problem of specialization came to the fore. The choice was between 
surgery and internal medicine. He was even promised an assistantship in 
Munich by Professor Mliller, then in charge of the department of internal 
medicine at Basel University, which Jung attended. Despite this ~ttractive 
offer Jung finally chose Psychiatry, a field which was not part of his 
earlier plans. The unexpected choic~ came.about after a number of events 
which Jung mentions in his autobiography. 
First, there were two incidents during which objects in the Jung household 
tnexplicably split and broke. One day, without any apparent reason, the 
top of a solid walnut wood table cracked with a powerful noise and Jung's 
mother's No. 2 said, nodding 11 darkly 11 , "Yes, yes, .•• that means something" 
(M.D.R.p.126). Then, a couple of weeks later the steel blade of a bread 
knife snapped off in several pieces, again with a deafening noise. Although 
Jung had no explanation for either of these incidents, he felt his mother's 
No. 2 had intuited their meaning. The last, and perhaps most significant 
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episode preceeding Jung's final decision to specialize in Psychiatry, 
involved a girl who acted as a medium in a group of people indulging 
in spiritualistic phenomena. A more detailed discussion of her behaviour 
and Jung's explanations will be givenin the following chapter , .but it is 
necessary to stress here how Jung 11 somehow connected" this girl with the 
previous two puzzling and causeless occurrences. He persistently observed 
her for a period of two years and finally moulded this study into his 
doctoral dissertation. The significance of these observations can be 
appreciated once Jung's own words are quoted: 
", •• I had learned from this example {of the girl with the 
abilities of a medium) how a No.2 personality is formed, 
how _it enters in_to_a child's consciousness and finally 
integrates it into it~elf" (M.D.R.,p.128 emphasis added). 
In addition to the above mentioned events, Jung also considered another 
factor instrumental in his sudden inclination for Psychiatry. One of the 
s~t books which he was studying for the state e:Kamination reversed his 
original prejudice against psychiatry. Through the pages of Krafft-
Ebing 1 s•1ehrbuch derPsychiatrie!1 Jung realised with great excitement that 
psychiatry was: 
0 
, , • the empirical field common to bio_logical and 
spiritual facts, which I had everywhere sought and 
nowhere found'' (M.l.).R. ,P.130 emphasis added). 
At long last his No. l.. and No.2 did not have to be antagonistic to each other 
but could co-exist. Studying psychiatry would enable him to give full 
expression to all parts of his personality. Thus, he came to his decision, 
despite the reaction from his colleagues at the University, and felt 
confident that it was undoubtedly the right one. He experienced himself 
as a 11 united double nature'' with all the energy and confidence that the 
eradication of the previous split could bring. 
It is, therefore, once more evident that Jungts experience and conceptua~~ 
ization of a division between 'himself 1 afid an-Other personality played a 
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crucial role in his life. Here it was the significant factor in deciding 
his career in psychiatry. Jung's constant ~reoccupation with the inter-
relationship between No. 1 and No.2 compelled him to view his own experiences 
and the phenomena around him in terms of this dichotomy. The two unusual 
• 
events in his house (with the table and the knife) were \'somehow'' connected 
,•. t· 
with the Other. He got this clue from his mother's behaviour. Then, the 
girl in the spiritualistic seances (whom he also related to the previous 
incidents) made him realise the 'formation' of No.2. Jung called this 
encounter a "great experience" which: 
" •.. wiped out all my earlier philosophy and made it 
possible for me to achieve a psychological point of 
view. I had discarered some objective facts about 
the human psyche" (M.D.R., p.128 emphasis added). 
When finally he saw that there was an established scientific discipline, psych-
iatry, whose very subject matter was this division within the human psyche, 
Jung, in a sense, had no option but to devote himself entirely to it. 
In psychiatry Jung found an objective scientific account of what had 
troubled him for so many years in secret. 
No.l and No.2 were not a product of his own world of imagination, but 
indeed existed in all people, and moreover psychiatry had this "united 
double nature 11 as its object of investigation. Reading Krafft-Ebing' s text-
book-3'tm:g was al.so overwhelmed by the discovery that the author, in a 
perfectly legitimate way, expressed his subjective experiences. The book 
was "in part a subjective confession" and the author stood behind the 
"objectivity of his experiences ••. with the whole of his personality, 
with the totality of his being" (M.D.R., p.130). This was for Jung a 
great revelation. He did not have to hide his own intimate search for 
making sense out of human existence - in psychiatry he would be 
allowed to utilise his insights within the framework of a scientific 
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discipline. The totality of his being could be involved and not only 
his No.l personality. 
Viewed in this way, Jung's option to specialise in psychiatry is afforded 
a logical and developmental explanation. Other factors influencing this 
choice can also be enumerated, e.g., his father's nervous breakdown 
(Rieff, 1966), and perhaps all include elements of some truth. Nevertheless, 
the argument developed above still stands, as it captures the inner 
consequence and personal meaning of Jung's choice of career, by presenting 
it as a culmination of his long personal inquiry into his own psyche. 
PART TWO 
Chapter Two 
C.G. Jung:. Psychiatric period. 
"When you set out for Ithaka 
ask that your way be long, 
full of adventure, full of instruction ••. 11 
C.P. Cavafy: Ithaka 
Tr. E. Keeley and P. Sherrard. 
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- 120 -
Jung's early psychiatric work, which begins with the period after his 
clinical internship and continues approximately until the time of his 
close association with Freud, (1900 - 1907), has received very little 
attention. Very few studies have concentrated on this period and; with 
the notable exception of Ellenberger (1970) and Fordham (1956), most 
have treated it in a rather superficial manner, as unrelated to Jung's 
later periods and as a subject of mere historical curiosity (e.g. Lewis 
1957, Bennet 1967, Hall and Nordby 1973). In contrast, Michael Fordham; 
stressing the "remarkable inner coherence" throughout Jung's researches, 
emphasised that 
" the only way to understand Jung is to take his 
researches as a whole, perceiving how one stage grows 
out of that preceding it" (1956 ,p. 3). 
This study, in full accordance with this viewpoint, goes a step further 
by adding Jiing's own life, in addition to his researches, in an inseparable 
part of the continuum which reveals this ''remarkable inner coherence". 
This approach has already been demonstrated in the previous chapter and 
will continue throughout this investigation, from the specific viewpoint of 
the metatheoretical structure of the Other. 
In 1900 Jung started his psychiatric internship at the Burgh8lzli Psychiatric 
Hospital which at the same time was the training centre for the Medical 
School of the University of Zurich. Two years earlier Dr. Eugen Bleuler 
took up the post of medical superintendent, replacing Dr. August Forel.: 
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1 !t was Forel who first coined the term" dissociation", referring to 
1
' confused processes of thought '1 which 1' apply most correctly t~ 
schizophrenic disturbances of association '1 (Bleuler 191 l , p. 86). This 
term was destined to exert considerable influence on psychiatric thought 
for many succeeding years, and acquired a central place in Jung's early 
work. 
During his period of service at BurghBlzli (1900 - 1909), Jung found 
himself among prominent psychiatrists and psychologists such as Ludwig 
Binswanger, Karl Abraham, Eugene Minkowski, Frederick Peterson, A.A. Brill 
and Herman Rorschach. The Zurich School of Psychiatry , as it was 
called, under Bleuler and in the tradition of Forel and Adolf Meyer 
(who, before leaving for America in 1892, was also associated with 
BurghBlzli), established itself as an international centre of research in 
I 
the fields of hysteria, schizophrenia (dementia praecox), and the pathology 
of association. Eugen Bleuler's contribution to Psychiatry is substantial. 
His pioneer studies led him to originate the term schizophrenia , thus 
abandoning the gloomy and theoretically restrictive model of dementia 
praecox as a process of premature and irreversible degeneration.Bleuler's 
, 
theory of schizophrenia rejected the previously held view that the age 
of onset was in adolescence {praecox), and that the course of illness was 
that of a progressive deterioration. He found that the essential features 
of this abnormality were the 11 loosening of associations ti and a "disharmony 
among affects 11 (Bleuler 1911). This psychological theory offers a 
• -- I • - - • functional interpretation of sch:uophrem.a by focussing on the disorganisation 
of the association process. One might remark here that Forel found in 
Bleuler a most imaginative and innovative successor who creatively moulded 
the concept of "dissociationti into a modern theory with many implications 
I 
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and great heuristic value. As will be examined later, both dissociation 
'and schizophrenia touch on the fundamental issue of inner division and 
Jung's treatment of this issue will be considered against this background. 
Bleuler is also credited as being the first psychiatrist who introduced 
the Freudian theories of psychoanalysis (then considered very unorthodox) 
into a mental hospital. Jung, in his second letter to Freud (5th October 
1906) claims credit for Bleuler's 'conversion' to psychoanalysis, and 
Freud, by return post (7th October ) congratulates him on this achievement, 
" ••• I am especially gratified to learn that you have 
converted Bleuler ••• u(McGuire 1974, p.5). 
The Zurich School was also renowned for the particularly sensitive and 
caring attitude of the staff towards patients. A.A. Brill' s exclamatory 
record of his first encounter with the approach of the Burgh8lzli team 
is characteristic : 
li'rhey were not interested in what the patient said, but 
in what the patient meant" (Brill 1946, p.12). 
This strong commitment at Burgh8lzli to grasping the meaning which the 
patient himself attributes to each of his acts can be seen as the inevitable 
background inspiration for Binswanger's and Minkowski's later 
phenomenological writings. It is also glaringly evident in Jung's approach 
to patients. Ellenberger (1970) gives a dramatic account of the working 
conditions and austere atmosphere at BurghBlzli at the time of Jung's 
internship. Bleuler's selfless service and dedication set an example to 
his medical staff, all of whom were resident at this 0 secular monastery"· 
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No. alcohol consumption was permitted and the working hours were shaped 
by the amount of work that had to be done and the patients' needs. The 
lights of all doctors' rooms were regularly on until late at night. 
Bleuler's humility and good nature were also responsible for the friendly 
and supportive relations among the staff. 
Jung writes in his memoirs that he spent most of the first six months at 
the Burgh!Hzli reading through all the fifty volumes of the "Allemeine 
Zeitschrift fUr Psychiatrie,11 thus mastering the psychiatric theories of 
his time. One may identify two major trends in them: 
i) the predominantly French interest in hysteria, 
hypnosis and somnambUlistic states (Charcot, Liebault, 
Binet, Bernheim, Janet et al ), and 
.. ) l.l the particularly German orientation which included 
investigations into dementia praecox, catatonia and 
hebephrenia (Morel, Kahlbaum, Kraepelin, et al), 
the development of classificatory systems of mental 
diseases (Millon 1969, p.11) and studies on association. 
Zurich, in the Swiss tradition of neutrality, combined both of these trends~ 
blending them in the phenomenological pursuit of meaning. 
Jung consulted Bleuler, his professor and clinical supervisor, for a topic 
for his dissertation and Bleuler suggested an experimental study of the 
disintegration of ideas in Schizophrenia. Jung, because of various 
difficulties, was unable to follow this research and instead decided to 
study the young female medium (who has already been mentioned in the 
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previous chapter). Jung candidly admitted that this choice of topic 
for his thesis was "probably not by accident"! (1958, p.256). 
Jung's first published independent scientific work was the inaugural 
dissertation for his medical degree, "On the Psychology and Pathology of 
So-called Occult Phenomena "(1902). It is therefore justified to examine 
it in some detail in order to trace his early basic themes, and see how 
they are conceived and treated. 
First of all, in examining the background of Jung's choice of thesis topic, 
the following data could be drawn together: 
1. His own admission that the choice was not accidental. 
2. The role his experiences with that medium had played in 
his choice of psychiatry as a specialisation and career. 
3. The 'occult' character of the phenomenon treated in the thesis. 
4. t His intense interest in occult phenomena. According to 
Ellenberg's (1970) and Oeri 's (1970) evidence, during his 
student years at the University of Basel, Jung was known for 
his passionate lectures in student societies on occult and 
philosophical themes. 
5. The existing interest of scientific circles in hysterical and 
somnambulistic states, and 
6. The rather startling fact that under the false initials 1's.w. '' 
Jung concealed the identity of Helene Preiswerk, his cousin, 
on his mother's side (Hillman 1976). 
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Taking all the above together one could say that Jung's thesis combined 
the personal and scientific aspects of enquiry; the research for his 
thesis, although it could be seen as rooted in his own search for meaning 
was, at the same time, phrased in the prevailing scientific paradigm • 
• 
"On the Psychology and Pathology of so-called Occult Phenomena'' 
When Jung first attended Helene Preiswerk's (S.W.) seances, she was fifteen 
and a half years old and had not previously had any serious illness or 
peculiar symptoms of any kind. She came from a disturbed family. Her 
father and two of his brothers had exhibited ''waking hallucinations'', and 
her mother had a ''congenital psychopathic inferiority often bordering on 
psychosis'' (1902, p.17). The aloof father died when s.w. was still an 
- adolescent and left the children to be looked after by their mother who was 
often cruel to them. s.w. grew into a shy and reserved person and ''it is 
... 
no wonder that she felt shut in and unhappy" (p.18). Her educational level 
• was cona.derably low. She had read virtually nothing outside the school 
syllabus. Some members of her family were involved in tableturning, 
spiritualistic sessions and S. W., having expressed some interest, was allowed 
to join in. She initially treated the whole affair as a joke bu.t soon, 
"amid general astonishment" it was discovered that she was 11 an excellent 
medium''· (p.19). 
As far as Jung was concerned S.W. 's performance as a medium was, in fact, 
a somnambulistic act. He carefully observed and described how she assumed 
different personalities, allegedly of the spirits that were expressing 
themselves through her at that particular time. He also noted that shortly 
before her trance, s.W.entered into a catatonic state. While in 'trance' 
s.w. referred to herself in the third person, as the first person was the 
Iii 
' 
• 
-
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alleged spirit that had taken her over. The new role that s.w. had 
found was very exciting and immensely rewarding. She was convinced that she 
had discovered her ''true vocation'' (p.23). Gradually her happiness 
disappeared and the "crude ;::, ali ty 11 of everyday living made her painfully 
aware of her 
"Curiously contradictory life, a real 'double life 1 • With 
two personalities existing side by side or in succession, 
each continually striving for mastery" (p.25). 
The intially fascinating material she used to produce slowly degenerated into 
dull and stale regurgitations. One day, in her efforts to revive the 
excitement of her earlier performance, she was caught cheating. Soon 
after, she was compelled to abandon her spiritualist career and get a job 
in a large business concern. In the meanwhile, her character had improved 
considerably. She became "quieter, steadier, more agreeable 11 as well as 
0 industrious and dutiful ii, After a period in Paris she returned to Basel 
and opened her own dressmaking shop. Her premature death from tuberculosis 
put an end to a successful career as dressmaker. 
Jung undertook detailed analyses of many aspects of this interesting case. 
One of them was the development of S.W. 's sonmambulistic personalities. 
S.W. 's first "control spirit'' i.e. the spirit that established the link with 
the 1'spiritual realm''; was that of her own dead grandfather. He was her 
''protector and guide'' (p. 31) and had a constant paternalistic and moralistic 
attitude. The second ''control spirit'' was that of a Mr. P.R., a dead brother 
of a member of the group. He was childish and frivolous and had an 
"astonishing eloque~ce towards the ladies of the circle" (p.31). The third 
guide spirit, a certain Ulrich von Gerberstein; was a more sophisticated 
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version of P.R., also with special affinity to the female members of 
the group, but of . nobler origin and speaking polished High Genna~. At 
this time Jung observed a critical development; s. w. 's own "spiritualistic" 
personality formed itself into a special coherent ego which was markedly 
different from s.w. 's everyday personality. Jung called it the 
' "s~mnambulistic ego"· The differentiation between the two personalities 
was such that S.W., herself, gave a special name to her 'other' ego -
Ivenes • Jung remarked that 
" Ivenes was not boringly unctuous or irrepressibly silly 
like her two guides: she is a serious, mature person, 
devout and rightminded, full of womanly tenderness and very 
modest, ••• There is something soulful and elegiac about her, 
an air of melancholy resignation; she longs to get out of 
this world, she returns unwillingly to reality, she bemoans her 
hard lot, her odious family circumstances" (p. 36). 
Ivenes, according to s.w. 's own description was a 
" ••• personality almost entirely freed from the body: a 
small but fully grown black-haired woman, of a markedly 
Jewish type, clothed in white garments, her head wrapped 
in a turban" (1902,p.33). 
In 'the final analysis Jung rejected that he was dealing with the phenomenon 
that ps1chologists of that time (e.g. Janet 1906), described as 
double consciousness • By observing that all the somnambulistic 
personalities of s.w. 's shared the same memory (p.32), and that conscious 
content from Ivenes was passed to S.W., and vice versa, Jung concluded 
that it was a case of ''semi-sonm.ambulism 11 (p.47). There was one further 
difficulty: Ivenes talked a 'mystical language of her own' which had 
similarities with Latin. Jung dismissed this as being any special language. 
He examined the syntax of both the 'mystical' language and the patient's 
own; found that it was the same and concluded that these languages were not 
different from each other. Moreover, he analysed the 'mystical' language 
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and discovered that "it was only based on the unconscious use of different 
impressions'' (p.86). This meant that s.w. was creating latin-looking words 
by distorting existing ones through acoustical or optical 
&ssociation, e.g. Persus, Fenus, Sirum, Magnesor, hyfonism from Perseus, 
Venus, Sirius, Magnetism, Hypnotism. 
Jung tried to give an answer to the question "Who is speaking?'' (p .52), 
who is really speaking? After all his investigations he could only report 
that there was ~ "person 11 speaking. One who had strong 11£._reoccupations" 
(p.47). By preoccupations J~ng meant the extreme absorption of the patient 
in a particular role. His following step was to investigate the 
psychological function of these .. preoccupations. 
'Ideal middle' and.the 'two extretne' personalities 
Jung first accepted Janet's conviction that "Once baptised, the unconscious 
personage is more definite and distinct, he shows his psychological 
characteristics better''· Jung underlined the importance of this 
j 
11 individualisation of the subcoi.i.scious 11 as "a great step forward'' (1902 ,p. 53-54). 
' 
Then he examined the various somnambulistic personalities of s.w. which he 
assumed were instances of individualisation and personification of her own 
unconscious. This examination led Jung to the understanding that Ivenes 
could be accepted as the 'ideal middle' between the 'two extreme! personalities 
of'her grandfather (moralistic, pious) and voh Gerberstein (frivolous, gay). 
"The patient is a peculiar mixture of both" (p. 77). Now, since these two were 
• 
~ ••• really only a question of two different subconscious personalities 
I appearing under various names ••• n (p.73); Ivenes could also be seen as an unconscious representation of the desired. ideat per:sonality. · 
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Piecing all parts together, the following picture emerges: Ivenes is 
the 0 direct continuation of her [s.w. 's] everyday ego 11 (p.64), 
''waking ego'' (p.65), and she is essentially an 'unconscious' personality. 
Because Ivenes has all the desired characteristics of s.w. 's ideal 
personality, and is also much older, Jung postulates that S.W. 
But 
" ••. anticipates her own future and embodies in Ivenes what 
she wishes to be in twenty years time - the assured 
influential, wise, gracious, pious lady .•. builds up a 
personality beyond herself." 
" one cannot say that she deludes herself into the higher 
ideal state; rather she dreams herself into it" (p.66 emphasis 
added). 
Thus, the phenomenology of Ivenes and of the other two subconscious 
personalities are not similar. Although all three belong to the realm 
of the unconscious, the two extreme ones are existing aspects of s.w. 
at present. They are her painful extremes that she 'represses'. Ivenes, 
on the other hand, is the desired personality. 
"The patient is obviously seeking a middle way between two 
extremes; she endeavours to repress them and strives for a 
more ideal state. .These strivings lead to the adolescent 
dream of the ideal Ivenes, beside whom the unrefined aspects 
of her character fade into the background" (p. 77). 
Jung, therefore, presupposes an independent unconscious drive towards 
achieving a more balanced personality. This striving has an obvious 
teleological function. He postulates that wherever there are any "special 
difficulties, (unfavourable circumstances, psychopathic dispositions of 
the nervous system, etc.) 'i, which do not allow the 11 future personality 
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to break through 11 , then ''somnambulisms sometimes have an eminently 
teleological significance, in that they give the individual, who would 
otherw~s'e.i~evitably succumb, the means of victory" (p. 79 emphasis added). 
This position implies that what is usually called 'illness' could also 
be understood as a positive attempt on behalf of the organism to circumvent 
certain existing difficulties which prevent the natural growth of personality, 
by offering the "means of victory''· Jung, as early as 1902, spoke about 
''teleological 11 or "visionary" hallucinations, with precisely this function -
to restore the balance of personality and bring about a healthy wholeness. 
The unconscious, besides its ''repressive 11 function {as exhibited here by 
the two 'extreme personalities') also has a teleological tendency intended 
to assist the growth of the personality if and when endangered. 
Jung's description of the development of this process seems to imply the 
following steps: (a) individualising , or personifying , the unconscious, 
i.e. giving certain strong unconscious tendencies an individual character 
and even an actual name; (b) these split off egos , by acting independently 
somehow activate the teleological function which produces a ''reconciliatory'' 
figure which at the same time -
(i) reduces the tension of the two existing opposite tendencies 
by representing the 'ideal middle', and 
' (ii) paves the way towards the natural progression and development 
of the personality by anticipating a state of wholeness where 
the opposing aspects harmoniously coexist. 
Briefly, this is the personality theory that emerges from Jung's first 
scientific publication. Some similarities between this theory and his 
previous problematic of the Other must have become obvious during the 
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presentation but nevertheless it would be useful to make them explicit. 
Fragment Other (F~A.) and Anticipated ·whole Other (A.W.O.) 
There should be little 
1
difficulty in perceiving the striking correspondence 
between the phenomenology of Jung's childhood No. 2 personality and Ivenes. 
' 
Both were in sharp contrast to the 'everyday' personality, i.e. No. 1 and 
S.W. respectively. The everyday personalities were insecure and full of 
fears, whereas the 'other' ones were confident, wise and well grounded in 
the entire' context of existence. They were in tune not only with the 
specific environment of their own families,, but with Nature and the universe 
in general. It is characteristic that both were old and, in a sense, 
beyond time. Their wisdom and knowledge seems unrelated to the life 
experiences of their everyday personality counterparts.It is also worth 
noting that both had a special 'mystical' and private language. 
The similarities between No, 2 and Ivenes extend to their function. 
Both had a very soothing effect and assisted in bringing about a more balanced 
state. They, in fact, represented a mature 'version' of the same 
personality. If one assumes that here Jung is dealing with the same 
phenomenon, i.e. the 'other' personality, it is of great interest to examine 
) 
the developments that he introduced to this model of personality. 
For a better understanding of Jung's new position in the case of Ivenes, 
an examination of the two 'extreme personalities' is necessary as they are 
closely related. According to Jung these two personalities represented the 
extreme tendencies of S. W. 's own.personality; they were personifications 
of two diametrically opposed unconscious tendencies. Moreover, these two 
tendencies could be traced back to s.W. 's own life! the childish frivolous 
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tendency could be seen. as her own childishness trying to impress and play 
games, whereas the pious, moralistic tendency was directly related to her 
own grandfather and past religious upbringing. It could be said that the 
latter was an introjection of the externally imposed mores. In their 
personificatory form the two unconscious tendencies elaborated themselves 
in an explicit manner and in a sense reached their own limits. Ivenes 
gradually makes her appearance once the other two have 'extinguished' 
themselves and Jung's analysis places her as a synthesis of the first two. 
But here Jung goes further. He claims that Ivenes, in fact, anticipates 
the mature whole personality of s.w. and shows that this, indeed, takes 
place. S.~. subsequently develops a stable personality. Ivenes is, 
therefore, not only a mere synthesis of the extreme poles of the personality 
but also has elements of what might be termed a 'prototype' of s.w. 's 
maturity, or 'true nature'. 
This analysis introduces new insights into Jung's understanding of the Other 
in this period. Firstly, it offers a differentiation of two types of 'others': 
(a) the Other as illustrated by Ivenes and No. 2, which was 
characterised "not only as a source of suffering but also of 
potential unity". This Other (anticipatory ideal middle) could 
he called the ATJ.tici'['.Jated t\Thole. Other, and 
(b) the 'other' which was a personification of an extreme unconscious 
tendency. This type of Other , corresponding to no previous 
description offered by Jung, is introduced for the first time in 
his dissertation. !t is these Others that would account for 
'the little devil' or 'little angel' within a person, which could 
be understood as existing aspects 0£ one's own personality and be 
identified as such. This Other could be called the Fragment Other. 
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Secondly, Jung's new theory partly accounts for the origin and function 
of these Others. As far as the Fragment Other is concerned, Jung 
indicated that by virtue of it having striking similarities with externally 
identifiable figures, (e.g. S.W. 's grandfather), one might say that its origin 
could, at least partly, be accounted for by the process of internalisation 
of external, parental and societal norms and mores. Such definition would 
bring this type of Other close to what Freud terms Super-Ego • The function 
of this Other has already been mentioned above. It accentuates the extreme 
aspects of one's personality in order to have attention drawn to them so 
that a digestive process can deal with them accordingly. 
'!'he origin and functions of the AnticiEated Whole Other have also been 
enlarged and clarified in this new theory. As outlined earlier, Jung 
postulated a "corrective 11 and teleological function embedded within a 
personality, which would come to. the assistance of an endangered maturity. 
Jung could offer no explanation for the origin of this Other. In his 
dissertation he ~entions two possibilities: 
(a) The A.W.O. personality will appear as a reconciliatory third 
tendency in order to synthesize two opposing tendencies, and 
(b) The A.W.O. although it has ·in its make-up aspects drawn from 
the personal e:xperience of the individual, it also possesses qualities 
that seem to come from outside the personal repertoire. Here Jung 
advances the "explanatory hypothesis" that the layers of the 
unconscious which are beyond the reach of the split caused by the F .0., 
try to represent the unity of the automatic personality (pp. 76-77) 
In other words, there is a part in the unconscious that is not affected by 
the split of opposing tendencies, and this part is responsible for bridging 
the disparity. (For a graphical depiction of the process from the Fragment 
Other to the Anticipated Whole Other t see the diagram be.low). 
************************** 
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This diagram illustrates Jung's understanding of the function of the 
Other/s in the aevelopment of personality as exemplified by his 
analysis of S.W. in his dissertation. The importance and relevance 
of this diagram to Jung's later theoretical positions will'become 
more evident in the c~apters to follow (and with particular reference 
to the processes of active imagination specifically and individuation 
in general). 
Fig.1.1 
Fig. l .2 
Fig. 1.3 
Fig.t.4 
Fig. I .5 
Fig. I .6 
The personality is undifferentiated in an anorphous whole. 
The "two extreme" unconscious tendencies appear as opposite 
polarities - the moralistic, pious vs. the frivolous, gay. 
The "two extreme" tendencies are repressed because they 
are irreconcilable. 
The "two extreme" tendencies are formed as "other" 
personalities (Fragment Others) - they are "baptised", 
named, identified and then continue to operate on a con-
scious level, but at the same time weakening the central 
ego personality. 
The two F·.o. 's cease their explicit operation and the 
"ideal middle" personality appears as a resu 1 t of the 
overstretched central ego personality. 
The "ideal middle" personality (Anticipated Whole Other) 
develops further. It represents a synthesis of the two 
Fig. J • 7 
Fig.t.8 
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F .0 •. 's and at the same time an anticipation of the whole 
I 
mature personality. 
The A.W.O. guides the development of the central ego person-
ality so that it comes closer to the projected, anticipated 
whole, mature personality. 
The central ego personality and anticipated whole person-
ality coincide in a whole again, but unlike in Fig. l.t this 
totality is now differentiated into a "conscious nature". 
Jung later called this the "Self" ,das Se lb st. 
************************** 
A little further he refers to this part as the '"supraconscious' 
personality" (p. 77). In addition, he discusses "certain acca:npanying 
phenomena" to this under the title 0 Heightened Unconscious Performance'' 
(pp. 80-87) • Here, he elaborates on theories and cases drawn from the 
scientific literature of the time, dealing with such phenomena as 
cryta:nnesia, glossolalia and finds that he has 
" ••• no choice but to assume for the present a receptivity 
of the unconscious far exceeding that of the conscious 
mind ••• " (p.80). 
Later, he comes to the conclusion that in order to make sense of 
these phenomena it is necessary to 
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" postulate a highly developed intellectual activity of 
the unconscious •.• " (p.87). 
r 
This he does, though, not in a naive manner. He is fully aware of the 
inherent difficulties in postulating such a mechanism ofuunconscious 
intellectuality'', ('! •. if, indeed, it is permissible at all to make an 
analogy between the cognitive processes in the unconscious and those of 
the conscious ••• '' (p.87). 
These hypotheses allow Jung to assume that Ivenes' wisdom could be accounted 
for in terms of that heightened unconscious performance which tran'scends 
S. W. 1 s conscious capabilities and personal experience. This performance is 
the first evidence of that 1' supraconscious personality '1, the core of 
No.2 and Ivenes, the 'nature' of the Other. 
COMPLEX - Preliminaryn observations 
Jung first introduced the term complex in his doctoral 
dissertation. But he did so in a rather unsystematic way. He called 
the 'extreme personalities' and ''split off egos" coI!lplexes , but at the 
same time also interpeted Ivenes as being an ego-complex . No clear 
description of their functions was given then. Nevertheless, in terms of 
the theory of the Other, Jung, in his doctoral dissertation offered 
sufficient indications to substantiate a claim that all types of complexes 
could be accepted as instances of the Other. In another paper, "On 
Hysterical Misreading 9 , Jung (1904) makes a somewhat better distinction 
between the ego-complex and the 'other' complex. In his ''hypothesis of split 
consciousness 11 (p. 91) he describes how this other complex has aut_o_nO!f!Y 
and can manifest its activity independently of the ego-complex 
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which has a centralising function. A year later Jtmg becomes even more 
explicit in his article on "Cryptomnesia" (1905). The "heightened 
unconscious performance'' of his dissertation is here openly called 
h unconscious perception" (p. 96). It is the dynamics of this perception 
that Jung studied. He observed how the contents of this perception, 
when charged with sufficient affect, can assume an independence from the 
coordinating ego agency. This independent, or "automatic'' process he also 
called ''complex''· Complexes are, therefore, structural components of the 
unconscious which act on their own and exert their influence on the personality. 
Jung, in this study, outlined several aspects of the complexes' function 
and implications. 
(1) A person should ''continuously exercise the most rigorous self-
criticism" (p.99) otherwise he is prone to become prey of the 
complexes. 
"One of the corrunonest and most usual marks of degeneracy 
is hysteria, the lack of self-control and self-criticism ••• " 
(p.99). 
Jung, therefore, defines psychopathology in terms of his complex theory 
and assumes that when they are s~fficiently powerful, complexes can 
disrupt the entire personality and cause 'mental illness'. A kind of 
psychological vigilance (self-criticism, self-control) is understood 
by him to be the antidote to pathology. 
(2) Complexes are not in themselves pathological. It is part of 
normal psychological functioning that complexes are formed in 
the unconscious. Pathology is, therefore, a,question of degree 
and not of quality. 
f 
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" hysteria ••• is nothing other than a caricature of 
normal psychological functioning ••• " (p.98). 
Psychological abnormality depends on the relative strength of the ego 
to control the complexes and their autonomy • The more the control of 
the ego the less the autonomy of the complexes. 
(3) Not only normality and abnormality rest· on the same 
continuum but also creativity shares the same dimension! 
"Our unconscious must therefore harbour an immense number of 
psychic complexes which would astonish us by their strangeness. 
The inhibitions imposed by our waking consciousness do something 
to protect us from invasions of this kind."(pp.98-99). 
But " ••• all new ideas and combinations of ideas are premeditated by the 
unconscious'', and it is therefore 
" to this unconscious that all those who do creative work 
must turn" (p. 99). 
and further 
" the genius ••• has to bear the brunt of an outsize 
psychic complex tapping the depths of the psyche, 
the instinctively functioning complex sends up from its 
unknown and inexhaustible treasure countless thoughts 
(p.100 emphasis added). 
II 
"Consciousness only plays the role of slave to the daemon 
of the unconscious, which tyrannises over it and inundates 
it with alien ideas" (p.105). 
From the above it follows that for Jung, at least at this stage of his career, 
the complex is a source of innovative thoughts, and also functions . 
autonomously (instinctively). 
- ') 41 ..,; 
As far as the origin of 'the unconscious material that the complex channels 
into consciousness is concerned, Jung had no final answer: First, he 
clearly argued that complexes are made up of images and thoughts that are 
overloaded with affect. The personality, unable to negotiate with them 
represses them in the unconscious. Men "try to repress the affect from their 
daily life ••• 11 (1905, p.100). One can therefore say that Jq.ng's first 
explanation as to the origin of the complex is from one's own personal every-
day life. This reveals nothing unusual. It is the same theory that Freud 
' 
propounded at the same time. But Jung does not stop here. In this very 
same paper he makes some further remarks on this subject. It will be 
necessary to follow his train of thought faithfully in strict order to be 
able to appreciate the conclusion that he is led to. 
Considering the originality and creative qualities of the unconscious, he 
writes that, '' ••• only the combinations are new, not the material, which 
hardly alters at all, or almost very slowly and almost imperceptibly ••• " 
(1905, p.lOO~mphasis added). The distinction between originality and 
creativity as, (a) combinations of old material, or as, (b} new material, 
could be better understood once the question of the origin of the 
unconscious material is brought back into focus. Jung seems reluctant to 
accept that a person can create ab ovo, totally new thoughts and ideas, without 
the assistance of already established patterns and, of course, existing 
material. 
" ••• our psyche is not so fabulous iy rich that it can build 
from scratch each time." 
He observes, and adds that 
I 
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" ••• neither does nature. One can see from our prisons, 
hospitals and lunatic asylums at what enormous cost nature 
takes a little step forward ; she builds laboriously on 
what has gone before" (p. 101). 
The analysis now narrows down to the question: What is the meaning 
of ''what has gone before" in the realm of the unconscious of a person? 
Does Ju~g here allude to any hereditary factors? 
It seems of paramount importance to read Jung's own words with regard to 
this matter, as it seems that it was the first time that he openly dealt 
with this issue: 
"This process in the world at large is repeated in the smaller 
world of language: few novel combinations, nearly all of it 
old fragments taken over from somewhere. We speak the words 
and sentences learnt from parents, teachers, books" (1905,p.101 
emphasis added). 
One should be extremely cautious not to misinterpret or 'read into' the 
" 
above quotation ideas that Jung did not intend. Nevertheless, a number of 
remarks could be afforded here: 
The topic of this paper is cryptomnesia and the issue of plagiarism, so 
that Jung could have mentioned language only to illustrate his argument, 
viz. remembering a text unconsciously is not a straightforward case of 
plagiarism, but it depends on affective factors and complexes. It is also 
possible that Jung meant to utilise language as a model for the unconscious. 
In other words, as one does not learn language from scra~ch, i.e. inventing 
all its rules and words, but enters , as it were, into an established 
realm where one has to learn certain parts and by doing so also acquires 
the accumulated experience stored in language. 
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The thir.d possibility is that Jung equates the unconscious with language 
and says that by learning language through books, parents and other people 
we, in fact, amass an enormous amount of potentially conscious material, 
i.e. a great wealth of unconscious material which does not come from our 
own life experiences. This material is not part of our own personal 
unconscious but belongs to a larger, collective pool, because by learning 
language we automatically acquire all the unconscious material embedded in 
it. 
It is ultimately difficult, if not impossible, to decide what Jung means 
here exactly. Does he use language only as part of the argument on 
cryptomnesia, does he use language as a model for understanding the 
unconscious, or does he equate language with the unconscious? At this stage, 
any further interpretation would be dangerous and without substantiation. 
Whatever the case might be, there is no doubt that he introduces here the 
idea of a collective, transpersonal, unconscious, which is indispensible to 
his definitions of abnormality and creativity as well as 
psychological functioning. 
normal 
Translated into the theory of the Other, the complex, or the Other, originates 
from personal experiences of the individual, as well as experiences that 
existed before him, i.e. material that could be called collective. 
Any discussion of Jung's theory of the complexes would be incomplete without a 
close examination of his research eg. into the association experiment. It was in 
these investigations that his understanding of canplexes was moulded and as a 
result of which his first coherent psychological theory formulated. Firstly an 
historical/theoretical background to the field of Association will be outlined in 
order to place into relief Jung's own innovations in this area. This will then 
provide a clearer vantage point from where the context of his theory of the 
Other may be more competently surveyed. 
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Word association experiments 
As indicated earlier, Bleuler with his team at the University of Zurich 
constituted an international hub of psychiatric research. One of their 
fields of investigation was in association. As an outgrowth of the 
British empiricist philosophy, associationism established itself in psychology 
after the theoretical and experimental work of Francis Galton (1822-1911) 
in England and Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) in Germany. According to this doctrine, 
man's source of knowledge is his sensory experiences. The imput of these 
experiences (images or ideas) are connected, associated among themselves. 
The mind is therefore nothing but the network of all the associations the 
individual has amassed. This basic formulation underwent many modifications 
from Locke (1632-1704),Berkeley (1685-1753) and Hume (1711-1776) to the time 
of Galton and Wundt. The laws of association, (simultaneity, similarity, 
sequence and contrast) are by themselves the result of accumulation and 
transformation of the various theories of association put forward by 
philosophers as early as Plato and Aristotle. 
Galton, trying to trace the origin of associative reactions presented 
words written on a ~lip of paper to his subjects and demanded their associations. 
He also measured the time between the presentation and the response (reaction 
time). One of his significant conclusions was that childhood and adolescent 
experiences were often the source of the associations (Watson 1971). In 
addition; Galton divided the "stimulus" words into various categories and 
from the statistical treatment of his results was able to observe the 
response's character, 11 ••• their tendency to recurrence, and their relative 
precedence ••• '1 (Galton 1883, p.145). The whole enterprise for him was 
valuable in offering credence to the belief,"··· in the existence of still 
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deeper strata of mental operations, sunk wholly below the level of 
consciousness', (p.145). Also, he concluded that, " ••• our working stock 
of ideas is narrowly limited and that the mind continually recurs to the 
same instruments in conducting its operations, therefore its tracts 
\ 
necessarily become more defined and its flexibility diminished as age 
advances" (p. 146). 
Alexander Bain (1818-1903), a Scotsman with a special place in the school of 
British Associationism (cf, Boring 1957), emphasised one important limitation 
of associations. Concerned with the logical consequence of strict 
associationism, that no new action is possible which is not related to 
existing associations, he introduces the issue of WilJ. He argued that 
sp,ontaneo_us act;ion is possible. In his voluminous study, "The _Emotions 
and the~_tR11 11 he connects spontaneity with the _self. 
"••• Spontaneity, or original tendencies of our nature, viewed 
in contrast to the check, guidance or influence of impressions 
from without, is an aspect of self 11 (1865,p.95). ' 
lt is worth remarking here on the similarity between Bain's idea that there 
are'original tendencies in our nature ii which are closely related to the 
~elf, and the Jungian concept of the Self where the potential true nature 
of the individual is stored • 
Wundt 1 s actual experimental work on association has been described by 
Boring as including nothing "classical 11 (195 7 ,p. 343). But the Wundtian 
theory of association is of considerable importance. Any attempt at a 
systematic exposition of this theory would be out of place in this present 
study, although the following remarks are indicated, 
Wundt drew a clear distinction between association and apperception. 
The former was a passive phenomenon whereas the latter was an active 
process. Wundt defined apperception as 
" ••• the psychological process in which, on the objective 
side a certain contents becomes clear in consciousness and, 
on the subjective, certain feelings arise which, as 
referred to any given contents, we ordinarily term the 
state of 'attention' .•• 11 (Wundt 1910, p.316). 
In association, on the other hand, the clarity of consciousness and 
feeling is missing. Wundt's involvement of feeling, attention and activity 
in his understanding of association and apperception are worth noting as 
they formed the background of .Jung's theoretical framework for his researches. 
I 
Both Galton and Wundt examined word associations as part of their investigations 
into the field of cognitive functioning. Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926), a psychiatrist, 
adapted this.method and applied it in his studies of psychopathology. Being 
well versed in the technique of the association experiement (he was Wundt' s 
pupil), Kraepelin introduced certain modifications by manrpulating the 
conditions of application; e.g. he denied food or rest to his subjects from whan 
he demanded a response to a series of experiments lasting from eight o'clock 
at: night to eight in the morning. Another experimental situation that he 
introduced was alcoholic intoxication. He observed that under these 
unfavourable conditions the subjects' external associations were increased 
and their internal decreased. Internal associations were defined as based 
on a pail'"ing of "meaning or conceptual content of the words''; (Jung 1906 ;P• 412) 
whereas 1 external' associations were of a kind that 1' the connecting link 11 was 
''not the intrinsic sense or meaning but an external contingency ti (p .412). 
Aschaffenburg interpreted these findings by assuming that motor agitation 
was the essential element, present in all experimental conditions. which 
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was responsible for the predominance of external associations. Jung, 
according to his experience in this field of experimentation found that 
it was not motor agitation but a lack of attention, or inability to 
concentrate that caused the decrease of internal associations (1906). 
Since this interpretation touches on the issues that were raised earlier 
I 
in connection with the personality's control over its complexes (lack 
of 1' self-control and self criticism'') it is necessary to discuss these 
two approaches together. 
Eugen Bleuler's interest in the problem of association dictated a certain 
climate at the BurghBlzli clinic. Jung, soon after his initial introduction 
into the new world of psychiatry, set out to investigate specific aspects of 
this vast field. First, he wanted to establish in some detail the 11 laws 
governing the range of associations in normal subjects '1 and the ''direct 
effects of attention on the association process'' (Jung and Riklin 1904,p. 4). 
It is of paramount importance to read the introduction to his first paper 
on association very carefully, because he challenges here the entire field 
of association by introducing some disturbing questions. The argument is 
about the meaning of association. With his co-researcher, Franz .Riklin, 
they query the legitimacy of calling the 11 connection between stimulus-word 
and reaction ... an 'association''~ (p.9). If by association is meant 
the psychological phenomenon of a link between two psychological experience's, 
the association experiment cannot tap this at all. The technique of 
association experiment simply demonstrates the connection between two 
11 linguistic signs" (p.10), one. the ''stimulus'' and the other the "response''· 
"We do not, therefore, claim that the reactions we describe 
are associations in the strictest sense: we even wonder 
if it would not be altogether better to drop the word 
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'association' and talk instead of linguistic reaction 
thus, when describing and classifying lingui~tically expressed 
connections, we are not then classifying the actual associations 
but merely their objective symptoms, from which psychological 
connections can be reconstructed only with caution .•• " (p.10). 
They accept that association experiments, in fact, ''stimulate the language 
apparatusn and, therefore, the classification principles that should be 
applied for analysing the results should be 11 simple logical" and not 
psychological principles as the latter would be totally hypothetical and 
based on no data at all. Moreover, they emphasise that 
" the use of the linguistic acoustic brain mechanism 
naturally is not without influence on the associations. 
The purely intrapsychic association cannot become the 
object of another's consciousness without being transformed 
into the familiar symbolism of language" (p. 11). 
This leads them to include ''verbal ability'1 as 1'one of the chief principles'' 
of their classification. Jung's acute sensitivity to language 
issues, especially during this period, is of great importance. As was 
discussed earlier, he used the model of language to understand some aspects 
of the complex. Now he exhibits an unusual awareness which helps him to avoid 
crude confusions by identifying the verbal expression with what it is 
supposed to express. His linguistic sophistication should be appreciated 
in its historical context. Similar approaches have gained respectability only 
recently with the impetus given by the theories of Jacques Lacan (cf.Part Three). 
The classification system that Jung and Riklin used is based on linguistic 
principles (semantic, phonetic, syntactical and grammatical). It has eight 
major categories, twenty subcategories, twenty-two sub-subcategories and 
some more sub-divisions. 
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It is interesting to note that they also include a special major 
category called linguistic. In this group they assigned all associations 
which were formed solely on the basis of ~certain external acco~tic 
properties ' 1 (p. 35). Otper "external linguistic factors '1 are also included 
here, such as 11 same grammatical syllables ' 1 and 1' same grammatical form'' 
(p. 36). 
In the elaborated analysis of their data the authors noticed a number of 
''constellations'' which were responsible for clustering the responses 
around certain themes. These themes were derived from the subject's 
experiences in the recent past, or present and varied in character from 
being purely external, si.tuational (e.g. associations with the physical 
environment of the experimental room and its furniture) to more personal and 
egocentric (they found that girls failed to respond to ''stimulus-words 
borciering sexual theme~'). In addition to the cognitive and linguistic 
factors in association, emotional factors also featured prominently. 
" ••• Now it is possible that an emotionally charged complex 
of ideas becomes so predominant in an individual and has 
such a profound influence that it forms a large number of 
constellations, failures, and reactions with long reaction-
time, all referring to this complex of ideas~ (p.82). 
Jung thus detected that the reason behind certain abnormalities in 
responding, if there was a central theme common to all the stimulus-words 
affected, was ad1emotionally charged complex of ideas''. This caused the 
subject to 'make use of a mode of reaction that is not usual' in him, 
in other words, the complex was, in a sense, taking control of the 
personality. This phenomenon was understood by Jung in terms of the 
function of attention. He found that the appearance of a complex causes 
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••• a big increase of internal associations, probably due 
to the intense stimulation of attention •.• The stronger the 
emotional stress of the stimulus-word is for the individual 
and the more attention is devoted to that stimulus-word,the 
more the number of internal associations rises. This 
phenomenon is the exact opposite of the distraction I>he°nom"'en'otr. 
Attention is improved because of the invasion of an emotional 
complex, which absorbs the whole personality, because the 
attention is directed more to the 'significance of the 'stimulus-
word' 11 (p. 94, emphasis added). 
In their analysis, Jung and Riklin present and discuss in detail a great 
number of different characteristic types of subjects. These are subjects 
whose responses fall predominantly into one category of the classification 
system. They do not lose the opportunity to introduce a "complex-
constellation type '1• This type is characterised by the predominance of 
a 'feeling-tone complex' in the responses. 
This preoccupation is so strong that it borders on abnormality. Once 
again, they make it explicit that the condition resulting from the 
presence of a powerful complex is of the same quality as psychological 
abnormalities. It is only a question of degree and duration, in other 
words, in normals the effect of the complex is more 1' temporary". 
" ••• One could generalise and say that this abnormal state, 
caused by the affect, is the prototype of the hysterical 
reaction" (p.161). 
In their final conclusion of this study,the authors underline the 
importance of the 11 affective side of associations (effects of feeling-
toned complexes)'' (p .191) and their implications for experimental 
investigations in psychopathology. 
A last comment on this article is indicated. It again concerns the 
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role of language. After carefully analysing their results they found 
that there is a positive relationship between attention and meaningful 
or ''higher" associations. ' I The lower the attention of the-subject the 
lower the kind of associations he was likely to give. Associations were, 
therefore, ranked in order of personal relevance. At the bottom of the 
hierarchy were associations based merely on the sound similarities of 
the stimulus-word and the response-word. These were considered to be the 
most primitive associations. Then a little higher came the associations 
with more "meaning'' but still within the general linguistic similarities. 
Gradually, on top of the hierarchy were the strongly personal and highly 
meaningful associations for that particular subject. In expressing this 
relationship Jung and Riklin observed: 
"If, by further lowering the attention, we remove the 
linguistic mechanisms, which in most cases still 
possess some meaning, the sound reactions come to the 
fore; they represent the lowest level of linguistic 
reaction and therefore remain constantly below the 
threshold of consciousness in everyday life. In the 
process of development of the child's speech, sound 
reactions, as is well known, still play a fairly 
important part; later they are increasingly suppressed 
and usually enter into the unconscious, from which they 
can under normal conditions be brought up only with a 
certain effort'' (pp.138-139). 
In the above quotation, one could discern the relationship between 
language, the unconscious and the ego: The lower the associations the 
more impersonal they are, the less they involve the ego of the subject 
and his personal experiences. In addition, an impersonal, more "primitive'' 
unconscious could be postulated in the child where few personal contents 
exist apart from the general characteristics of language on a level of 
sound. This aspect will be discusse~ again later in the light of a) 
Jung's reference to phylogenetic memory; .and b) recent theoretical 
contributions in this field. 
. . ... 
' " 
.. ... :·:: ~: • . " " 
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Jung continued his investigations into the field of psychopathology using 
the theory of complexes. In 1905 he published a case study of an 
epileptic (ttAn analysis of the associations of an epileptic•) and in 
1906 he completed two papers on this topic. In the first, •Association, 
dream and hysterical symptom'', Jung regards the cream as a ''natural'' way 
·that the complexes are brought to consciousness in a •'harmless form" 
(p.383) and this gives him the right to deal with dreams in the same manner 
as with associations. He also indicates that therapy should aim at 
"r.esolving" the patient's "possession by the complex" (p. 369). In the 
second,1'Psychological significance of the association experiment", he 
emphasised that the complexes of persons exhibiting mental disorders •are 
of the same nature as in normal cases, except that the intensity of the 
emotional content is far greater than in the normal'' (p.423). The 
connection between abnormality and complexes was mentioned widely in 
Jung's writings of this period. In 1907 he puts normality, hysteria and 
dementia praecox on a continuum where only the intensity and independence 
of complexes vary. 
11 In dementia praecox the complex is more independent and 
more strongly detached, and the patient more profoundly 
injured by the complex th.an in the case of hysteria" 
(Peterson and Jung 1907, p.517). 
Elsewhere he boldly declares that 0 hysteria and obsessive phenomena stem 
from a complex''(l906 ,p. 317). 
To return to the complex, it is now evident that Jung's experience from 
I 
the association experiments led him to postulate the existence of complexes. 
Specifically, he regarded as complex indicators lengthened reaction time, 
a 11 sudden embarrassment" in the behaviour of the subject after being 
confronted by the stimulus-word or any other reaction ''out of the ordinary'' 
{Peterson and Jung 1907, p.527). 
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These ••out of the ordinary'' reactions included ''failures'' to react, 
"perseveration, stereotyped repetition of the stimulus-word, •••• 
translation into foreign language, strong language, quotations, slips of the 
tongue, assimilation of the stimulus-word" ~Jung 1905c, p. 263), 11 laps us 
linguae when pronounci~g the reaction-word, ••• interpolation of 'yes' 
or of other interjections before ar after the reaction-word" (Jung 1908, 
p.591) and other specific reactions that Jung documented. The stimulus-
words that produced such irregularities in the associations of the 
subjects were examined and the personal significance and connection 
with the subjee t were investigated. They were then assigned to a number 
of clusters, complexes. Jung mentioned a great number of complexes, e.g. 
of mother, family, school, sex, money, divorce. A person might possess 
(or more accurately, be possessed by) one or more complexes. Their number 
could increase or decrease in time within a given personality and so 
with their strength or power over the ego. Some complexes are interlinked 
with each other, while others are independent. In a case study Jung 
reports that he traced ''about ten complexes independent of each other" 
(1905c,p.256), six of which were major or primary complexes and four 
"secondary''· The secondary were aspects of the main complexes, 
e.g. an erotic complex with revulsion and remorse as its two second~ry 
complexes. 
Comp le_:ic as the Other 
Returning to the discussion of complexes in terms of a theory of the 
Other, a clearer picture now emerges. As was shown earlier, Jung first 
discussed the complex in his doctoral dissertation, but it was not until 
his research with the association experiment that he was able to pre'sent 
it in a coherent theoretical and empirical context. Jung's description 
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of the complex betrays strong similarities with his earlier theme of 
the Other: 
" A strong complex possesses all the characteristics of a separate 
personality. We are, therefore, justified in regarding the complex as 
somewhat like a small secondary mind, which deliberately (though unknown 
to consciousness) drives at certain intentions which are 
contrary to the conscious intentions of the individual" (Jung 1911, p.601) 
" ••• A morbid complex plays the part of an independent being, or 
soul within a soul, comparable to the ambitious vassal who, by 
intrigue, finally grew mightier than the king" (Peterson and 
Jung 1907, p.517). 
Many years later Jung was to state clearly that 
" ••• fundamentally, there is no difference in principle bet-
ween a fragmentary personality and a complex" (1948,p.97). 
These quotations, in addition to the preceding analysis should be 
' 
considered sufficient justification for accepting the Complex as Jung's 
formulation of tll.e Other during this period of his life. 
To recapitulate, in this study the following formulations of the Other by 
Jung were observed up to this period of his life: Childhood - the Other 
as fire, stone, manikin and pebble, as well as his own No. 2 personality. 
Early psychiatric period - a) the Fragment Other, as the personification. 
of extreme unconscious tendencies. b) The Antici.pated. Whole Other as an 
unconscious 'ideal middle' personality, like Ivenes, the sonmambulistic 
personality in the case of s.w. 
A more systematic exposition of the Complex as the Other will be attempted 
below. Jung's theoretical positions should always be remembered in the 
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broad context of his personal quest for meaning, (his pursuit for 
bridging harmoniously the worlds of'No. 1 and No. 2 personalities) and 
the prevailing paradigm in psychology and psychiatry of that time (studies 
on somnambulistic states, hysteria, dementia praecox, association etc). 
Jung understood the complex as essentially a second personality within the 
personality proper, as if it was an homunculus, a little manikin ·inside 
the person. That is why he compared it to a fragmentary personality. As 
was indicated above, Jung used the complex as the basis for his understanding 
of psychological abnormalities: following a model of 'balance of power', 
abnormality was regarded as the state in which the complex controls the 
personality, and normality the reverse state. It should be noted that 
Jung's theory of psychopathology included another hypothesis, in addition to 
complexes - the "metabolic toxins '1 or "affect-toxins'' which he postulated 
as being responsible for the condition of dementia praecox. These toxins 
were supposed to be some of the ''irreparable organic disturbances" due to 
"affectivity 11 • ''Affectivity'' was deemed to be a result of ''disposition'' 
(Peterson and Jung 1907,p.517; Jung 1907, p~36-37, 69, 97-8; 1914,p.156 etc). 
Nearly fifty years later, Jung appears to have withdrawn the toxin hypothesis 
in favour of a more "psychogenic ·causation rt of schizophrenia (1958,p.264). 
Be that as it may, it is significant that Jung, at least during the 
period under examination, was prepared to argue even for an organic 
foundation of complexes because, however he tried to introduce the toxins 
as a factor additional to complexes, he was subtly · at the same time 
offering a biological explanation of the complexes themselves: Firstly, 
by considering affects as instrumental in producing both complexes and 
toxins and, secondly, by hypothesising that the affect-toxins were involved 
in the hfinal fixation of the complex" (1907, p.37) and thus its ultimate 
.triumph over the dominion of personality. 
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But what was the very fabric of this Other? Jung conceived "ideas'' 
and ''thought material'' as the basic nature of complexes. In the association 
experiments he observed the recurring clusters of 11 a large number of 
component ideas '1 and he called them'' a complex of ideas 11 and clarified: 
"The cement that holds the complex together is the feeling-tone 
common to all the individual ideas ••• we are therefore 
speaking of a feeling-toned complex of ideas" (1906d,p. 321). 
By ''feeling-tone'' Jung understood the emotional mood (e.g. unhappiness, 
agitation) that accompanied those particular ideas. 
With regard to the logical question of how the connection between the 
ideas and affect was established in the first place Jung held at least three 
opinions - the first one has the visible marks of the Burgh~lzli traditions, 
the second is influenced by the Freudian doctrine on psychic trauma, and 
the third has the stamp of Jung's own original theory of the archetype. 
The first one will be examined here, while the other two will be dealt with 
accordingly in the following sections of this study. 
It was Bleuler who took the bold step and, in the Wundtian tradition, defined 
attention in tenns of affects. Jung quoted his definitions: 
II ••• Attention is nothing more than a special form of affectivity • 
••• attention is an aspect of affectivity, and does nothing more · 
than what we know affectivity does, i.e. it facilitates certain '· 
associations and inhibits others ••• Attention is ••• an affective 
state" (In Jung 1907 ,p.40). 
-
Against this background it is not then surprising that Jung advanced his 
own dictum - "Every affective event becomes a complex" ! (1909,p.67). He had 
earlier established that the key process in association was attention (as 
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discussed above). Now the formula should read as follows: Associations 
increase in a positive proportion to the amount of affect involved in the 
process. The more the underlying affect the more attention will be 
generated and the more associations will result. A circularity could 
be observed here. Jung attributed strong affective reactions to every situation 
where a complex was stimulated. He measured this phenomenon even 
physiologically with galvanometers, pneumographs etc (Jung, 1907; 
Peterson & Jung 1907; Ricksher & Jung 1908). It thus follows that a 
particular idea or ''thought material" would be loaded with emotion if it already 
belonged to a complex. How is the complex then formed? Jung's declaration 
that ''every affective event becomes a complex" points at one resolution of 
this circularity: 
" ••. If [an affective event} does not encounter a related and 
already existing complex and is only of momentary significance, 
it gradually sinks with decreasing feeling-tone into the 
latent mass of memories, where it remains until a related 
impression reproduces it again" (1907,p.67). 
By successive stimulation a given affective event can, therefore, either 
be incorporated into an existing complex or form a new complex by attracting 
a body of related ideas and thought material around it. 
According to tliis interpretation, the Other is formed. by a gradual process; 
it is not as given in the personality. Moreover, the personalityitself 
is also formed in a similar manner and is ultimately nothing but a complex. 
" ••• One's own personality is ••• the firmest and strongest 
complex" (1907, p.40). 
Having accepted that a complex is a "higher psychic unity", as it displays 
an intricate function of interrelationships and organisation, Jung arrives 
at the conclusion that 
.. ··· 
".'" 158 -
" the ego is the psychological expression of the firmly 
associated combination of all body sensations" (1907,p.40); 
further, that 
" ••• the ego is psychologically nothing but a complex of 
imaginings held together and fixed by the coenesthetic 
impressions", 
and therefore 
" ••• the complex of the ego may well be set parallel with and 
compared to the secondary complex. This comparison shows 
the existence of a certain psychological similarity, because 
the emotional tone of the secondary complexes is also based 
upon coenesthetic impressions, and further, both the ego and 
secondary comp lex may be temporarily split up or repressed" 
(1911, p.601). 
J'llll.g is here able to give an account of how the Other is formed and for 
the first time to discuss its very texture. Moreover, in doing so he is 
in the position to formulate his first theory of personality: Both the 
tme' and the Other are made of the same 'stuff'. The Other is defined, 
at this stage, as a 'secondary me'. The ego is the primary complex 
simply because it is central, "most stable and the richest in associations" 
(1907, p.41) and, as such, represents the ''highest'' psychic authority 
(1907, p.40). As he was to clarify later, 
" the ego complex forms the centre characteristic of our 
psyche. But it is only one among several complexes ••• " 
(1948b' p. 307). 
The Other is no longer a mysterious unknown with so many exciting, but 
also dangerously far-fetched, implications. Using the scientific theories 
of his time as well as his own original contributions, Jung formulated his 
old problem of the Other predominantly in the mentalistic terms of clusters 
of affective associations. His early hypothesis of split consciousness 
(1904, p.91) was modified and gradually found expression in the definition 
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of complex in terms of attention, automatism and association. The 
Burgh8lzli tradition is evident. The theory of complexes is situated f~rmly 
in the lineage starting with dissociation (Forel), and Schizophrenia 
(Bleuler). 
An aspect of the complex that was mentioned earlier is its autonomy. Jung 
emphasised the independence of the complex (affective or secondary) from the 
. ego-complex: 
" Researches have shown that this independence is based upon 
an intense emotional tone, that is, upon the value of the.affective 
elements of the complex, because the 'affect' occupies in the 
constituti.on of the psyche a very independent place and may easily 
break through the self-control and self-intention of the 
individual. The 'affect-intensity' of the complex can be easily 
proven psychophysiologically. For this property of the complex 
I have introduced the term autonomy" (1911, p.601). 
Jung also stressed that the_ autonomy of complexes is not by itself a 
pathological phenomenon although it could lead to psychological disorganisation 
and disorder. This could be interpreted to mean that he accepted that the 
existence of an Other in one'·s own personality does not 'imply pathology; 
the Other is not necessarily a threatening demon. It is normal to have an 
Other, after all, the Other and the 'me' are relative terms as both have 
the same constitution. 
Moreover, according to Ellenberger's distinction (1970, p.692), Jung 
identified three types of complexes: a) normal, b) accidental, and 
c) permanent. This classification should, therefore, correspond to three 
types of Others. 
a) In Jung's personality theory of this period complexes are understood 
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as normal psychological phenomena formed as a result of the normal 
psychological functioning of affects and associations. 
b) As 11 every affective event becomes a complex" strong emotional 
situations have a higher probability of being incorporated in complex 
structures. This theoretical position prepared Jung to accept later 
the Freudian theory of psychological trauma with great ease. As 
will be discussed later, for a period of time Jung adopted the 
theory of traumatic causation of complexes. 
c) According to Jung, certain complexes were permanent by virtue of 
their dependency on unchanged affective states in the person, e .. g. 
women will always have a special emotional relationship to 
' 
motherhood (be it positive or negative). From his research findings 
Jung tentatively argued that there are certain permanent complexes 
associated with particular classes of people, e.g. men,. women, 
educated, uneducated, etc (e.g. Jung and Riklin, 1904). 
In addition to these three types, Jung also investigated and presented another 
type of complex which could be called· shared·or collective complex. 
Examining the associations (i.e. linguistic reactions) of members of the 
same families Jung and his pupils found special ''family constellations" of 
responses. On ingeniously drawn graphs Jung plotted the lines of responses 
of members of families which he investigated thus indicating clearly the 
similarities and differences between the particular members, (1909), This 
enabled him to postulate the existence of identical complexes that are shared 
by all members of families or by sub-groups within given families. This type 
of Other would, in a sense, be different from all previously discussed in that 
it is not a 'personal' Other. 
. ': 
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It thus becomes increasingly difficult to refer to the Other as a 
unitary, simple and specific phenomenon. The above analysis shows 
that Jung's formulation of the Other during this period, within the 
theoretical framework of the Canplex, belongs to a different category 
frcm all his previous formulations in that 
,; (a) It allows a finer distinction and classification of several 
kinds of Others, some of them not conceptualized in any 
earlier formulation, e.g. the Fragment Other; normal, 
accidental and pennanent. 
(b) It offers a clearer understanding of the nature, origins 
and functioning of the Other/s, and 
(c) it locates the issue of the Other within the psychological 
theories of the time with the result of 
i. - rendering it canprehensible to the scientific 
conununity, and 
ii. - introducing innovations in the theoretical 
field, stimulated and informed by the problematic 
of the Other. 
PART TWO 
Chapter Three 
C.G. Jung: Psychoanalytic period. 
"Odysseus: In Heaven's _name, say'st thou 
this to mock at me? 
Neoptolemus: If it be mockery to speak 
the truth." 
Sophoc~es: Philoctetes, 1235-6 
Tr. F. Storr. 
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This title will here designate the period of Jung's association with 
Freud. This legendary association cannot be confined t~ a precisely 
defined chronological period. Jung had read Freud's works long before 
I 
he established personal contact with the great master. One may also 
argue that Jung's association with the Freudian doctrines lasted a 
long time after the bitter termination of their friendship and 
collaboration, marked by those formal; cold and tragic letters which 
the two men exchanged in 1913 (McGuire 1974). Nevertheless, for the 
practical purposes of the present study, the "Psychoanalytic Period" 
will deal with Jung's life and work during his recorded friendship 
with Freud. The events and details of this extraordinary relationship 
with all its peaks and abysses, however interesting they might be, 
will only be peripheral to the aims of this section and little or no 
mention of them will be made her~. The object of this chapter is to 
examine Jung's attitude toward his old problem of the Other as shaped 
during this period - what form did his enquiries into and formulations 
of the issue of the Other take? This chapter will therefore be 
divided into two parts (A and B). In the first and shorter part, 
crucial observations concerning the relationship of Freud and Jung 
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will be made in the light of Jung's earlier theoretical and personal 
development. This will place the second part, dealing 
with a . more detailed theoretical analysis of Jung's development in 
this period, in perspective. 
A. THE FREUD-JUNG RELATION SHIP 
To begin with, it would be useful to be reminded of the original 
difference between these two psychologists. In a very early letter 
to Freud (19 December 1906) Jung felt the need to outline what he 
• perceived as their differences: 
• 
(a) Different clientele and working condi~ions: Jung canplained that 
he had to operate "under enonnously difficult conditions" and ''mostly 
with uneducated insane patients" (McGuire 1974, p.14). Freud's 
• ·patients were educated middle class private patients, mostly neurotic • 
Jung's ~ere hospitalized patients mostly schizophrenic (dementia 
praecox). 
(b) Jung, in a respectful and/or subservient manner, saw himself 
as Freud's inferior as far as general psychiatric and specific 
psychoanalytic experience was concerned. This. was the obvious 
result of the age difference (at that time Jung was 31 years 
old, and Freud 50) and the fact that Freud was the originator of 
psychoanalysis whereas Jung was an aspiring novice. These 
I differences are therefore not substantial but rather circum-stantial. The fact that Jung mentions them at all is more 
indicative of his feelings towards Freud than anything else: 
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these feelings were a mixture of humility in front of the 
great teacher and a need to justify his own shortcomings. 
It is very important to note that Jung refers to all three 
differences in the context of his reply to Freud's criticisn 
of his book "The Psychology of Dementia Praecox" where he 
treated Freud's "researches too ruthlessly" (McGuire 1974, 
p.13). The apologetic tone is therefore understandable. 
(c) Jung. wrote to Freud: 
''My upbringing, my milieu, and my 
scientific premises are in any case 
utterly different from your own" 
(McGuire 1974, p.14). 
These statements should be accepted as more than just an 
attempt by Jung to 'save face' before the master's 
critical eye. Jung here emphasised genuinely the great 
differences in their personal history, training and individual 
scientific approach to their subject matter, thus making a 
plea for tolerance and respect for each other's "personal style". 
In this early letter Jung, therefore,indicated his respect for 
Freud"s greatness but at the same time also reserved his right to 
autoncmy. It is incorr~ct to assume, as several authors explicitly or · 
implicitly do (e.g. Stern 1977; Neel 1977, p.261), that Jung was just a 
disciple of· Freud's who, having used him to rise to fame, later 
ungratefully deserted his teacher. This view is simply contrary 
to the historical facts - Jung had made original contributions to 
psychology long before he met Freud. In ''Memories, Dreams, Reflec-
tions", Jung stresses the fact that the invitation to Clark Uni-
versity in the USA was extended to Freud and himself "indepen?ently" 
(1963, p.141) although simultaneously. Jung makes this p~int clear 
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as if trying to correct the impression which was initiated by 
Freud (1914), that it was his association with him that procured 
this invitation. He further explains that it was through his 
American students and collaborators at the laboratory for experi-
mental psychopathology at Burgholzli, which he founded and headed 
from 1904, that he became known to the English-speaking world. 
Jung was highly esteemed for his pioneer work, particularly with 
the association and psychogalvanic experiments. 
It is ironical that one of the main attractions Freud had found in 
Jung's work was his experimental and scientific approach (McGuire 
1974, p.18) which provided a much needed boost to the early 
psychoanalytic movement. Freud valued and greatly welcomed Jung's 
"hard-nose scientific" proof for the existence of the unconscious. 
This proof was offered by the results of the association experiment and 
Freud hailed it as "the first bridge linking up experimental 
psychology and psychoanalysis" (1914, p.28). Jung was to be sub-
sequently accused by Freudians and Freud himself (e.g. Freud 1925, 
pp.52-53; 1923, pp.255-7) of precisely the opposite - that his 
theories were unscientific and a product of his allegedly speculative 
and mys tic al inclinations and thus were ultimately "scientifically 
sterile" (Freud 1926, p.270). 
Despite their inequality in experience and expertise, the relation-
ship between Freud and Jung was not one-sided. Jung indeed learned 
a great deal from the Viennese pioneer of psychoanalysis but also 
exerted some influence on Freud's thought. Freud explicitly 
acknowledged Jung as the originator of at least five important 
aspects of psychoanalysis: 
.:: .. :·· 
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(a) The tradition in experimentally investigating psychoanalytic 
concepts (e.g. 1913, p.174; 1915, p.199). 
(b) The notion of ccimplex (e.g. 1901, p.210; 1910, p.50; 1914, 
pp. 29-30). 
(c) The institution of training analysis as an essential part 
of the education of new analysts (e.g. 1912b, p.I 16). 
(d) The use of anthropological and mythological material in the 
discussion of psychoanalytic theories (e.g. 1912, p.82; 1913, 
p.185; 1914, p.3~). 
(e) The application o~ psychoanalytic theory in the understanding 
of psychotic conditions (e.g. 1911, p.77; 1914, p.28). 
Moreover, Freud warmly welcomed his close trusting friendship with 
Jung and saw it as a necessary refreshing antidote to his often 
inevitable image of leader. In a letter to Jung (6 December 1906) 
he wrote: 
"As you know, I suffer all the torments that can 
afflict an 'innovator', not the least of these 
is the unavoidable necessity of passing among my 
own supporters, as the incorrigibly self-righteous 
crank or fanatic that in reality I am not". 
(McGuire 1974, p.12). 
It is true that Jung, touched perhaps by the overwhelming accept-
ance he found in their friendship became over-enthusiastic and for 
a number of reasons temporarily set aside his reservations toward 
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the Freudian doctrines, particularly those on sexuality. These sporadic· 
expressions of unquestioned support for the Freudian cause in its 
entirety should not be interpreted as related at all to the genuine 
respect Jung had for Freud not only during their friendship, but 
also long after. 
Jung had read Freud's Interpretation of Dreams in 1900, the year in which 
-','· 
it was published. But it was not until 1903 that this significant 
book "linked up" with Jung's own ideas (1963, pp.169-170). Reference to 
Freud is found in Jung's dissertation (see previous chapter). There, in 
investigating dissociative phenomena of a "split-off personality" 
type, Jung wonders whether Freud's dream theories and particularly 
the mechanism of repression could adequately account for them (1902, 
p.56). A little further on he attempts a Freudian interpretation: 
"Our patient's'romances' throw a most signif-
icant light on the subjective roots of her 
dreams. They swann with open and secret love-
affairs, with illegitimate births and other 
sexual innuendoes... It is the woman's 
premonition of sexual feeling, the dream of 
fertility, that has created these monstrous 
ideas in the patient. We shall not be wrong 
if we seek the main cause of this curious 
clinical picture in her budding sexuality. 
Fran this point of view the whole essence of 
Ivenes and her enonnous family is nothing but 
a dream of sexual wish-fulfilment, which differs 
from the dream of a night only in that it is 
spread over months and years." (1902, pp. 
69-70 emphasis added). 
This is a rather curious quotation. In no other place in his 
dissertation does Jung bring up this theory again and it certainly 
does not tie up with the teleological function and other charac-. 
teristics that he ascribed to Ivenes (as was discussed in the 
previous chapter). It becomes even more strange when the actual 
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style of writing is clos·ely examined. Dogmatic phrases such as 
"the whole essence ••• is nothing but" are not to be found in the 
rest of that work, and not in any other writings by Jung, for that 
matter. On the contrary, Jung was later extremely critical of 
Freud's frequent use of "nothing but" as an inflexible manner of 
theorising. Moreover, with evident contempt he grouped all such 
theories into a"'nothing but' psychology" (1914, p.289). In the 
face of such evidence one is therefore left to speculate that the 
paragraph quoted above was perhaps an amateurish attempt at in-
cluding some new theoretical trends in his thesis without really 
giving them the weight that the strong language of their formulation 
implies. This hypothesis might also explain a ntnnber of other 
similar references to Freudian theories found in some of Jung's 
early works (e.g. 1906b, pp.390-393; pp.400-401). 
Inaddition to this almost "snobbish" motivation, the careful re-
searcher could identify another: Jung's explicit intention to 
please Freud and show him how much he valued his original theories. 
In these references one again has the strong feeling that Jung 
"scrambled" sexual interpretations in the text in an unsuitable 
way. They betray themselves as not belonging to the rest of the 
argument (e.g. 1906b, p.373). 
Jung, on the une hand, propagated openly the Freudian revolution and 
he actively involved himself in academic arguments defending Freud 
(e.g. Jung 1906e; 1908b; 1910). But, on the other hand, Jung's 
individuality and spirit of independence was preserved, even when 
he was overeager to gain the master's favour. As will be shown 
later, Jung made a fairly sharp distinction between Freud's 
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"psychology" which he supported, and the "sexual hypothesis" of 
whose truth and value he was never convinced. Moreover, Jung 
never kept this distinction to himself but openly connnunicated it 
to Freud. Throughout their friendship Jung emphasized his need to 
be true to his own convictions. On the 26th November 1906 he sent 
Freud an offprint of his published reply to Aschaffenburg's lecture 
where he attacked psychoanalysis. Commenting on his reply, Jung 
writes: 
" .•. I have tailored it a bit to my subjective 
standpoint, so you may not agree with everything in it. 
I hope I haven't misrepresented you! In any case 
I wrote it out of honest conviction. Incidentally, 
I have also championed your cause at the Congress of 
alienists in Tiibingen amid stifling opposition .•• " 
(McGuire 1974, p.9). 
The most important observation one could perhaps make about the 
relationship of these two men is that it came at a very opportune 
time for both of them. As far as Jung was concerned, his profes-
sional association and subsequent personal friendship with Freud 
represented at the time a culmination of his bright and promising 
career. His personal and scientific quest found a comforting and 
secure harbour in the closeness with Freud. In his memoirs Jung 
openly admitted that "Freud was the first man of real import8.lllce I 
had encountered .•• " (1963, p.172). The relationship was one of 
father-son, king-crown prince, master-disciple. Despite their 
tragic break Jung retained a deep respect and care for Freud. 
Laurens van der Post discloses that it was a friend of Jung's (Dr. 
E.A. Bennet) who assisted Freud in escaping in 1938 from Nazi occu-
pied Vienna and settling in Hampstead, London. Moreover, van der 
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Post stresses Jung's sincere concern about Freud's fate at that 
critical time. Jung anxiously waited for news of Freud's flight 
to London and when his safe arrival was confirmed, Jung sent him 
"the wannest of telegrams of welcane" (van der Post 1975, p.148). 
Jung's personal loyality and respect for Freud is also reflected 
in the interview he gave to John Freeman for the BBC in 1959. He 
refused to divulge any information about Freud's dreams which he 
had access to, insisting that such action would be "indiscrete" and 
unprofessional. To the remark of the interviewer that Freud had 
been dead for many years, Jung replied firmly: 
"Yes, but these regards last longer than life" 
(McGuire and Hull 1978, p.418). 
Michael Fordham confirms the loyalty and fondness Jung always had 
for Freud, and recalls that Jung, when asked about Freud, "would talk 
in warm, appreciative tones and refer to him as 'the master' " 
(1975, p.110). 
The. personal friendship that was inaugurated by the thirteen hours 
of talk during their first meeting, in 1907 in Vienna, was to 
undergo a great deal of modulation and was destined to leave a 
very strong impression on the development of psychology. 
It appears that Jung had more affinity with Freud's theories of 
the unconscious and repression than with his theories of sexuality. As already 
discussed , Jung seems to have paid more lip service to the 
theory of sexuality than really identifying himself with it; where-
as the unconscious made more sense to the young Jung. The reasons 
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for this inclination are not difficult to find, especially when 
placed in the perspective of Jung's preoccupation with the Other, 
developed in the preceding parts of this study. 
In short, Jung's position in psychology at that time could be 
summarised as follows: His eagerness to further explore the entire 
phenomenon of his childhood No. 2 personality was a very important 
factor which contributed towards his final decision to choose 
psychiatry as his speciality. Jung's next crucial choice, with 
regard to the subject matter of his dissertation, also betrays the 
same concern. As was shown in the previous chapter, in analysing 
S.W. and discussing the field of somnambulism and phenomena of double-
consciousness, Jung developed a number of important insights into 
the nature, origin and function of the Other. These insights were 
further augmented by the rich experiences that Jung gained from 
his pioneer investigations with the association experiment. The 
notion of the complex represented the culmination of his theoretical 
achievements in that period. Complexes were regarded as "second 
consciousness", as "independent selves" within the personality, as 
an-other personality, as the Other. 
It was at this point of his development that Jung became aware of 
Freud's new and revolutionary teaching. Apart from his impact on 
clinical psychology, Freud introduced new insights which stirred 
up the fairly settled contemporary theories of _association. 
Reik (1956) relates the following characteristic anecdote: 
Professor Jodl, lecturing to his psychology students at the 
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University of Vienna, announced with amusement that there was a 
fellow, by the name of Freud, who was claiming that in addition to 
the accepted laws of association there was also a new one based on 
emotional involvement and the participation of the unconscious. 
His mocking words were received by his audience with ironic smiles 
of disbelief. This was the typical reaction to Freud's 
theories at the time. Jung, on the other hand, for at least two 
main reasons not only found the Freudian innovations sound and 
exciting, but he even became a fanatic propagator of them. 
(a) 
(b) 
The first reason is theoretical. Jung's own findings in the 
area of the association experiment, particularly his theory 
of complexes, bore striking similarities to Freud's discoveries 
in treating hysteric and neurotic patients·. Both had 
tapped an area of psychological functioning which did not 
obey the rules of the conscious, everyday ego. Freud referred 
to it as the unconscious. Jung understood it in terms of 
automatism and independently functioning complexes. 
The second reason could be called "psychological". Jung's 
great dynamism and creativity could not be contained within 
the restrictive envirorment of Burgholzli. Despite the exciting and 
pioneering research, work at Burgholzli was, like in many 
State Mental Hospitals, highly regimented, and routinized 
according to the rules and regulations of the strictly hier-
archical system. One might also speculate that Jung's strong 
attraction to Freud could be related to Jung's peculiar and 
ambivalent relation to Eugen Bleuler. Ellenberger (1970), 
reminds us of the oddity that Jung makes no reference in his 
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autobiography to his teacher, supervisor and chief! What-
ever feelings Jung might have had toward Bleuler, it seems 
that their relationship could not have developed to that of a 
master-disciple. -Jung, for whatever reasons, was not suffi-
ciently inspired by him to model after and follow him. But 
with Freud it was different! His courage, imagination and 
seriousness overwhelme:l and inspired Jung. Freud 
became the idol of many young doctors and despite the "sane~ 
tions" that the establishment imposed on the new "heresy", 
it was for them an honour to belong to the new and revolu-
' 
tionary movement.. In his obituary on Freud, Jung made this 
very point clear: 
" ••• For us, then young psychiatrists, 
[Freud was] ••• a source of ilhnnination, 
while for our older colleagues... an 
object of mockery" (Jung 1963, p.169n). 
Psychoanalysis was not merely a system of psychotherapy, or 
a redefinition of psychology, but also a movement with broader 
social and moral implications (e.g. Fromm 1971; Marcuse J.956; Rieff 1961; 
Robinson 1969 ) • Jung identified strongly with Freud's 
call for a re-examination of the hidden and neglected "parts" 
of ourselves, which we conveniently ignore. This can be 
better appreciated once it is placed in the perspective of 
Jung's problematic of the Other, starting right from his child-
hood No. 2 personality to the theory of canplexes. 
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B. JUNG'S THEORET ICAI. DEVELOPMENT 
Psychoanalysis offered a systematic understanding of the origin, 
nature and function of those ~eglected aspects of personality. 
This is what Jung needed for his own understanding of the Other as 
expressed in his theories of somnambu listic phenanena and complexes. 
Moreover, his theory, that strong affects produced complexes, was 
phrased within the framework of the association theories; although 
it was a modification and expansion of the established and accepted 
theories, it nevertheless lacked a broader basis with implications for 
a larger variety of psychological phenomena. By marrying his 
theory of complexes to the new Freudian psychology, Jung was able 
to establish contact with a whole new world of rich relatives! 
Thus, Freud's theory of the unconscious provided the much wanted 
fruitful theoretical context for Jung's own investigations. 
It was Breuer who, in the "Studies on Hysteria", published with 
Freud's collaboration in 1895, propounded that unconscious ideas 
were a product of a certain process that made them "inadmissible 
to consciousness": 
".,.Their psychical ideational activity is 
divided into a conscious and an unconscious 
part, and their ideas are divided into some 
that are admissible and some that are in-
admissible to consciousness. We cannot, 
therefore, speak of a splitting of conscious-
ness, though we can of a splitting of the 
mind" (p.225). 
Contrary to contemporary theories of "double consciousness" or 
"multiple consciousness", Freud and Breuer had proposed that the 
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conflict takes place between two separate and distinct psychological 
systems - a conscious and an unconscious. Freud's most significant 
contribution was his subsequent elaboration of these two systems, 
and particularly the unconscious. 
The relevance of Freud's distinction of an independent psyehological 
system, the unconscious, should be appreciated in the light of the 
previous discussion on Jung's preoccupation with the problem of the 
Other. Freud further developed the process of "inadmissibility 
to consciousness", having first renamed it repression (1900, p.672). 
Repression was to become one of the most crucial terms in psycho-
analysis. Freud emphasised that: 
"The theory of repression became the f ounda-
tion-stone of our understanding of the 
neuroses •.• It is possible to take repression 
as a centre and to bring all the elements of 
psychoanalytical theory into relation with 
it ••• " (1925, p.30). 
Initially, Jung's theory of complexes did not refer to the unconscious 
in a direct manner. As James Strachey correctly notes in his 
·editorial foreword to Freud's article "Psychoanalysis and the estab-
lislnnent of the facts in legal proceedings" (1906), Jung's early 
understanding of complex did not include any "direct reference" to 
it being "unconscious or repressed" and concluded that a "complex 
may or may not consist of repressed material" (p.101). Jung 
had formulated his theory of complexes within a separate system, 
different from the Freudian theoretical framework. His was the 
experimental paradigm of association and attention. It was only 
during the period under present examination that Jung realised that 
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Freud's systematic study of the unconscious as a separate and 
autonomous system provided a most useful background for the under-
standing of complexes. Soon after, Jung located the complexes, 
or at least some or part of them, in the unconscious (e.g. Jung & 
Riklin 1904, p.88). Jung made extensive use of both the concepts 
of the unconscious and repression in his theories of this period but 
at the same time maintained that his own theory of complexes " ••. 
goes a little beyond the scope of Freud's views II (1907,p.38). 
According to Jung, "the essential basis of our personality is 
affectivity" (1907, p.38). He accepted thought and action as 
"symptoms of affectivity", and further understood that the "elements 
of psychic life" are fanned as "functional units"with three canponents: 
"sense-perception, intellectual components (ideas, memory-images, 
judgraents, etc.), and feeling-tone" (1907, pp. 38-39). These are 
interlinked so that when one is focused upon one, all the others will 
be activated. In Jung's example, when one meets an old friend, the 
''image" of that friend, as a functional unit, will stimulate all 
three components along with their further associations, e.g. 
an unpleasant affair that resulted from the "thoughtless gossip" 
of that friend: 
II the functional unit, 'my friend', is 
only one of many figures. The entire mass of 
memories has a definite feeling-tone, a lively 
feeling of irritation. Every molecule partici-
pates in this feeling-tone, so that, whether it 
appears by itself or in conjunction with others, 
it always carries this feeling-tone with it, and 
it does this with the greater distinctness the 
more distinctly we can see its connection.with 
the complex-situation as a whole" (1907, p.39). 
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Following this theory of psychological functions 'as inter-linked 
units, Jung extends it to include the supreme unit, the entire 
personality itself. It was these units of ideas "grouped and 
selected" by affect that Jung called feeling-toned complexes and 
by extension Jung tenned ego-complex what is called "personality": 
" by this we mean the whole mass of 
pertaining to the ego, which we think 
being acccmpanied by the powerful and 
present feeling-tone of our own body" 
(19 0 7' p • 40) • 
ideas 
of as 
ever-
In a normal person the supreme complex is the ego-complex which 
dominates the psychological functioning of the individual and should 
be in control of all other complexes. Now, Jung's experiences with 
the association experiment and his reading of Freud gave rise to a 
new understanding of complexes which incorporates the theory of 
repression: 
At a given moment, when any component/s of the complex (sense-
perception, intellectual or affective elements) comes to the indivi-
dual' s attention, it will inevitably "irritate" all the other com-
ponents as well as produce 
II bodily changes, by a complicated harmony 
of muscular tensions and excitations of the 
sympathetic nervous system .•. [thesfi} count-
less body sensations become altered, and in 
turn alter most of the sensations on which the 
nonnal ego is based. Consequently the normal 
ego loses its attention-tone (or its clarity, 
or its stimulating and inhibiting influence on 
other associations). It is compelled to give 
way to the other, stronger sensations connected 
with the new complex ••• " (1907, p.41). 
. I 
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The ego therefore tries to avoid being overwhelmed by the "stronger 
sensation" of individual complexes and attempts to "silence" &spects 
or components of the threatening complex. The stronger the feeling-
tone accompanying a complex, the more "undesirable" it will 
be for the ego. This leads Jung to conclude that: 
II complexes are in a state of repression 
because they are concerned as a rule with the 
most intimate secrets which are anxiously 
guarded and which the subject either will not 
or cannot divulge" (1907, p.45 emphasis added). 
Following this approach, Jung had no difficulty in accepting the 
limited importance of sexuality, as he realised how powerful the 
feeling-tone that usually accompanies the sexual complex is: 
"The strongest and most lasting effects are seen 
above all in sexual complexes, where the feeling-
tone is constantly maintained, for instance by 
unsatisfied sexual desire" (1907, p.44). 
In the interests of the entire personality, aspects of complexes 
with potentially disrupting effects have to be repressed. At this 
pain~ a comparison is indicated between one of Freud's early form-
ulations of repression, and Jung's present theory under examination: 
In a letter to Fliess (6 December 1896) Freud outlined his "latest 
bit of speculation": Assuming that "our psychical mechanism has 
come about by a process of stratification" (Freud 1954, p.173), he 
postulated three instances of "registration" (or "transcription") 
between what is perceived and what finally enters consciousness. 
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These"registrations" were the following:, 
(a) Pcpt-s: It is not conscious and "is 
arranged according to associations of 
simultaneity". 
(b) Uc (unconsciousness): It is arranged 
"Perhaps according to casual relations". 
Uc traces may correspond to conceptual 
memories". 
(c) Pc (preconsciousness) is "attached to 
verbal images" and corresponds "to the 
official ego" (1954, p.175). 
Freud called the successive movement from one "registration " (or 
"transcription") to the next "translation" and understood repression 
as precisely the process through which translation is prevented: 
II I explain the peculiarities of the psycho-
neuroses by supposing that the translation of 
some of the material has not occurred ••. 
A failure of translation is what we know 
clinically as 'repression'. The motive for 
it is always a release of unpleasure which 
would result from a translation; it is as 
though this unpleasure provokes a disturbance 
of thought which forbids the process of 
trans la ti on ... " (p. 1 7 5, emphasis added) • 
Through this short exposition the similarities between Freud's theory 
of repression, in terms of the process of stratification and as a 
failure of translation, and Jungs understanding of the same notion, 
in tenns of the "functional unit", should become evident. Both 
authors accept repression not in terms of an "all or none" effect but 
as a partial process of interlinked mechanisms of sensory, perceptual, 
intellectual1 as well as affective elements. Both underline the 
significant role of affective components (Freud: unpleasure; Jung: 
• 
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strong feeling-tone) in the protection of personality, the formation 
of psychological abnormalities and in general, the structure of 
psychological functioning. 
According to Jung's theory, since complexes are constellations not 
only of ideas, memories, judgments, etc., but also of sense-percep-
tions and feeling-tone, all functioning as a unit, it is highly 
unlikely that this entire functional unit will disappear from con-
sciousness when a complex is repressed. Aspects, or components of 
the unit will always remain conscious but since they will no longer 
be part of the unit they will inevitably lose their unit character 
and identity and will ultimately appear distorted. Jung called most 
distortions of complexes displacements. The repressed complex tries 
to 'squeeze' as much of itself as possible through the components 
that are achnitted to consciousness. The result is that the person-
ality retains its dominion over the complexes but the victory is 
indeed pyrrhic. Complexes nevertheless manage to come through 
either as "double personalities" or in disguise: 
II these displacements and disguises may, as we 
know, produce real double personalities, such as have 
always excited the interest of psychological writers 
(cf. the recurrent problem in Goethe of 'two souls', 
and among the moderns Hermann Bahr, Gorky and others). 
'Double personality' is not just a literary phrase, 
it is a scientific fact of general interest to psycho-
logy and psychiatry, especially when it manifests it-
self in the form of double consciousness or dissocia-
tion of the personality. The split-off complexes 
are always distinguished by perculiarities of mood 
and character ,;o" (1907, p.50). 
tn other words, the complex, fenced off from consciousness because 
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of its potentially disruptive role, may nurture a whole other 
personality, which, by virtue of its isolation will retain an 
autonomy and will manifest itself in eruptions only. A second 
possibility is that the complex will strive for expression through 
its uncensored components by disguising itself as an-other. 
In both cases an otherness is inevitable. 
It is within this context that Jung first made reference to symbols. 
Repressed and/or displaced, complexes express themselves symbolically. 
This means that again, parts of the functional unit in carrying the 
whole complex are inevitably invested with additional meaning that 
they would not nonnally carry if they were not representing the 
entire complex. This is clearly observed when one innocuous 
association, by virtue of its membership of a certain complex 
constellation, influences sense-perceptions and evokes affects in 
an unexpected and disproportionate manner. A special category of 
symbols are what Jung termed "power-words" which he understood, in 
much the same way as symbols in general, as hinting 
" at the whole system hidden behind them, just as technical words do in normal speech" 
( 1907, p. I 09) • 
Jung later said that his first understanding of symbols was within 
the framework of the "personalistic medical psychology mainly as 
presented by Freud" (1939, p.243). In that passage, Jung's aim 
was to differentiate between his early understanding of symbols, 
which was influenced by Freud (relating symbols to personal 
pathology), and his later development, where he accepted symbols 
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as being expressions of a collective normal psyche. In fact, the 
truth remains that his initial use of symbols was derived from his 
experiences with the association experiment. He then called the 
relation between a word-stimulus and a complex "symbolic" in 
"character" (1911, p~599). 
In 1907, Jung drew a distinction between "symbolical" and 
"allegorical". Basing his definition of symbols on Pelletier's 
theory, he accepted that 
II Allegory ••• is the intentional inter-
pretation of a thought, reinforced by images, 
whereas symbols are only indistinct, sub-
sidiary associations to a thought, which ob-
scure it rather than clarify it." (1907, p.65). 
Pelletier's own definition, which Jung quotes in the same passage, 
emphasizes the inferiority of symbol to thought, and clarifies that 
" one could define symbol as the false 
perception of a relation of identity, or 
of very great analogy, between two objects 
which in reality are only vaguely analogous" 
(1907, p.65). 
Jung, connecting these points with his own position with regard to 
complexes, focuses on the conditions that lead to the formation of 
symbols. He observes that "there must be a lack of sensitivity 
to differences, or a deficiency in the power of discrimination" 
(p.65). The significance of this focus is not difficult to 
understand. It brings symbols within the framework of complexes 
and in fact makes them almost identical terms • To be reminded, 
.Jung stressed the same characteristics for the complexes: 
- 184 -
II When the canplex is hit, conscious association 
is disturbed and becomes superficial, owing to the 
flowing off of attention to the underlying complex 
('inhibition of attention'). During the normal 
activity of the ego-complex the other complexes 
must be inhibited or the conscious function of 
directed association would be impossible •.• 
The effects of the complex must normally be feeble 
and indistinct because they lack the full cathexis 
of attention which is taken up by the ego-complex •.• 
The main part of attention is directed to the 
activity of the ·ego-canplex, while the autonomous 
complex receives only a fraction... For this 
reason the autonomous complex can only 'think' 
superficially and unclearly, i.e. symbolically, 
and the end-results (automatisms, constellations) 
which filter through into the activity of the ego-
complex and into consciousness will be similarly 
constituted" (1907, pp.64-65, emphasis added). 
Thus, in this period, Jung understood symbols as precisely those 
complex components which, burdened with the task of expressing the 
"whole system hidden behind them", i.e. the canplex in its entirety, 
inevitably have to convey meaning that exceeds their "normal 
capacity". 
Following the essence of this analysis Jung was able to write: 
II Dreams, too, are constructed along 
similar lines; they are symbolic expres-
sions of the repressed complex" (1907, p.57). 
As far as the theory of sexuality is concerned, if his initial 
attempts at pleasing Freud and flirting with theoretical innovations 
are excluded, it seems that it was again from his own theory of 
complexes that he set out to incorporate aspects of the psycho-
analytic doctrines on sexuality: Jung accepted the partial sexual 
character of symbols and dreams as a logical extension of his 
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observation that complexes with sexual themes are usually accompanieq 
by strong feeling-tone. Since 
II the strongest feelings and impulses are 
connected with the strongest complexes, it is 
therefore not surprising that the majority of 
complexes are of an erotic-sexual nature, as 
also are most dreams and most of the hysterias. 
Especially in women, for whom sexuality is the 
centre of psychic life, there is hardly a 
complex that is not related to sex. To this fact 
may well be due the significance of the sexual 
trauma for hysteria, assumed by Freud to be 
universal. At any rate, we must always bear 
sexuality in mind in psychoanalysis, though 
this does not mean that every hysteria can be 
traced back to sexuality" (1907, p.67). 
One can easily note the progression of Jung's gradual acceptance 
of the Freudian doctrines, but always from his own vantage point. 
The idea of sexuality became more palatable to Jung once he digested 
it and it became part of his own theories of canplexes. It there-
fore follows logically that from this position it was easy for Jung 
to accept (at least temporarily) the traumatic causation of complexes. 
Freud's theory of psychic trauma refers to an experience which is 
produced under severe emotional stress (cf. feeling-tone). A 
usual consequence is then 
II that some part at least of the affect that 
accompanies the trauma persists in conscious-
ness as a component of the subject's state of 
feeling" (Freud, in Freud & Breuer, 1895, 
pp.86-87). 
Freud's e:icperience in treating hysteric patients led him to 
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appreciate the powerful effects of psychic traumata. He observed 
how the repressed traumatic experience makes its way through to 
consciousness even in the most distorted (symbolical) manner. He 
described how the repressed or traumatic experience which Jung 
later tenned complex, could indeed manifest itself as a separate 
independent system not only of a psychological but also of a 
physiological, somatic nature. 
II The incompatible idea is rendered 
innocuous by its sum of excitation being 
transformed into something somatic. For 
this I should like to propose the name 
conversion." (1894, p.49). 
' 
Therefore besides the two possibilities of manifestation of the 
repressed experience (complexes or traumata) mentioned earlier, 
i.e. eruptions of a second personality, or symbolical distortions 
(both psychological in nature), Freud had spoken of a somatic 
possibility where a substantial transformation of the actual somatic 
functioning was disrupted. This he saw as the peculiarity of 
hysteria. 
"Thus we see that the characteristic factor 
in hysteria is not the splitting of conscious-
ness but the capacity for conversion " 
(189Lf, p.50). 
Conversion was not the only result of traumatic experiences. It 
was perhaps the most powerful one. Depending on the seriousness 
of the trauma there was for Freud a gradation of disrupting effects. 
Jung utilized the theory of trauma as early as 1906 where in at least 
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two papers he explicitly connected it with his own theory of complexes. 
In "Psychoanalysis and association experiments" he argued that 
''Hysteria and obsessive phenomena stern from 
a complex. The physical and psychic syrnp-
tans are nothing but symbolic manifestations 
of the pathogenic complexes" (1906c, p.317). 
He concluded that his association experiments might be a 
"valuable aid in finding the pathogenic complex" thus "facilitating 
and shortening Freud's psychoanalysis" (p.317). In the other 
paper, "Association, dream, and hysterical symptom", Jung, looking 
for the origin of complexes in a case that he discusses, wrote 
"We must also postulate the existence of an 
event that prepared the way for repressing the 
sexual complex, i.e. a sexual event of child-
hood. Here the sexual trauma, which the 
dreams seem to indicate would fit in" (1906b, 
p.403 emphasis added). 
ln the preceding paragraphs a number of Jungian insights formulated 
·in Freudian language were presented. Jung indeed enriched his own 
theories by marrying them with the Freudian ones. What should be 
emphasised too are his reservations or even rejection of cert~in 
psychoanalytic axians. One does not have to search hard for them. 
They include the ones mentioned above. Jung always accepted the 
Freudian concepts in his own terms, so that even when he made use 
of psychoanalytic theories such as sexuality, repression, trauma, 
unconscious and others, he did not go all the way along with his 
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older colleague, but only used them to fit his own theories. 
He never abandoned his own training in empirical and experimental 
approaches to association. Even during the peak time of their 
relationship, in 1909, Jung kept the association experiment so 
central to his psychological understanding that he·wrote 
II The association experiment is nothing 
other than a small segment of the psycho-
logical life of a man, and everyday life is 
at bottom an extensive and greatly varied 
association experiment." (1909b, p.305). 
On the 5th October 1906 Jung wrote to Freud: 
II What I can appreciate ••• are your psycho-
logical views, whereas I am still pretty far 
from understanding ••• the genesis of hysteria 
It seems to me that though the genesis 
of hysteria is predominantly, it is not ex-
clusively, sexual. I take the same view of 
your sexual theory. Harping exclusively on 
these delicate theoretical questions, Aschaf-
fenburg forgets the essential thing, your 
psychology .•• " (McGuire 197 4, pp. 4-5 
emphasis added). 
Two days later Freud replied: 
II Your writings have long led me to 
suspect that your appreciation of my 
psychology does not extend to all my 
views on hysteria and the problem of 
sexuality, but I venture to hope that in 
the course of the years you will come 
much closer to me than you now think 
possible" (McGuire 1974, p.5). 
Thus, right from the beginning, Jung had differentiated between Freud's 
\ 
and 
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(a) "psychology" which he understood as the 
essential contribution to and revolutionary 
innovation in psychology, 
(b) the whole body of "hypotheses" connected 
with sexuality which he could not find 
entirely acceptable. 
But Freud himself did not make this distinction at all, and did not 
consider his work on sexuality as mere "hypotheses". Although he 
could write conclusions like the following: 
"The unsatisfactory conclusion, however, that 
emerges fran these investigations of the 
disturbances of sexual life is that we know 
far too little of the biological processes 
constituting the essence of sexuality to be 
able to construct from our fragmentary informa-
tion a theory adequate to the understanding 
alike of normal and of pathological conditions" 
(Freud 1905, p.243 emphasis added), 
one has a strong suspicion that they were more a result of authors' 
, 
etiquette (an expected humility in writing style) rather than true 
conviction. In this particular case, if one compares the conclusion 
with the opening sentences of the same work, one finds that the 
"fragmentary information" is there ref erred to as "scientifically 
sifted observation"(!) (1905, p.136). Even besides the textual 
discrepancies in qualifying the sexual "theory", Freud's basic 
attitude to it is well known from his writings. It would be 
difficult indeed to explain how he could solemnly ask Jung 
~ 
\ 
II 
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Promise me never to abandon the sexual 
theory. That is the most essential thing 
of all. You see, we must make a dogma of 
it, an unshakable bulwark" (Jung 1963, p.173), 
if he accepted his views on sexuality as just a "hypothesis". As 
far as Jung is concerned, there is ample evidence to show that he 
genuinely believed in the inconclusive and hypothetical status of 
Freud's investigations on sexuality and did not think that referring 
to them as such would offend the master. This will be discussed later. 
A typical example is the following: In 1908, at the prime of their 
relationship, reviewing the Freudian theories on hysteria in an 
article in Berlin's Monatsschrift fiir Psychiatrie und Neurologie, 
Jung writes: 
"Freud has never propounded a cut-and-dried 
theory of hysteria ••. his theoretical for-
mulations can claim the status of a working 
hypothesis ••• " (I 908b, p. 10). 
Now, this statement should be evaluated in the light of the fact 
that Freud had already published a number of studies on hysteria and 
sexuality by then. Three years earlier, in two consecutive issues 
of the very same authoritative journal, Freud had published his 
"Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria" (1905b). Also, 
apart from his "Studies on Hysteria" (1895) with Breuer, major works 
had already appeared such as "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality" 
(1905), ''My views on the part played by sexuality in the aetiology of 
the neuroses" (1906b), as well as his three books "The Interpretation 
of Dreams" ( 1900), "The Psychopathology of Everyday Life" ( 190 I), and 
- . - -
\. 
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"Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious" ( l 905c). Thus Jung's 
unambiguous remarks about the inconclusive nature of Freud's theories 
on sexuality and hysteria should be accepted as reflecting his sincere 
understanding that his master's thesis on the sexual aetiology of 
neuroses and hysteria was not the final product but a mere "working 
hypothesis". Jung refused to accept them as definitive and perhaps 
in his own turn hoped that Freud "would come closer" to him! He 
continued 
And again, 
II There can be no talk of a firmly-established 
Freudian theory of hysteria, but only of numerous 
experiences which have certain features in common 
.•• we are not dealing with anything finished and 
conclusive, but rather with a process in develop-
ment ••• " (1908b, p.10). 
"Since it has grown out of empirical practice, 
the theoretical foundations of the psycho-
analytic method are s ti 11 very obs cu re" ( p. I 5) • 
In this review Jung proceeds to define Freud's view of the field and 
aims of his psychoanalytic researches. He easily accepts that Freud's 
view is "that hysteria is a psychogenic neurosis" (p.10) based on 
the theoretical presuppositions which (a) place hysteria in the 
context of "psychic dissociation and unconscious psychic automatisms" 
and (b) underline the "aetiological significance of affects" (p.10). 
One cannot fail to recognize the above as Jung's own theoretical 
presuppositions. As far as the aim of Freud's research is concerned, 
Jung again perceived it through the spectacles of his own aims, to 
discover 
II 
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how the mechanism producing hysterical 
symptoms works. Nothing less is attempted, 
therefore, than to supply the missing link 
in the long chain between the initial cause 
and the ultimate symptom ••• " (1908b, p.IO). 
Jung relates this search to the Breuer-Freud proposition "that the 
hysteric suffers most of all from reminiscences" and Jung innnediately 
translates this into his own theoretical language: 
II i.e., fran feeling-toned complexes of 
ideas which, in certain exceptional conditions, 
prevent the initial affect from working itself 
out and finally disappearing" (p. J J). 
Thus, right from the beginning of this review Jung transparently 
betrays his own reading of Freud which is urunistakablY firmly 
located in his own language. The argmnent that Jung accepted the 
Freudian formulations as possible solutions to his own problematic 
is further supported by the subsequent exposition in that paper. 
This discussion will focus on the illustration of two further points: 
(a) Jung's translation of the Freudian theories into his own theory 
of complexes, and (b) Jung's treatment of the Freudian theory of 
. sexuality. 
(a) Jung 'attributes a central role to complexes in the Freudian 
theories. It should be noted that Freud himself hardly used the 
term "complex" a dozen times throughout the twenty-three volumes 
of his collected works! Despite his original praise of the term (1910c,p234) 
he later deplored it as irrelevant. But as far as Jung was concerned, 
the aim of psychoanalysis was 
11 
••• to bring to consciousness all the false 
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associative connections produced by the com-
plex, and in that way resolve them. Thus 
the patient gradually gains complete insight 
into his illness, and also has an objective 
standpoint from which to view his complex" (p.15). 
He further offers the following interpretation: 
"If, as psychoanalysis presupposes, free 
association leads to the complex, Freud 
logically assumes that this complex is 
associated with the starting-point or 
initial idea" (p. 10). 
This assumption leads Jung to accept " the initial idea as a sign 
or symbol of the complex" (p.16). 
After some theoretical objections Jung finally agrees that it is 
possible to explore and reach the central core of complexes using 
the technique of free association, as 
II If you take any segment of the psychological 
present, it will logically contain all the 
antecedent individual events, the affective 
experiences ••• that is, complexes ••• occupy-
ing the foreground, according to the degree of 
their actuality. This is true of every particle 
of the psyche. Hence it is theoretically possible 
to reconstruct the constellation from every part-
icle, and that is what the Freudian method tries 
to do" (p.16). 
Nevertheless Jung does not restrain himself from a translation of the 
Freudian theories. He goes further in suggesting improvements 
derived from his own work. Having granted Freud the theoreti~al 
validity of his method of free association, Jung still remarks that 
~ 
- 194 -
"it is extraordinarily difficult" and hazardous, and wonders why his 
own methods of word ·association developed in his researches on the 
association experiment are not used as an alternative: 
"An altogether hannless but most instructive 
exercise, for instance, is the analysis of 
constellations indicating a complex in the 
association experiment. With the help of 
this perfectly harmless material a great 
many Freudian phenomena could be studied 
without undue difficulty" (p.18). 
Jung basically felt that it was more difficult to use the directionless 
free association although it would finally lead to the pathogenic 
complex than the techniques of the association experiment. There, 
after the initial exposure to the entire list of stimulus-~ords the 
subject was asked to give his associations to specific key words that 
the experimenter had isolated as complex-indicators by virtue of the 
peculiar responses they had evoked. This technique was therefore 
more focused and directed though aiming at the very same target -
the analysis of the ccmplex. 
(b) Jung correctly observed the centrality of sexuality in Freudian 
thought and always had a number of reservations as far as that 
position is concerned. In the paper under present examination the 
reservations and comments are characteristically exemplified: 
(I) Firstly, Jung accepted the significance of sexuality as 
fitting his own theory. As was mentiorred earlier in this 
chapter, Jung had no difficulty acknowledging sexuality as 
one instance of affectivity. Neither had he any 
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qualms either in conceding that it is possible that one of 
the central affective events that is causative in the creation 
of a complex is of a sexual nature. He therefore saw it as 
perfectly legitimate for Freud to search for the "memory 
traces of sexual scenes in infancy" and also to point out 
the "sexual nature of the initial affect" (p. 13). 
(II) Jung nevertheless doubted whether it was possible that all 
(III) 
affective components could possibly be of a sexual nature. 
This view is obviously logical within the framework of his 
interpretation of sexuality. 
II No-one knows 
is applicable to 
(p.23). 
whether Freud's schema 
all fonns of hysteria" 
Jung at no stage accepted Freud's theory of infantile 
sexuality in its entirety, especially because of its re-
stricted fonnulation in terms of (i) its definition of 
sexuality and (ii) its axianatic and strong deterministic 
role in the development of personality. In this paper he 
voices again his disagreement: 
" •.• Not that the frequency of sexual 
traumata in childhood could be doubted, 
but rather their exclusively pathogenic 
l?ignificance for normal children" (p. 13). 
(IV) As far as the actual meaning of sexuality is concerned, it 
appears that the two men had different views. Jung always· 
considered sexuality as something broader than the "libido 
sexualis". In this paper Jung in fact attributes a 
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similar interpretation to Freud: 
"When Freud speaks of sexuality, it must not 
be understood merely as the sexual instinct" 
and in a footnote continues 
"Freud's concept of sexuality includes roughly 
everything covered by the concept of the in-
stinct for the preservation of the species" (p. 18). 
And a little further, referring to "sexual excitation", 
Jung seems to feel the need to clarify it in terms of his 
own interpretation, and adds parenthetically: "in the widest 
sense of the word" (p.19). 
In passing, it might be necessary to point out that Jung at 
a later stage, in his "Symbols of Transformation" quotes a 
long passage from Freud's "Psychoanalytic notes on an auto-
biographical account of a:case of paranoia" whe~e the fol-
lowing is included 
II we regard instinct as being the concept 
on the frontier-line between the somatic and 
the mental, and see in it the psychical 
representative of organic forces. Further, 
we accept the popular distinction between 
ego-instincts and a sexual-instinct" 
(Freud 1911, p.74) 1 
and in conjunction with his own understanding of certain 
other passages fran the "Three Essays on Sexuality" concludes that 
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Freud indeed had expanded his definition of libido to refer 
not only to the sexual instinct per se, but to a broader 
concept of psychic energy. Jung therefore justified his 
conclusion by calling upon his reading of the above-mentioned 
passages. He wrote that the references to Freud which he 
had discussed 
" allowed me to identify 'psychic energy' 
with 'libido'. The latter term denotes a 
desire or impulse which is unchecked by any 
kind of authority, moral or otherwise. 
Libido is its natural state" (1952c, p.135). 
(V) This final point on Jung's comments on the Freudian theory 
of sexuality is, in a sense, an extension of the previous 
one. Let his words set the tone: 
"The public can forgive Freud least of all for 
his sexual symbolism. In my view he is really 
easiest to follow here, because this is just 
where mythology, expressing the fantasy-thinking 
of all races, has prepared the ground in the 
most instructive way. I would only mention the 
writings of Steinthal in the 1860's, which prove 
the existence of a widespread sexual symbolism 
in the mythological records and the history of 
language. I also recall the eroticism of our 
poets and their allegorical or symbolical ex-
pressions. No one who considers this material 
will be able to conceal from himself that there 
are uncommonly far-fetching and significant 
analogies between the Freudian symbolisms and 
the symbols of poetic fantasy in individuals and 
in whole nations. The Freudian symbol and its 
interpretation is therefore nothing unheard of •.• " 
(1908b, p.23 emphasis added). 
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This lengthy quotation speaks for itself! Having liberated 
sexuality from the confined limits of libido sexualis, Jung is 
thus free to observe and hail its wider connections with other 
spheres of human symbolic activity, such as mythology, poetry 
and language. This inevitably leads him to appreciate the 
importance of studying_ symbolism in its collective context. 
Jung's evaluation of the Freudian theories, as typically presented 
in his article "The Freudian theory of hysteria" (1908b) could, at 
the same time, be considered as an indication of his own position at 
that time. This could be sunnned up as follows: 
(a) The theory of complexes still occupied a central place in Jung's 
thought. Having become part of the larger theoretical context 
of the psychoanalytic experience, complexes gained in both depth 
of understanding and width of application. Specifically, they 
were now related to hysterical phenomena, dreams, symbols and 
in general all manifestations of the unconscious that Freud 
discussed. 
(b) As far as Freud's theory of sexuality was concerned, Jung had 
clear and firm views. He was quite happy to accept its partial 
validity as long as it fitted into his own frame of reference. 
The concept of infantile sexuality as well as the exclusively 
sexual interpretation of complexes and psychopathological 
conditions were unacceptable to Jung. It is worth noting 
- 199 -
that Jung became aware during this period of the wider implica-
tions of sexual symbolism. Areas such as mythology, history 
of language, artistic creativity, as well as individual and 
national symbolism were mentioned by Jung as being related to 
the field of sexual symbolism. Nevertheless, Jung, appreciating 
the difficulties that his readers might have with the Freudian 
theories of sexuality, urges them not to throw out the baby with 
· the bathwater, and, if the "obtrusion of sexuality" puts them 
off (p.18), they should give psychoanalysis a fair chance as 
there is a lot more to it than mere sexual instincts! 
THE OTHER AS SYMBOL 
In the previous "psychiatric" period, Jung's formulation of the 
Other was seen to be reflected in his discussion of, inter alia, the 
Complex. In this chapter, Jung's further elaborations of the 
complexes were examined, and the following three observations can be 
made: 
1. It appears that Jung gradually adopted symbol as an equivalent 
of complex. His description of their dynamics of formation and 
functioning, as discussed above, makes the claim of their equi-
valence justified. This exchange of terms, however, should not 
be seen as a static meaningless exercise. Located in its proper 
dynamic and developmental context it reveals that it was not a 
mere renaming, but a process with further implications: Jung 
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increasingly ref erred to symbols more as carriers of the meaning 
of complexes rather than as strict synonyms of complexes. Thus, 
one may observe that in this period Jung initially accepted the 
symbol as an alternative term for the complex, but soon this 
, led to an expansion of the original denotation. Perhaps the 
most important extension which was in this manner introduced 
was the broadening of the meaning and application of the Other 
(as complex) by including more "shared '1 or 'collective' fonns 
of Others. 
2. More specifically, in examining this development within its 
historical context, it should be noted that Jung derived the 
"Shared" or 'Collective' complex from his earlier observations 
of patterns of complexes within families (1909, 1909b). He 
then found that certain complexes were shared by a number of 
members of the same family. A similar observation was made by 
Jung during this period as well. In his "Contribution to the 
psychology of rumour" (19llb) Jung discusses the case of a 
thirteen year old girl whose dream with sexual overtones directed 
toward her teacher, became instrumental in sparking a rumour 
about some alleged sexual involvement of the teacher. Jung's 
interpretation of that phenomenon indicates a manifestation of 
a general sexual complex that all the girl students "shared". 
The researcher, however, finds no further reference in Jung's 
work to this specific type of "shared" complex as such, and the 
following inference may be formed, therefore, with some substan-
tiation - that Jung found it extremely difficult to continue 
referring to this kind of Other within the existing system of 
the Other-as-complex, and in order to expound on this "shared" 
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and 'collective' Other he had to move on to a new conceptual 
framework, i.e. the Other-as-symbol. The latter offered him 
a more fertile ground for cultivating his novel phenanenon, and 
a better opportunity for investigating its ramifications and 
consequences. Hence the extension of comp~ex to relate to 
symbolic activities represents an advanced formulation of the 
"shared,. complex. The Other-as-symbol enables Jung to ex-
plicitly associate the Other with mythology, history of language, 
artistic creativity, as well as with the national, racial and 
collective network of symbolism; so much so that Jung as 
early as 1908 writes about symbols of ''whole nations"! (1908b, p.23). 
3. The third point concerns the issue of language, in particular. 
First of all, the shift from the complex to symbol should be 
properly appreciated. Complexes were defined in terms of 
individual psychological functioning. Symbols, on the other 
hand, are located within the cultural, mythological, religious 
and artistic contexts. It is logical therefore that Jung 
included history of language as one of the spheres where symbols 
are manifested. To return to the "Freudian theory of hysteria", 
Jung applauds Freud's references to language and "verbal 
expression" (1908b, p.17) as, one should not forget, he himself 
had a clear understanding throughout his researches in the 
association experiment, that what he was in' fact investigating 
was not a "pure" association but only a language association 
(vide supra, p.187f~. Jung never abandoned that original 
understanding and was carefully observing its relevance at each 
stage of his development. That is perhaps why he prefers his 
I 
I 
I 
I 
-
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own method of word association to Freud's elusive free association. 
In the former the actual activity is named properly. There is 
no pure association; only verbal association. Why then not 
call it so? 
The differences, naturally, between these two methods are not 
confined to their names. As outlined in this chapter, in the 
Jungian method further associations were sought to the key, 
ccmple~-indicator words, whereas in the Freudian method, 
associations were free and without guidance. In a supplement 
to his significant book, "The Psychology of Dementia Praecox", 
Jung raises verbal expression as a "special point". He main-
tains that "innovations of language" in patients should be 
accepted as meaningful! communications and not gibberish. 
They are "technical terms serving to designate in concise form 
certain complicated ideas". He sees no difference in essence 
between "pathological" speech and the formation of technical 
terms except that in patients it develops much too quickly to 
allow the normal process of assimilation. He further suggests 
that 
II 
a philologist would be able to make 
valuable observations on speech-confused 
patients which would help us to understand 
the normal changes that have occurred in 
the history of language" (1907, pp.146-147). 
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TRANSITION 
During this "psychoanalytic" period, Jung made some significant 
contributions. These should be appreciated in the light of the dis-
cussion which emphasised that Jung entered into that fateful relation-
ship with Freud although always maintaining his own basic orientation, 
viz. his problematic of the Other. In his association with Freud 
and the broader· psychoanalytic movement Jung accepted only those 
doctrines that assisted him in further developing his own problematic, 
the formulation of the Other, and discarded those that he perceived 
as irrelevant to this central theme. 
Specifically, Jung deepened and expanded his understanding of the 
complex. He analysed it further in tenns of its components and 
functions, and connected it with symbol. Perhaps the most important 
implication of this extension was the broadening of this concept to 
include more collective forms of complexes and a more general and 
collective understanding of the Other. 
Fihally, an overview of the development of Jung's formulations of the 
Other is necessary at this stage again. The following formulations 
have so far been identified and discussed: 
I. From the CHILDHOOD AND PREPSYCHIATRIC PERIOD 
- ~ - -
The Other as fire, stone and pebble, and manikin 
' 
' 
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these could be understood as global, undifferentiated, primitive 
forms of animistic Others 
I 
The Other as No.2 personality 
although still a global and undifferentiated Other, No.2 was 
nevertheless of a human form. This development toward·differen:.... 
tiation, however, produces a new problem, i.e. the possibility 
of a dual or split personality. 
2. From the PSYCHIATRIC PERIOD 
. . 
Fragment Other and Anticipated Whole Other 
f ... 
'~: 
The former was a further personalised Other which was differen-
tiated to such a degree that it constituted almost a unidimen-
sional mini personality (extreme unconscious tendency, either of 
an exaggerated unctuous or childish type); inevitably such an 
Other was acting in a highly fragmenting way by splitting the 
personality. The latter, although also of a personalised nature 
has unifying qualities. Thus the two types of Others could 
be understood as being of a different order, i.e. whereas the 
F.O. represents an existing Other competing with the ego person-
ality (and tending towards splitting the total personality)j 
the A.W.O. not only is not in competition with the ego person-
ality, but it also guides and anticipates its expansion. Both 
nevertheless are more specific Others in a human form. 
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The Other as Complex (with particular reference to association) 
In this formulation the Other ceases to have a fairly distinct 
human form, and instead is explained in terms of its even 
further specific functions. In doing so,· Jung is able to 
examine more carefully its overall phenomenology, functions, 
origins and nature. It is noteworthy repeating here his 
attempt at offering some kind of biological substratum to the 
complex (through his tentative theory of toxins). 
3. From the PSYCHOANALYTIC PERIOD 
The Other as Complex (with particular reference to unconscious) 
The examination of the Other in terms of specific functions 
continues. Here the Other is studied in its relation to the 
unconscious, sexuality, trauma and other Freudian concepts. 
The Other as Symbol 
In examining the specific functions of the Other, Jung 
gradually discovers connections with the entire network of 
collective symbolism, and however paradoxical it may seem, the 
further he proceeds analytically in his investigations of the 
differentiated functions of the Other, the more he, in fact, 
works synthe_tically in unifying antithetical individual 
tendencies by placing them in their collective, global, yet 
at the same time human contexts. 
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An examination of these different formulations of the Other reveals 
the following tendency: 
Jung started off from a non-human, animistic, global and undifferen-
tiated Other and gradually in an analytical way he followed its 
differentiation to a human global Other, a personalized differen-
tiated Other, an Other with specific functions. He carefully 
isolated its body, dissected it and studied and identified its 
various parts, aspects, qualities, textures and functions. But, as 
a 'true student of Goethe (and also a descendent of his, perhaps more+ 
than in the sense of intellectual tradition!) he was well aware of 
the trap suggested by Mephistopheles: 
"He who wants to comprehend a living thing 
Seeks first to drive the spirit out, 
He then holds the pieces in his hand, 
Merely lacks perforce the living link" 
(Faust, Part 1, Scene IV). 
Jung, despite his successful apprenticeship in the analytical 
departments of science, could not possibly have neglected that 
"living link" and had no desire to drive "the spirit out", because 
his whole problematic of the Other was precisely the comprehension 
of this crucial l~n~, the living link. 
By the end of the psychoanalytic period, Jung started seeing tne 
generality of the Other and through the new system of the Other-as-
symbol, made moves to identify its functioning in larger groups of 
people. He had, of course, earlier suggested that No.2 Personalities 
+ The allusion here is made to rumours of C.G. Jung being a blood 
descendent of Goethe (e.g. in Jaffe 1979, p.11). 
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exist in all people and that the A.W.0. had transpersonal qualities, 
but in both instances he did not elaborate further on the matter, and 
maybe he was not able to within those conceptual frameworks. No.2 
personality was a crude global other personality split from the ego 
personality, and without much empirical foundation; the A.W.O. 
was conceived within the restrictive theory of association and com-
plex and by virtue of its anticipated and projected nature, which 
was not rooted in the present, had a quality of intangibility. 
This did not render it to empirical study. In the Other-as-
s:ymbol system, Jung attempts to reconnect the pieces and explore the 
living link. The global Other, unlike the animistic fire and pebble 
is now of a human nature, with dif.ferentiated analysed functions. 
This is a prima facie return to the original globality, but with 
the vital difference of differentiation. The Other-as-symbol is 
now understood by Jung no longer as an unspecific principle or as 
specific personalities, but as specific structuring principles. 
PART TWO 
Chapter Four 
C.G. Jung: The Break trilogy. 
'
1 
••• When tired of being happy and unhappy, 
you mined into yourself and painfully 
climbed with an insight, almost breaking 
under the weight of dark discovery: 
you carried what you never recognized, 
you carried joy, you carried through your 
your little saviour's burden to the shore 
R.M. Rilke 
down 
blood 
" 
From Requiem for Wolf Graf von Kalckreuth. 
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THE BREAK 
"When I parted from Freud, I knew that I was plunging 
into the unknown. Beyond Freud, after all, I knew 
nothing; But I had taken the step into darkness ••• " 
Jung (1963, p.224). 
In this chapter-interlude, the examination of Jung's life and work 
in the light of his problematic of the Other will cover roughly 
the period between the years 1912 - 1917. It is called "chapter-
interlude" because this period, as a significant landmark, stands 
in the middle of Jung's theoretical development, viz. in between 
his early Psychiatric and Psychoanalytic periods, and his subsequent 
Years of Individuation. In this context, therefore, the intended 
meaning of interlude is not that of an interval or pause, a cessation 
of performance in between acts, but rather, according to its original. 
and literal signification, i.e. an inter-play, a "short dramatic 
performance between the acts" (Wyld and Partridge 1968, p.750). 
And indeed dramatic it was! In the preceding chapters the Freud-
Jung relationship has been reviewed mainly from two perspectives: 
Psychological and Theoretical. 
Psychological: The investigation so far of certain elements of the 
association and friendship between the' two men indicates the following 
four characteristics: a) Jung admired Freud as an original 
thinker and theorist as well as an inspiring personal mentor; 
b) the mutual esteem in which they held each other overshadowed 
i· 
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sporadic flashes of their differences which both wished in time 
would pass; c) Freud not only appreciated Jung's original con-
tribution to the psychoanalytic school, but also had a strorig 
personal fondness of him; d) In view of the above, it appears 
that the relationship was advantageous to both men and well timed 
in terms of their respective development. 
Theoretical: It has been argued that Jung's adoption of the 
psychoanalytic framework and utilization of its terminology within 
which he formulated his own insights and research findings was based 
on his realization of the positive implications that it had for 
furthering his understanding of his own problematic. This argument 
emphasizes clearly Jung's theoretical independence despite his 
sojourn in the psychoanalytic territory, and moreover identifies 
the theoretical kinship of this independence. 
These two perspectives form the backdrop to the drama. As the main 
plot is well known and of no direct interest to this investigation 
only some reverberations and distant echoes will enter the narrative 
here. To begin with, the very characterization break appears to 
be a misnomer. How should this break be understood in the light 
of all the discussed evidence? How can the characterization break 
apply to a relationship where differences always existed and were 
even acknowledged? How should one interpret Jung's own words 
"beyond Freud I knew nothing" (which appear in the motto of this 
chapter), if the testimony, that Jung remained consistent in the 
pursuit of his own problematic throughout the course of their re-
lationship, is accepted? 
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The attempt to achieve some lucidity on this issue will follow two 
steps: a logical, conceptual clarification, and a hermeneutic 
exploration. 
On a purely logical basis, the break refers to the termination of the 
externally manifested forms of personal frienship and professional 
association between Freud and Jung. The qualification of 'externally 
manifested forms' is here indicated as it is extremely difficult, if 
not impossible to determine when the friendship between the two men 
ended (if it at all ended) in view of what has been said in the 
previous chapter with regard to Jung's loyalty to Freud. The satne 
applies to their professional association: one may argue that at 
least certain themes (if not actual theories) followed by Freud were 
the direct or indirect product of his association with Jung, and 
vice versa. In other words, it is inevitable that after a period 
of close contact between two theorists, their sub,sequent intellectual 
fruits are affected by their earlier interpollination to such a 
degree that would render untrue any categorical statement concerning ' 
either a clear termination of their professional association, or their 
complete theoretical independence. 
Yet, a break of some kind did indeed occur in the Jung-Freud rela-
tionship. It is a historical fact and it is well documented and 
discussed by many authors (e.g. Balogh 1971; Brome 1967, 1978; Edelheit 1964; 
Fine 1979; Freud 1914, 1925; Glover 1950; Hannah 1976; 
Jones 1957; Jung 1931, 1935, 1946, 1948c, 1950, 1961, 1963; Mannoni 
1971; McGuire 1974; Roazen 1973, 1974; Schur 1972; Stern 1977; Weigert 1942; 
Yandell 1978). However, in order to come nearer to the meaning and 
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exact nature of this break, a hermeneutic exploration is imperative. 
Hermeneutics, being the "system by which the deeper significance is 
revealed beneath the manifest content" (Palmer 1969, p.44) would 
constitute the most appropriate method for such a~ undertaking. 
A major aspect of any hermeneutic investigation is the initial 
establishment of the textual context of original sources in order 
to arrive at the problematic; which will in turn be interpreted 
(cf. Laplanche 1970). In this study, it is imperative to delineate 
the account of the actual events surrounding the break between Jung 
and Freud from the ntnnerous exegetical attempts, even . (or rather 
especially) when these come from the protagonists themselves. This 
very issue is dealt with by Paul E. Stepansky , wh~ questioning the 
validity of Freud's and Jung's "retrospective judgements" concerning 
the break, which appeared in their writings of many years later, states 
II though illuminating from a psychobiographical 
perspective, constitute a relative stumbling block 
for the historian of psychoanalysis" (1976, p.217). 
Isolating events from lives of people-legends is not easy. 
Ordinary events were subsequently loaded with biased interpretations. 
Theodor Reik, referring to Freud, expressed it very aptly when he 
wrote 
Ii in retrospect, words he had spoken 
day conversation acquired undreamed-of 
casual remarks echoed in our minds for 
wards ••• " (1940, p.27). 
in every-
s ignif i cance; 
years after-
Dr K.R. Eissler (1971) comes to a similar conclusion after a detailed 
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analysis of the much discussed event of Freud's ''unusual behaviour" 
during the Munich Conference of the International Psychoanalytic 
Association (November 1912). Freud allegedly confronted Jung 
because of his partizan attitude and it is said that in the ensuing 
discussion Freud fainted in the arms of Jung. This is often 
considered as the coup de grace of their relationship. Eissler's 
examination of various reports of that incident, including both 
Freud's and Jung's own separate accounts, lead him to conclude that 
"Freud's behaviour in Munich cannot be properly evaluated". In 
summing up the usefulness of that exercise he remarks on" ••• how 
difficult it is to interpret a single biographical incident" 
(Eissler 1971~ p.144). 
One should, therefore, treat very cautiously the subsequent exposition 
of and connnentary on the 'facts' of the break as given by Freud and 
Jung, despite their seeming authenticity. 
Before enquiring into the theoretical positions held by Jung and in 
comparison to the Freudian ones during the period of and shortly 
after the break (where in fact the mait't interest of this section lies), 
it will still be necessary to examine one further aspect of their 
relationship, yiz. the politi¢al aspect, as some authors have claimed 
this to be the decisive factor resulting in the break (e.g. Stepailsky 1976; 
Roazen 1974). Although political dimensions of their association 
have already been discussed in earlier parts of this thesis, it is 
felt that since reference to them was made in passing and as part 
of the other two perspectives (psychological and theoretical) which 
were analysed, a separate short review of them is indicated. 
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Many authors have made explicit or implicit comparisons between the 
Psychoanalytic movement and various non-scientific organizations, 
e.g. with industrial corporations (Szasz 1963), Lenin's revolution 
(Roazen 1973), religious groups (Brown 1959; Lesse 1972; Suzuki, 
Fromm and De Martino 1974), political parties (Fromm 1959), cultural 
organizations (Kazin 1958) and social institutions (Szasz 1961). 
The argument here is that Freud's dealings with his disciples were 
primarily geared toward furthering the cause and strengthening the 
position of the "organization", and any other theoretical or personal 
motives were of secondary importance. Exemplifying this, Stepansky 
(1976) has presented the political dimensions involved in the Jung-
Freud relationship in a concise manner by quoting three incidents 
to indicate Freud's biased position toward Jung: 
In the first one, Freud attempted to appease Karl Abraham's dis-
satisfaction with Jung; the master pleaded with the distressed 
disciple to ''be tolerant'' with Jung as, the latter being a "non-Jew" 
and even a "pastor's son", did not share the same ''intellectual 
constitution" and "racial kinship'' that they did, and affirmed that 
Jung's 
" association with us is the more valuable for 
that. I nearly said that it was only his appearance 
on the scene that psychoanalysis escaped the danger 
of becoming a Jewish national affair" (Freud, In 
Stepansky 1976, p.237). 
In the second, Freud openly admitted in a letter to Jung 
tiMy selfish purpose, which I frankly confess is to 
- 215 -
persuade you to continue and complete my work 
by applying to psychoses what I have begun with 
neuroses. With your strong and independent 
character, with your Germanic blood which enables 
you to cormnand the sympathies of the public more 
readily than I, you seem better fitted than anyone 
else I know to carry out this mission" (Freud 
In Stepansky 1976, pp.237-8). 
-
In the third excerpt, Stepansky quotes from Wittels' biography on 
Freud. Describing the incident following Jung's election as 
president of the International Psychoanalytical Association at the 
second congress in 1910, Wittels recalls how the Viennese analysts 
were angry with Jung's new post and how Freud tried to pacify them: 
"'Most of you are Jews, and therefore are incompetent 
to win friends for the new teaching. Jews must 
be content with the modestrole of preparing the 
ground. It is absolutely essential that I should 
form ties in the world of general science. I am 
getting on in years, and am weary of being per~ 
petually attacked. We are all in danger.' 
Seizing his coat by the lapels, he said, 'They 
won't even leave me a coat to my back. The Swiss 
will save us - will save me, and all of you as well' " 
(Freud In Stepansky 1976, p.238). 
Stekel's version of the same event has it that Freud walked into the 
"secret meeting" of Viennese psychoanalysts called by Stekel himself 
to discuss strategies to counter Ferenczi's proposition during the 
first session of the same Congress, that Jung should be elected as 
life-time president. Stekel parenthetically notes that Ferenczi's 
proposal was "induced" by Freud (Stekel 1950, p.127). In Stekel's 
words, Freud entered the room and 
Ii 
... was greatly excited, and tried to persuade us 
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to accept Ferenczi's motion; he predicted hard 
times and a strong opposition by official science. 
He grasped his coat and cried, 'They begrudge me 
the coat I am wearing; I don't know whether in the 
future I will earn my daily bread.' Tears were 
streaming down his cheeks. 'An official psychiatrist 
and a gentile must be the leader of the movement.' 
He foresaw a growing anti-Semitism. We tried to 
persuade him that his misgivings were exaggerated. 
There was a long argument pro and con. Finally 
he proposed a compromise. We should elect a 
president to serve for two years, and every two 
years there should be a new election... We 
accepted the compromise advocated by our adored 
master. As a result, at the next session Jung was 
elected president to serve for two years; but Freud 
was surprised when I announced that Adler and I were 
going to found an independent monthly journal devoted 
to psychoanalysis [and separate from the official 
one edited by Jung] ••• The fight with Jung was on ••• " 
(Stekel 1950, pp.128-9). 
Referring to his own "separation ' 1 from Freud, Stekel pensively re-
fleeted "Perhaps Jung was working against me, and Freud was afraid 
to lose him" (1950, p.142). He blamed Jung directly again in his 
last interchange with Freud, which, according to him, ran as follows: 
" 'Dear Master', I said, 'I am afraid that in a 
short time you will see you have sacrificed your 
most faithful collaborator for an ungrateful one. 
Jung will not remain a Freudian long.' 'Let's 
hope you are mistaken,' answered Freud, sighing" 
(1950, p.143). 
These two versions differ only in intensity rather than essence and 
both depict clearly Freud's desperate wish to give Jung a prominent 
place in the budding psychoanalytic movement. His reasons, according 
to the above excerpts, were "political" and unrelated to Jung, the 
person. Years later, in 1930, Freud, reflecting on his attempt "to 
put Jung at the head of psychoanalysis" (Blanton 1971, p.43), and on 
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the occasion of the publication of a book by Dr Roback where psycho-
analysis was presented as a product of the Jewish mind, said: 
" ••• At the time, I felt that people would think 
of psychoanalysis as a Jewish movement. Now, 
Roback is not unfriendly to psychoanalysis, yet he 
thinks of it as a Jewish movement - so you see I 
was right • • • But Jung proved to be a failure" 
(Blanton 1971, p.43). 
Freud very clearly verbalised that his priority lay with the 
'organization' rather than individual disciples when he wrote to 
Oskar Pfister (in 1913): 
II Do not have too much confidence in a 
lasting personal agreement between me and Jung. 
He demands too much of me, and I am retreating 
from my overestimation of him. It will be 
sufficient if the unity of the association is 
maintained" (Meng and Freud 1963, p.59). 
The ·above discus·sion has highlighted the issue of the ethnic differ-
ence between Freud and Jung. On the one hand, much has been made 
of the "Blond Siegfried's'' (Jung's characterization .in the early 
Psychoanalytic circles, especially by Viennese Jewish analysts; cf. 
Progoff 1956) gentile·identity in the writings of the Freudian school, 
culminating in the ugly accusations of his "Fascist corruption" (sic!) 
(Schneider 1950). Characteristic is the discussion of the following 
episode by Max Schur in his otherwise balanced biography of Freud. 
Referring to the re-election of Jung as president at the Fourth 
International Psychoanalytical Congress in 1913 in Munich, and the 
Freudian followers' abstention from voting, he wrote: 
I 
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"When Jung noted that Jones was among the dissidents, 
he remarked to the latter: 'I thought you were a 
Christian [i.e. a non-JeYL7.' Jones' connnent (Vol~ 
2, p.102f), 'It sounded an irrelevant remark, but 
presumably it had some meaning,' proved to be an 
understatement in view of Jung's stand during the 
Hitler period" (Schur 1972, p.272). 
On the other hand, Freud's own ambivalent stand toward his Jewish 
idelltity received much more attention (e.g. Bakan 1958; E.Freud 1970; Gay 1978; 
Heer 1972; Loewenberg 1970; Menninger 1959; Robert 1974; Simon 
1957). Freud's emphasis of Jung's non-Jewishness might therefore 
be more indicative of his own inner struggle than an objective 
assessment of the positive political role of a gentile in the 
-psychoanalytical movement of the time. The almost messianic 
qualities attributed to Jung by Freud in the earlier passages are 
glaringly apparent. In other words,it still remains debatable how 
purely political the 'political' aspects of their relationship were. 
Freud's own psychologi,cal motives as well as his attachment to Jung, 
the person, appear to play an equally important part with the un-
deniably objective political considerations. 
This discussion has established that Freud defended Jung rather 
vehemently against the Viennese analysts. This fact could be seen 
as a political manoeuvre on Freud's behalf to further the ''cause'' 
(as it was usually referred to) of psychoanalysis. The same fact 
might also be understood in terms of Freud's own psychological needs 
concerning either his ambivalent position with regard to his Jewish 
identity; and/or his attraction to Jung as a friend, disciple and 
1
' crown prince"· The significance of non-political dimensions in 
the Jung-Freud relationship (and break} is strengthened by accounts 
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and interpretations emphasizing Freud's standing ambivalence toward 
his disciples and collaborators in general. Max Schur (1972), foI'. example, 
sees the Freud-Jung break as a "revival" of Freud's central 'old 
conflict'' which was first manifested in his relationship with and 
break from Wilhelm Fliess. In a further example, Colin Wilson 
describes the Freud-Jung relationship as" ••• yet another version of 
[Freud'$] relation with his nephew, John" (1972, p.107). 
The purpose of the above hermeneutical excursion to the central 
theme of this study is to throw some light on the paradoxical 
phenomenon of Freud's excessive tolerance of Jung's independent 
theoretical positions, which only at times coincided with the 
orthodox psychoanalysis but more than often expressed an unambiguous 
reservation or even rejection of i.t. This discussion indeed revealed 
other than theoretical reasons (i.e. psychological, political and 
personal) responsible for Freud's almost stubborn blindness to Jung's 
theoretical diversity. This finding renders the whole issue of the 
break more intelligible: i.e. the implication is that since Freud's prime 
motive for his persistent association with Jung was of a non-theo-
retical nature ( viz. a personal, psychological and political nature), 
the break should also be understood in terms of this prime motive. 
Therefore; no theoretical disagreements between the two men should 
be sought to elucidate the meaning of their break. 
The claim that their theoretical differences cannot be held respon-
sible for the termination of their association can further be 
substantiated by the following discussiort, in which previously 
mentioned and additional evidence will be presented to indicate that 
a) not only can there be no talk of a previous unity of theoretical 
\ 
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positions (which would in turn justify the use of the word 'break'), 
but also b) the theoretical standpoints held by the two theorists 
shortly before, during and shortly after the break did not alter 
significantly. 
In previous parts of this study the point was repeatedly made that 
Jung at all times followed his own problematic and that his theoret-
ical positions were always dictated by that problematic, i.e. the 
quest for the meaning of the Other. Jung's "Freudian period" was 
thus understood as a time when he utilized the Freudian terminology 
to express his own positions. Moreover, during that period, actual 
explicit differences were traced and discussed, concerning specific 
theoretical issues (e.g. the sexual hypothesis, libido). Yet, the 
impression is created that Jung was initially a disciple of Freud's, 
that they both shared a unified body of theory until at a certain 
point Jung broke away from it, to develop his own separate theories. 
The paradox, however, is that Freud and Jung themselves were respon-
sible for starting and spreading this view which was later picked 
up and propagated by their respective disciples. According to this 
view, the reasons for the break were based on theoretical differences. 
Characteristic examples are the following: 
Jung in his Tavistock lectures said: 
" I started out entirely on Freud's lines. I 
was even considered to be his best disciple. I 
was on excellent terms with him until I had the 
idea that certain things are symbolical. Freud 
would not agree to this ••• " (1935, p.125 emphasis added). 
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It is worth noting that Jung, as seen in this excerpt, was not 
satisfied with merely stating his alleged theoretical origins, but 
apparently needed to emphasize further his Freudian background. 
The usual reasons for the break are also reiterated here in the 
same excerpt; theoretical differences. This is still clearer in 
the following quotation: 
II When Freud publicly declared that psychoanalysis 
and his sexual theory were indissolubly wedded, I 
was obliged to strike out on a different path, and 
I was unable to endorse his one-sided views ••• " 
(Jung 1946, pp.96-7). 
This claim is in sharp contrast to the evidence presented in the 
preceding chapters where Jung openly connnunicated to Freud his 
reservations and rejection of the "sexual hypothesis" and Freud 
was fully aware of them and still accepted the state of affairs as 
it was. To strengthen the latter point, Freud's own words are 
illtnninating. In July 1912 he wrote to his good friend, the Swiss 
pastor, Oskar Pfister: 
" ••. It is a pity that you did not meet or speak 
to Jung. You could have told him from me that he 
is at perfect liberty to develop views divergent 
from mine, and that I ask him to do so without a 
bad conscience .•. " (11engand Freud 1963. pp.56-7). 
Freud's message here is unambiguously clear. Binswanger's record (1957) 
of his friendship with Freud, which could be read as a tribute to 
Freud's ability not only to tolerate his friend's theoretical 
differences, but also to continue his selfless support and encourage-
ment of them, gives additional validation to Freud's magnanimity which 
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is here expressed. Yet a very dramatic turn takes place within the 
following few months in his attitude to Jung's "divergent views". 
It is worth tracing it. Five months later (9 December 1912) Freud 
writes to Pfister: 
. " Naturally I am very pleased at your 
opposition to Jung's innovations ••• " 
A rather startling contrast to the earlier letter! and Freud continues: 
" but do not expect me to write anything 
against him. My disagreement is too obvious 
to make any impression ••• " 
And the same paragraph ends in the following revealing manner: 
"But I think he will receive a great deal of 
criticism from most of the leading analysts. 
So you will not be isolated in this purely 
internal and objective battle. I wonder what 
sort of technique he uses to arrive at such 
views" (Meng and Freud 1963, p.58). 
It should be remembered that a month earlier (in November 1912) the 
famous incident in Munich (which was mentioned above) took place. 
Two more samples of Freud's feelings toward Jung as expressed in the 
same correspondence are of interest. Hardly a month later the 
sudden gap between Freud and Jung seems to broaden. It was in this 
letter of 1 January 1913 that Freud wrote the telling excerpt which 
has already been quoted earlier (but which is nevertheless repeated 
here due to its significance): 
\ . 
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II Do not have too much confidence in 
a lasting personal agreement between me and Jung. 
He demands too much of me, and I am retreating from 
my overestimation of him. It will be sufficient if 
'the unity of the association is maintained" (Meng 
and Freud 1963, p.59). 
Further, Freud two months later (11 March 1913) writes to Pfister: 
''My congratulations on having finished your book. 
I hope that in my judgement of it I shall once more 
see eye to eye with Jung ••• "! (Meng and Freud 1963~ p.60). 
In these few passages from Freud's letters to Pfister one may_ witness 
the amazing change in Freud's attitude: from extreme tolerance of 
Jung's "divergent" views to open rejection of them (to such an extent 
that his ~disagreement was so great that he felt that no critique 
would make any 'impression'', to the final yearning to "see eye to eye 
with Jung". This oscilation augments the argument that it was not 
the theoretical differences per se responsible for the break, but 
others of a more personal, psychological and partly political nature. 
One may justifiably question both Freud's and Jung's motives for 
initiating and spreading an account of their relationship and subse-
' 
quent break which, according to the presentation here, does not corres-
pond to the actual facts. The way of answering this legitimate query 
should include further exploration of whether the two men experienced' 
these facts as facts. It is possible that for certain psychological 
reasons they were not aware of.these facts in the same manner as were 
I 
unfolded here. It is also possible therefore that they were not 
aware of the contradictory nature of their account of the break. It 
might further be possible that they were in full knowledge of the 
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discrepancy between their accounts and the 'actual events, but for 
various reasons (personal, psychological and political), they tainted 
the truth! Art investigation into this issue forms a separate 
probl~tttatic of its own, and will obviously rtot be followed here. 
The most frequently mentioned cause of the break is Jung's book Wandlungen 
und ~ymbole der Libido (1911-12). In Memories, Dreams, Reflections 
Jung in no ambiguous terms described this book's decisive role in the 
break. He wrote that af t~r he realised that for Freud the theory of 
sexuality did not represent a worki:ng hypothesis, but 0 some kind of dogma" 
he was left with "no choice ••• but tb withdraw'' (Jung 1963, p.191) from 
the Freudian psychoanalysis. It was in the !_artdlung~n that he intended 
to expand afohg his own path awa:y :from the Freudian emphasis on sexuality 
and he conveyed the magnitude of his dilemma in that he could n()t touch 
his pen for two months. The conflict between keeping Freud's friendship 
and freely expressing his otvn ideas was very painful, artd 
" ••• At last I re so 1 ved to go ahead with the writing -
and it did indeed cost me Freud's friendship" (Jung 1963, p.191). 
The heretical thoughts printed in that book are taken to be, in broad terms, 
Jung's preoccupation with symbolical and mythologica1 dimensions of libido 
with all its implications of a 'desexualized' conception of libido, Yet; 
as previously discussed, Jung held these same positions even earlier and 
with Freud's full knowledge. In addition, the following evidence gives 
more credence to the argument that it was not the theoretical differences, 
exclusively, between the two men that led to the break. 
In contrast to the claims Jung made in his memoirs, Freud's reaction to the .. 
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draft of the ~andlungen was that of approval! After some specific connnents 
and some disagreements, Freud in his letter to Jung (circa 22 June 1910) 
concludes: 
II Nevertheless everything essential in your essay 
is right" (McGuire 1974, p.335). 
Jung, virtually by return mail (26 June 1910) replies: 
" ••• Today being Sunday I am using it to go over your 
critique in peace. I am most grateful to you and 
guite agree with what you say ;, (McGuire 1974, p.335 
emphasis· added). 
A little further he reassures Freud 
II o o o r am always Open tO good advice" (p, 338), 
Freud's next letter (5 July 1910) includes a rather remorseful note: 
~nd acids 
" ••• Today I see that my criticism was quite premature" 
"Still , I believe that such far-reaching interpretations 
cannot be stated so succintly but must be accompanied 
by ample proof, which, I am sure, you will now add" 
(McGuire 1974, p.338). 
In other words, Freud stuck to his original evaluation of the work that 
"everything essential" was "right" and only due to its succinct form, 
additional substantiation from the literature was needed. 
It is of some interest to examine the notorious 'libido theory', which 
in addition to previously discussed factors is also commonly held respon-
sible for the break. In the chapter on "The conception and the genetic 
theory of libido" of the Wandlungen (the same chapter in the Collected 
Works, which is based on the extensively revised edition of 1952, is called 
"The concept of libido") Jung gave a clear account of the history and 
origin of the term. It is of great importance to follow this account 
and especially the discrepancy between the original and the 1952 editions 
carefully. Jung started with Freud's introduction of the term in his 
"Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality" (Freud 1905) and corrnnented: 
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" ••• There the term libido is conceived by him in the 
original narrow sense of sexual impulse, sexual need" 
(original edition, English translation 1919, p.77), 
which implied that there was a later sen.se of the tenn which was not 
''narrow". 
II 
. 
But even within this ''narrow11 usage, Jung clarified that 
despite his definition of libido as sexuality, Freud 
does not explain 'everything' in terms of sex, as is 
connnonly supposed ••• " (translation of the 1952cedition, p.132). 
It is highly significant that this last statement survived all editions 
(unlike many parts of this book concerning his theoretical kinship with 
Freud). This makes it an undeniable fact that Jung at least until 1952 
did not share what is ''commonly supposed'' about Freud's theory of sexuality! 
Returning to his reading of Freud, the previous quotation continues as 
follows: 
' 
" but recognizes the existence of special instinctual 
forces whose nature is not clearly known ••• At the back 
of all this lies the hypothetical idea of a 'bundle of 
instincts', in which the sexual instinct figures as a 
partial instinct ••• " (1952c,p.132). 
In another example of his understanding of the Freudian libido, Jung stated: 
"Later, however, Freud was forced to ponder whether libido 
might not in the end coincide with interest in general" 
(19s2c,p.133). 
It is again worth registering that this is how Jung viewed Freud's libido 
theory more than a decade after the master's death! 
The last piece to be considered here, and perhaps the most revealing one, 
is a discrepancy between the two editions. It only appears in the original 
edition of the Wandlungen and is missing totally from the 1952 one. 
It reads: 
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"Since the.appearance of the "Three Contributions" !J.e. 0 Three Essays'!J ln 1905, a change has taken place 
in the libido conception; its field of application has 
been widened. · Art extremely clear exc1!fiPle of· this 
§1.tilPlificatiort is this _present wo_rk. However, I must 
state that Freud, as well as niyself, saw the need of 
·w:i.dertin.g the conception __ oflibido ... " ! (1917, p.77 emphasis added). 
This demonstrates Jung's sincere understanding of Freud's conc·epts of 
libido and se:x:uality, during the period of writing the Wandlurtgen, and his 
O'Wii relation to those concepts. Specifically, he accepted that the 
''narrow" concept of libido, as e:icprMsed in the "Three Essaysu, was not 
as simplistically sexual as 'connnonly suppose~', and, moreover, both 
'.Freud and himself ''saw the need bf widening" it; finally, as a faithful 
adherent of the Freudian psychoanalysis~ he took it upon himself to under-
take such a task and, here, in the ~nndlungert was doing precisely that, 
i.e. continuing the 11widening11 of that concept according to both Freud's 
and his common design. 
Such a reading of the state of affairs allows no room for the claim that 
the Wandlungen tepresented Jung's major deviation from the Freudian "dogma"· 
This reading is further supported by the correspondence between the two 
men. 
In order to present a fuller picture of their correspondence and especially 
to provide the developmental background which led to Freud's positive 
assessment of Jung's draft of the Wartdlungen it wouid be useful to start 
with Jung's letter to Freud dated '14 October 1909. ln that letter, Jung, 
greatly inspired by Freud•s analysis of the Rat Han (1909) responds in the 
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following manner concerning the implications of that analysis: 
" ••• I am obsessed by the thought of one day writing a 
comprehensive account of this whole field, after years of 
fact-finding and preparation, of course. The net should 
be cast wide. Archeology or rather mythology has got me 
in its grip, its a mine of marvelous material. Won't 
you cast a beam of light in that direction, at least a 
kind of spectrum analysis par distance?" (McGuire 1974, pp.251-2). 
Parenthetically, it is worth noting the streak of prophesy in these 
words: Jung indeed followed that direction and "after years of fact-
finding and preparation" did cast the net wide. 
Freud's reply (17 October 1909) to this letter states clearly: 
" ••• I am glad you share ~ belief that we must conquer 
the whole field of mythology ••• " (McGuire 1974, p.·255 
emphasis added). 
It is interesting that from this correspondence an unclear account 
emerges as to whose original idea it was to "conquer the field of 
mythology". Nevertheless it is definitely clear that both men were 
extremely enthusiastic about their new expansions into the virgin field 
of mythology. Freud, in the same letter (17 October), adds: 
"·'·.I have had an inspiration ••• The riddle of 
Leonardo <la Vinci's character has suddenly become 
clear to me ••• 11 
And Jung again writes (8 November 1909): 
" ••• One of the reasons why I didn't write for so long 
is that I was immersed every evening in the history 
of symbols, i.e. ~in mythology and archeology ••• All 
my delight in archeology (buried for years) has sprung 
into life again ••• If I come to Vienna in the spring, 
I hope to bring you various ancient novelties " 
(McGuire 1974, p.258). 
Freud1 obviously pleased, replies (11 November 1909): 
" .•• I was delighted to learn that you are going into 
mythology. A little less loneliness. I can't wait 
to hear of your discoveries ••• But recently chance 
brought me a young Gymnasium teacher who is studying 
mythology. His ideas· are similar to ours (emphasis 
added), but backed tip by solid eruditi00.-:-. 11 (McGuire 1974, p.260). 
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The same pattern continues. Jung writes (15 November 1909): 
" ••• ~ow to better things - mythology. For me there 
is no longer any doubt what the oldest and most natural 
myths are trying to say. They speak quite "naturally" 
of the nuclear complex of neurosis ••• " 
and after some specific examples of his insights into mythological themes 
he candidly confesses: 
11 
••• I am painfully aware of my utter dilettantism and 
continually fear I am dishing you out banalities ••• " 
(McGuire 1974, p.263). 
Freud replies with the almost adolescent excitement of a new discovery: 
" ••• I am delighted with your mythological studies. Much of 
what you write is quite new to me ••• These things cry out 
for understanding and as long as the specialists won't help 
us, we shall have to do it ourselves ••• And isn't it odd 
that none of the mythologists ••• has seen the need for an 
interpretation on different levels! We really ought to shake 
them into consciousness ••• I do wish I could show you my 
analysis of Leonardo da Vinci, I am desparate1y sorry not to 
have you here ••• 11 
and he also admits 
11
• • • I am coming to attach more and more importance to the 
infantile theories of sexuality. My treatment of them, 
incidentally, is deplorably incomplete ••• "(McGuire 1974, pp.265-6). 
No wonder Jung did not accept these theories as definite and final facts, 
but only as hypothesis (cf previous chapter). 
This connnon search into mythology expanded Jung's horizons and openly 
communicated themes that were later to become significant aspects of his 
own theoretical "school": 
" ••• I feel more and more that a thorough understanding of 
the psyche ••• will only come through history or with its 
help.Just as an understanding of anatomy and ontogenesis 
is possible only on the basis of phylogenesis and comparative 
anatomy. For this reason antiquity now appears to me in a new 
and significant light. What we now find in the individual 
psyche - in compressed, stunted, or one-sidedly differentiated 
form - may be seen spread out in all its fullness in times 
past. Happy the man who can read these signs!" (McGuire 1974, p.269) 
And he too reiterates the same wish: "I often wish I had you near me. · 
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So many things to ask you ••• " (p.270). 
Freud replies: " ••• your letters delight me because they suggest a 
frenzy of satisfying work ••• " (p .272), and about a month later he 
expresses again his joy at the new collaboration: 
"·•· your displeasure at my longing for an army of philosophical 
collaborators is music to my ears. I am delighted that you 
yourself take this interest so seriously, that you yourself 
wish to be this army; I could have dreamed of nothing better 
but simply di.d not suspect that mythology and archeology had 
taken such a powerful hold on you ••• " (p. 282). 
This should be sufficient to silence the usual commentators who attribute 
the break to Jung's branching off into mythology. Freud then advises: 
•i··· I don't think it would be a good idea to plunge directly 
into the general problem c1£ ancient mythology; it strikes me 
as preferable to approach it in a series of detailed studies ••• " 
(p. 282). 
This is precisely what Jung attempted in the Wandlungen and his later 
studies. He followed his older friend's advice, breaking this f:i.eld 
down into smaller managable studies, as well as providing "erudite", 
"ample proof'' for the "far-reaching i~terpretations". Jung confirms this 
On lO January 1910 he writes: 
" ••• mythology certainly has me in its grip" and he explains 
"I bring to it a good deal of archeological interest 
from my early days ••• " (McGuire 1974, p. 285). 
For the first time Jung writes ~o Freud about the Wandlungen (then in the 
fonn of two public lectures he gave) at the end of the same month: 
" ••• the subject was 'symbolism'. I have worked at it and have 
tried to put the 'symbolic' on a psychogenetic foundation, i.e., 
to show that in the individual fantasy the primum mavens, the 
individual conflict, material or form (whichever you prefer), is 
mythic, or mythologically typical ••• 11 (p. 288). 
And yet again Freud's agreement, support and encouragement is beyond any . 
question. Within a week he replies (on 2 February 1910): 
11 
••• Your deepened view of symbolism has all tny sympathy ••• 
It would be wonderful if you could do a piece on the 
subject for the Jahrbuch ••• "(McGuire 1974, p.291). 
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This is exactly what Jung undertook to do. The Handlungen was indeed 
first published in two parts in the Jahrbuch fl.ii• psychoartalytische und 
psychopatholo~ische Forschungen, III-IV (l 9 t 1-2) with Freud's full blessing. 
Before the actual publication, the two men continued their frank exchange 
of views about matters of common interest, from the politics of the psycho-
analytic mo\rement and administrative issues, to specific themes (e.g. the 
symbolism of wood) which later were included in the Wandlungen. On '24 
May 1910 Jung writes about another lecture that he gave ''on symbolism" 
(on.Which the Wandlurtgeu was later based) and assures Freud that he would 
- - .. 
send him a copy. To this .>Freud replies (26 May 1910): 
1
'! was delighted to hear that I shall soon have the opportunity 
to read another fine piece by you ••• especially as I am 
counting on your formulations to clarify certain. vague ideas 
of my own ••• " (McGuire 1974, p.320). 
Jung continues: 
" ••• my mythology swirls about inside me, and now and then 
various significant bits and pieces are thrown up " (2 June 1910) 
and Freud again replies encouragingly: 
" ••• eagerly awaiting your mythology ••• " (9 June 1910). 
Substantial proof for the argument that no theoretical differences can be 
held to be responsible for the break is offered by the followirg exchange: 
Jung (17 June 1910) expresses unguarded enthusiasm after reading Freud's 
"Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood" (1910b). In that essay 
(vide infra p.246£) Freud explored certain psychoanalytic projections into 
mythology. This appealed to Jung who found the whole work "wonderful" 
J 
(McGuire 1974~ p.329). Freud's reaction to this, fairly predictable by 
now, was equally enthusiastic: 
" ... I was overjoyed at your interest in Leonardo and at your 
saying that you were coming closer to my way of thinking ••• " 
( 19 June 1910) 
and went ahead, acknowledging receipt of Jung's initial draft of the 
" 
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Wandlungen. It was to this draft of the !.Jandlurtgen that Freud offered 
that positive response mentioned above. 
The same pattern continues. Freud (l October 1910) writes to Jung 
11 
••• I see that you go about working in the same way as I do; 
rather than take the obvious path that leads straight ahead, 
you keep your eye peeled for one that strikes your fancy. 
This is the best way, I think; afterwards one is amazed at 
the logical sequence in all these digressions. Consequently 
I wish you luck with your immersion in mythology ••• 11 
(McGuire '1974, p.'358 emphasis added). 
Jung, feeling greatly encouraged by his older mentor, decided to carry 
on with his investigations which a.ppeared in the first draft: 
11 
••• What I sent you will be completely reworked on the basis 
of further studies which reached into the most impenetrable 
obscurities of philosophy ••• " (20 October 1910). 
And a couple of months later he remarks about the e~ansion of that draft 
... this time I have hit the mark, or nearly so, as the material is falling 
into a surprising pattern ••• " (13 December 1910), and warns Freud, 
11 
••• be prepared for some strange things the like of which 
you have never yet heard from me ••• My conscience is clear, 
I have done honest work and drawn nothing out of a hat ••• " 
(McGuire 1974, p.'378). 
Later that month, commenting on Adler's work, Jung critically notes that 
II he is trying to replace the libido ••• by rigid instinctual 
forms, and crashing the spirit and the life out of our theory ••• 11 
·(23 December 1910, emphasis added). 
It gradually, however, becomes evident that both men are very sensitive 
about their individual expeditions into mythology and from time to time 
reassuring remarks appear in their correspondence: 
II I don't know why you are so afraid of my criticism in matters 
of mythology. I shall be very happy when you plant the flag 
of libido and repression in that field and return as a 
victorious conqueror to our medical motherland ••• " (Freud to 
Jung, 22 January 1911). 
Jung again.openly describes his own part of the expedition without any 
traces of defensiveness, but, on the contrary, with pride and excitement: 
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II Symbol fonnation, it seems to me, is the necessary bridge 
to the rethinking of long familiar concepts from which the 
libidinal cathexis is partly withdrawn by canalizing it into 
a series of intellectual parallels (mythological theories) ••• 
As you see, I approach the problem from a rather different 
angle ••• 11 (19 March 191 t) • 
Two months later the net is cast even wider: 
II Occultism is another field we shall have to conquer -
with the aid of the libido theory ••• Please don't worry 
about my wanderings in these infinitudes. I shall return 
laden with rich booty for our knowledge of the htnnan psyche ••• 11 
(8 May 1911). 
To this Freud replies: 
0
.,. I am aware that you are driven by innermost inclination 
to the study of the occult and I am sure you will return home 
richly laden. I cannot argue with that, it is always right 
to go where your impulses lead ••• " ( 12 May 1911 emphasis added), 
and a month later; 
" ••• in matters of occult I have grown humble ••• I premise 
to believe anything that can be made to look reasonable. 
I shall not do so gladly; that you know. But my u~p I.~ 
has been shattered. • •• 11 ( 1 S June 191 l). 
This frank interchange was characteristic of this period of their corre-
spondence. Even when Freud had reservations, such as in this case with 
regard to the occult (cf. Devereux 1953), his encouragement of Jung was 
unequivocal. The exhilaration continues. Jung communicates his pre-
occupati.on with unconscious fantasies and how he considers them "the matrix 
of the mind" (23 June 1911) and Freud writes 
"··· in respect to ucs. fantasies, I share your assumptions 
as well as your expectations ••• " (27 June 191 1). 
Two months later Freud announces that he has "been working in a field where 
you will be surprised to meet me ••• I add that I am dying to read your 
'Transformations and Symb. of the Lib. '"(20 August 1911) and Jung replies 
with uncontrolled contentment 
"I was overjoyed by your letter, being, as you know, very 
receptive to any recognition the father sees fit to bestow ••• 
thanks to your discoveries, we are C111 the threshold of 
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something really sensational ••• I daren't say too much, 
but would only counsel you (very immodestly) to let my 
'Transf. and Symb. of the Lib.' unleash your associations 
and/or fantasies ••• " (29 August 1911). 
Apparently both Freud and Jung did. Jung became more aware of the 
"historical layer of the unconscious" (12 June 1911) and wrote a lot to 
his older friend about the "phylogenetic memories in the individual", to 
which Freud, in his open style of making his reservations as well as his 
appreciations clear, responded by admitting that such memories "unfortu-
nately will soon be undeniable" fact (13 October 1911). 
After Freud read the second draft of the Wandlungen he wrote Jung a 
rather peculiar letter, in which he praises the author of the essay in 
the third person(?)," •• it is the best thing this promising author has 
written up to notv, though he wi 11 do still better ••• " (12 November 191 J), 
and adds 
"In the section about the two modes of thought I deplore 
his wide reading. I should have liked him to say every-
thing in his own words ••• u 
This seems to contradict a) his suggestion after reading the first draft, 
i.e. that the ideas expressed then needed "ample proof" and b) his implied 
criticism that both he and Jung lacked ''erudition" in their dealings with 
mythology. These same words could also be seen as an encouragement to 
Jung to stop hiding behind other authors' writings and express clearly 
and openly in his own language his thoughts about that topic. It should 
be noted that the "two modes of thought" were perhaps Jung's first attempt 
to formalize the No. 1 and No. 2 personalities in terms of psychological and 
more particularly, cognitive functioning (vide infra p.279f). Freud 
in the same letter continues with this admission: 
" ••• Since you yourself are this author, I shall continue 
more directly and make an admission: it is a torment for me 
to think, when I conceive an idea now and then, that I may 
be taking something away from you or appropriating something 
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that might just as well have been acquired by you. When 
this happens, I feel at a loss ••• Why in God's name did 
I allow myself to follow you into this field? You must 
give me some suggestions ••. " 
I 
These words indicate that something started happening in their relation-
ship. Freud appears to exhibit some possessiveness of his ideas that did 
not exist earlier. The tone of the letter is still friendly but Freud's 
changed mood cannot be mistaken. Jung in his reply tries to rationalize 
" ••• Our personal differertces will make our work different ••• 
and because of the difference in our working methods we shall 
undoubtedly meet from time to time .•• " 
but also shows signs of possessiveness; even if his writing is perhaps 
tongue in cheek: 
11 
••• the outlook for me is very gloomy, if you too get into 
the p$ychology of religion. You are a dangerous rival -
if one has to speak of rivalry ••• 0 
and in a pen.sivt=l but determined way, he continues 
" ••• Yet I think it has to be this way, for a natural 
development cannot be halted, nor should one try to halt it ••• " 
( 14 November 1911) • 
The hazards that face every explorer seem to have spared neither Freud nor 
Jung. Venturing into new fields with ''rich booty", and driven by "inner-
most inclinations'' and "impulses tt, requires so much concentration and 
energy as well as vigilance and care irt guarding the booty, that possess-
iveness might easily replace the idealism of the original "impulse" and 
as a result other considerations and relationships may somehow suffer. 
At about this time something very significartt happens. Jung's wife, 
Emma, wrote four letters to Freud, unbeknown to her husband. They contain 
both a private confession to the great master as well as a plea for his 
favour towards her husband, in a style of servility, great trust and self 
determination. Irt the first one (30 October 1911) she eXpresses her 
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concern (in fact "torment") that " your relation with my husband is 
not altogether as it should be." She attributes this to the Wandlurtgen 
"I do not know whether I am deceiving myself when I think 
you are somehow not quite in agreement with 'Transf orniations 
of Libido' 11 
and asks· that he should tell her what the reason was if it was not indeed 
because of the Wandlungen. In the third one (14 November 1911) she 
clarifies the issue when she writes: 
" ••• Lately Carl has been analysing his attitude to his work 
and has discovered some resistances to it. I had connected 
these mis·givings about Part II [of the WandlungenJ with his 
constant worry over what you would say about it, etc. It 
seemed out of the question that he would have resistances to 
his own work; but now it appears that this fear of your 
opinion wa.s only a pretext for not going on with the self-
analysis which this wo~rk in fact means" (emphasis added) 
and she adds that she now realises that it was her own interpretation 
that led her to that "projection" of her problem from her own "neighbour-
hood in to distant Vj_enna u 
Jung's differences from Freud, which, as shown above, always existed, 
were acknowledged, respected and accepted, but somehow at this point in 
time appear to have acquired some unprecedented importance. Also the 
willingness to share new thoughts .and ideas in an unformulated manner 
gradually gives way to a cautious restraint until they are well formulated 
and substantiated. The impression is strongly formed of both men fran~ 
tically working on their new ideas while communication of their results 
assumes secondary importance. On the 30 November 1911 Freud becomes 
impatient and bold: 
11 
••• I should be very interested in know'ing what you mean by 
an extension of the concept of the libido to make it applicable 
to Dem pr. I am afraid there is a misunderstanding bet:Ween 
US •, •II 
To which Jung replies 
" ••• The essential point is that I try to replace the descriptive 
concept of libido by a genetic one. Such a concept covers not 
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only the recent sexual libido but all those forms of it 
which have long since split off into organized activities .•. " 
and pleads 
"You must let my interpretation work on you as a Y7hole to 
feel its full impact. Mere fragments are barely intelligible ..• " 
(11 December 1911). 
and Freud responds: 
" ••• I run all in favour of your attacking the libido question 
and I myself run expecting much light from your efforts" ! 
( l 7 December J 9 11 ) • 
this indicates that even after the differences started becaning important, 
they were not really of such great importance, as Freud here still shows 
open mindedness and flexibility. 
At this point another pause for reHection ar1d adjustment of the course 
0£ the he't'tiieneutical exploration is necessary. On the basis of what has 
b~en J>resefited above the foll.owing can. be said~ 
No actual theoretical differences have been identified as responsible for 
the break. Indeed, theoretical differences existed right from the 
beginning of their relationship, but this did not prevent their relation-
ship frt>rn conHrtuirtg and f'loud.shing. Moreover, it becomes ev-ident here 
that during this particular period th~ir theoretical differences somehow 
subsided in the face 0£ a connnon search into new territories - archeology 
and mythology. A rather clear picture has emerged of the two men walking 
hand~in-hand and with almost adolescent excitement into the virgin fields 
of their discovery, pieking up gems here and there and shouting to each 
other about theit' Hndings with mutual encouragement. Yet, in the true 
tradi t:fon of classical th tillers; we; the readers, know in retrospect 
while watthing them, how trngiea1ly thnt relationship ended; and intro-
spectiv~1y we may ponder whethe.r this frantic exhilaration was not an 
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unwise act on their part , viz, unrealistically and without caution they 
ignored their existing differences as well as the new conflicts which 
surrepticiously crept in, thus dangerously building all kinds of ex-
pectations of themselves, each other and the "rich booty" which they 
believed they had discovered. Dramas teach us how heroes slip and fall 
in times of euphoria when vigilance slackens or disappears and instead, 
all sorts of fantasies reign uncontrollably. This intentionally extensive 
expose of the p~riod through their correspondence strongly suggests this 
scene. It is now necessary to put the above picture into a broader 
context and examine the specific conflicts and expectations in this 
particular situation between Freud and Jung, and further, seek any links 
with previous developments that have already been observed in Jung. 
:tn this search, Ennna Jung ts letter is invaluable: and a closer analysis 
is needed. She begins with the statement of an event, i.e. her husband 
had some resistances to his own work. It seems that this claim can be 
accepted as indeed a factual event as it is corroborated by evidence 
from at least two other sources: Jung's memoirs and his correspondence 
with Freud. As quoted earlier, Jung, during this period; related how 
he was unable to touch his pen for months. This is also reflected in 
the corrMpondence. Jung kept btt promising to send the final draft of 
the tfandlungen to Freud; and the latter kept writing how eagerly he was 
awaiting it. In addition, Jung repeatedly confessed to Freud some 
difficulties he was encountering in relation to his work. But, at no 
time did he con'lmunicate to Freud any interpretation of them (his 
difficulties, conflicts and resistances), accord:i.r1g to which they could 
be seen to be a product of his alleged fear of how Freud would receive 
his 'nt:lw' theories contained in the Wanci1ungen. Jung did, however, 
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admit in his letters to Freud that some of his difficulties were related 
to Freud the person. He formulated that interpretation in tenns of a 
terminology that would have been intelligible to Freud: the father-
complex. Exatnples of this confession are the following: 
It seems to be no mere coincidence that Jung made the first reference to 
his own difficulties in that letter of 30 January 1910 in which he also 
for the first time referred to his lectures on "symbolism" (the first 
version of the Wandlungen) 
"· •• During the time when I didn't write to you I was 
plagued by complexes, and t detest wailing letters ••• 
• • • In spite of t.empestuous complexes my enthusiasm for 
work is riding high ••• "(McGuire 1974, p.289). 
Freud (2 February 1910) acknowledges the intimate connnunication 
11
., • Living so far apart, we are bound to have experience 
of all sorts that we cannot share. You are living on high 
seas, while I often can't help thfr1king of our little Dal-
matian islands where a ship puts in every second Monday ••• " 
Jung again confesses: 
" ••• Luckily the Walpurgis Nights of my unconscious do not 
affect my capacity for work although my mythology is tem-
porarily at a standstill ••• Otherwise I am in good shape 
and still have resistances to writing you at the right time, 
my conscious motivation being that I must select a particularly 
undisturbed manent which of course never comes until one takes 
it. The reason for the resistance is my father-complex, my 
inability to come up to expectations •.• " (20 February 1910) 
Freud's reply to another letter of Jung's on the same issue starts: 
"Believe me, there are no misunderstandings between us, nor 
do I regard you as 'vacillating'. I am neither so forgetful 
nor so touchy, and I know how closely we are united by personal 
sympathy and by pulling on the same cart I am merely irritated 
now and then ..• that you have not yet disposed of the resis-
tances arising from your father-complex, and consequently limit 
our correspondence so much more than you would otherwise. 
Just rest easy, dear son Alexander, I will leave you more to 
conquer than I myself have managed •. ," (6 March 1910). 
On the 26 July 1911 Jung writes to Freud 
" ••• The feeling of inferiority that often overcomes me when 
I measure myself against you has always to be compensated by 
increased emulation. I need a large practice in order to 
.... ·: ...... 
.. . 
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gain experience, for I do not imagine that I know too much. 
Also, I have had to demonstrate to myself that I am able to 
make money in order to rid myself of the thought that I am 
non-viable •• , Scientific work does me far more good lf:han 
financial succesiJ . , , 11 
And Freud in another letter, in which he writes how Ferenczi r'complained 
bitterly" about his (Freud's) "lack of affection.,, candidly says, after 
Ferenczi admitted that he was wrong in that complaint: 
11
••• I don't deny that I like to be right. All in all, 
that is a sad privilege, since it is conferred by age. 
The trouble with you younger men seems to be a lack of 
understanding in dealing with your father-complexes •.. " 
( 31 December 1911). 
The powerful I~ grip" that his work had on Jung is clearly evident: 
11 
••• I am overwhelmed with work and grappling with the 
endless proliferation of mythological fantasies. In 
order to master the overwhelming mass of material I have to 
work unceasingly and am feeling intellectually drained ••• " 
(23 January 19 J 2), ' 
"A quick·word to let you know I am still alive. I am having 
grisly fights with the hydra of mythological phantasy and 
not all its heads are cut off yet. Sometimes I feel like 
calling for help when ! am; too hard pressed by the welter 
of material. So far I have managed to surpress the urge. 
I hope to reach dry land in the not too distant future ••• " 
(circa 15 February 1912), 
11 
••• I think I am not wrong in suspecting that you rather 
resent my remissness as a correspondent. In this regard 
my behaviour is indeed a little irresponsible, as I have 
allowed my libido to disappear into my work ••• u (25 February 1912). 
Freud's reply (29 February 1912) to the last letter was explosive 
11 
••• What you say about my resentment of your tendency to 
neglect our correspondence warrants more thorough ~ A 
elucidation. There can be no doubt that I was a demanding 
correspondent, nor can I deny that I awaited your letters 
with great impatience and answered them promptly. I dis-
regarded your earlier signs of reluctance. This time it 
struck me as more serious ••• I took myself in hand and quickly 
turned off my excess libido. ! was sorry to do so, yet glad 
to see how quickly ! managed it. Since then I have become 
undemanding and not to be feared ••• " 
He then switches to saying how important the Psychoanalytic Association is 
and how ilit would be a severe blow to all of us if you were to draw 
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the libido you require for your work from the Association", and later 
indirectly assures Jung of his care for him when again referring to the 
Association, and writes: 
"But I am· less concerned with the present than with the 
future; I am determined to make all necessary preparations 
for it, so as to see everything safe in. your hands when the 
time comes " 
It was Freud's first attempt to draw serious attention to Jung's manifested 
conflicts with his older colleague. The interpretation given to these 
conflicts was presumably the same as previously, i.e. Jung's father-complex. 
Jung's reply was equally explosive 
u ••• I have not kept up a lively correspondence during these 
last weeks because I wanted if possible to write no letters 
_at all, simply in order to gain time for my work and not in 
order to give you a demonstration of ostentatious neglect ••• " 
(3 March 1912). 
In that very letter Jung e:xplains that he did not actually neglect his 
duties towards the psychoanalytic movement and concludes in an assertive 
:ind possibly challenging manner: 
"•·· Of course I have opinions which are not yours 
about the ultimate truths of 'l' A ••• " and later 
"I would never have sided with you in the first place 
had not heresy run in my blood ••• " 
Again he w·ri tes: 
"Since I have no professional ambitions I can afford to 
admit mistakes. Let Zarathustra speak for me: 
'One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil •• ' 
••. This is what you have taught me through "'¥A. As one 
who is truly your follower, I must be stout-hearted, not least 
towards you " 
It is worth noting that when ultimately confronted in the open, Jung did 
not use the father-complex interpretation but defended his own explanation 
that the delay in correspondence was only a result of his absorption in 
his work. 
Freud responded in the usual pacifying manner. He ref erred to the 
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situation as "so simple'' and assured Jung that "otherwise we agree about 
everything" and further, made a new interpretationt 
" ••• The indestructible foundation of our personal relationship 
is our involvement in ~A ; but on this foundation it seemed 
tempting to build something finer though more labile, a 
~eciprocal intimate friendship. Shouldn't we go on building? ••• 
Still if you think you want greater freedom from me, what can I 
do but give up my feeling of urgency about our relationship, 
occupy my unemployed libido elsewhere' and bide my time until 
you discover that you can tolerate greater intimacy? When 
that happens, you will find me willing ••• 
Rest assured of my affective cathexis and continue to think 
of me in friendship, even if you do not write often ••. " 
(5 March 1912 emphasis added). 
And in another letter, 
11 
••• my sense of disappointment probably springs from the 
postponement of your 'Transformations and Symbols' ••• " (21 March 1912). 
From these excerpts, Jung's version of the cause of the break as far as 
the t.fandlttna._eti and the theories he propounded there are concerned, does 
not seem to receive much support. What emerges here is that Jung's 
productivity was not hindered at all, but on the contrary, it was his 
excessive preoccupation with the Wandlungen that led him to neglect his 
correspondence with Freud. Theoretical differences did not appear in 
these excerpts to have played the role that is usually attributed to them. 
What again featured prominently here was Jung's conflicts. These did not 
seem to be caused by the '*father-complex" which was so casually communicated 
I 
between the two men. In the letter of 5 Harch 1912 a rather more serious 
interpretation of Jung's conflicts was offered by Freud, who virtually 
accused him of being incapable of fortning an "intimate friendship" with 
him. 
Jung alleged in his memoirs that another reason for the break was Freud's 
authoritarianism. Certainly this does not appear to be so from the 
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excerpts considered here. Conversely, Freud's almost desperate attempts 
to accormnodate any of Jung's theories and writing regimes, as long as their 
friendship was ensured, reveal a rather submissive attitude. Jung, 
in Memories, Dreams, Reflections mentioned that "during this period I 
became aware of how keenly I felt the difference between Freud's intel-
lectual .attitude and mine" (p.184), and clarified that they held different 
views due to their respective different backgrounds in their study of 
.. , 
psychology and in particular with respect to the issue of the historical ~ccessive 
layers of consciousness. But again, it was clear from the above that 
Freud was not opposed to Jung's views and moreover encouraged him to carry 
on along his own direction. 
Thus, as the reasons mentioned by Jung are not supported by the evidence 
of their correspondence perhaps an opening to the cul-de-sac could be 
provided by an admission he once made. He wrote that because he feared 
he ''might lose his {yreud'sJ friendship" (~,p.183), 
II I wanted to know ••. what his reaction would be 
if I deceived him by saying something that suited his 
theories. And so I told him a lie. I was quite 
aware that my conduct was not above reproach, but a 
la guerre' comme a la guerre ! II (H. D.R.' p. 183). 
Of course, Jung did not say this in connection with the particular issue 
at hand, but with a dream he had at about the same period. He then 
decided to give Freud a 'Freudian' interpretation to that dream as he 
was apprehensive that his own interpretation might not have been palatable 
to Freud. After this admission one wonders what validity to give to their 
correspondence. In other words, Jung might have 'dissimulated' also in other 
instances in order to make things easier for himself. But the question 
of validity should not become a blanket issue. The overall authenticity 
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of the correspondence cannot be seriously affected. This incident can 
only affect Jung's interpretations mentioned in the correspondence and 
only these should be scrutinized with caution and studied in the context 
of other evidence. Therefore the validity of Jung's "father-complex" 
interpretation should be regarded with scepticism. This throws this 
puzzle again wide open , with the key always remaining elusive, with the 
link still missing. 
Returning to Emma Jung's letters, it is significant to note that her 
interpretation with regard to the "reason" for the ''not-as-it-should-be" 
relationship between her husband and Freud, was identical with Jung's own 
version of the break, i.e. Freud's disagreement with the Wandlungen. 
It is perhaps more significant that she later dropped that "reason" and 
admitted that it was just a "pretext" that Jung himself used "for not 
going on with the self-analysis which this work in fact means"! Now, if 
one gives credence to the latter interpretation, i.e. that Jung's dif-
ficulties during this period were primarily the product of his own ''self-. 
analysis", then a great deal of other evidence falls into place and seems 
to further validate this version. This new approach also places Jung's 
' life and work in the perspective of the developmental analysis of the 
problematic of the Other. It might not be a question of a missing link, 
after all, in a chain already mis-shapen by a series of mis-guided hypotheses, 
but of a new chain constructed with newly fanned links. 
The culmination therefore of this hermeneutical exploration will consist 
of a progressive series of four hypotheses in order to arrive at a new 
understanding of the break. 
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First Hypothesis: 
Jung's reference to his interest in archeology and mythology at this time 
which he admitted was a revival of an old similar interest, to be under-
stood as referring to a revival of his old interst in the No.2 personality 
and, broadly speaking, to the whole problematic of the Other. 
This hypothesis will be based mainly on the following data from Jung's 
letters to Freud -
II all my delight in archeology (buried for years) has 
sprung into life again •.. " (IO November 1909); 
11 
••• mythology certainly has me in its grip. I bring to 
it a good deal of archeological interest from my early 
days •.• " (IO January 1910). 
" ••• I have read Leonardo straight through and shall soon 
come back to it again. The transition to mythology grows 
out of this essay from inner necessity, actually it is the 
first essay of yours with whose inner development I felt 
perfectly in tune from the start. .• " (17 June 1910). 
One cannot fail to note that Jung spoke about previous interests in 
archeology and mythology when, in his memoirs, he discussed his dilennna of 
what to study at the University. He then wrote of two opposing directions: 
on the one hand, history, philosophy and particularly archeology(" ••• I 
was intensely interested in everything Egyptian and Babylonian, and would 
have liked best to be an archeologist . '.." - M.D.R., p. 104), and on the 
other hand, science. On the very same page Jung describes this dilennna 
as " ••• No. I and No. 2 •.• wrestling for a decision ••. u. This is not 
the only connection Jung made between No. 2, the Other, and archeology. 
In the chapter on his School Years of the same book, he explicitly noted 
that 11 ••• Science met • • . the needs of No. l personality, whereas the 
humane or historical studies {Greco-Roman, Egyptian, and prehistoric 
archeologff provided beneficial instruction for No. 2 ••• ;• (p.91). In his 
letter to Freud (17 June 1910); Jung stresses the inner development and 
inner necessity of the transition to mythology, with which he feels 
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"perfectly in tune from the start". The strong wording of this passage 
demands further examination. After such strong collaboration and friend-
ship, Jung admits that Freud's Leonardo was the first work of his master with 
which he felt "perfectly in tune". Leonardo was indeed Freud's first 
essay where he introduced mythology in a serious manner, so if the close 
link between mythology and the Other is accepted, then Jung's excitement 
is understandable - it was the first indication to him that Freud perhaps 
shared his problematic of the Other. This inference is further substan-
tiated if the actual theme of Leonardo is considered. In that essay 
Freud discusses da Vinci's 1' double nature" ("as an artist and as a 
scientific investigator"! 1910b, p.73). It is thus highly probable that 
Jung's enthusiasm for this work was directly related to his problematic of 
the Other. 
Second Hypothesis: 
Jung's reference to himself being gripped by mythology and archeology to 
be understood as suggesting that at this particular period he was gripped 
by the problematic of the Other in an especially forceful manner. 
In addition to the points made in the previous assumption and according 
to the development of Jung's problematic of the Other, one would expect 
that Jung would now have arrived at a decisive turning point in his ovm 
relationship with his problematic. Jung, at the end of his previous 
I 
period had enten:d a synthetic process in his understanding of the Other, 
viz. he started seemingly to return to the globality and generality of 
the Other, although this time not in the primitive manner of his early 
childhood formulations, but within an appreciation of the Other in, terms 
of differentiated functions (more precisely, differentiated structuring 
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principles) of collective application· (= the Other-as-symbol). This 
return to the original problematic with the enrichment of the meticulously 
and painfully traversed routes of clinical and experimental psychiatry, 
as well as Freudian psychoanalysis, coupled with the timely revived interest 
in archeology and mythology (in short, the modes of No. 2 personality) 
must have created a climate in him which would make intelligible to any 
researcher Jung's strong wording in describing the "grip'' that his work 
had on him during this period. In other words, one is here witnessing 
a climax of a life-long search, one aspect of which was in the form of 
an intellectual puzzle (i.e. a further and finer reformulation of the 
Other towards a better and more advanced understanding of it). However, 
this aspect was not unrelated to the entirety of the experiential meaning 
of his.problematic. Clearly demonstrating this are the excerpts- from 
Jung's letters which refer to a) the special meaning his work had for him -
n.othing of which he claimed was "drawn out of a hat", but was a "natural 
development0 which could "not be halted" and b) the great amount of 
libido that "disappeared into" his work, leaving him "intellectually 
drained". 
Third Hypothesis: 
Jung's reference to the •isornething really sensational" that he and Freud 
were on "the threshold" of discovering (which was based on Freud's 
pioneering work) to be understood as an expression of Jung's genuine 
belief that despite their original differences they were now marching 
together with a common purpose, approaching the territory of the problem-
atic of the Other; and that this belief created in him great expectations 
of Freud 
The extracts from the Freud-Jung correspondence that have already been 
quoted offer ample substantiation to the claim that both Jung and Freud 
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believed that they shared a common theoretical platform. The references 
-
to ''our'' theory abound during this period, as well as their common invest-
ment in the fields· of mythology. Now, if this is added to the previous 
two hypotheses one would accept that Jung believed that Freud shared his own 
problematic. This hypothesis can be further supported by Jung's special 
exhilaration at reading Freud's Leonardo. Jung's emphasis on the "inner 
development" and "inner necessity" of that essay was accepted in the 
first hypothesis as betraying his involvement in the problematic of the 
Other; it can now equally be applied to Freud. In other words, it is 
very likely that Jung thought that the theme of the Other (which was the 
motif in Leonardo) had the . same i•inner" meaning for Freud as it had for 
himself. This special shiver of hope must have activated hoards of 
expectations in Jung that Freud would assist him in solving their 'connnon' 
problematic. He had earlier asked Freud to "ca.st a beam of light in that 
direction, at least a kind of spectrum analysis pardista,nc~"! The 
unusually pleading tone of that letter is particularly conspicuous and 
reinforces this hypothesis. This argument is further supported by 
extracts from their correspondence in which Jung received repeated en-
couragements from Freud to follow his own "impulse"~ Freud not only 
allowed him to criticize the "libido question" but also "expecting much 
light" :from him, hoped that he would "clarify certain vague ideas'' of 
his (Freud's) own. One therefore wonders what Jurig was thinking of while 
reading Freud's blessings to "conquer more than he himself 'had managed'"; 
also of what he meant when he wrote to Freud about "something really 
sensational" which they were on the threshold of discovering. 
It can therefore be assumed with not undue justification that both Jung 
and Freud had great expectations of each other. Jung expected Freud to 
....... : 
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assist him in his problematic, and, seeing that he also believed that they 
had a common theoretical interest with an equally gripping effect on them, 
he possibly believed that Freud expected the same from him. 
Fourth Hypothesis: 
Jung's reference to his !'conflicts" and difficulties during this period to 
be understood as suggesting: firstly, a primary inner conflict created 
by the critical stage of the problematic of the Other, and secondly, a 
seconda:o/ conflict with Freud and himself which developed after realising 
that Freud could not meet his expectations as he did not, after all, share 
his problematic. 
It is important to reiterate that Jung's conflict with Freud (however one 
wishes to understand it) was not of a primary nature. Jung's corres-
pondence with Freud offers considerable support for this argument. Jung 
repeatedly wrote about the "gdsly fights with the hydra of mythological 
\ 
phantasy" (read: inner conflicts with the problematic of the Other) and 
how they occupied all his libido as a separate issue from his "father-
complex"which he folt were responsible for his difficulties with Freud. 
In other words there are two types of conflicts that Jung experienced 
initially: the one in connection with his newly launched expedition (read: 
his old problematic), and the other, in connection with Freud. The 
second one does not appear to have much power. It was to this conflict 
that Freud attributed Jung's procrastination in writing. Freud is,the 
one who time and again goes back to this. It seems that Jung's pre-
occupation with the new fascinating field caused certain delays in his 
correspondence with Freud who was a self-confessed obsessive correspondent. 
Jung, on the other hand1 was not that particular about his correspondence, 
and after all, the delays were no~ that serious. But, it appears that 
Jung used the "father-complex" interpretation as yet another example of 
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his policy a la guerre' connne a la guerre. The problem with Freud, 
however, gradually became more serious as Jung did not see his expectations 
being fulfilled. Their connnon excitement, alas, must have been after all 
not so common, or rather, not about the same thing. Each one , as it 
' turned out, had great but different hopes from their expedition into 
mythology and archeology. And it was at this particular time that they 
both became victims of their blind excitement when they hoped now that 
firstly, their previous moderate differences would be eradicated, and 
secondly, that they would soon make the "sensational" discovery which 
wuuld prove the correctness of their previous (separate) routes. Each 
was expecting clarification of his own view from the other and they now 
considered their theoretical positions as identical. It goes without 
saying that in this situation the. strong personal ties between the two men 
were equal (with the theoretical issues) in responsibility for the 
particularly strong bond that developed between them. Freud's overdrawn 
tolerance and pleas especially bear out this ob·servation. 
Despite his earlier impressions (e.g. with Leonardo), it now started 
dawning on Jung that Freud in fact did not even share his problematic. 
It was only then that his original and primary conflict with No. 2, 
already reinforced and multiplied (cf. hydra) by the length of all the 
years that it had remained unresolved, and despite his increased intel-
lectual understanding, flared up in dangerous dimensions. Moreover, 
this conflict assumed even greater proportions when he felt the 
withdrawal of Freud's friendly and moral support. Further, he received 
no theoretical enlightenment or guidance from Freud, but on the contrary, 
increasing hostility and suspicion because he (Jung) did not live up to 
I 
Freud's expectations? 
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The break can therefore be understood in tenns of these four assumptions. 
The present hermeneutical exploration does not produce a formula of the 
break based on one single aspect of this highly complex issue (e.g. 
theoretical differences, political factors, personal-psychological dim-
ensions) or even a mechanical combination of them because it has been 
shown that such attempts cannot solve the puzzle in a satisfacory manner, 
and always leaves an unfathomed missing link. Instead, the adopted 
approach places the understanding of the break in the tapestry of the 
developmental perspective of Jung's life and work with all aspects of the 
issue woven into it- so that it produces an intelligible whole. It is in 
this way that it differs from all previous exegeses of the break. 
A final note about this account of the break is necessary: The manifold 
and intricate aspects and issues of the break with their fascination have 
attracted a great number of authors and the field is by no means exhausted. 
Despite the luring temptations of being side-tracked into exciting ex-
cursions, the present analysis must remain well tied to the mast of this 
study, the problematic of the Other .•. A more complete account of the 
break per se should also establish Freud's own problematic as separate 
from Jung's and moreover include a synthetic discussion of the two in the 
light of personal-psychological, theoretical and political aspects. In 
addition, particularly illuminating would be a survey of the relevant 
literature from which a classification would be undertaken of the various 
interpretations of the Freud-Jung relationship in terms of such categories 
as: exploitative, opportunisti~, repressive (for whom? - Freud or Jung), 
compromising, of mutual benefit and growthful. It would then appear that 
the majority of studies on this association are not particularly helpful 
to the independent researcher as their approaches are imbued with various 
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degrees of personal bias. It would, finally, perhaps become evident 
that the last word has not yet been written about this relationship, and 
only attempts along suggested guidelines given here could aspire to grasp 
the meaning of the friendship between the two men in a comprehensive 
manner. 
Continuing the historical development of the break, a separate subsection 
is deemed appropriate to examine in brief the period following immediately 
after Jung's termination of fonnal and informal contact with Freud. This 
will again be viewed from the perspective of the problematic of the Other. 
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THE BREAKDOWN 
"Between two big roles exists a logical emptiness 
which you have to fulfill in the best possible way 
you know and are able" 
Danilo Ki~ (1977, p.58). 
Due to the nature and main theme of this investigation, the reader is 
spared the tragic details of the closing moments of the Freud-Jung episode -
the description of the deadly blows, the evaluative commentaries attemp-
ting to identify the victor and.the vanquished, the villian and the 
martyr, and the analysis of the vicissitudes of their strength and 
righteousness. 
This sub-chapter will deal with what Jung in ·"Memories, Dreams, 
Reflections" calls "Confrontation with the Unconscious". The beginning 
of that chapter runs as follows: 
"After the parting of the ways with Freud, a period of 
inner uncertainty began for me. It would be no exag-
geration to call it a state of disorientation. I felt 
totally suspended in mid-air, for I had not yet found my 
own footing ... " (M.D.R., p.194). 
These words can now be understood in the light of the previous analysis. 
Jung's comprehension of his own problematic, previously fonnulated in the 
language of Freudian terminology, gained substantial impetus from the 
novel expansions of psychoanalysis into fields such as archeology, history 
and mythology. Jung expected a great deal from this extension, only to 
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be disappointed. He became aware of the fact that Freud's expectations 
of this expansion were dissimilar to his and a period of great uncertainty 
was therefore inevitable. , Jung des crihes vividly this period of un-
certainty, and it is important to follow its outline, not for the hist-
orical record but for the continuity of the argument in this study. 
Abstracting the developmental stages of this period the following steps 
can be identified: Firstly. Jung became acutely aware of his unfulfilling 
achievement in the Wandlungen (vide infra p.288 ). He had indeed 
written a book about "the hero, in which man ••• always lived"' but what 
about himself, there and then, at that particular time? He questioned him-
self deeply, but soon "the dialogue with myself became uncomfortable and 
I stopped thinking. I had reached a dead end" (M.D.R., p. 195). He had 
indeed ventured into the enchanting lands of mythology, archeology and 
history, come back and reported on th~ expedition, but, the excitement 
soon vaporised. The findings still meant very little to him as they were 
not digested sufficiently and they did not radicalise the existing psycho-
analytic terminology of his problematic. On the contrary, they created 
a gap between the meaning of their discovery and the psychoanalytic Ian-
guage that was used to account for them. He had gradually discovered 
that Freudian ."terminology and theory" was "concretistic" and "too narrow" 
and thus unsuitable for his novel insights (M.D.R., p.175). Jung under-
standably reached a dead end. 
Realising the unsuitability of his theoretical understanding in relation 
to the inner experiences that overwhelmed him, he was compelled (later he 
admitted that he had had little choice) to follow the experiences which 
took their own course without much conscious control and theoretical 
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understanding. He allowed a series of powerful dreams to "activate" 
his "unconscious" progressively. This was not an easy undertaking. The 
I 
earlier theoretical discrepancy was growing into a fundamental upheaval 
of his whole personality. Jung spoke about this state with sincerity 
and humility. The helpless ''feeling of disorientation"developed into a 
"constant inner pressure" ••• 
, .. 
"At times this became so strong that I suspected there 
was some psychic disturbance in myself ••• " (M.D.R.,p.197). 
It was then that Jung started returning to his childhood memories. This 
led to a yearning for the security which he experienced during childhood. 
He then began to play favourite childhood games by "gathering suitable 
stones" (emphasis added) and building with them. He later called this 
moment "a turning point in my fate" (M.D.R., p.198). These games and 
introspections gradually revoked many childhood dreams and experiences, 
and Jung in his memoirs, saw that this exercise put him "on the way to 
discovering my own myth " (M.D.R., p.198). 
Jung commenced describing the next step as follows: 
"Towards the autumn of 1913 the pressure which I had felt 
was in me seemed to be moving outwards, as tpough there 
were something in the air ••• " (M.D.R., p.199). 
This marked the beginning of a series of visions that initially disturbed 
Jung considerably, to the extent that he "decided that I was menaced by 
a psychosis" (M.D.R., p.200). After about a year, Jung's "task was clear•. 
He had to "understand" that which was in himself and that which was not of 
himself in these visions and fantasies. Above all he had to make sense 
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of his experiences, "find the meaning" (M. D. ~' p, 201) of that which he 
was undergoing 
II For as long as we do not understand their meaning, 
such fantasies are a diabolical mixture of the sublime 
and the ridiculous " (M.D.R., p.202). 
His lack of an adequate system in and through which those experiences would 
\ 
be rendered intelligible became painfully evident. His existing theor-
etical language/system proved so inadequate that he considered it nothing 
but "a few theoretical prejudices of dubious value" (M.D.R., p.203). 
The way he found most appropriate was "to translate the emotions into 
images" (M.D.R., p.201 emphasis added). A number of such images emerged 
from Jung's psyche, the most important being Philemon. These figures-
images represented forces which Jung experienced as being not himself. 
Jung characteristically pondered about one of them: 
"Perhaps my unconscious is fanning 
is not me, but which is insisting 
to expression11 (M.D.R., p. 210). 
a personality that 
on coming through 
He accepted them as ''mediators" (M.D.R., p.212) with the task of com-
municating meaning from the unconscious. His experience taught him that 
"The essential thing is to differentiate oneself from these 
unconscious contents by personifying them, and at the same 
time to bring them into relationship with consciousness .•• " 
(M.D.R., p. 211). 
"Insight into them must be converted into an ethical obli-
gation ••• " (M.D.R., p.218) 
l.n other words, it was by no memlS sufficient to allow himself to be exposed 
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to the inner autonomous forces, but initially they had to at least assume a 
certain fonn, i.e. become personified, and then "bring them into rela-
tionship with consciousness". The final word was with consciousness, 
the ultimate reality was of the conscious system and thus whatever was 
brought into relationship with it had to be scrutinized by the ethical 
agency of consciousness. If these conditions were not upheld, Jung had 
fleeting glimpses of the ominous consequences: insanity, psychosis, a 
state where the unconscious floods and annihilates consciousness. Fin-
ally, Jung's task was to translate all this process into a psychological, 
scientific language/ system, which was his reality. 
II For me reality meant scientific comprehension" (M.D.R., p.213) 
Jung finally achieved this reality, but it was by no means an easy 
achievement • These steps were repeated several times during this period 
which, incidentally, approximately coincided with the First World War. 
He repeatedly developed new languagefsystems to account for his experiences, 
only to find later that they were still inappropriate. One of these 
attempts was his Black and Red Books in which he registered the incoming 
fantasies with ~'aesthetic elaboration". Then 
II I became aware that I 
language and that I still 
something else" (M.D.R., 
had not yet found the right 
had to translate it into 
p.213 emphasis added). 
Another attempt was his work "Septem Sermones ad Mortuos" (Jung 1916) 
(which will be examined later on its own). 
These experiences are certainly not that common, particularly in 
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autobiographies of eminent psychologists, and have therefore stirred the 
imagination of many authors who have attempted to interpret them. The 
interpretations which members of the Psychoanalytic School have offered, 
range from a benevolent and patronizing reference to "insanity" (e.g. 
Andreas-Salome, in Pfeiffer 1972, p.82) to a clinical diagnosis of 
"psychosis" (e.g. Leavy 1964). Other authors gave their free speculations: 
e.g. Brome diagnosed him "a cyclothymic personality who suffered a manic-· 
depressive psychosis" (1978, p.168), Winnicott (1964) , "a re-
covered case of infantile psychosis" whereas Storr thought it was more 
a question of "a schizophrenic episode" (in Brome 1978, p.301). 
Ellenberger compared Jung's intense suffering of this period with similar 
states that Fechner and Freud experienced and termed them "creative illness". 
I 
By that he understood 
II a polymorphous condition that can take the shape of 
depression, neurosis, psychosomatic ailments, or even 
psychosis .•. the subject •.. suffers from feelings of 
utter isolation ... /jnf/ emerges from his ordeal with a 
permanent transfonnation in his personality and the con-
viction that he has discovered a great truth or a new 
spiritual world ... " (1970, pp.447-8). 
A similar ~rocess is the condition described in the recent writings of 
Dr Biihrmann based on her observations of tribal African diviners (Biihrmann 
1977; 1978; 1979;in press; Schweitzer and Biihrmann 1978). The person 
"called" by his ancestors falls into an "illness" called "thwasa". Then, 
if he accepts the call he will undergo certain rituals which will even-
tually not only free him from the "illness", but also develop his own 
divining powers (cf. also Sandner 1972; Fortes 1959). This process again 
may be likened to the condition of the "Dark night of the soul". In the 
medieval poem of the same name, Saint John of the Cross (1959 translation 
- 259 -
by E. A. Peers) describes the thorny path of the soul towards its mystical 
union with God (cf. Fordham 1958). The purgatory function of intense 
suffering/illness/'death'/rebirth is a well known theme that runs through-
out human history from the ancient Greek understanding of tradegy i.e. 
hybris/fall/catharsis (Aristotle's "De Arte Poetica"; Hallman 1961; Vickers 
1973; Murray 1934; Sheppard 1911) through Dante's "Divine comedy" to 
modern time anthropology (e.g. Lewis 1971), mysticism (e.g. Leuba 1925; 
Muktananda 1972; Suzuki 1957; Zaehner 1957), mythology (e.g. Campbell 
1949; 1968; 1972; Eliade 1959; 1968), and psychology (e.g. James 1902; 
Frankl 1964; McGlashan 1976; Otto 1970; Watts 1961). Dr Kahn (1975) 
considers.yet again a similar phenomenon in biblical Job. In his book 
"Job's Illness: Loss, Grief, and Integration" he identifies at least 
three possible cycles which could be applied to this type of ''illness". 
They are: health/illness/cure; obsessional preoccupation/depression/ 
creative insight; and perfectionism/disintegration/integration. All 
three could be applied in some sense to Jung's situation. Finally, the 
central themes of creativity and the renewal process in madness (cf. e.g. 
Perry 1974; Greely 1974), the positive effects of the journey through 
madness (cf. e.g. Barnes and Berke 1971; Custance 1951; Esterson 1970; 
Jerotic 1977; Laing 1967) and in general the theme of rebirth (cf. e.g. 
Plaut 1977; Wilhelm 19 31) appear all to have useful implications for the 
understanding of this particular period of Jung's life. 
However appropriate the above suggestions might be, they do not offer a 
developmental understanding of Jung's specific theoretical positions. 
For this purpose, a closer examination of this phase of Jung's life in 
relation to his _psychological work is indicated. 
In scrutinizing the various phenomena Jung described in the developmental 
I 
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steps outlined above, one cannot fail to observe two similarities: 
(a) Jung's stages in his problematic of the Other since childhood 
approximately correspond with the specific steps that he had to follow 
during this period, and 
(b) There is a strong resemblance between the steps of this period and 
the phases that S.W. went through as discussed by Jung in his dissertation. 
Jung's period of "inner uncertainty" and "disorientation" began when he 
broke with Freud after the unsatisfying effect of the Wandlungen. It is, 
rather ironic that the Wandlungen , the supposed 'cause' of the break, 
never satisfied Jung. In his foreword to the fourth Swiss edition he 
admitted openly that he 
" never felt happy about this book ••• it was written 
at top speed ••• without regard to time or method. 
There was no opportunity to let my thoughts mature. 
The whole thing came upon me like a landslide that 
cannot be stopped •.• because of its imperfections and 
incompleteness it laid down the programme to be followed 
for the next few decades of my life" (1950, pp.xxiii-xxiv 
emphasis added). 
There is no doubt that there was some genuine inspiration in the Waridlungen 
but it was not worked through sufficiently in order to give rise to a 
mature, appropriate method, a system/language ab le to match the material 
and its meaning. And this, above all, was what Jung needed; an adequate 
language, a "right language" to account for his experiences. The 
limitations of his existing (psychoanalytic) language were hopelessly 
exposed by the Wandlungen. The ensuing search was painful. His 
increasingly deeper and stranger experiences demanded a system within 
which they could be comprehended. The lack of such a system led to an 
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acute disharmony between the experiential and intellectual aspects of his 
personality. Therefore, the Breakdown (the title of this sub-chapter) 
refers to what Bateson (admittedly from a different perspective) called 
an "epistemological crisis" (1970, p.430). The breakdown is thus under-
stood in this study not as a 'psychological', 'emotional', 'psychotic' or 
similar event, but as an epistemological one. Jung's system/languag.e 
which he used to account for his reality and problematic in the face of 
new events and experiences broke down. The theoretical formulation of 
the problematic of the Other became inadequate to account for the actual 
manifestations and experience of the Other! Jung had already found the 
"terminology and theory" of psychoanalysis "too narrow". 
It is important to note that Jung's first attempt to heal this state of 
disunity was to go back to childish games with stones. Consciously or 
(most probably) unconsciously he associated that state of inner disharmony 
with that which he experienced in his childhood, and thus he repeated the 
same activities. As presented in the chapter on his Childhood Period, 
Jung's early attempt to deal with the painful effects of his experienced 
Otherness was with a stone, his stone, to which he gave animistic qualities. 
The "conversation" between little Jung and "his stone" was limited, but 
now, in the advanced form of the same procedure Jung was able to have 
long and instructive dialogues. The method that he followed here was 
essentially the same: Personify the disturbing and incomprehensible 
aspects of the unconscious and then enter into a relationship with them. 
This was the method S.W., Jung's medium, had also adopted. The difference, 
however, lies in the quality of that relationship. Jung's primitive 
Others of his childhood were, in a sense, too external. Jung as a child 
did not carry them around in himself, but they had a definite external 
form and substance. Ivenes, on the other hand, was an exclusively 
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internal Other. Still she hardly had a relationship with S.W .. While 
as Ivenes, S.W. was virtually non-existent. Ivenes, in other words took 
over completely S.W.'s personality, at least during the times of her 
manifestation. Contrary to the above, Jung's internal Others of this 
period enter into an actual relationship with him in such a way that he 
can regulate up to a point their influence, and subject them to the ethical 
scrutiny of consciousness. This however does not reduce their signifi-
cance. On the contrary, insofar as their message is allowed to be 
heard by consciousness, they facilitate greater interaction within the 
various parts/aspects of the personality. One may therefore justifiably 
call this relationship dialectical interrelationship. This is the 
ultimate form of the process which Jung later termed active imagination 
(Jung 1916/1958). A similar comparison between Jung's early play objects 
and his experiences in the breakdown , also in terms of active imagination, 
was undertaken by M. Fordham (1977). His approach was to examine these 
phenomena in the light of Winnicott's theory on "transitional objects". 
As shown· in the diagrams (vide supra p.134f , and infra p.267f) the process 
of personifying unconscious tendencies both in the case of S.W. with Ivenes 
and now with the new image- figures is similar. In addition, Philemon 
has striking resemblances to Ivenes. In the same way as Ivenes was the 
guiding spirit, so Philemon acted as Jung's "psychagogue" , "inner guru" 
and "psychologically ..• represented superior insight" (M. n; R. , pp. 
208-9). According to J. Hubback, he represented "the other within" 
(I 966, p. 97) . Moreover, as Anticipated Whole Other, Philemon was indeed 
a personality with wisdom and harmony which not only served as Jung's 
example but also actually guided him to achieve that. In other words, 
it also had the teleological function of the Anticipated mature personality. 
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Thus, the process until this moment includes part recapitulation of the 
past history, and part repetition of the various stages the phenomenon of 
the Other followed. Indeed it .might have been unnecessary to repeat the 
childhood manner of healing the disunity of his personality, but it may 
be argued that once the breakdown occured a whole recapitulation might 
have been necessary in order to arrive at the critical point, but now 
with a new and corrective approach. Also, although Jung theoretically 
described the A.W.O. in S.W., he did not experience this himself and 
perhaps here was the beginning of the discrepancy which led him to feel 
"the gulf between the external world" with its conscious theoretical 
language and epistemology "and the interior world of images in the most 
painful fonnli resulting in the "irreconcilable contradiction between 
•inner' and 'outer"' (M.D.R., pp.219-20). Jung had to experience his 
language as well as develop a language for his new experiences. A 
dialectical interaction was needed. 
However, Jung's various attempts to develop the "right language" did not 
limit themselves to a recapitulation of the previous stages of the 
development of the fonnulation of the Other. A number of significant 
innovations were also introduced which indeed represent a breakthrough 
(the title of the following sub-chapter) in the elaboration and com-
ptehension of his problematic. Briefly, they are the following: 
According to the description Jung gave of Philemon, as an old, wise man 
and guide, this image-figure of the unconscious had all the characteristics 
of an Anticipated Whole Other, yet Jung also mentioned another figure which 
he experienced in opposition to Philemon. That was a figure he named "Kail. 
' 
' ·...._ / 
. ' 
.. 264 -
". • • Phi lemon • • • was a winged spirit, whereas Ka represented 
a kind of eatth demon or metal demon. Philemon was the 
spiritual aspect, or 'meaning.' Ka, on the other hand, 
was the spirit of nature ••• " (M. D. R., p. 209). 
This opposition is puzzling, since, if Philemon was indeed an A.W.O., 
then, according to the definition given in the chapter on the Psychiatric 
Period, he should have actually represented the unification of the previous 
. 
opposing Fragment Others. Would Philemon then in fact be a F.O. instead 
of an A.W.O. ? The answer can emerge from an examination not only of 
Philemon and Ka, but also of what was to follow. In this way, it can be 
said that there is a new formulation of the problematic at hand, in which 
the existing A.W.O. itself is opposed and a higher synthesis of this 
dialectic is therefore expected. This assumtion is further supported 
not only by what later emerged as a higher A.W.O. (to be discussed below), 
but also by the actual quality of Ka. He was certainly not a Fragment 
Other, in the sense that this term was defined earlier in this study. 
He was not an Extreme Unconscious Personality with a detrimental effect. 
He was not of a personal nature at all, but had the globality of an 
A.W.O. Jung's understanding that Philemon represented the spiritual 
aspect and Ka the spirit of nature epitomize this issue. 
It now remains to investigate the kind of "higher A.W.O." this new form-
ulation introduced. Jung wrote that a "principal event" which helped 
him to emerge (towards the end of the First World War) from the darkness 
was his understanding of his "mandala drawings" which he first painted 
"in 1916 after writing the Septem Sermones" , and at the time did not 
understand (M.D.R., p.220). He later accepted that they were "spontaneous 
and natural" and "seemed to correspond to my inner situation". He 
gradually grasped their meaning in Goethe's words from Faust: 
" 'Formation, Transformation, Eternal Mind's eternal recreation' 
And that is the self, the wholeness of the personality, which 
if all goes well-rs-harmonious, but which cannot tolerate 
self-deceptions ••• " (M. D. R., p. 221 emphasis added). 
I 
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Thus a new structure appeared, the Self (das Selbst) which is the "whole 
being" in its totality, a unity of all Others within one great whole. 
The fact that it dialectically supersedes (Aufheben) all Others is 
expressed in its abstract form - mandalas, which symbolically represent 
it, and are structural designs, beyond any personal psychological content. 
The dialectical synthesis of opposing Others was aptly expressed by Jung 
when he wrote that subsequent to the emergence of the Self he 
II began to understand that the goal of psychic development 
is the self. There is no linear evolution; there is only 
a circumambulation of the self ••• everything points towards 
the centre ••• " (M. D. R., p. 222). 
Before depicting the new formulation of the Other diagrailll!latically and 
through that discussing its characteristics and further implications for 
the central problematic, another image-figure will be examined briefly. 
Soon after the appearance of Philemon Jung wrote that a female figure 
also started relating to him. It is significant that at first Jung 
experienced that image as the internalization of a female patient and 
only later did it become an autonomous inner Other. Jung named this 
"woman within me" "anima" (M. D.R., p.210). During this period Jung 
did not understand much about the "anima", his "inner feminine figure" 
except that he felt her negative aspects. He was "a little awed by her" 
and she appears to have cast a flattering and seductive spell on him. 
She kept on admiring his work as being of great artistic value and Jung 
felt that if he did not oppose this with his own conscious judgement he 
could have easily fallen into a self-deceptive image of himself as a 
"misunderstood artist". The fact that Jung attributed his emergence 
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from darkness to his "breaking with" the negative influence of the 
anima (in addition to his understanding of the mandala drawings) is most 
relevant here. In other words, the anima was definitely an Other of 
an inferior order than the Self. As far as the anima herself is concerned 
from the brief account of this period it appears that she could be 
understood as a Fragment Other, as an exaggerated tendency of the unconscious. 
Returning to a closer analysis of the new system, the Other-as-Self, 
as developed so far by Jung during this phase of his .life, the following 
characteristics will be discussed with particular emphasis on their 
• 
implications for the understanding of both the pathological as well as 
healthy and growthful directions: 
(a) inner I outer 
(b) concrete I abstract 
(c) personal I collective 
(d) conscious I unconscious 
According to the diagram below, the new Other (Ka in Fig. I.JO), is growing 
from the opposite direction to Philemon, the initial and only A.W.O. 
(Fig .1.9). This novel development, according to the previous system 
would lead to a new and irrevocable disunion of the personality with 
disastrous effects. The revolutionary development is that this 
opposition to an existing A.W.O. leads to a new dialectical synthesis 
which has perforce to be of a higher order, of an even greater unity. and 
wholeness. This in the diagram (Fig.I.II) is depicted in three dimensions 
in the vertical movement of both A.W!O.'s now meeting at a higher centre, 
the Self, which grows in such a way that it pulls all the personality 
into a three dimensional whole, a sphere, around which all the aspects 
of the personality will harmoniously function (Fig.1.12). A note of 
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- 269 -
warning is here given to the reader to regard these diagrams as 
representational guidelines only. 
During the period of the break Jung found that the Freudian terminology 
was "too narrow" to express certain phenomena which he was now discovering. 
This claim was made by Jung nearly fifty years later and one is not sure 
whether he understood it at the time in such a conscious manner. However, 
whatever the case might be, consciously or unconsciously Jung went ahead 
to create his own terminology which would be broad enough to account for 
and express intelligibly at least the experiences which he underwent 
during the breakdown. Thus, one of the major characteristics of the 
new system that was forged in the breakthrough was the coincidence 
between the theory and the experience, the intellectual and the lived, 
the externally connnunicated and the internally felt. 
'-
But, this co-
incidence did not obliterate the difference between these two polarities 
of the internal and the external; in other words it was not an absolute 
coincidence. That would have meant no distinction between these two 
levels which in turn would have meant insanity. Thus, the best 
expression for this relationship can be the dialectical interaction. 
The Self is indeed the centre of the personality, its innermost core, 
yet, at the same time, in a dialectical conceptualization, it is represented 
by the most abstract formula - a mandala. 
This can be properly understood once another fact is drawn to the reader's 
attention: In attempting to comprehend the various figure-Others Jung 
made use of his knowledge of history, religion, archeology and mythology. 
The very names of the figures, "Phi lemon", "Ka", "Elijah", "Salome" and 
"Anima" betray Jung's way of making them intelligible to himself. It is 
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true that he did a lot of research in discovering more about these figures 
in the years that followed, but even at the very moment of their original 
emergence during this period, in the very act of personifying and naming 
them, Jung inadvertently revealed his epistemological direction. Further, 
following his previous system of the Other-as-symbol, where the Other 
also began having a collective meaning, Jung gradually appreciated that 
these autonomous images represented to him the same as they represented 
in general in bodies of collective psychological representations, such as 
mythology, religion, history of language etc. This became particularly 
clear to him with the mandalas. First, he drew mandalas "spontaneously" 
and then found that however paradoxical, those abstract patterns did 
somehow represent his own very concrete "inner situation" and his tendency 
towards the centre of his being. Subsequently he discovered that 
mandalas were used in the East with precisely the same symbolical meaning: 
a psychological representation of the centre! (cf. Jung 1929; 1937; 1943b; 
1950b). All the undigested excursions into the territories of mythology, 
which brought so many premature expectations were now acquiring their 
exact place, having been filled with the life of their experiential sub-
stratum. Mythology was not just an area from which to make erudite 
references, but represented an invaluable treasure of accumulated forms 
.. 
of psychological meaning: symbols, rites etc all have a collective 
symbolism which at the same time can be experienced on a highly personal 
level. The dialectic of the personal/collective is here particularly 
apparent. Finally, the polarity conscious/unconscious can be viewed in 
the same light. Jung, time and again after the breakdown, stressed the 
importance of the interrelationship between the figures from the unconscious 
and consciousness (e.g.- Jung 1928; 1936; 1956) •. The necessity of 
this dialectical interrelationship became evident to Jung during this 
I 
. I 
i 
I 
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period. Since this issue has already been discussed ?hove it would 
suffice to give only the final formula here. The conscious should not 
obliterate the image-figures, but also should not be governed by them 
totally. The first would lead to a highly defensive state where the 
unconscious messages are repressed, while the second would result in an 
uncontrolled influx of unconscious material, thus depriving the personality 
of any conscious functioning. Jung survived thanks to their dialectical 
interrelationship. 
Thus, the Self, the ultimate psychological unity of the personality, 
unites dialectically all opposing Others and represents the ultimate 
Other to the present personality. In the Self the polarities of inner/ 
outer, personal/collective, concrete/abstract and conscious/unconscious 
meet harmoniously. One particularly important implication of such a 
reformulation of Jung's problematic is that since the unconscious can 
be understood in both the personal as well as the collective sense, the 
collective unconscious can be legitimately accepted as "the matrix of 
mythopoeic imagination" (M. D.R., p.213) and therefore plunging into 
the unconscious by itself does not necessarily imply mental illness. It 
might indeed result in insanity if the person does not maintain the 
dialectical relationship between the two structures. If he does, the 
experience can only be enriching and corrective as it was for Jung (cf. 
Jaffe 1972). 
Jung always referred to this period of his life and work with great 
humility. 
II 
From the above analysis it is not surprising to read that 
All my works, all my creative activity, has come 
from those initial fantasies and dreams which began 
in 1912 ••• " (M. D.R., p.217), and 
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"The years when I was pursuing my inner images were the 
most important of my life - in them everything essential 
was decided. It all began then; the later details are 
only supplements and clarifications of the material that 
burst from the unconscious, and at first swamped me. 
It was the prima materia for a lifetime's work" (M.D.R., p.225). 
This study has treated this period with the same seriousness that Jung 
saw in it, and for this reason this chapter, inspite of being a chapter-
interlude, is actually the largest on Jung in this investigation. 
The solemnity of this period has impressed itself upon many authors, 
even upon some who are not particularly favourably disposed towards Jung. 
Paul J. Stern in his controversial book "C. G. Jting: The Haunted Prophet" 
captured the importance of this period when he wrote: 
"Jung had to forge singlehandedly the tools to fend 
off the soul-devouring demons ••• " (1976, p.115). 
It is these tools that this study will now examine further. In the 
next sub-chapter entitled The Breakthrough some light will be cast upon 
the initial form that these tools took. 
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THE BREAKTHROUGH 
' , , , c " , ~ yap ~U~L~ ~~~ anop a~ EUpEOL~ EO~LV 
("the resolution of a perplexity is discovery") 
Aristotle: Ethica Nicomachea 1146b 6. 
In this final sub-chapter of the chapter-trilogy The Break, The Breakdown 
and The Breakthrough an attempt will be made to present and discuss the 
initial phases of Jung's forging of the "p!ima materia" of the years of 
the _preak into "the tools to fend off the 'soul-devouring demons'" and 
thus the creation of his "independent line of thought". 
The Wandlungen and the Septem Sermones will be reviewed here in order to 
trace the original conception and infrial articulation of what Jung 
understood to be "everything essential" in his "lifetime work", so that 
in the Transition, at the end of this chapter, a comparison can be 
made between these first steps of the new direction and the previous 
line of development of his problematic of the Other. These two works 
mark approximately the beginning and end of t~e period of the break. The 
Wandlungen was written in 1911-12 and the Septem Sermones in 1916. 
Although an outline of this "independent" path has already been presented 
in the previous sub-chapter, it is felt that a more specific document-
ation of Jung's written material of this period should be produced. 
l 
This section will, therefore, concentrate on the early formulations of 
what may be called a breakthrough in Jung's theoretical development. 
' 
- 274 -
W a n d 1 u n g e n u n d S y m b o 1 e d e r L i b i d o 
So much reference has been made to this work that the reader deserves due 
warning that there is a real danger that unrealistic expectations could 
arise from this presentation. The full title of the first English 
translation by Beatrice M. Hinkle in 1916 was "Psychology of the uncon-
scious. A Study of the Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido. 
A Contribution to the History of the Evolution of Thought ". The revised 
edition of 1952, whose original title was "Symbole der Wandiung: Analyse 
des Vorspiels zu einer Schizophrenie", was translated by R.F.C. Hull 
under the title "Symbols of Transformation. An Analysis of the Prelude 
to a case of Schizophrenia". It is this edition that is included in 
the Collected Works of Jung. As previously mentioned, this work was 
originally published in two parts in the Jahrbuch (1911-12) of which Jung 
was still the editor at the time. In these two articles, Jung undertook 
an analysis of a series of fantasies written by a wom:tn, Frank Miller 
(an assumed name), an American patient of Dr Theodore Flournoy (1854-1920), 
a psychiatrist from Geneva. The fantasies were published under the 
title "Quelques faits d'imagination creatice subconsciente" with an intro-
duction by Flournoy himself in the Archives de Psychologie (Geneva, 1906). 
At the outset the following three observations should be made: 
(a) Jung knew Flournoy well and held him in high esteem. He had 
already used extensively Flournoy' s influential book "De.s lndes a la 
planete Mars. Edute sur un cas de sonmambulisme avec glossolalie" 
(1900) in his dissertation. This fact might lead one to expect that 
Jung would perhaps return in the Wandlungen to a similar problematic that 
gave rise to those early studies of his dissertation. 
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(b) On a personal level, Jung had a special relationship with Flournoy. 
In the Foreword to the second Swiss edition of the Wandlu~gen (1924) Jung 
referred to him as "my respected and fatherly friend" (£.J:!.:.,vol.S;p.xxviii). 
This strong characterization was repeated.verbatim in "Memories, Dreams 
Reflections" (M. D.R., p. 186). The relationship between the two men is 
further illustrated by Barbara Hannah who reported that Jung related to 
her 
II that after the break with Freud he still felt too 
young and inexperienced to stand alone and that Flournoy 
was a helpful bridge to his later independence~ •• " 
(1976, p.98). 
Two years after the publication of the Wandlungen, commenting on the 
"inevitable misunderstandings" that the book led to, Jung remarked 
in consolation that he had 
II had a satisfaction particularly to be valued, for 
the book won the approval of Flournoy himself, who 
knew the case personally ••• " (1914d, p188). 
These might lead one to interpret Jung's association with Flournoy on 
this project as a possible (conscious or unconscious) gesture on Jung's 
behalf to distance himself from Freud. 
(c) Jung wrote in his memoirs that Miss Miller's fantasies 
" · operated like a catalyst upon stored-up and still 
disorderly ideas within me ••• " (M.D.R., p.186) 
and Hannah advances the plausible argtnnent that those fantasies were 
"a god-send" to him as he would have been unable to deal with his own 
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fantasies in that particularly fragile psychological state of his at the 
time. Emma Jung in fact considered that the writing of the Wandlungen 
in fact represented for her husband a "self-analysis". 
In the Introduction of the Wandlungen Jung in his attempt to reinforce 
the validity of his methodology (i.e. of relating historical material in 
the analysis of individual psychological problems) evokes the example 
of Freud's undertaking in his essay of Leonardo. The irony is that Jung 
in the Wandlungen was not following Freud's methodology in Leonardo as 
much as the actual theme·of that study. As Freud correctly observed 
in the Preface to "Totem and Taboo", his own work offered a "methodological 
contrast" to Jung's tJandlungen (which he dutifully acknowledged as the 
"source" from which he "received the first stimulus" for his own study) 
in that Jung endeavoured to "solve the problems of individual psychology 
with the help of material derived from social psychology" whereas his 
attempts were at "applying the point of view and the findings of psycho-
analysis to some unsolved problems of social psychology" (Freud 1913b,p.xiii). 
One might still argue that there was sane similarity in their respective 
methodologies in that both related individual to social psychology. 
This, of course, cannot be denied. However, on the other hand, as far 
as the theme of their studies is concerned, the similarity is even more 
striking: Freud's central thesis was that da Vinci's personality was of 
a "double nature": One "as an artist" and another "as a scientific 
investigator" (1910b, p.73). His task, therefore, in that essay was to 
interpret this phenomenon. He did this in terms of the great artist's 
childhood sexuality which he understood as expressing certain dynamics 
connected with his illegitimate birth. Freud observed a further duali_ty 
which essentially revealed Leonardo's same "double nature" in two 
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celebrated paintings of his: "Mona Lisa", with the mysterious double 
smile, and "St.Anne with two others", where the motif of two mothers 
(St. Anne and Mary) is powerfully depicted. It is thus primarily the 
theme of Leonardo that Jung followed in the Wandlungen, f.e. the double 
nature of the personality which represents an old theme of Jung's and 
was again given a central place in the Wandlungen. 
Some of the themes of the double, or, according to the terminology of the 
present study, the Other, that Jung examined in the first part of the 
Wandlungen were the following: "Two kinds of thinking", "The double 
role of Faust: creator-destroyer", the "Sun-hero: creative-destructive" 
and "Byron's Heaven and Earth". 
Jung, after a detailed examination of the various theories of language, 
distinguished two types of thinking. He called them "directed" and 
"non directed" respectively. He related these to "Science" (directed, 
"thinking in words") and to "dream phantasy" (non directed, 11 thinking in 
images"). 
" ••• The first, working for connnunication with speech 
elements, is troublesome and exhausting; the latter, 
on the contrary, goes on without trouble, working 
spontaneously, so to speak, with reminiscences. The 
first creates innovations, adaptations, imitates 
reality and seeks to act upon it. The latter, on the 
contrary, turns away from reality, sets free subjective 
wishes, and is, in regard to adaptation, wholly un-
productive " (''Psychology of the Unconscious"*· p. 11) 
Insofar as non directed thinking was producing an "overwhelmingly 
* Hereafter referred to as "P.U." , Hinkle's translation, London 
edition ( 1919) 
- 278 -
subjectively distorted idea of the world" Jung regarded that "state of 
mind as infantile. It lies in our individual past, and in the past of 
mankind" · (P. U. , p. 19) • He understood non directed thinking as not only 
the characteristic mode of thought in the child but also of earlier 
historical times. Science was the product of directed thinking, and 
mythology of non directed thinking. The "naive man of antiquity" held 
"an idea of the universe which was not only very far from reality, but 
was one which corresponded wholly to [his] subjective phantasies ••• " 
(P.U., p.13). Jung observed that many authors, and particularly Freud, 
had described the "infantile soul" as being involved in its own phantasy 
world (comparable to the dream state) and was able to conclude that there 
was an "intimate connection between dream psychology and myth psychology" 
(P • U. , p • 15) • Jung drew a parallel "between the phantastical, mytho-
logical thinking of antiquity and the similar thinking of children, 
between the lower human races and dreams" and accepted that "ontogenesis 
corresponds in psychology to phylogenesis" (P.U., p •. 14). 
Thus the two kinds of thinking were for Jung characteristic of two 
general, and one might say primary polarities: On one hand, mythology, 
dreams, phantasies, infantile, non directed thinkin~; everything sub-
jective, primitive, effortless and spontaneous; and on the other hand, 
science, "scholasticism", adult directed thinking, concerned with adap-
tation and modern times and everything of an objective nature. 
This kind of dichotomy of human faculties is not a unique phenomenon 
encountered only in Jung's writings. Apart from similar earlier attempts 
(e.g. ratio and irttellectus in Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas 
Eopleston l950 vol. 2 part If] ) , in our century Henri Bergson,· a few 
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years before Jung, drew a distinction between "intuitive'' and "analytical" 
thinking (1903), and since Jung this issue has been reiterated in many 
different forms and variations by a long line of distinguished scholars, 
ranging from Max Weber (1'949) and Karl Jaspers (1'946) - both of whom 
elaborated on the division between verstehen and erklaren, first intro-
duced by Droyson and Dilthey in the nineteenth century (von Wright 1971) -
E. Husserl (Kockelmanf;) 1967), M. de Unamuno (1921), J. Maritain ( 1'940), 
to modern authors such as T.S. Eliot (1916), C. Naranjo (1972), H. Osmond 
et al (1974), C.A. Reich (1970), L.A. Reid (1961), T. Roszak (1972), 
J. Starobinski (1977), K. Stern (1965), E.W. Straus (1930) and A. Watts 
(1972). This division may further be related' to the polarities of 
Dionysian - Apollinian (e.g. Nietzsche 1872), the Chinese principle of 
Yin - Yang (e.g. Capra 1975; I Ching; Lao Tzu; Rawson and Legeza 1973; 
Versfeld 1979; Yu-Lan 1962), and the recent physiological controversy 
over the two separate functions of the right and left hemispheres of the hunan 
brain (Diamond and Beaumont 1974; Gazzaniga 1970; Gooch 1972; 1973; 
Hilgard 1977; Jaynes 1976; Ornstein 1972; 1973; Rossi 1977). 
This basic distinction cannot but remind one of Jung's original dichotomy 
between the No. 1 and No. 2 personalities. It could therefore be 
ascertained with justif·iable conviction that the two kinds of thinking 
that Jung introduced in the first part of the Wandltingen was his first 
serious attempt to conceptualize the problematic of the Other in a system 
that would accentuate its importance by elevating it to an almost uni-
versal principle, and also rendering it intelligible within a broader 
perspective which includes not only individual development, but also 
historical and phylogenetic development. It goes without saying that 
' 
·• 
/ ' 
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directed thinking corresponded with No. 1 and non directive, phantasy 
thinking with No. 2 personality. 
I 
Against this background Jung then examined Miss Miller's fantasies. 
From her first poem, "The hymn of creation", Jung identified a "creative 
god" with "dual nature, moral and physical". In the chapter "The song 
of the moth" he interpreted her poem "The moth to the sun" as expressing 
"two things which never meet" (P.U., p'.47) and compared this dichotomy 
to many similar examples from world literature, mythology and religion, 
all of which, according to him, conveyed essentially the same.conflict: 
II a problem of modern man which has been turning in 
restless slumber since Renaissance, just as was done 
by the drama of Oedipus for the Hellenic sphere of 
culture. What is to be the way out between the Scylla 
of renunciation of the world and the Charybdis of the 
acceptance of the world?" (P.U., p.50). 
"Renunciation of the world" meant a movement of the libido inward, an 
"irtttovetsion", an.opportunity to deal with inner conflicts and tune in 
with the harmony of nature. "Acceptance of the world0 , on the other hand, 
implied an outward movement where "adaptation" was the priority. Jung 
compared Miss Miller's fantasies with among others the motif of "the 
dou'b1e role of Faust: creator-destroyer", the "sun-hero: creative-de-
s tructive", and "Byron's 'Heaven and Earth'", which he understood as 
follows: 
II Love raises man, not only above himself, but also 
above the bounds of his mortality and earthliness, up 
to divinity itself, and in the very act of raising him 
it destroys him ••• " 
The conflict is not solved: 
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" ••• The longing of the moth for the star is not absolutely 
pure and transparent, but glows in sultry mist, for man 
continues to be man. Through the excess of his longing 
he draws down the divine into the corruption of his passion; 
therefore he seems to raise himself to the Divine; but 
with that his humanity is destroyed ••• " (P. U., p.66). 
In the second part of the Wandlungen, Jung coi!Illlenced with an analysis of 
the libido in which he compared it with the Sun God and noted that "sun 
is not only beneficial, but also destructive"(~, p.70). Now, since 
the libido is represented mythologically with sun, which is god with 
"dual nature", the libido too, according to Jung,was pervaded with a 
fundamental duality: it had in addition to its sexual con.nation also 
"desexualised derivates". At this stage,still convinced that he was 
expanding along a direction that he and his "teacher" together saw 
appropriate (as discussed earlier), Jung saw fit to "replace the expression 
'psychic energy' with the tenn 'libido"' (P.U., p.80). This widening 
of the concept was possible also because of his understanding of the 
"functional independence" of "biological impulses" in the history of 
evolution. Calling upon the Freudian terms of sublimation and repression 
he argued that the."primal" sexual libido can be transformed into 
"secondary impulses" of "associated functions". Such successful diversion 
is sublimation, and when unsuccessful, repression. He called 
this revision "the genetic conception" of libido (P. U., p. 83). Jung 
attached great importance to the transformational properties of libido and 
speculated that in addition to "phantastic analogy formation" "human 
consciousness" itself might be the product of such transformation (P.U., 
p.86). Not only primitive fantasy formation (mythology), but also 
I 
schizophrenic fantasies were produced by the same mechanism, both of them 
being of the non directed kind of thinking. 
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In analysing Miss Miller's third and last poem, which she called "a 
hypnogogic poem", Jung first discussed the "dualism of the human will" 
which consisted in the "forward and backward flow of the libido": 
II A part of the soul desires the outer object; another 
part, however, harks back to the subjective world, where 
the airy and fragile palaces of phantasy beckon ••• " 
(P • U • , p • 1 0 7) 
Jung, remarking on Miss Miller's description of the "circumstances 
surrounding the origin" of the poem (a series of psychological and 
physiological sensations of anxiety, excitement, relaxation etc), compared 
them to those usually preceding "intentional somnambulism often described 
by spiritualistic mediums" and suggested that it was a case of an 
essentially introverted mechanism in which 
II it seems that the libido has suddenly dis-
covered an object in the depths of the unconscious 
which powerfully attracts it ••• " (P. U., p. 107). 
Normally, there is a delicate "harmony of finely attuned opposition" in 
that "dualism". Only an "abnormal third frees the pair of opposites ••. 
and causes their manifestation in the form of separate tendencies" (P.U., 
p. 108). Jung, again following Freud's theories,argued that the incest 
problem is at the root !?f that "abnormal third". After considering the 
universality of the "incest problem" Jung interpreted it, and its mythical 
counterpart "the myth of the hero", as representing 
II the myth of our own suffering unconscious, which has 
an unquenchable longing for all the deepest sources of 
our own being; for the body of the mother, and through 
it for communion with infinite life in the countless forms 
of existence ••• " (P.U., p.127). 
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In the same chapter Jung made some further remarks on the universality 
of the unconscious and its origin. He claimed that: 
II The unconscious contains the differentiated renmants 
of the earlier psychologic functions overcome by the 
individual differentiation ••• " (P. U., p. 110). 
And also that 
II The essence of consciousness is the process of 
adaptation which takes place in the most minute details. 
On the other hand, the unconscious is the generally 
diffused, which not only binds the individuals among 
themselves to the race, but also unites them backwards 
with th~ peoples of the past and their psychology •.• 11 
(P • U • , p • I I 0) • 
The incest conflict, however, does not have to be a cause of pathology. 
The union with the mother symbolically represents "rebirth". Through 
the transforming ability of the libido, the incestuous desires may be 
diverted to a symbolic rebirth. Thus the libido may be "spiritualized". 
Jung analysed a number of myths and religious symbolism to indicate the 
manifestation of precisely this transformation of libido and the rebirth 
theme. But the dangers of achieving rebirth are not to be minimised. 
A central conflict exists there: 
II When some great work is to be accomplished, before which 
weak man recoils, doubtful of his strength, his libido returns 
to that source fJ..e. the mothe:r] - and this is the dangerous 
moment, in which the decision takes place between annihilation 
and new life. If the libido remains arrested in the wonder 
kingdom of the inner world, then the man has become for the 
world above a phantom, then he is practically dead or desper-
ately ill. But if the libido succeeds in tearing itself 
loose and pushing up into the world above, then a miracle 
appears. This journey to the underworld has been a fountain 
of youth, and new fertility springs from his apparent death ..• 11 
(P. U. , p. 182) • 
\ 
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This long quotation will undoubtedly remind the reader of Jung's own 
"journey into the underworld"! 
In trying to summarize the chapter on the "Dual Mother Role" the temptation 
of quoting yet another lengthy paragraph cannot be resisted as Jung, in 
this passage, in a succinct and lucid style, expresses himself in the 
best possible manner: 
"Man leaves the mother, the source of li'bido, and is driven by the 
eternal thirst to find her again, and to drink renewal from her; 
thus he completes his cycle, and returns again into the mother's 
womb. Every obstacle which obstructs his life's path, and threatens 
his ascent, wears the shadowy features of the 'terrible mother', who 
paralyses his energy with the consuming poison of the stealthy, 
retrospective longing. In each conquest he wins again the smiling 
love and life-giving mother-images which belong to the intuitive 
depths of human feeling, the features of which have become mutilated 
and irrecognisable through the progressive development of the surface 
of the htnnan mind. 'fhe stern necessity of adaptation works cease-
lessly to obliterate the last traces of these primitive landmarks 
of the period of the origin of the human mind, and to replace them 
along lines which are to denote more and more clearly the nature of 
real objects" (P. U., pp. 235-6). 
In the concluding chapter, "The Sacrifice" , Jung emphasises that 
II the sexual phantasies of the neurotic· and the exquisite 
sexual language of dreams are regressive phenomena. The 
sexuality of the unconscious is not what it seems to be; it 
is merely a symbol; it is •.• a step forward to every goal"""of 
life - but expressed in the unreal sexual language of the uncon-· 
scious, and in the thought form of an earlier stage; a resurrec-
tion, so to speak, of earlier modes of adaptation ... " (P.U., pp',239-40). 
The Sacrifice refers to the sacrifice of the "Infantile hero", the "retro-
gressive longing (incestuous libido)" so that the libido, free and 
"unbound in familial bonds must be brought outside into human contact" 
(P. U. , p ,'251) • !t is further the sacrifice of the mother, i.e. when 
one frees "himself from the midst of his unconscious lying in the mother". 
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" the libido forced away from the mother by the incest 
prohibition seeks for the sexual object in the place of the 
forbidden mother. In this wider psychological sense, which 
expresses itself in the allegoric language of the 'incest 
prohibition', 'mother', etc, must be understood Freud's 
paradoxical sentence 'Originally we have known only sexual 
objects'. This sentence must be understood psychologically 
throughout, in the sense of a world image created from within 
outwards, which has, in the first place, nothing to do with 
the so-called 'objective' idea of the world ••• " (P.U., p.'2'54). 
A brief examination of this book substantiates the three basic claims 
that were initially made about it, i.e. that it represents yet another 
attempt by Jung of formulating the problematic of the Other, and that 
despite being studded with gems of inspiration (which were to be deve~oped 
later), it essentially precipitated and expressed his epistemological 
breakdown, in that it exposed the limitations of his adopted psycho-
analytic language/system. 
The division between No. t and No. 2 personalities in this book became 
a fundamental dichotomy permeating not only the individual psychological 
system but also extending to collective and cultural dimensions, broadly 
defined. The two kinds of thinking corresponded to historical periods 
of mankind. Since both the child and primitive man share the same kind 
of thinking, Jung claimed that there is a close relation between ontogenesis 
and phylogenesis. This issue was taken up by E. Neumann (1949) and developed 
further to become one of the main pillars of the Jungian theoretical 
structure. (For a brilliant critique of this axiom see Giegerich 1975; 
cf also Jaynes 1976; Starobinsky 1977). The same primary dichotomy bet-
ween No. I and No. 2 gave rise here to yet another general principle of 
human development and functioning. Jung defined "the problem of modern 
man" in terms of the same dichotomy, i.e. how to solve the basic dilenuna 
in following either the mode of directed thinking, an outward movement 
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of psychc:>logical energy for the purpose of external "adaptation", or 
the mode of fantasy thinking, an inward movement towards the realm of the 
unconscious, the original spring of consciousness. It was for the latter 
movement that Jung first introduced the term "introversion" which was 
elaborated further in his "Psychological Types" of 1921 (cf. also Shapiro 
and Alexander 1975; von Franz an:d Hillman 1971). However, in order that 
the libido would have this flexibility as well as account for the two 
kinds of thinking and their historical and cultural dimensions, Jung had 
to expand the Freudian concept of libido to denote psychic energy in 
general,with sexual impulse being one aspect of it. This modification, 
though, is still formulated in an awkward manner: Fantastic thinking 
still "concerns wishes" both on the individual and collective-cultural 
level. This, essentially Freudian formulation,although appearing per-
fect1y logical on the individual level, on the collective level not 
only has a feeling of artificiality about it, but it ,also lacks 
explanatory clarity. Jung claimed in the Wartdlungen ·that "phantastic 
thinking tells us of mythical or other material of undeveloped and n9 
longer recognized wish tendencies irt the soul" (P. U., p. 20 emphasis added). 
Without referring here at all to the validity of the actual theory behind 
this formulation, one cannot but note the overstretching of the notion, 
wish to the wish tendencies of the soul. Wish in the Freudian theory is 
unequivocally connected to sexual libido and is a product of repression; 
in short, it is an integral part of the Freudian language/system. Jung's 
new usage of the term extracts it from its structural context, thus 
creating a contextual vacuum. Terms of a specific theoretical structure 
are not like bottles that can easily contain any kind of liquid in them • 
They.are shaped by, as much as they shape their contents. Jung's 
attempts to re-create this context in the Wandltingen are incomplete. 
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The unconscious was still a personal one. Although he introduced many 
ideas implying an actual collective unconscious, the term appeared only 
four years later (Jung 1916b). The transpersonal aspects of the uncon-
scious were suggested but not theoretically elaborated and explained. 
Since the wish was expressing the libido one understands why here Jung 
attempted to expand its meaning, i.e. in order to base the new kind of 
"wish tendencies of the soul" on non-sexual grounds. Specifically, Jung 
proposed a "desexualised" , "spiritualised" libido which was a trans-
formation of the primary sexual libido. This new and "secondary" 
function of the libido did not oppose the primary function but represented 
its superseded form. It was an extension of it and thus its apparent 
opposition was nothing but a transcendent form, both stemming from an 
identical source, the neutral base of psychic energy. The "secondary 
impulses" suggested in the Wandlurtgen can be considered to be the origin 
of G. Allport's theory of the "functional autonomy" of "motives" (1937) 
and modern Ego Psychology (e.g. Hartmann 1939; 1964). 
An important methodological point is that for the first time here Jung 
freely used anthropological, mythological, historical and philological 
material without accepting the hermetically closed 'boundaries' of these 
disciplines. As far as he was concerned, insofar as these disciplines· 
provide material which he understood as expressing in a symbolical form 
the "wish tendencies of the soul" he was perfectly happy that dealing in 
these areas was within his jurisdiction as a psychologist. This attempt 
was to subsequently receive much more attention from him and its method-
ology was justified and theoretical base broadened. It was in this 
context that Jung perceived "typicalu images expressing symbolically 
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"typical" "wish tendencies" of the soul not only of the individual but / 
also of mankind in general. Examples are the "hero" and the "mother" 
whom Jung termed "primordial images". These, as Jung himself noted in 
a letter were the first formulation of "archetypes" (Adler 1976, p.289). 
It was these images that Jung, having theorised about, was to experience 
in the period of the breakdown. The actual term "archetype" was to 
emerge later, in 1919, after Jung had acquired their experiential, as well 
as their full theoretical context. At this stage the notion of archetypes 
remained awkwardly attached to the "primordial images" which themselves 
did not belong to a cohesive theoretical structure. It is worth noting 
that Freud's initial response to some key ideas in the Wandlungen - the 
prototype images, imagos, as well as the notion of "introversion" - was 
positive (1912c, pp.100, 102). Then gradually this changed to his well 
known criticism which is typically exemplified in his praising of 
Ferenczi's attack on the Wandlungen (Freud 1923b, p.269). 
After all, it seems that Freud's comment that Jung said too many things 
in the Wandlungen but not in his "own words" had much truth in it. It 
seems that at least Jung himself felt the validity of his master's 
remark and set himself the task of developing just that in the years to 
follow - a more adequate language to express his novel insights. Jung 
was indeed fully aware of the shortcomings of the Wandlurtgen. Even from 
his correspondence with Freud, the researcher gets a strong feeling that 
he was almost struggling for time: Time to digest the material properly, 
as well as to contain his excitement at the glimpse of the new vistas. 
And Freud kept pressing him, impatiently waiting to read the final draft 
Despite all the difficult circumstances under which it was written, as 
well as its inappropriate theoretical framework, the Wandlungen remains 
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a remarkable work, a milestone indeed which paved the way for Jung's 
later researches. According to the motto Jung used for this book 
" theory, which gives to facts their value and 
significance, is often very useful, even if it is 
partially false, for it throws light on phenomena 
which no one observed ; .• and gives the impulse 
for more extended and more productive researches 
Guglielmo Ferrero 1895 (In Jung 19!2). " 
The "Symbols of Transfonnation of the Libido", with its imperfect 
theoretical structure indeed exposed all areas which Jung subsequently 
had to attend to , thus proving to be the right impulse transforming 
the direction of his problematic. 
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S e p t e m S e r m o n e s a d M o r t u o s 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The full title of this short and obscure piece composed by Jung in 1916 
is "The Seven S ennons to the Dead. Written by Basilides in Alexandria 
the city where East touche th the We st. Translated from the original 
Greek text into German". As discussed earlier, this little book 
represented one of Jung's attempts to develop the "right language" which 
would account for and explain his overwhelming experiences during this 
period of "disorientation". It was printed privately and Jung's name 
did not appear on it. Jung's original comment about this book is in-
eluded in a letter to his old friend and colleague Alphonse Maeder to 
whom he presented it. After expressing his "special joy" at the previous 
evening during which he saw "how close we are in spirit to one another in 
our different ways", he continued: 
"Allow me to give you personally the enclosed 1i ttle present -
a fragment with far-reaching associations. I deserve no 
credit for it, nor does it want or pretend to be anything, it 
just is - simply that. I could not presume to put my name to 
it, b~ chose instead the name of one of those great minds of 
the early Christian era which Christianity obliterated. It 
fell quite unexpectedly into my lap like a ripe fruit at a time 
of great stress and has kindled a light of hope and comfort for 
me in my bad hours. Of course it won't mean anything more to 
you than what I mean by it: a token of my joy over our wordless 
understanding yesterday evening. 
I would ask you to find the little book a discreet resting place 
in your writing desk. I don't want a profane hand to touch 
my memory of those limpid nights .•• "(Adler 1973, pp.33-4). 
All other comments by Jung on the Septem Sermones are included in his 
memoirs, which, of course, were written nearly fifty years later. 
Maeder was one of the few members of the Swiss Psychoanalytic group that 
stayed with Jung after his break with Freud. This book was translated 
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into English by H.G. Baynes and again privately printed in 1925. The 
editors of Jung's Collected Works did not see fit to include it in the 
twenty voltnnes and in ~eneral it has received extremely little attention 
(e.g. Reisig 1972; Hubback 1966; as well as Bateson 1970; 1972; Quispel 
1968; Serrano 1966; Weaver 1977). It seems there is some controversy 
,concerning Jung's ultimate evaluation of this book. Aniela Jaffe, 
his secretary for many years, wrote that "he described it as a sin of 
his youth and regretted it" (in the American edition of "Memories, 
Dreams, Reflections", 1961) and she makes only a passing reference to it 
in her authoritative article on his "Creative phases" (1972). Both 
Marie-Louise van Franz (1975) and Barbara Hannah (1976) consider this 
piece an error and clarify that Jung regretted the publication of the 
book, even in its private edition, but not its contents. Von Franz 
adds that Jung "renounced" the "style of writing" of the Septem Sermones 
(1975, p. 121), which was of a 1lpoetic proclamation or announcement", as 
well as being "too personal" (1975, p.36), and Hannah relates that "after-
word he felt very strongly" that it should have been included "in the 
Red Book like his other fantasies and conversations with inner figures" 
(1976, p.121), which, incidentally, are still inaccessible. One, of 
course, is in no position to know what Jung said privately to these 
friends and collaborators of his. The only references to his own 
comments that exist are connected with his defence against Martin Buber's 
criticism that he was a Gnostic. 
"To support his diagnosis Buber even resorts to a sin of.my 
youth, committed nearly forty years ago, which consists in 
my once having perpetrated a poem. In this poem I expressed 
a number of psychological apercus in 'Gnostic' style, because 
I was then studying the Gnostics with enthusiasm. My enthus-
iasm arose from the discovery that they were apparently the 
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first thinkers to concern themselves (after their fashion) 
with the contents of the collective unconscious. I had the 
poem printed under a pseudonym and gave a few copies to friends, 
little dreaming that it would one day bear witness against me 
as a heretic ••• " (Jung 1952d,pp. 663-4). 
And in a letter a year before his death he again wrote: 
" Buber has been led astray by a poem in Gnostic style t 
made 44 years ago for a friend's birthday celebration ( a 
private print!), a poetic paraphrase of the psychology of 
the unconscious ••• "(Adler 1976, p.571). 
The defensive tone in both passages is easily detectable and can be 
understood in the context of the accusations levelled at him. 
Jung wrote this booklet (a total of thirty~four pages) within three 
"limpid nights" after a very tense period of several days in which a lot 
of strange phenomena took place, e.g. two of his daughters had their 
blankets snatched away during the night, the front door bell rang frant-
ically but there was nobody there. Jung "knew that something had to 
happen", he experienced the "whole house ••• filled as if there were a 
crowd present, crammed full of spirits. They were packed deep right 
up to the door, and the air was so thick it was scarcely possible to 
breathe" and then he felt the urge to sit down to write and "as soon as , 
I took up the pen, the whole ghostly assemblage evaporated" (M.D.R., 
pp.215-6). 
The Septem Sermones actually consists of seven "sermons" which the author 
gave to the "dead" who "came back from Jerusalem, where they found not 
what they sought". They "prayed" to the author to "let them in" and 
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"besought" his "word" (Sep tern Sermones ad Mortuos, * p. 7) which he gave 
in the form of these seven sermons. 
In the first and largest sermon a fundamental distinction is drawn bet-
ween the realms of Pleroma and Creatura. Pleroma is "infinite and 
eternal, hath no qualities, since it hath all qualities" (S.S.M., p.7); 
it could therefore be said that it is an undifferentiated whole. Creatura., 
on the other hand, which is the realm of the created beings, is "confined 
within time and space", it is "changeable", it is "fixed and certain; 
because it hath qualities: it is even quality itself" (S.S.M., p.9); it 
is a quality of pleroma which pervades creatura. Thus, insofar as "we 
are parts of the pleroma, the pleroma is also in us" (S.S.M., p.8). 
Now if these two realms could be conceptualised as concentric circles, 
with creatura being anything within the outer circle and pleroma anything 
beyond the outer circle (see Fig. 2.1) the question arises as to what 
possibilities exist for communication between these two realms. Nat-
urally, since there is no question of pleroma 'doing' anything, it is 
with creatura that these possibilities may exist. Basilides/Jung poses 
this question quite clearly: "Wherefore, then, do we speak of the pleroma 
at all, since it is thus everything and nothing?" (S.S.M., p.9) and later, 
"What use, say ye, to speak of it?" (S.S.M., p.10). The answer is given 
as follows: 
* 
"When we distinguish qualities of the pleroma, we are 
speaking from the ground of our own distinctiveness and 
concerning our own distinctiveness. But we have said 
nothing concerning the pleroma .•• " (S .S .M., p. 10) 
Hereafter referred to as "S.S.M." , Baynes' translation, London 
edition, (1967) 
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This, however, should not discourage us from indulging in any distin-
guishing activities, as being of the creatura our very nature is dis-
tinctiveness (cf. differentiation) and we have to actualise it. At 
this point a grave warning is given: 
"If we do not distinguish, we get beyond our own nature, 
away from creatura. We fall into indistinctiveness, 
which is the other quality of the pleroma. We fall into 
the pleroma itself and cease to be creatures. We are 
given over to dissolution in the nothingness. This is the 
death of the creature ••• " (S.S.M., p. 11). 
Therefore we have to pursue our nature. The "principle" of the "essence 
of the creature" is called Principium Individuationis. This is Jung's 
very first reference to this principle which was to be later expanded and 
termed "the process of individuation" (cf. Jung 1916; 1916b; 1917; 1921). 
This principle, however, is not an easy one to follow as, inasmuch as 
"the pleroma is also in us", a mere pursuit of distinctiveness would not 
actualize our plercmatic nature. In order to deal with this issue the 
author reminds the dead of the pairs of opposites. The pleroma includes 
all opposites in a balanced and perfect manner so that they produce no 
overall effect. But in us, creatures, it is not the same. "We are 
the victims of the pairs of opposites" because they exist in us in an 
unbalanced way which produces distinctiveness. After enumerating a 
number of pairs of opposites which he also calls " qualities" (e.g. Good 
and Evil, Light and Darkness, Difference and Sameness), Jung/Basilides 
makes a finer qualification: 
"The qualities belong to the pleroma, and only in the ~ 
and sign of distinctiveness can and must we possess or 
/ 
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live them. We must distinguish ourselves from qualities. 
In the pleroma they are balanced and void; in us not. 
Being distinguished from them delivereth us ••. " (S. S .M., 
p. 12 emphasis added). 
And later on 
"Ye must not forget that the pleroma hath no qualities. 
We create them. through thinking. If therefore ye strive 
after ••. any qualities ••• ye pursue thoughts which flow 
to you out of the pleroma •.• " (S.S.M., p.13). 
But, if in order to be delivered from qualities we have to cease our 
thoughts what is left for us to do? A new category is introduced -
the being: 
"Not your thinking, but your being, is distinctiveness. 
Therefore not after difference, as ye think it, must ye 
strive; but after YOUR OWN BEING. At bottom ••• there 
is only one striving, namely, ••• after your own being" 
(S.S.M., pp. 13-14 emphasis added). 
This striving is what is needed ~and there is "no need to know anything 
about the pleroma and its qualities" for that. But, of course, the 
question is 'How does one achieve this?' How can one block out his 
thinking, and what does it mean to strive after one's own being? 
Basil.ides here underlines the alienating function of thinking: 
" ••• thought estrangeth from being II (S.S.M., p.14). 
In the Second Sermon, Jung, responding to the cries from the dead,tells 
them about God. He states that insofar as God is "something definite" 
and distinguishable he is also of the creatura, like creatures, but with 
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this difference: He is "more indefinite and indeterminable than they" 
(S.S.M., p.15). Also, because Creatura is characterised by the pairs 
of opposites in their divided form, and therefore results in specific 
effectiveness of opposing qualities, God (who, in this text, is also 
referred to as Helios, or Sun) has its own counterpart, the Devil (see 
Fig. 2. 1). God's nature is "effective fullness", and Devil's "effective 
void" (S.S.M., pp.15-16). Basilides/Jung introduces here another God 
whom "mankind forgot" and who represents that very commonness of both 
Helios and Devil, i.e. effectiveness, and named him Abraxas (see Fig. 2.1). 
Thus Abraxas is the union and totality of the pairs of opposing effective-
ness and in this way is also of the pleroma because he "is the effective-
ness itself, not any particular effect". Thus, "Had the pleroma a being, 
Abraxas would be its manifestation" (S. S .M., p. 17). To this teaching 
the dead "raised a great tumult, for they were Christians" (S.S.M., p. 18). 
In this sermon Jung made a significant methodological statement when he 
wrote (in connection with gods and devils) that 
"We need no proof of their existence. It is enough 
that we must always be speaking of them" (S.S.M., p.16). 
This could be accepted as a reference to psychic reality, an issue he 
elaborated later (cf. Jung 1933; 1954b), and even called it "the most 
important achievement of modern psychology" (Jung 1934, p.354). 
The dead asked for further knowledge about that "supreme god", and the 
Third Sermon is devoted entirely to describing Abraxas. Abraxas is the 
source of "Life, altogether indefinite, the mother of good and evil". 
Abraxas is the ultimate union of all opposites, the supreme union "but ye 
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see it not, because for your eyes the warring opposites of this power are 
extinguished" (S.S.M., p. 19). A series of contradictory qualities which 
exi'st in harmony within Abraxas is given. Abraxas is "the hermaphrodite 
of the earliest beginning", "love and love's murder", "saint and his 
betrayer", •the brightest light of day and the darkness night of madness", 
"the world, its becaning and its passing"; before Abraxas "there is no 
question and no reply ••• " (S.S.M., pp. 20-22). This poetic account 
canriot but remind one of (besides many similar mystical writings e.g. 
de Estella 1575; Philocalia; Reps 1957; Venkatesananda 1970) the famous 
verses of the co-existing contradictory qualities of the Supreme in the 
B'f'ihad-ata"Q.yaka Upanishad (vide supra p. It 3 and cf. P.E. Hume 1931;and 
S. Purohit and W.B. Yeats translations). This teaching, however, upset 
the dead "for they were unperfected". 
The perplexed dead asked for further understanding of "gods and devils" 
and the Fourth Sermon concentrates on two: a Burning one, and a Growing 
one (see Fig. 2.1). These are, in a sense, minor aspects of Abraxas as 
they both include the opposites of Helios and Devil. A further elabora-
tion is introduced when these two "god-devils" are equated with Eros and 
Tree of Life respectively. This gives a combination of four "god-dev.ils"; 
God (Helios), Devil, the burning Eros and the growing Tree of Life. The 
last two are included in the first two. The picture becomes more con-
fused and a stern warning is again given: 
"For me, to whom knowledge hath been given of the 
multiplicity and diversity of the gods, it is well. 
But woe unto you, who replace these incompatible many 
by a single god. For in so doing ye beget the torment 
which is bred from not understanding, and ye mutilate 
the creature whose nature and aim is distinctiveness ••• " 
(S.S.M., p.24). 
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Thus, a real danger exists for the person without the proper "under-
standing", knowledge or "right language" who tries to comprehend this 
cosmic complexity, for he would be tormented. Again the similarity 
between this teaching and the Hindu concept of avidya (cf. e.g. Muller 
1903; Venkatesananda 1976) is strongly suggested. Yet, the old 
problem still remains as to how creatures are to be true to their own 
complete and complex nature of both union and separation 
"But men are weak and cannot endure their manifold nature. 
Therefore they dwell together and need communion, that 
they may bear their separateness ••• " (S.S.M., p.25). 
The dead demand to be taught of "the church and holy communion" and 
Basilides/Jung, in the Fifth Sermon, distinguishes between two manifest-
ations of gods: "spirituality" and "sexuality". "Celestial" gods 
manifest in spirituality and "earthly" ones in sexuality. These are 
represented by Mater Coelestis and Phallos (see Fig. 2.1) respectively 
(S.S.M., p.27). These are11 superhuman daemons which reveal the world of 
gods. They are for us more effective than the gods, because they are 
closely akin to our own nature" and further it is said that 
" ••• spirituality and sexuality are not your qualities, 
not things which ye possess and contain. But they 
possess and contain you ••• they ••• are •.• things 
which reach beyond you, existing in themselves •.. 
(S.S.M., pp. 28-9). 
Continuing with the indispensability of "corrnnun.ion" the preacher-author 
warns against excessive or insufficient corrnnunion. Corrnnunion may be 
either "under the sign of the Mother" or of the Phallos (S.S.M. ,p.29). 
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The opposite of cornmunion, 11singleness" , is the result of distinctiveness, 
and as both do not correspond to the dichotomy of good and evil, but 
each one of them contains both, they are both to be pursued, but only 
in the "right measure". Both are desirable and useful in their own 
right:" ••• communion is depth. Singleness is height", "Communion giveth 
us warmth, singleness giveth us light" (S.S.M., p.30). 
The Sixth Sennon deals with the negative and destructive aspects of 
sexuality and spirituality. Their representational forms which we 
experience are the "serpent" and the "white bird" (see Fig. 2.1) res-
pectively. In Basilides' language these are the daemons of sexuality 
and spirituality. Both have devious ways of tempting us to succumb to 
the daemonic aspects of these qualities. 
In the Seventh and final Sermon a sunnnary of the teachings is given in 
which the relativity and especially the complexity of interwoven 
polarities is given with special emphasis on their application in 
and relation to "man". Man is essentially seen not as the centre, of 
the universe, but only as a gateway through which the multiplicity of 
cosmic structures may walk in and out. Man, as Reisig aptly notes, 
"is a microcosm which mirrors the macrocosm" (1972, p.216). The symbol 
of the "Star" is finally introduced in this sennon and could be 
understood as an early symbol of the Self. In the Star, man and god 
co-exist "man here, god there" (S.S.M., p. 34). Man is not the active 
agent in the universe. On the contrary, he is acted upon. But he is 
active with respect to his own decision to either "turn" or not to 
turn "his eyes" to "the flaming spectacle of Abraxas" (S. S.M., p .34). 
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Man,though,is an integral part of the universe and as long as he acquires 
the right knowledge of it, his position in it can be redeemed when he 
realizes his double nature i.e. both of the creatura and the pleroma; 
both of man and god. If he chooses not to pursue that knowledge he is 
bound to be acted upon by all those forces that permeate him. Finally, 
if he acquires the ~~ong knowledge, not respecting his limitations and 
not acting according to the total perspective of his existence, woe to 
him. 
The Sermons end with an incomprehensible "anagramma'.'. One should be 
reminded that similar attempts by Jung at distorting ordinary language 
were encountered on two previous occasions: In his childhood efforts 
to avoid disunion with himself (by developing a "secret language" of 
his "own invention" which he wrote on some tiny scrolls and kept in the 
box with the manikin) and in his analysis of Ivenes' special magic 
language, which was also anagrarmnatic. Both these "languages" were 
understood as attempts at forging the language of the Other, the "right 
language" of the unconscious. 
in the same manner. 
Thus, this anagram should be interpreted 
Reflecting on the language and style of the Septem Sennones in general, 
Jung's choice of poetry as the medium of expression deserves some con-
sideration, and should be placed against the background of the following: 
On one hand, he was painfully aware of the terminological inconsistencies 
of the Wandlungen and the confusion that they precipitated, and therefore 
he intended to forge his own "right language" which should have been 
\ 
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closer to his own personal experiences and away from the interfering 
influence of theoretical systems. On the other hand, the very fun-
damental 'teaching' in the Septem Sermones demanded the necessity of 
"distinctiveness" and differentiation; in other words, a clear account 
of his experiences in a lucid and differentiated theoretical system. 
This 'teaching' was not an abstract schema, but a lived realization that 
Jung arrived at during his own "epistemological crisis"; an existential 
necessity, one might say. Jung solved this problem by opting for 
poetry. This freed him from the obligation of developing an entire 
cheoretical structure with internal consistency and external validity, 
and granted him permission to stay closer to the experiential level of 
his inner world. With regard to the necessity for "distinctiveness", 
the language of poetry still allows for that. Poetical epistemology, 
in contrast to scientific epistemology, allows for a more subjective 
account of experiences without compromising the comprehensiveness of 
its system (cf. Harding 1963; Langer 1942). 
Another advantage of the poetical language is that it is not proposi-
tional, but symbolic. The Septem Sermones abounds with symbols. 
Jung's preference for symbolic language is thus understandable. 
According to Fawcett 
"Symbols do not denote things which are already understood, 
but attempt to push forward the frontiers of knowledge 
and to grasp the reality of things, the real nature of 
life, the stuff of existence itself •.• Symbolical language 
operates for this task by taking images derived from the 
world of sense experience and using them to speak of that 
which transcends them •.. " (I 970, p .30). 
It is therefore not surprising that after the discontentment from the 
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Wandlungen, Jung turned to a completely different medium of expression 
which offered all the opportunities of grasping the "real nature of life", 
of getting to grips with something more substantial and basic than that 
which a theoretical language may afford. From this perspective, Jung's 
Septem Sermones represents both a pause and a detour. A pause from 
the previous theoretical endeavours which exposed the epistemological 
and terminological gaps, and a detour from this direction in order to 
establish a new language system. Also, insofar as this poem was written 
in the archaic style and "high-flown language" which Jung observed to 
"correspond to the style of the archetypes" (M.D.R.,p.202), it could be 
said that this was the only work of Jung's that was written 'entirely' 
by his unconscious, in the language of the Other. Poetry enabled Jung 
to express himself without having to justify either himself or the poem. 
The Septem Sermones enabled Jung to utter and formulate something from 
vnthin, something invisible and inaccessible. This process, essentially 
one of externalization, made the contents of the unconscious available 
to Jung for examination and reflection. As the noted Yugoslav poet, 
Vasko Popa, remarked, it is not possible to either answer the question 
of how the poem is born, or to justify its existence: 
"They ask you how you made the poem. Why don't they ask 
the stone how it made the little stone or the bird how 
she hatched her fledglings?" (Popa 1969, p.133) 
It is in this same light that Jung's adoption of a pseudonym should be 
understood. By attributing this poem to Basilides, Jung, in a sense, 
disclaimed the authorship of its contents by distancing himself in order 
to afford a clearer and more objective study of the workings of his 
psyche. 
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At this point it would be instructive to briefly look at the case of 
S~ren Kierkegaard, who systematically wrote pseudonymously. Most of 
his commentators and biographers did not fail to discuss this unusual 
phenomenon (e.g. Diem 1950; Lowrie 1944; Thomas 1957; Thompson 1974;· 
Wahl 1949). It seems that there is a consensus of opinion among these auth-
ors in accepting the various pseudonyms as punctuations of the develop-
mental stages in Kierkegaard's life and thought. Moreover, Lowrie 
advanced some interpretations which might be relevant to the understanding 
of Jung. He wrote that: 
"/Jrf,ren Kierkegaard'.il pseudonyms were for the most part 
personifications of aspects, or at least poss~bilities, 
which he discovered in his own nature ••• " (Lowrie 1944, 
p.154 emphasis added). 
According to Lowrie, the pseudonyms represented a form of "indirect 
communication"which Kierkegaard dropped after his "metamorphosis" in 
1848, later never to use any pseudonyms again. Nevertheless, the same 
author considers the pseudonyms as ensuring "an apt form for meiotic 
instruction, the Socratic form" in that Kierkegaard's "essentially 
dialectical thought ••• had to be expressed in the form of dialogue, 
as was the teaching pf Socrates" (pp. 155-6). The dialogue is not only 
between the author, Kierkegaard himself, and the assumed personage of 
the pseudonym, but also within the works themselves. It should be re-
marked here that Jung's Septem Sermones is also constituted as a ·dialogue 
between Basilides and the spirits of the dead. Finally, Lowrie argued 
the possible interpretation that the use of a pseudonym was for Kierke-
gaard an expression of honesty as 
II 
' 
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he was fearful of admitting to himself a result he 
had not really acquired or had not personally appropriated 
by 'double reflection' ••• " (p. 199) • 
This would make sense in Jung's case too, where the ideas expressed in 
the Septem Sermones had indeed not undergone the scrutiny of his "double 
reflection" and were thus not yet digested and appropriated by him. 
In the years to follow, as will be seen later, he reflected upon these 
ideas in earnest. 
Thus, placed next to the Wandlungen, the Septem Sermones represents 
Jung's attempt to delve more deeply into his own psyche and to deal with 
his own experiential problematic in a more direct manner: it represents 
Jung's unavoidable attempt to impose sense upon the storm of his experi-
ences. It should be remembered that Hannah (1976) considered Miss 
Miller's fantasies a convenient catalyst for Jung because working on his 
own fantasies would have been very disturbing for him. Four years 
later this was more possible, but still, the pseudonym provided a con-
venient and safe distance. 
Jung's emphasis on understanding should be noted. Since both the uni-
verse and man are composed of such multiplicity and diversity, the mpst 
important task that faces man is to develop the "right language", i.e. 
a proper understanding which would be discriminating in the realm in 
which discrimination is possible,and thus fit within the entire per-
spective of existence. This understanding should not be confused with 
intellectual thinking which, as has been indicated, "estrangeth from 
being". In this it should not be difficult to appreciate Jung's all-
out effort to ground his theoretical language/system in an experiential 
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kind of understanding. At about the same time that he wrote the 
Wandlungen, Jung also wrote another paper, "New Paths in Psychology" 
in which he dramatically declared that 
II Anyone who wants to know the human psyche .•. would 
be better advised to put away his scholar's gown, bid fare-
well to his study, and wander with the human heart through 
the world. There, in the horrors of prison .•. in brothels 
and gambling-halls, in the salons of the elegant, ••• 
through love and hate, through the experience of passion in 
every form in his own body, he would reap richer stores of 
knowledge than text-books a foot thick could give him ... 
Between what science calls psychology and what the practical 
needs of daily life demand from psychology there is a great 
gulf fixed" (1912b, pp. 246-7). 
These strong words reflect Jung's determination that at least he himself 
was no longer prepared to cover under a "scholar's gown" real existential 
questions which were affecting "the practical needs" of his "daily life". 
The Principium Individuationis which Jung introduced here calls for a 
differentiation of one's own nature within the broad undifferentiated 
pleroma. This process however is not without its hazards: they stem 
partly from an indiscriminate use of thought, intellectual functions 
and theoretical constructions. It is easy to develop theories, i.e. to 
amass collections of concepts fitted together, with the intention of 
solving all kinds of problems. But since thoughts belong to the pleroma, 
they, like the Homeric "winged words", are elusive and deceptive. 
Thus they should be grounded in the being. Loose theories without their 
experiential substratum are not only empty, but may also be dangerous 
because they can plunge the person into the chaos of indistinctiveness. 
Jung does not expand much on this issue in the Septem Sermones. What 
he does deal with, though, here, is the essential distinction within 
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which the thinking versus being is but one manifestation viz. the realms 
of plercma and creatura. According to their characterizations, pleroma 
and creatura would correspond to the realms of the Self and Ego respec-
tively. The creatura/ego is "effectiveness", action, differentiation, 
whereas the pleroma/self is a broader realm containing the first as well 
as its.opposite (non-effectiveness) in a complete whole, in a state of 
total equilibrium. Now, since Abraxas represents the pleroma, it could 
be claimed that he may be accepted as an archetype of the Self. The 
distinction between the pleroma and the creatura might further be related 
to the two types of thinking of the Wandlungen. The effectiveness of 
the creatura would correspond to the directed thinking, and the indis-
tinctiveness of the pleroma to the spontaneity and effortlessness of the 
non directed or fantasy thinking. Now, since the two types of thinking 
were in their turn found to suggest the primary problematical dichotomy 
between the No. 1 and No. 2 personalities, the Septem Sermones could 
be located in the same line of developments and reformulations of the 
original problematic of the Other. It could thus be remarked that 
although the two kinds of thinking were functional principles, in the 
realms of the pleroma and creatura, Jung offered perhaps the first 
ontological formulation of his problematic. 
Abraxas is a 'forgotten' god, inclusive of, as well as above1 all 
opposites. Abraxas represents the ultimate unity and wholeness. This 
could further be likened to the "genetic" theory of libido in the Wand-
lungen according to which libido represents the overall psychic eriergy 
out of which all opposites flow. Abraxas is the source of "Life, 
altogether indefinite" which like libido is the energy behind all 
effectiveness. But talking about the unity of opposites results in 
-I 
• 
I 
• 
• 
-
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paradoxical talk. Such attempts to conceptualize the union of opposites 
should be considered as neither nonsensical nor obscure and 'mystical' 
formulations, but rather as dialectical formulations. The latter are 
characterized by statements referring to two antithetical notions at 
the same time from a synthetic position which is higher than the 
opposing two notions. 
The division between Eros and the Tree of Life can be accepted as an 
additional reference to the issue of sexuality and spirituality which 
had emerged in the Wandlungen. Jung's later treatment of them reflected 
the impartial validity he attributed to both of them, which represents a 
continuation of Basilides' treatment of them, viz. actualizing them in 
the "right measure". 
A final qualification about the Septem Sermones is indicated. Basilides/ 
Jung's teachings in these sermons have striking similarities with 
identifiable Gnostic views (Quispel 1948 ; cf. Grant 1961; 1966) as 
well as with the beliefs expounded in the Dead Sea Scrolls (van der 
Post 1975, p. 201; cf. Vermes 1968; Verettas 1978). Any excursion, 
however, in comparative attempts between these sources on the one hand 
and the Seven Sermons on the other would serve no purpose in this study • 
If the argument in favour of such an exercise would be to expose Jung 
as having borrowed the ideas expressed in this book from the above 
mentioned sources, or for that matter from others, it is of no conse-
quence to the present analysis. The fact remains that Jung chose these 
ideas, whether they w.ere his own invention or not, and not others. As 
such therefore they must have ~een intrinsically connected to his own 
theoretical and personal development. In other words the claim for 
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originality is unrelated to the present investigation. 
I 
Similarly, the 
validity of the teachings as such in the Septem Sermones is equally 
irrelevant here. However, such a comparison would have its place in 
a discussion where the validity of the collective unconscious was at 
question. There it would indeed be of great importance if proved that 
Jung arrived at the same ideas expressed in these sources, but 
independently. This, though, is not the object of this section. 
The approach followed in the present study is to search for the meaning 
of this work within the developmental context of Jung's life and work. 
In this framework the Septem Sermones may be accepted as the first 
tangible expression of the autonomy of the archetype. 
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TRANSITION 
"It is impossible to grasp the import of Jung's contributions 
as long as one thinks of him as merely a split-off from 
psychoanalysis. He represents an altogether separate and 
independent line of thought based upon fundamentally different 
postulates" (Progoff 1953, p.18). 
In this chapter-trilogy Jung's most critical period was examined. The 
intended play on words with the titles of its sub-chapters, Break, 
Breakdown, and Br~akthrough, reveals immediately the positive light in 
which this period is viewed. The meaning of 'critical' should also 
be interpreted in the same spirit, and, since it is said that in Chinese 
the words crisis and opportunity are synonymous, the word 'critical' 
should thus refer to the particularly opportune chance that Jung had 
during this period to substantially develop further his exploration into 
the problematic of the Other. 
This period proved to be a turning point in Jung's development. No 
authors seem to disagree about this, although some look at this positively 
and others negatively. It is characteristic that Friedman and Goldstein, 
after praising Jung's work before the break express a genuine regret at 
his branching out into his own. direction as they feel that should he have 
"remained close" to his "original clinical interests" he would have elab-
orated and enriched his early concepts" (1964, p.220). In other words 
they fail to see the value of the Breakthrough and prefer his earlier 
paradigm. 
Jung had claimed that "beyond Freud" he "knew nothing". It is now 
possible to appreciate the partial truth.that this statement conveys. 
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Having accepted/borrowed the psychoanalytic terminology to formulate his 
own problematic Jung knew of no better one to replace it after having 
experienced its limitations. But, on the other hand, the same state-
ment is also partially false as Jung had never identified completely with 
the Freudian theories, but had always stayed faithful to his own problem-
atic; this suggests that he had a fairly clear direction although, 
again, not a theoretical language/system, a "right language" within 
which to express it. 
Thus, the break may be understood not only as Jung's break from Freud 
(with regard to their personal and professional association), but also 
as Jung's break away from a particular terminological system. It should 
not refer to Jung's break from psychoanalysis as he had never identified 
his problematic with the Freudian theories and therefore he could not 
have been considered "as merely a split-off from psychoanalysis". 
Reflecting again on the de-emphasis in this study of the theoretical 
differences between the two men during this period, the following may be 
said. The essential point is to understand that they were pursuing 
different problematics. This investigation has a task of analysing 
Jung's problematic and therefore it cannot afford a deviation of such 
magnitude: i.e. to fonnulate and follow Freud's own problematic as well. 
As delineated above, theoretical differences existed all the time and the 
question that a researcher has to answer is why at this point in time did 
the break have to occur. In attempting to answer this crucial question 
any reference to their theoretical differences only begs the question. 
New pathways in approaching this issue were cleared. Based on the 
cen.tral theme of this study these pathways revealed a combination of 
' 
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critical moments in: 
(a) Jung's development of his problematic -
In a sense, Jung's latest system, the Other-as-Symbol, had nearly all 
the ingredients of a perfected understanding of the Other, with the 
exception of one factor: the personal, experiential one. In other 
words, the Other-as-Symbol was almost a complete return to the original 
; 
problematic, but not exactly. It was the ultimate formulation of 
structuring principles within a human context, but not explicitly within 
the human personality. The original division between No. 1 and No. 2 
was not dealt with directly. Having arrived at its logical conclusion 
it made the lack of any account of this original dichotomy evident. It 
was as if a linear dimension had been extended to its full limit and 
a new vertical turn was imminent: i.e. a dialectical synthesis of the 
original thesis (of an experiential, existential problem) and the de-
, 
veloped antithesis (of a highly sophisticated theoretical elaboration) 
resulting in a new formulation, grounded in Jung's existential reality 
of the time. 
(b) their friendship and association -
Both men were in a particularly vulnerable position due to the over-
estimated sets of expectations they had of each other, which at this very 
moment was aggravated by the all promising glare of their common ex-
pedition into the fields of archeology, history and mythology. It has 
been argued here that not only did they underplay their existing differ-
ences, but each one secretly believed that this common expedition would 
at any moment vindicate his own views, thus forcing the other to follow 
him. The subsequent events however proved that their common expedition 
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unexpectedly provided two separate and independent vindications! 
Thus, the understanding of the break suggested here is based on a dis-
tinction between a primary conflict in Jung himself (with regard to his 
problematic), and a secondary one between the two men (in which personal/ 
psychological/theoretical/political aspects of their association and 
friendship are accounted for). 
The breakdown, again in the same perspective, is understood not in 
psychopathological terms (however valid such an approach might be, since 
it does not fall within the scope of this study, not being a clinical 
'case study') but predominantly in epistemological terms. Jung's break-
down refers to the collapse of his epistemological system.which he 
experienced with the influx of new theoretical possibilities and the 
resultant painful alienation of his language/system from his existential 
reality. The "Confrontation with the Unconscious" which Jung was then 
forced to undergo was compared to similar experiences he had had in his 
childhood, as well as in his theoretical analysis of S.W.'s experiences 
in his dissertation. This exercise suggested that what happened during 
this period could be considered, in a sense, to be a recapitulation of 
the previous formulations of the Other, but with the notable innovation: 
the image-figures (Others) from the unconscious were not only personified~ 
but also entered into a dialectical interrelationship with consciousness. 
Moreover, as far as the formulation of the Other is concerned, the al-
ready observed progression from global, undifferentiated and animistic 
Others, through all the described stages of finer differentiation to 
general structuring principles (the Other-as-Symbol) now took the shape 
of an internalized structuring principle with external and internal, 
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concrete and abstract, as well as personal and collective, conscious 
and unconscious aspects. 
' 
The first stage of this new development was 
only to be completed with the introduction of Abraxas as the first pre-
cursor of the archetype of the Self. 
Thus, Jung's reference to this period as the "prima materia" for his 
later life's work is understandable. This chapter-trilogy examined 
this whole period as a unit and the sub-chapters were not dealing with· 
separate historical periods but rather with separate aspects of the 
same period. In this sense, the Breakthrough is contained in both the 
Break and the Breakdown. No clear delineation between the three aspects 
is absolutely possible. During this period all three processes inter-
changed in an extricable manner and gradually the crude shape of a new 
language/system started emerging. 
One of the characteristics of this innovation was Jung's tendency to 
expand (for others, to abandon) the Freudian system. According to the 
present investigation this is seen as a continuation of his own problem-
a tic. Jung's continuing searches into the realm of the Other gradually 
led him into landscapes where Freud's psychoanalysis proved to be of 
little assistance. _Jung had to therefore abandon the Freudian cart, 
which he had so enthusiastically helped to build (hoping that it would 
lead him/them to the inner territories of the Other) and alone piece to-
gether his own raft to sail along the route of his inescapable expedition. 
A final point can now be made. It concerns a vital distinction in 
Jung's problematic which has clearly been alluded to ear1ier. At last, 
a separation between Jung's own experiential, existential relationship 
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with his own Other/s and his theoretical understanding and fonnulation 
of it/them was made. This does not suggest that these two facets are 
unrelated and capable of separate existences, but rather focuses on the 
discrepancy between them at this particular time. Jung's childhood 
experiences as well as his conceptualization of them were the first full 
reference to his own existential problematic. It was again brought up 
in his dilennna of choosing a career. The subsequent reformulations of 
the same problematic dealt with other people's experiences (e.g. S.W.), 
and even more, were by and large a product of intellectual and theoretical 
reasoning. This activity enabled Jung to develop to an enviable degree 
his theoretical and critical faculties (cf. "directed thinking", No. I 
personality) and establish himself well in the realm of "effectiveness" 
(cf. "Creatura", Ego). This essentially antithetical course of direction, 
from Nature to Ego (see diagram below, Fig. 1.13), must have reached its 
own limits by alienating the highly differentiated Ego from its own un-
differentiated Nature. 
Self 
Nature 
TIU!., cli..a.gJz.am Wal.> devel.ope~ by Papadopoulos and Saayman oveJL the 
pe!Uod 06 the.J.Ji common a.1.>-0oc.i..a:tion a.nd tea.c.fUng. It Wal.> 6illt 
nepoJt:ted by Papadopoulos (1974). 
Fig. 1.13. 
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Jung's own experience was left out of all his subsequent formulations 
of the Other. It is therefore not unexpected to witness now his return 
to his neglected existential reality. The experiences during the 
breakdown precisely represent this inevitable return. Leaving aside 
all his theories about the Other, Jung was now forced to confront the 
very Other in himself. Philemon could thus be understood as the neg-
lected No. 2 personality of his childhood. In confronting these ex-
periences Jung had no means of comprehending them, as his existing 
theoretical language had outpaced his existential position. This is 
the critical moment. Jung had to "forge singlehandedly the tools to 
fend off the soul-devouring demons", the overwhelming multiplicity of 
the Others and the confusion created by them. This is the unavoidable 
task of every person in a similar situation. Some persons survive it 
and some others roll down into the fascinating and terrifying world of 
insanity. 
Jung painfully realised that his experiences were incomprehensible to 
himself, to his Ego which was moreover endangered by them. But what 
was the archemedian point he could find to stand on 'outside' himself, 
apart from his Ego in order to decode the experiences? On what should 
he rely apart from that which he considered to be the centre of his. 
personality, his Ego? If no external system was at all helpful he had 
to forge his own 'private language' with all its possible ominous con-
sequences. This route was dictated by his own previous similar child-
hood experiences. He then spoke to his stone, manikin, and wrote a new, 
obscure, magical language of his own. In following the same direction 
now, he again personified the unconscious impulses and in entering into 
a conversation with them ("there is a tremendous difference between 
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intending to tell something and actually telling it" M.D.R., p. 211), 
he gradually realised that he had indeed developed some kind of language/ 
system of his own. It was in this interrelationship of the Others and 
'himself' that he first started becoming aware that, after all, his 
'private language' was not so private as it had striking resemblances 
to other existing languages: those of mythology, religion, etc. That 
was the critical and redemptive moment. After that he proceeded to 
examine his experiences in the light of those languages as well as those 
languages in the light of his experiences, and he must have humbly 
realised that it made sense both ways. This dialectical process 
gradually led him to actually experience that which he had already 
/ 
theoretically conceived in the Wandlungen, i.e. that mythology and other 
bodies of symbolical expressions, by virtue of their development ( as 
collections of expression of individual psychological states, conflicts 
and aspirations) can actually assist a person in such difficulties by 
offering this archemedian point outside their own affected (and inflicted) 
Ego, in providing the much needed objectification of those personal 
experiences, within an established transpersonal structure with common 
validity and understanding. The opposite to this is the private lang-
uage of insanity, where, in fact, no discrimination is at all possible 
private language is like meaningless gestures in the undifferentiated 
chaos of pleroma, and thus no communication is possible. 
In other words, having sufficiently developed his theoretical, "directed 
thinking" Jung was now forced to develop his "non directed fantasy 
thinking", the language not of the Ego, but of the ultimate Other, the 
Self (see again Fig. 1.12), with all its accompanied innovations which 
have already been mentioned. 
I 
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Like the Homeric Odysseus, Jung, having sailed along on his own raft, 
wandered for years in the high seas of "disorientation" and among the 
luring landscapes of inner visions, before arriving at terra firma, his 
Ithaka of appropriate language/system. His transition saw him moving 
from the hybris of intel1ectual Ego consciousness to the fall into 
the darkness of the unconscious, to the final cathartic path of humility 
and congruency between language and experience. But, as with the 
Homeric hero, the task was not completed by arriving (incognito) at the 
shores of Ithaka. He still had to conquer the inner palace, establish 
himself as the king and receive the crown. No tumultuous welcomes 
with fanfares and adulation yet The final battle to crown all the 
previous efforts had just begun! •••• 
PART TWO 
Chapter Five 
C.G. Jung: The years of Individuation. 
"The capacity for inner dialogue is 
a touchstone for outer objectivity" 
C.G. Jung (1916/1958, p.89). 
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I 
Prolegomena 
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The title of this chapter refers to Jung's preoccupation with the process 
o'f individuation in both its theoretical formulation as well as its 
lived experience. This chapter will deal with Jung's final stage of 
development which starts approximately with the year 1916 and stretches 
until his death, in 196 l. Although chronologically this period is by 
far the longMt dealt with in this study, the decision to treat it here 
as one chapter is based upon the understanding that it contains a 
fairly unified formulation bf the Other. This by no means suggests 
a definite and mon.t>Hthic system which Jung had li3unched at the 
beginning of' this period and kept unaltered until his death. His 
ultimat~ fornulatfon; in the structure of the ()th~r:as"'.'J\~chetXEe !> 
et:instantly undetwent mitior modifi,c11t:i.ons and refinements, especially 
in his att:ern.pts to re late it in~reas ingly to p sychologital and 
psychopathoiogica1 iMues in addition to various aspects of other 
spheres of human culture. 
Jung, in this peri.od, had arrived at his o\tttl lthaka after a long series 
tif refotmulations of his prt>blemat:i.c, and his ;1wayu was indeed "full 
of athrenture; rull of instruction'; (vide supra, p.119). As will be 
sh9.vrt hereafter~ it was also t:rut:l that ueverything essential" was 
found by h:ltn in th!::! irtirtiediately preteeding years. However, it was 
only in the fe>rm or "prima materia11 (vide supra, p.272), and still 
requ:lted tnuch careful .craftman.ship in forging and embellishing it into 
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In this chapter, the new reading of the Jungian opus will take the 
following fonn: Firstly, four early papers which Jung wrote in the 
years 1913, and 1914 will be discussed in order to provide the necessary 
background in addition to the previous presentation of the two major 
works in the chapter on the Breakthrough. The reason for not including 
the four papers in the previous chapter (where they belong, according 
to a strict chronological sequence) was not to detract from the impact 
of the two milestones (the Wandlungen, and the Septem Sermones). 
Indeed they do not include major innovations; however, they weave the 
insights offered by the two central works into the fabric of the 
Jungian thought, and it is here that their value li~s: they consolidate 
the findings of the Breakthrough period. 
These ·four papers serve as an appropriate preamble and background to 
the new eme·rging fonnulation. These are followed by a reading of a 
number of other works which gradually introduce the new pivotal terms 
0f Jung's ultimate formuJation of the Other; viz. collective unconscious, 
persona, anima/animus, transcendent function, acitve imagination, 
individuation, shadow,archetype, Self, etc. Thus, the "right language", 
that Jung was searching for for a long time, is here followed in its 
construction. The last work to be examined in this section is the 
"Psychological Types"which introduces for the first time the term "Self". 
This is the last of the main terms of the Jungian discourse on the 
Other. After this, the chronological sequence of reading is abandoned 
and the Jungian work is examined as a whole. 
Having completed the developmental introduction of the crucial terms, 
and their implications to the entire Jungian thought, the relevance 
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that alchemy had for Jung is briefly explored. In this, a compendious 
account of the meaning of mysticism in connection with the Jungian 
approach is attempted. 
The last section of this chapter exanines the formulation of the 
Other-as-Archetype in relative detail. It commences by developing 
a series of diagrams to graphically represent the crucial elements and 
processes of this fonnulation. It is argued that they constitute a 
contribution of reasonable merit in the understanding of Jungian 
psychology with particular reference to the problematic of the Other. 
In elaborating on Jung's final formulation, e~errsive use of quotations 
from his works is made in order to demonstrate that this re-reading 
indeed reveals Jung's own problematic. 
The transition at the end of this chapter examines the totality of the 
Jungian discourse from the perspective of his ultimate formulation of 
the problematic of the Other with particular reference to the dialec-
tical triad, Nature/Ego/Self. 
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Four early papers (1913-14): 
Be~ore writing the Septem Sermones Jung wrote three papers which 
reflect some significant aspects of his approach to psychopathological 
and psychotherapeutic issues. In the "Content of the Psychoses" (1914b) -~ 
he connnences with a serious questioning of the "scientific method" 
of ·Psychiatry. Since the great majority of psychiatric patients have 
\ 
an "unimpaired" brain 
"Psychiatry, the art of healing the soul, still stands at 
the door, seeking in vain to weigh and measure as in the 
· other departments of science" (p. 158 emphasis added). 
In so far as Psychiatry is a "healing art" trying to find the "meaning" 
of the "so-called" psychopathological "absurdities" (p. 165) its 
future "can only be by way of psychology" (p. 162). He even goes so 
far as to argue that a poet's account of psychosis reveals that he 
"knows better than a psychiatrist" as the "world of the artist is a 
world of solved problems; the world of reality, that of unsolved 
problems" (p. 170). This is based on Jung's understanding that the 
unconscious (the eruptions of which into the realm of consciousness 
are creating the condition called insanity) represents the "founda-
tions of our own being, the matrix of those vital problems on 
which we are all engaged" (p. 178). He regrets that people usually 
overlook the "richness" of the "inner life", of the unconscious and 
see psychotic patients as "burnt-out ruins o~ humanity" (p. 172). 
Once examined carefully the meaning of the "baroque jumble of words" 
,, 
of such patients demonstrate that they 
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"are fragments of an enigmatic inscription, bits and 
pieces of fairy-tale fantasies, which have broken 
away from hard reality to build a far-off world 
of their own" (p. 177). 
These fantasies, according to Jung, appear as an attempt at "wish-
fulfillment" (p. 176). 
These ideas are further elaborated in a succinct form in a lecture 
he gave the same year in Aberdeen entitled 0 on the importance of 
the unconscious in psychopathology" (1914c). There, after defining 
the unconscious as "the sum of all those psychic events which are 
not apperceived", he clearly declared the "unconscious as the 
foundation upon which consciousness is built0 (p. 203). He further 
argued that "mental balance'; is no mere f:i.gure of speech (p. 207) 
but a state of being based on the "compensating" function of the 
unconscious. This function ("all extreme conscious tendencies are 
softened and toned down through a counter-impulse in the uncon-
scious", pp. 205-6) is present equally in "normal people" as well 
as "insane patients". It moreover represents a natural "healing 
process" insofar as it actually identifies the conscious aspects 
that need "correction", and also provides the means for such 
"relief". Jung claimed that "these corrective impulses or compen-
sations which •••• break through into the conscious mind" 
will inadvertently turn "to the detriment of the individual" (p. 208) 
if they are resisted. The effect of that will then be an increasing 
"distortion" of the corrective impulses thus creating 
\_ 
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" ••• a condition of excitation, which produces a great lack 
of hannony between the conscious and unconscious 
tendencies. The pairs of opposites are torn asunder, 
the resultant division leads to disaster, for the 
unconscious soon begins to obtrude itself violently 
upon conscious processes. Then come odd and incom-
prehensible thoughts and moods, and often incipient 
forms of hallucination, which plainly bear the 
stamp of the internal conflict •.• " (1914c, p. 208). 
The revolutionary implication is that if there was a way to allow 
the compensation of the healing process to take its course, no 
pathology would be effected, as for example "primitives may have 
visions and hear strange voices without their mental processes 
being at all disturbed" (p. 206). It therefore appears unfortunate 
that modern man, unlike his primitive cousin, cannot distinguish and 
tolerate the presence of the unconscious material emerging from 
within himself. Jung understood that predicament well. He observed how 
these "compensating influences" do appear indeed in a "strange manner" 
because (a) they get "distorted" in their "struggle against the re-
sistances already there" and (b) being unconscious they inevitably 
I 
appear in their own language, viz. the inaccessible "language of the 
unconscious" (p. 209). Thus the tragedy is that the "corrective" 
(i.e. healing) ·"compensations" from the unconscious, due to their 
inevitably di~guised form, are perceived by consciousness as threatening 
and are thus barred from it, so that their beneficial effect is 
reversed. 
Before discussing the third paper, it would be useful to reflect on a 
number of salient points raised in the preceding papers: The dichotomy 
between "science" and "art" should remind one of Jung's own conflict 
between his No. 1 and No. 2 personalities when deciding to specialize 
•>':1.: •. 1 
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in psychiatry. He then thought that psychiatry would combine both 
tendencies in himself. It how appears that his expectations did not 
produce the anticipated hannony. Jung's discussion of this dichotomy 
further indicates that he was not unprepared for the experiences of 
the Breakdown. His unequivocal appreciation of both the unconscious 
material itself as well as its poetic language must have provided him 
with sufficient insights to "fend off the soul-devouring demons" that 
were to appear later. Moreover, the actual poetical language of the 
Septem Sermones is in accordance with the theoretical positions which 
he advanced in these papers. Finally, his preoccupation with the essen-
tial division between the conscious and unconscious "sides of the soul" 
as well as their complementarity, betray once again his original 
problematic. The solution implied here is that a dialectic union 
of the "pairs of opposites" (which again strongly resembles the themes 
in the Septem Sennones). 
In his paper "On psychological understanding" (1914d), which was also 
read in the United Kingdom in July 1914 (in London), Jung attempted 
to systematize his thoughts on a more theoretical and methodological 
level. He then contrasted for the first time his own "constructive 
method" with Freud's "reductive method". He connnented that the two 
methods dealt with two distinct kinds of understanding: Freud~s 
method yielded "retrospective understanding", which was "objective" 
and "causal", whereas his own method enabled the clinician to reach 
"prospective understartding", which was "subjective" and not causal. 
This division reminds one of the "two kinds of thinking" in the 
Wandlungen, and the prospective aspect of this method, of his earlier 
discussion of what was here termed Anticipated Whole Other. As in 
-• 
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his previous writings Jung showed here again an appreciation of the 
complementarity of these two methods. ''To understand the psyche causally 
is to understand only one half of it. .. " But causal understanding "does 
not show us its living meaning. That meaning only lives when we 
experience it in and through ourselves" (p. 183). The last quotation 
reveals that Jung must have been aware of what we was going through 
during the Breakdown as well as being aware of its potentially positive 
effects. Moreover, Jung's acute awareness of epistemological issues 
an~ their role played in insanity is lucidly illustrated by a discussion 
which is included in the same paper. He claimed that although not 
"objective", the constructive understanding, in contrast'to the 
causal understanding, "also analyses, but it does not reduce. It breaks 
the system down into typical components" (1914d, p. 187). "Typical" is 
clarified to refer to corrnnonness and "unmistakeable analogies with 
other systems" as "even the most individual systems are not absolutely 
unique" (p. 187) . Therefore, in trying to understand a person, an 
"individual system", the clinician should compare him to some others 
from his uwn "eJ{perience and knowledge" (p. 187) with similar, "typical 
components", in order to 
" ... widen the basis on which the construction is to rest. 
At the same time [this] serves the purpose of objective 
communication. Without these parallels we would proceed 
entirely subjectively; we would go on constructing in the 
language and mental range of the patient, building up 
a structure which would be intelligible to him and to 
the investigator but not to the wider scientific public, 
who could not be expected to feel their way into the 
peculiarities of his thought and language'' (pp. 187-188 
emphasis added). 
Jung's understanding of insanity'in epistemological terms is further 
,,, 
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demonstrated when he argued that insane patients fall victims to their 
legitimate "desire to create a new world-system .•.. a Weltati.sG:hauung" 
which would 
" ... enable them to assimilate unknown psychic phenomena and so 
adapt themselves to their own world" (1914d, p.189). 
At first this is a "necessary transition" in that an inward focus is 
needed (and only later a new "world-system") to account for the eruptions 
from the unconscious (which, as was shown in the previous paper, 
have a "healing" and "compensatory" role). But the real danger that exists 
·is that the patient would "remain stuck in this stage" and substitute 
his "subjective formulation for the real world" .. Any such attempt to 
understand himself within this confined language system would worsen his 
situation as long as his understanding of his world remains merely 
subjective "and this precludes intelligible communication" (p. 189). 
In other words, the individual's task is to allow the corrective, 
compensatory function of the unconscious to take its own course, It may 
be argued that to be in a position to permit this to occur, the person 
should be able to account adequately for the new manifestations of the 
unconscious which would appear unexpectedly. This would be necessary 
in order not to''misunderstand' the eruptions and be frightened by 
them. This means that he will have to "assimilate" them in a system 
of language and thought, a Weltanschauung, which would also make their 
connnunication possible to other people. As noted earlier, a particularly 
}1elpful phenomenon in this process is the existence of "typical 
• I 
I 
1' 
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components" among the various individual "systems". This commonness 
facilitates communication of the highly personal, inner and intimate 
experiences with others. The editors of Jung's Collected Works did not 
fail to note, very correctly, that these references "appear to be an 
early, very tentative fonnulation of the archetype theory, as well as 
of the method of amplification" (p. 187). 
In addition to these "typical components" Jung mentioned yet further 
"typical" categories of the human psyche which he based on his original 
theory of the libido propounded in the Wandlungen: they are ''extraversion" 
and "introversion" (the crucial tenns which he developed in the 
Psychological Types (1921)), the terms which Jung used in an earlier 
lecture, "A contribution to psychological types" (1913b), to describe 
the outward and inward movement of the libido respectively. Jung read 
that paper at the last Psychoanalytic Congress he attended in 1913 in 
Munich, which was also the last time he met Freud. He then observed 
that these two "movements" existed not only in pathological conditions 
but also in normal persons; they were not only interchangeable "modes of 
psychic reaction", but that two human "types" may be distinguished 
displaying a "predominance of one or other of the tw6 mechanisms" (p. 501) 
in the 11depth of their being" (1913b, p. 505). 
He also compared the two movements of the libido to a number of similar 
theories drawn from psychology (mainly the "tender-minded" and "tough-
minded" division of William James), aesthetics (Worringer's distinction 
between "abstraction" .and "empathy"), literary theory (Schiller's 
dichotomy of the "naive" and "sentimental" types), philosophy (Nietzsche's 
contrast between the "Apollinian" and "Dionysian"), as well as from 
/ 
; 
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linguistics. From the latter Jung used Franz Finck's hypothesis concer-
ning the structure of language, according to which there are two main 
types of linguistic structure: "one is represented ••• by the transitive verbs" 
and the other ''by the intransitive verbs" (1913b, pp.507-8). Jung remarked 
that the first "clearly shows a centrifugal movement of the libido going 
out of the subject "whereas the second "a centripetal movement of the libido 
coming in from the object" (1913b, p.508). Jung then attempted a classifica-
tion of the Freudian and Adlerian psychologies according to this system. He 
argued that the former's "dominant note ••. is a centrifugal tendency, a 
striving for pleasure in the opject", while the latter's "is a centripetal 
striving for the supremacy of the subject", and concluded 
"The difficult task of creating a psychology which will be 
equally fair to both types must be reserved for the future" 
(1913b, p.509). 
This was indeed Jung's task: to develop a theory, an understanding which would 
be fair to both tendencies in his own personality, as he had already declared 
that "neurosis is a self-division" (1912b, p.261). These four papers (1914b, 
1914c, 1914d, 1913b) should provide sufficient background not only to the 
understanding of Jung's subsequent works in the Years of Individuation, but 
also (in retrospect) to his previous writings and experiences which were 
covered in the Breakdown and the Breakthrough. J 
"The structure of the unconscious" 
In the same year that Jung wrote the Septem Sermones he gave a lecture 
'\_ 
in Paris which he later published in the Archives de Psychologie under 
the title "La structure de l'inconscient" (1916b). In its English 
translation it now appears in the seventh volume of his Collected Works. 
This is a significant work as for the first time Jung introduced the 
distinction between the personal and the collective unconscious, the 
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concepts of anima and animus, as well as the principle of individuation 
(in a psychological context). 
Continuing on the themes from the previous articles, Jung clarified 
that the contents of the unconscious do not only consist of the 
repressed "infantile-sexual wish-fantasies" but also include "all the 
psychic material that lies below the threshold of consciousness" 
(emphasis added). This comprises all the components that "have fallen 
below the threshold, as well as subliminal sense-perceptions" in 
addition to "material that has not yet reached the threshold of consdous-
ness (Jung, 1916b, p. 270). In elucidating this latter material 
Jung wrote that "these are the seeds of future conscious conten~s" 
(1916b, pp.270-1). Insofar as 
" ••• Human brains are unifonnly differentiated, the 
mental functioning thereby made possible is collective 
and universal ••• " (p. 275). 
Thus these "seeds" must spring from a ~'collective psyche" which Jung 
further subdivided into the "collective mind" (which refers to 
·"collective thinking") and the "collective soul': (which refers to 
"coUective feeling") (1916b, p. 275). Jung based this assumption 
not only on the anatomical similarities of alt human brains but also 
on the "quite remarkable correspondence" of unco~scious processes 
"nf the most widely separated peoples and races" which "displays itself 
•••• in the extraordinary but well:authenticated analogies between 
the forms and motifs of autochthonous myths" (p. 275). He had already 
discussed common motifs from comparative mythology in the Wandlungen, ,. 
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and, in addition .to his clinical knowledge and the experiences from 
his own psyche, he had observed a similar correspondence in the psychoses 
qf .negros in America during his lecture tour there (1913). 
The introduction of the collective unconscious at this stage should 
surprise no one, as it represents a most natural develppment in Jungian 
thought. The gradual ripening of this concept may be easily observed 
in the works of the Breakthrough, and its seeds may be identified in 
Jung's dissertation, and even as far back as the insights of his 
childhood experiences. After connecting this new term to his original 
problematic it should become evident that No. 2, Ivenes, and Philemon 
are image-figures of the collective unconscious and that the Pleroma 
was its first concrete reference. The "corrective", "healing", "mytho-
poeic" propensities of the unconscious should be attributed to this 
larger part of the unconscious, the collective one. Moreover, the 
references to ·the matrix of human consciousness, the source of creati-
vity, the prospective and teleological functions of the unconscious, 
,· 
would again better suit the collective rather than the personal uncon-
scious which is by and large a product of personal repressions. 
It is of great significance to carefully .. note and appreciate the 
.i! 
phenomenon of the emergence of a new terminology in the Jungian 
problematic now. This terminology is not a mere odd collection of 
fancy sounding terms but represents an entire structure, system, 
language, Weltanschauung, where the concepts are interrelated 
among themselves to create a coherent whole. As Jung observed 
earlier it is not enough to "think" about something but one has to 
"write it", 'name it', identify it (or even personify it); in other 
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words, locate it within a larger·framework. 
Jung had indeed alluded to the collective unconscious many times 
before. But it was not until he actually "baptised it" (Janet, 1906) 
that it acquired its own life. Moreover, it is more important that 
once name6 it was able to enter into new and further relationships 
with other terms and phenomena, thus making possible further revela-
tions. It is categorically stated here that it is by no means acci-
dental that in this very paper, after introducing the term "collective 
unconscious", Jung also 'coined' three additional terms, all crucial 
in the mature formulation of Analytical Psychology. It is strongly 
argued here that the forging of additional and new tenns was an 
inevitable result of initially identifying the collective part of the 
unconscious in clear and distinct manner and applying a separate term 
to it - i.e. collective unconscious, which is more than a simple 
descriptive adjective. It represents its own 'trade mark', and 'copy-
right', it is an official declaration of its existence, it is its 
'birth certificate' with the distinguishing~ attached to it, so 
that from now on its existence is guaranteed and thus it has to be 
accounted for. 
Having identified the collective unconscious, the problem had to 
inevitably arise, concerning a precise delineation between it and the 
personal unconscious, as well as the multiple implications of such a 
distinction. Jung discussed this issue at great length in this same paper. 
He began by observing the detrimental effects of a confusion of the 
collective and the personal. He argued that if the individual "annexes 
the unconscious heritage of the collective psyche" he will "enlarge" 
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"the scope of his personality in an illegitimate way" with the results 
that he will suffer "the consequences" (1916b, p. 276). This could take 
two main possible directions, as the collective psyche (like the 
Pleroma) being a neutral and undifforentiated source of all psychological 
potentiality contains all pairs of opposites, which from the 
perspective of a differentiated individual are seen as divided into 
positive and negative. Thus this 'annexation' would lead to either a 
"stifling of self-confidence and ••• an unconscious 
heightening of the· ego's importance to the point 
of a pathological will to power", 
or to the creating of 
"a hypertrophy of self-confidence, which in turn 
[fvould bi/ compensated by an extraordinary sense 
or inferiority in the unconscious" (p. 276). 
Jung very sternly warned against the dangers of the "fusion" of the 
collective and the personal psyche. He noted that a person's possible 
" ••• identity with the collective psyche always brings 
with it a feeling of universal validity - 'godlikeness' -
which completely ignores all differences in the 
psychology of his fellows" (p. 278). 
One cannot avoid having the strong impression that Jung's own experiences 
are reflected in this discussion. Then, having outlined all the possible 
grave consequences .of the experietial confusion or fusion of the two 
realms of the psyche, Jung proceeded in an absolutely logical sequence 
to underline the "ineluctable psycho.logical necessity" of individuation 
(1916b, p. 279). 
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Since the principle of ~ndividuation has l1.lready been mentioned in 
the Septem Sermones an explanatory note is here indicated. Historically, 
Jung first mentioned the principium individuationis in the lecture 
that he presented at his last Psychoanalytic Congress. This principle 
originates in Schopenhauer; and Jung (1913b) quoted Nietzsche's 
reference to it in a different context, i.e. in connection with the 
Apollinian and Dionysian duality (a theme which in its own right is 
closely related to the duality in the Jungian problematic). Returning 
to the paper under present consideration (Jung 1916b), one has to 
admit that Jung still did not offer a comprehensive account of this 
principle. Moreover, at this time Jung did not distinguish between 
individuation and individuality as he did later (1928). Hence in 
the 1916b paper he used the tenns interchangeably and thus, 
one may claim that strictly speaking Jung's first reference to the 
principle of individuation in its present meaning was only made in 
1928. However, since the negative meaning of individuality, an 
exclusion and denial of anything collective in one's personality, 
was only given by Jung when he contrasted it with individuation 
(1928, p. 174), the original assertion (i.e. that Jung's first 
reference to individuation in a psychological context was made 
here, in 1916b paper) may still stand. 
"Individuality" was here defined in broad terms as 
"the principle which makes possible, and if need 
be compels, a progressive differentiation from the 
collective psyche •.•. " (1916b, p. 301). 
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Individuation was the essential and imperative task of differentiating 
the individual from the collective. In another paper written the same 
year Jung amplified on this definition stating that individuation "is 
exclusive adaptation to inner reality" (1916c, p. 451) as opposed to 
"psychological adaptation to outer conditions". This task, however, 
could not be easy as "the personal grows out of the collective 
psyche and is intimately bound up with it" (1916b, p. 279). The 
parallels with the relationship between Pleroma and the Creatura of 
the Sept em Sermones are ag,:d.n self-evident. 
A further logical step in the description of this differentiation 
process was to isolate and discuss all possible complications in this 
pursuit. The first one Jung observed was the tendency of the collective 
psyche to develop 
"a mask that feigns individuality, making others and 
oneself believe that one is individual, whereas one 
is simply acting a role through which the collective 
psyche speaks" (1916b, p. 281). 
Jung called this mask "persona" and understood it as a "compromise 
formation between external reality and the individual. In essence .••. 
it is a function for adapting the individual to the real worL!I? (p. 298). 
Jung very carefully examined some further dangers resulting from a lack 
of clarity between the persona and the collective psyche (and one 
again strongly suspects the role that his own experiences played in 
formulating this understanding). 
- 337 -
In analysing the persona of patients a critical point comes when, if 
analysis is pushed far enough, the personality "dissolves" in the 
' 
collective. It is at this stage that the individual experiences the 
feeling of "god likeness" which is often accompanieC: by peculiar 
symptoms even of a somatic nature, in which the person's boundaries 
seem endless. 
"Psychologically this state is marked by a peculiar 
disorientation in regard. to one's own personality; 
one no longer knows who one is ..• " (1916bs p. 282). 
Two possible attempts to deal with this unbearable state, which Jung 
compares with insanity, may take the following form. The first is 
described as a "regressive restoration of the persona'."', in which, in 
order to avoid the "dissolution", the persona is strengthened and its 
dominance over 1the collective is reestablished. This, obviously, does 
not bring about a natural solution to this conflict as the collective, 
being the ground and source of all psychic functions, cannot be 
effectively silenced. The second possibility takes the form of an 
"identification with the collective psyche". This is another ill-fated· 
alternative in which "godlikeness" is totally accepted and "exalted 
into a system." This leads the individual to consider himself as "the 
fortunate possessor of the great truth", and fills him with "prophetic 
inspiration and desire for martyrdom" (1916b, p. 286). 
Jung's conclusion is that neither of these alternatives are viable and 
helpful in the further growth of the personality, as 
... 
.... 
- 338 -
" ••• the mischief .•. lies neither with the collective 
psyche nor with the individual psyche, but in allowing 
the one to exclude the other" (1916b, p. 288). 
Afterwards, relating these alternatives to the question of whether 
the object of study in psychology should be the collective or the 
individual, he comments that 
"the fundamental error of both procedures consists in 
identifying the subject with one side or the other of 
his psychology. His psychology is as much individual 
as collective, but not in the sense that the individual 
ought to merge himself in the collective, nor the 
collective in the individual. He must rigorously. 
separate the concept of the individual from that of 
the personal, for the persona can.be entirely dissolved 
in the collective" (1916b, p. 289). 
Jung proposes to resolve the suggested separation by a"synthesis"of 
the individual with the collective. This might seem a contradiction 
but under closer examination does not appear so, as this "synthesis" 
refers to the "constructive method" of "henneneutical treatment" of 
the unconscious raaterial, in which the patient's symbolic material 
is enriched by and corapared to additional analogies, ·first from the 
patient himself and then from the analyst's experience, as well as 
his knowledge of general "typical" themes in mythology and other 
fonns of accumulated psychological representations. 
" ... this procedure widens and enriches the initial symbol, 
and the final outcome is an infinitely complex and 
variegated picture, the elements of which can be reduced 
to their respective tertia comparationis. Certain lines 
of psychological development then stand out that are at 
once individual and collective" (1916b, p. 291). 
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This method is not at all different from that which was suggested in 
this study as being the one that Jung followed during the Breakdown: 
a progressive objectification of intimate experiences, a progressive 
development from an idiosyncratic, 'private' or confused language 
to a language which would adequately account for those experiences 
by placing them. in a broader perspective. The original dangerous 
confusion and antithesis between the personal and the collective is 
solved in a dialectical synthesis. This essential duality of personal 
and collective with its potential conflict is yet another reflection of 
Jung's problematic and it shoulc~ therefore be closely scrutinized. 
More specifically, in trying to disentangle the seemingly paradoxical 
interrelationships between the personal and the collective, Jung 
introduced another concept, which he named anima. The anima was for 
Jung essentially a "kind of persona". He understood her as the 
"feminine being in man", and her counterpart animus as the male being 
in woman. Thus her basic nature was "compensatory" in that it balanced 
the feminine part of a male and vice versa in the case of the animus. 
Moreover, anima represents a "compromise fonnation between the indivi-
dual and the unconscious world" (1916b, p. 299). 
It is here necessary to emphasize that both the anima and animus are I 
not only the "repressed feminine side of man" and the "repressed 
masculine side of woman" respectively (Thompson, 1950, p. 167, 
emphasis added), as some authors erroneously interpreted them. As 
Jung clarified repeatedly (e.g. 1928; 1929; 1951) both the anima and 
animus, insofar as they belong to the personal as well as the collective 
unconscious,include non-personal (Jung called them "impersonal", 
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"transpersonal" and "collective") aspects, not subject to the defence 
mechanism of repression, but existing ·i:here in potentio. These issues 
were further discussed competently by Jung's wife Ennna (1934; 1950) as 
well as De Castillejo (1973), Harding (1933), Hillman (1972), Howe 
(1974), Singer (1976) and Ulanov (1971). 
Both the anima and animus represent additional "typical" aspects of 
the human psyche which have to be accounted for in the process of 
individuation, i.e. the inevitable direction of differentiation of 
the individual psyche from its collective background. The persona as 
well as the animus/anima are, in a sense, mediating agencies between· 
the individual consciousness and the collective unconscious. As such 
they may facilitate coI!IIIlunication between these two parts of the 
personality, or, at the same time, may either contribute towards a 
differentiation of the personal from the collective or a fusion 
between them and a dissolution of the former in the latter. 
In other words, Jung introduced in this paper not only the distinction 
bebveen the two realms of the unconscious, but also the channels 
connecting them. They are the persona, the an:i.mus and the anima, and 
he further demonstrated how they may be used and/or abused. 
The emphasis given to this paper (1916b) in this study is not without 
justification. It has both illustrated as well as accounted for a 
number of new issues and concepts which gradually occupied a central 
position in his later psychology. 
,,. 
\ 
'· 
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"The transcendent function~: 
Still in .the same year of 1916 when Jung wrote the Septem Sermones 
and "The structure of the unconscious" (1916b), he also wrote a paper 
entitled "The transcendent function" (which was revised in 1958), in 
which he described the process of active imagination (although at this 
stage it was not named by this term). The importance of this paper lies 
.in its explicit account of the transcendent function "i.e., of the 
collaboration of conscious and unconscious data" (1916/1958, p. 82), 
which is none other than the central issue of individuation (as seen 
in the previous papers), and its concrete proposals of how to deal 
with this delicate problem (i.e. by means of the process of active 
imagination). 
Jung at the very beginning of this paper compares the psychological 
"transcendent function" with its synonymous equivalent in mathematics 
and concludes that they are both a function of the "real and imaginary" 
(in mathematics of c9urse it refers to "real and imaginary numbers"). 
Thus, the transcendent function "arises from the union of conscious and 
unconscious contents" (p. 69). This constitutes the "synthetic" 
approach which has already been mentioned earlier. The seeming paradox 
of both "synthesis" and "un:i.on" of the personal and the collective in 
their effort to secure separation and differentiation (1eading to 
individuation) is reiterated here. 
He further maintained that the qualities of "definiteness and directness" 
of the conscious mind despite their irreplaceable contribution to the 
process of "external adaptation" and the development of technological 
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civilization with its necessary emphasis on the "rational judgement", 
inevitably inhibit any other material and processes which appear to them 
"incompatible" and "unreasonable" (1916/1958, p. 70). This inhibition 
' 
leads to "one-sidedness" which "is an advantage and a drawback at the 
same time" (p. 71), although, one may add, not for the same reason. 
In other words, such a "one-sidedness" is of great advantB;ge to the 
process of external adaptation but a drawback to the internal adaptation. 
Jung remarked that the human psyche is "a self-regulating system" (p. 79), 
a statement whfch logically follows his previous argument that the 
' 
unconscious has a "compensatory" and "healing" function, but this does 
not apply any longer to the "psyche of civilized man" (p. 79), where 
the one-sidedness of rational dominance reigns supreme. The transcendent 
function is thus essential in making " the transition from one attitude 
to another organically possible, without loss of the unconscious" (1916/ 
1958, p. 73 emphasis added). 
The 'technique' of active imagination is the vehicle to bring about 
the needed "transition". It is basically comprised of certain unconscious 
material which is brought into the light of consciousness in a special 
manner so that a dialogue develops between them. Jung specified that 
the unconscious material must be accompanied by a reasonable intensity 
of energy, which would be at the "disposal" of the individual in order 
to bring about this transition. To achieve this Jung suggests using 
unconscious material in an "artificial" (p. 81) manner, i.e. to 
develop an existing fantasy to a degree that is sufficiently emotionally 
changed. 
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"In order ••• to gain possession of the energy that is 
in the wrong place, /J.he patient? •••• must make the 
emotional state the basis or starting point of this 
procedurE;! •••• " (1916/1958, p. 82) . 
The opportunity should be used to mention in passing a similarity 
between Jung's method of active imagination and many techniques which 
appeared on the psychotherapeutic scene (especially in America) during 
the last decade and a half. These techniques, based on extremely diverse, 
identifiable and non-identifiable sources; have in common an intense 
emphasis on feelings, their experience and expression (e.g. Burton, 1969; 
Custaitis, 1969; Eg~n, 1970; Lewis and Streitfeld, 1972; Perls et al, 
1971; Rogers, 1970; Schutz, 1967). Without entering into any detail of 
this parallel (as this would constitute an unjustifiable deviation from 
the theme of this study) only two sharp distinctions should be drawn 
between these techniques and Jung's methods: Firstly, while the farmer's 
understanding of "feelings" is in terms of some accent on the here and 
now, derived from aiphilosophy (mostly implicit) that man can act 
consciously and change his motives almost instantly in a manner approxi-
mating abreaction, Jung's reference to the "emotional states" is firmly 
based on the unconscious (partly personal but mainly collective). Secondly, 
while these techniques often propagate the supremacy of "feelings" and 
at' times to a point of indulgence, Jung's approach makes a clear 
stipulation that the unconscious material should be confronted with the 
conscious in order to integrate it. 
"The whole procedure is a kind of enriclnnent and 
clarification of the affect, whereby the affect and 
its contents are brought nearer to consciousness, 
becoming at the same time more impressive and more 
understandiible" (1916/1958, p. 82). 
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The important stage in active imagination is when the unconscious 
material is giv,en a certain shape. Jung observed that this is not 
always an easy task as different people have different abilities in 
this regard. Thus the emotionally charged unconscious material 
should be expressed in any way that suits the person - i.e. by 
painting it, sculpting it, acting it, dancing it, singing it, or 
articulating it in whatever other manner might be suitable to the 
individual. The ·aim is to express that "'other' voice" (p. 83) from 
the unconscious, and in such a way that the conscious will also 
participate. In this common participation a "collaboration of 
conscious and unconscious data" is ensured, and this produces the 
"constructive" and "synthetic" "un:ton" of the two realms in which the 
"meaning" of the unconscious product emerges, thus overcoming the 
one-sidedness. This process is the same as that which Jung himself 
followed in the writing of the Septem Sermones and one should therefore 
agree fully with· Judith Hubback's suggestion that 
"the writing of 'Seven sermons to the dead' was 
the personal experience out of which the paper "The 
transcendent function" emerged later in the same 
year, 1916" (1966, p. 110). 
Further elaborati.ons in the understanding of the collective unconscious: 
In an article in 1918 under the title "The role of the unconscious" Jung 
after recapitulating his theories of the unconscious clarified that the 
"suprapersonal" or "collective unconscious" should not be understood 
in terms of "inherited ideas" but rather in terms of "innate possibilities 
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of ideas" which "thm~gh ••.• /]:.hey] do not produce any contents them-
selves, •••• give definite fonn to contents that.have already been 
acquired" (1918, pp. 10-11). 
"Being part of the inherited structure of the brain, they 
are the reason for the identity of symbols and myth-motifs 
in all parts of the earth" (p. 11) 
He also added that the compensating function of the unconscious 1s 
accomplished through another function: its"symbol-creating function" 
(1918, p. 18). The latter Jung considered as the "most important" 
function of the unconscious and its most important product, the 
archetype, a concept which he introduced a year later, in a lecture 
which he gave (again in English!) at a joint meeting of the 
Aristotelian Society, the Hind Association, and the British Psycho-
logical Society, at London University in July 1919. It might not be 
coincidental that1 Jung first proposed the term archetype at a joint 
philosophical and psychological gathering, as its implications 
reach much wider landscapes than traditionally considered to be 
within the boundaries of psychology. 
In this short lecture "Instinct and the unconscious" (1919b)~ Jung 
defined archetypes as "typical modes of apprehension" and maintained 
that 
"wherever we meet with uniform and regularly recurring 
modes of apprehension we are dealing with an archetype, 
no matter whether its mythological character is re-
cognized or not" (1919b, pp. 137-138). 
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This definition followed a parallel definition of instincts: 
"Instincts are typical modes of action, and wherever 
we meet with uniform and regularly recurring modes of 
action and reaction we are Jealing with instinct, no 
matter whether it is associated with a conscious 
motive or not" (p. 135) . 
It is worth noting that what has been observed earlier in connection · 
with the consequences of the introduction of a new term, are 
equally valid here. Although Jung had grasped the Eeneral idea of 
the archetype in earlier writings, it was only after he 'baptized' 
it with its proper name - archetype - that he was able to observe it 
in a more comprehensive and systematic fashion, thus documenting 
its implications for other int(~rrelated principles, functions and 
fields. 
Thus, the biological aspect •Jf the archetype is here taken a step 
beyond, from the broad implication suggested earlier that since all 
brains have a similar structure they would also have similar potential 
capacit:y in tenns of their "mental functioning". Jung argued that 
1-1.lthough "instinctive action is characterized by an unconsciousness 
of the psychological motive behind it" (p. 130), one should not class 
all unconscious processes as instinctive; 
I 
" ... only those unconscious processes which are in-
herited, and occur unifonnly and regularly, can be 
called instinctive" (1919b' p. 131). 
Jung had little difficulty in asserting that instinct, almost by 
definition, is an "essentially collective, i.e. universal and regularly 
- 347 -
occurring phenomenon which has nothing to do with individuality" (p. 134). 
He also noted that besides instincts, the collective unconsd.ous includes 
"a priori, inborn fonns of 'intuition', namely the 
archetypes of perception and apprehension, which are 
the necessary a priori detenninants of all psychic 
processes" (p. 133). . 
Thus archetypes, insofar as they are also "collective phenomena", 
together with inst:i.ncts "fonn the collective unconscious" (pp. 133-134). 
However, Jung did not accept instincts and arc~etypes as two unrelated 
components of the collective unconscious: 
" .•.• in my view the question of instinct cannot be 
dealth with psychologically without considering 
the archetypes, because at bottom they detennine 
one another" (1919b, p. 134, emphasis added). 
This interrelation between instincts and archetypes was made even 
clearer when Jung maintained tha.t in fact the archetype is the 
"instinct's perception of itself" or the 11self-port:r:ait of the 
instinct" (p. 136). 
"Just as conscious apprehension gives our actions 
fonn and direction, so unconscious apprehension 
through the archetypes detennines the fonn and di-
rection of instinct" (1919b, p. 137). 
In this manner Jung related the collective typical psychological 
phenomena with the collective typical biological phenomena and made 
the fonner into the psychological (symbolic) representation of the 
latter. 
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The new terminology was almpst now complete, except for the last and 
perhaps most significant term, which,although e}dsting irt potentio 
in Jung's writings and insights from the beginning, had to wait its 
turn to be 'baptized'. It cannot be accidental that it had to wait 
for the coining of all the previous terms as it itself represents 
their totality, and the wholeness of the entire personality. 
"Psychological Types": 
Ju~g first introduced the Self by name only in 1921, in his book on 
"Psychological Types"+. This significant book constitutes a true mile-
stone in Jung's development along the path of individuation, i.e. 
differentiation of his own individual thought and terminology· from the 
collective background of his theoretical sources, not so much because 
it introduces new theories (in fact apart from the Self it does not) 
but because it offers the first comprehensive and systematic 
presentation of Jung's new language system until that period. All the 
new insights that appeared in the papers mentioned earlier were now 
coll--=cted into one whole in which they were all meaningfully inter-
related. By providing this new solidified and systematic structure 
Jung was after this able to proceed with the process of renovating and 
expanding his theories on this existing structure. 
Jung worked on this book during the years of the Breakdown and the 
Breakthrough and one may easily trace in it themes from the Wandlurtgen, 
the Septem Sermones and all his subsequent papers. Jung's claim that 
he became interested in psychological types after the break with Freud, 
in his attempt to conceptualize the differences among Freud's, Adler's 
/ 
+ Hereqft~r referred to as P.T., Baynes' translation of the first edition. 
This is here pr¢fe_r.r~d to Hull's translation of the eighth edition for 
the sole reason that it is the former which Jung wrote in 1921. 
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and his own outlooks (H.D.R., p. 233) has been frequently reiterated 
and accepted as the one and only motive for writing this work (e •. g. 
Cox, 1973; F. Fordham, 1966; Goldbrunner, 1964; van der Post, 1975). 
In addition to this motive, Storr (1973) mentions Jung's earlier 
"obseriations upon hysteria and sxhizophreniau as "equally important" 
(p. 63) and Cohen (1975) argues that the Psychological Types repre-
sented the culmination of the second phase of Jung's work" which for 
him was centered around the "question of opposites" (p. 17). 
One may not doubt that it was indeed Jung's conscious intention in 
investigating the differences between the psychologies of Adler, Freud 
and himself; in order to account for the b~ei}l~ in some tangible 
manner that led him to write the "P_sy;chotogical !y__pesi! But i£ one 
compares carefully the suggested dichotomies 0£ human functions in 
this book and Jung's previous attempts at such .. divisions (tLg. 
the two kinds of thinking in the Wandlungen, the distinction between 
the Pleroma and the Creatura nf the Septern_S_ermones) one cannot but 
accept that the "question of· opposites" in this book is yet another: 
reformulation of Jung's central problematic. According to this point 
of view, the motive of comparing and contrasting the Freudian, Adlerian 
and Jungian "outlooks" was secondary to the primary motive of further 
exploring his problematic of the Other. In other words, it could be 
argued that the parameters of comparing the three psychologies were 
the original parameters of his own problematic. A few lines after 
writing about his uneed to define the ways in which" his "outlook 
differed from Freud's and Adler'sli, Jung admitted: 
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"My book, therefore, was an effort to deal with the 
relationship of the individual to the world, to 
people and things ••• " (H.D.R., p. 233). 
Psychological Types is a big volume (over six hundred pages) of 
almost encyclopaedic scope and is Jung's only book which includes a 
glossary, an extensive one hundred page chapter! Jung synthesized here 
material from a wide spectrum of fields, including mythology, theology, 
philosophy, the arts, literary criticism, and history, treating it all 
as essentially an expression of the human psyche and thus accepting it 
as legitimate subject-matter of his psychology. The motto of the book 
is a passage from Heine in which Plato and Aristotle are contrasted as 
representing 
"tl..:ro distinct human natures, which from immer11orial 
time, under every sort of cloak, stand more or less 
inimically opposed .•.. Though under different names, 
always and essentially it is of Plato and Aristotle 
that we speak" (P.T., p. 9). 
"Platonic natures" are characterized as "enthusiastic, mystical" whereas 
"Aristotelian" as "practical, ordering". These descriptions answer 
perfectly to the previous distinctions of Jung which have been 
examined. The significant innovation, however, which appears in this 
motto is a uniting third entity: 
"The Church eventually embraces both natures ..• yet 
both incessantly at feud" (P.T., p. 9). 
This is precisely what this book is about: A dicussion of two main kinds 
of human nature, two psychological types (the introvert and the extravert) 
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and of the Self, a uniting totality of the whole personality, which, 
however, does not obliterate the psychological types. 
Jung defined the Self as "the subject of my totality" which "also 
includes the unconsd:ous psyche" in addition to the conscious Ego 
(P.T., p. 540). He maintained that 
" the individual Self is a portion, or excerpt, 
or representative, of something universally present 
in all living creatures, and, therefore, a corres-
pondingly graduated kind of psychological process, 
which is born anew in every creature •••• " (P.T., p. 475). 
This should be received with no surprise as it is a logical conse-
quence of Jung's previous observations, viz. that in addition to the 
personal unconscious there is also a collective unconscious with 
material stored from the history of mankind. Thus, since the Self is 
comprising all the layers and all psychological functions of the 
personality it should also have a collective aspect. Moreover, what 
was said about the higly delicate relationship between the personal 
and the collective in his previous papers may also apply to the inter-
relationship between the Self and the ego. Any "one-sidedness" would 
have detrimental effects for the individual. Jung understood neurosis, 
in these terms, as an unconscious identification of the ego with the 
Self, 
"whereupon the importance of the Self is reduced to nil, 
while the ego becomes inflated beyond reason ..•• " (B.T.,·p. 477). 
One-sidedness of the Self cannot take place, as by definition the Self 
is a totality including all unconscious and conscious parts of the 
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individual. Thus, if an obliteration of the ego occurs it would 
I 
not be from any usurpation by the Self but by the unconscious. The 
latter condition would still be of detriment to the personality, and 
it would lead, if left to reach uncontrollable dimensions, to insanity. 
The Self, as the Church in the motto, "embraces both natures". However, 
introversion and extraversion represent two natural and complementary 
movements of the libido, ie. inwardly towards the subject or outwardly 
towards the object. Once one such movement becomes "habitual" (P.T., 
p. 567) and characteristic of a person, then one speaks of either an 
introverted type or an extraverted type. Jung further distinguished 
four "psychological functions": thinking, feeling, sensation and 
intuition which he understood as the four primary "phenomenal fonns 
of libido" (P.T., p. 547). The first two were "rational" and the latter 
two "irrational". Jung also cla:i.med that the selection of these four 
"basic" functions was based only on his experience and that no a priori 
reason for such selection existed. One may certainly not doubt this. It 
is the same principle that Jung used in both the Wandlungen and the 
Septem Sennones, viz. after a general and primary division to further 
divide the various realms and functions of existence. 
Since Jung had already introduced most of the ideas included in the 
Psychological Types in his earlier works, the great value of this 
book lies in the introduction of the actual term Self. The appearance 
of this term brought into relief all other crucial tenns and thus 
added the last cornerstone to the ultimate structure of Jung's 
psychological language. He clarified that "in unconscious phantasy 
the Self often appears as a super-ordinated or ideal personality" 
/ 
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(P.T., p. 540). Thus No. 2 personality and Ivenes might be accepted 
as Self images. In the 1960 edition of this book Jung wrote a separate 
I 
definition of the Self (which was previously included under the entry 
of Ego) and clarified that it 1s 
"an archetypal idea which differs from other ideas 
of the kind in that it occupies a central position 
befitting the significance of its content and its 
numinocity" (1921, p. 461). 
Finally, Colonel van der Post (1975) emphasized a significant 
implication of this work which is worth mentioning. He argues that 
Jung by distinguishing different unique human natures (types) shows that 
each one had its own particular mode of expression because each 
one's own "psychology demands a different idiom of utterance". Thus 
Jung was the first, according to van der Post, who provided "mankind 
with a common code" of understanding and appreciating the differences 
between people (1975, p. 192). 
Further researches - Alchemy: 
Having completed the basic terminology of his new language, Jung 
proceeded to further develop it by adding supplementary terms and 
exploring the resulting implications of their interrelationships. The 
concept of the collective unconscious needed additional validation. 
He had hypothesized from his own experience, clinical practice, litera-
ture research and limited field research that common themes exist in 
the psychological representations of different individuals and cultures 
in different geographical places, of different stages of 'civilization', 
and in different historical times. 
. ··._. 
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From 1920 he began his extensive field research. That year he travelled 
to Algeria and Tunisia. Between 1924-25 he spent a short period of time. 
with the Pueblo Indians in New Mexico. During 1925-26 he undertook a 
long expedition to East Africa (including Kenya, Uganda, and the Nile). 
In 1938 he visited India. At the same time he considerably expanded 
his researches into most forms of collective symbolical representations, 
e.g. in history, archeology, mythology, anthropology, the arts, 
religion and philosophy. His aim was to find further substantiation for 
his theory of the collective unconscious with its "typical components", 
the archetypes, and thus expand the network of recorded instances of 
their manifestation. His researches were extensive and intensive and, 
in addition to the above mentioned fields, included, naturally, his 
own clinical psychotherapeutic practice. 
A subject that received Jung's particular attention was alchemy (Cf. 
Volumes 12, 13, and 14 of his Collected Works). His overenthusiasm 
in studying this field, as well as both western and eastern religion, 
(Cf. Volume 10 of his Collected Works) gave rise to the well known 
criticism that he was a 'mystic'. Since this criticism has been re-
peatedly levelled at him, a brief examination of the meanings of 
'mystic' is here indicated. 
One may observe that there are essentially two types of definitions 
of "mysticism" and "mystic". One bestows basically negative connotation 
to these words and attributes to them the meaning of "mystery" 
("hidden or inexplicable matter"), "mystify" ("hoax, play on credulity 
of"), and contrasts this to "scientific" which is understood as clear, 
rational truth based on tested evidence. There is, however, another 
' 
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definition of "mysticism" wh:i.ch is not at all a negative one. Attributing 
a positive .meaning to the "mysterious" aspect of "mysticism", a "mystic" 
is accepted as a person being preoccupied with a "hidden meaning", 
perhaps in trying to unravel it. Exploring further than ordinary 
dictionary definitions and entering the Greek etymological meaning of 
II • II • • • 
mystic· , it is established that although it is still related to 
"mystery", the J.atter does not have a negative connotation. Mysterion 
(mystery) is a "secret rite" which is attended by "mystics". A mystic 
11 UV<1'tTJ~" is the "initiated one" and the verb "µulw"means to initiate, 
to "instruct". In other words, a mystic is none other than but the 
person who has been instni.cted, who has been trained within the language 
system of that particular theory /phenomenon/activity. Thus it mi.ght 
indeed be a "mystery" to somebody how the aeroplane flies or how the 
television works but this might simply mean that he has not been 
instructed in the functioning of these technological gadgets. Certainly 
it does not imply that either the appliances themselves are mysterious 
or anybody who studies or has mastered their mechanism is a "mystic", 
in the 'negative sense of the word. But "mystic" and "r,iystical" have 
beco~e so heavily loaded with emotional meaning given to them by two 
opposing groups of people that it has little discriminating value 
nowadays, although it is rich with psychological meaning. Certain 
individuals are proud to be identified as mystics while others consider 
this label with ultimate contempt. Thus, if a neutral definition of 
"mystic" is accepted, the decision of whether a negative or positive 
meaning should be applied will depend on three factors: firstly, the 
kind of activity/theory/phenomenon with which the "myst:tc" is pre-
occupied; secondly, the manner in which he goes about investigating 
the "hidden meaning"; and thirdly, the purpose and/or gain inherent 
in this. 
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Another dimension of the "mystical", which is inextricably related 
to the above discussion is experience. The "mystical" is u11derstood as 
something almost synonymous with "experiential" as opposed to something 
intellectual and propositional. According to this meaning the mysterious 
part of the "mystical" would relate to its highly personal and intimate 
nature as opposed to being demonstrable , common and pub 1i c. A "mys ti ca 1 
language" would then be a language which would be understood only by 
those who have undergone similar exper;iences, who have been "instructed" 
in the same system. A "mystical language" should not be dismissed as 
a ~ontradicion in terms, 1n that language is something coilil!lon and a 
non-private affair. This 1s illustrated when one examines particular 
systems (such as the technology of aeroplanes and televisions) which 
are inaccessible to the majority of .people, but are indeed accessible 
to those who care and are able to be instructed in them. In other 
words this discussion has striking similarities with the Heraclitean 
"common logos". The key to a proper understanding of a "myr•tical 
language" is the shared experience: the incomprehensibility of such 
a language might be a result of (a) either not having gone through 
those experiences that the language accounts for, or (b) not having 
been instructed in utilizing that particular language to refer to, 
and account for those experiences even if one has undergone them. The 
mysterious aspect of "mysticism" might thus be understood as resulting 
I from the cautious attitude of those "instructed" in allowing those who are not instructed to use a language that the latter cannot understand 
I due to their lack of relevant experience. Now if one starts questioning 
the openness or closedness of a group in offering others the particular 
instruction with reference to those experiences and their expression, 
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i.e., the ''mystical language", the discussion leaves the realm of 
epistemology and becomes an open issue with social, political and a 
host of other uncontrollable variables involved. This confirms the 
initial connnent that the words mysticism and mystic, as commonly used, 
lack discriminating value and become mere tools in mud slinging. In 
a moment of indignation at the unjust accusations of being a mystic, 
Jung wrote the following to Calvin S. Hall, the editor of the widely 
.used textbook on Theories of Personality (1957), a work which is typical 
of the (perhaps inevitablA) simplification and compartmentalization in 
the modern teaching of psychology: 
" ••• If you call me an occultist because I am seriously 
investigating religious, mythological, folkloristic and 
philosophical fantasies in modern individuals and 
ancient texts, then you are bound to diagnose Freud as 
a sexual pervert, since he is doing likewise with sexual 
fantasies .•. " (Adler 1976, p. 186). 
Returning to the subject of alchemy, it is here suggested that Jung 
approached it in exactly the same manner that was suggested above, 
i.e. he discovered that the "hidden meaning" that alchemy expressed 
was none other than the typical steps the human psyche has to follow 
on the path of individuation. After years of intensive research he 
was satisfied that despite and besides any other intentions, alchemists 
through the highly elaborated process of their opus were essentially 
expressing the "typical" and universal stages and aspects of the 
differentiation of the personal from the collective in a balanced 
manner in order that no one-sidedness would result. 
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" ..• The language of the alchemists is at first sight 
very different from our psychological tenninology and 
way of thinking. But if we treat their symbols in the 
same way as we treat modern fantasies, they yield a 
meaning such as we have already deduced from the 
problematical modern material. .. " (Jung 1956, pp. 518-519). 
viz. a symbolical expression of the process of individuation. 
"Psychologically, [alchemy]" ... was a representation 
of the individuation process by means of chemical 
substances and procedures, or what we today call 
active imagination" (Jung 1956, p. 494). 
To prove his interpretation Jung called upon the alchemists' own 
confession that their symbols, although seemingly referring to a 
physical process of manipulating tangible materials with the aim 
of producing gold or some other magic elixir, were in fact understood 
in a "moral and philosophical sense" and not merely in a physical 
sense. He thus concluded that "their 'philosophy' was, indeed, nothing 
but projected psychology" (Jung 1956, p. 519). It is necessary to 
quote in some length Jung's understanding of what alchemy represented, 
and why he used it so extensively, as well as his feelings for those 
~vho rejected his allegations and methodology. 
"I would therefore counsel the critical reader to put 
aside his prejudices and for once try to experience on 
himself the effects of the process []Jf individuation whicli? 
I have described, or else suspend judgement and admit 
that he understands nothing. For thirty years I have 
studied these psychic processes under all possible condi-
tions and have assured myself that the alchemists as well 
as the great philosophies of the East are referring to 
just such experiences, and that it is chiefly our ignorance 
of the psyche if these experiences appear 'mystic'" (Jung 
1956, p. 535). 
.. 
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I 
Jung in fact, according to his own words, had suspended judgement on 
his obser~ations of mandala symbols in alchemy (and elsewhere) before 
committing himself on their significance: 
"I have observed these processes and their products 
for close on thirty' years on the basis of very 
extensive material drawn from my own experience. 
For fourteen years I neither wrote nor lectured 
about them so as not to prejudice my observations" 
(1936b' p. 99). 
The cardinal criterion again emphasized was that of experience. Jung 
never lost an opportunity to underline that 
" .••. everything about this psychology is, in the deepest 
sense, experience; the entire theory, even where it 
puts on the most abstract airs, is the direct outcome 
of something experienced" (Jung 1943, p. 117). 
The unfortunate misunderstanding arises from the fact that a) one does 
not easily admit one's own prejudices (as more often than not they are 
unconscious, in·the first place, and b) when a particular language is 
"understood" grammatically and syntactically no additional criteria 
are usually used for its interpretation, and therefore with the 
symbolical dimension of language missing, one considers it legitimate 
to query its validity. The one-sidedness and resulting blindness and 
arrogance of mere intellectual learning leads one to criticize and reject 
something that he does,1not understand in the :lfirst place, as he lacks 
its experiential substratum. This a fundamental factor in understanding 
Jungian psychology and its critics. But an intellectual, rational 
understanding and formulation is not to be despised. Although for Jung 
still 
I 
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" .•. the experience itself .. . ffeas] the important thing, 
not its intellectual representation or clarification 
/j:Jhicr;J proves meaningful and helpful when the road ~o 
original experience is blocked .... " (Jung 1956 545) • p. • 
Thus, Jung developed an appreciation of the signifiaance of the 
language in which an experience is conveyed: With particular reference 
to alchemy he wrote: 
"The alchemist... interpreted his experience as best 
he could, though without ever understanding it to the 
degree that psychological explanation makes possible 
today", 
and placing experience and the expression of it in perspective concluded: 
" .•.• his inadequate understanding did not detract from 
the totality of his archetypal experience any more than 
our wider and more differentiated understanding adds 
anything to it" (Jung 1956, p. 545). 
Returning to the central function alchemy had in Jung's psychology, it 
should be added that he did not simply note its psychological inter-
pretation, but also, in a reciprocal manner, maintained that it had 
an expanding effect on his experience: 
"Alchemy has performed for me the great and invaluable 
service of providing material in which my experience 
could find sufficient room, and has thereby made it 
possible for me to describe the individuation process 
at least in its essential aspects" (Jung 1956, p. 556). 
Moreover, alchemical language had the precious' advantage of expressing 
through its symbolical form the seeming paradoxes engendered in the 
individuation process: As diccussed earlier, individuation is the 
' 
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process of differentiating the individual from the collective (but not 
in a one-sided manner), in order to achieve the Selfhood, the totality 
of the personality in which the pairs of opposites harmoniously unite. 
According to the diagram (Fig. 1.13, p. 315) the antithetical rea!ms 
of Nature (which is characterized by unconsciousness) and the Ego 
(which is characterized by consciousness) must unite in the emergence 
of the Self. But, as Jung logic:.i.lly remarks, such union is logically 
impossible, and "theoretically incomprehensih1e" (1956, p. 539). 
What is needed is a "third thing, a neutral nature" (1956, p. 538), 
a "third" a "solvent" which "can only be of an irrational nature" 
(1956, p. 495). In other words, the real, lived, experienced dichotomy 
(usually in the form of a "hybris of ego-conscieusness" [p. 546]) cannot 
be solved conceptually/intellectually, but only in an "indirect11 and 
"symbolical" manner (p. 539). Jung made an apt analogy 
"In nature the resolution of opposites is always an 
energic process: she acts symbolically in the truest 
sense of the word (a ouµf3oXov is a I throwing 
together'), doing something that expresses both 
sides, just as a waterfall visibly mediates between 
above and below. The waterfall itself is then the 
incommensurable third. In an open and unresolved 
conflict dreams and fantasies occur which, like the 
waterfall, illustrate the tension and nature of the 
opposites, and thus prepare the synthesis" (Jung 
1956' p. 495). 
The symbolical and irrational process of the transcendent function 
results in an alteration of both antithetical poles (p. 546). In 
alchemy this was symbolized by Mercurius, the lapis philosophorum, 
the "initial material of the process but also its end-product". 
Mercurius is 
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" .•• the primordial matter from which God created all 
material things. The change which the artifex proposes 
to induce in it consists, among other things, in giving 
it 'immense Wt~ight' and indivisible wholeness" (p. 502). 
Jung studied the descriptions given to Mercurius in the immense 
alchemical literature and its role in th.e alchemical opus and 
concluded that in fact it constituted a symbolic representation of 
the Self, the ultimate wholeness of personality. For example, Mercurius 
was referred to as aqua permanens, as water 
"which occupies a middle position between the volatile 
(air, fire) and the solid (earth), since it occurs in 
both liquid and gaseous form, and also as a solid in the 
form of ice" (p. 503). 
But Mercurius was not unique in representing the end-product of alchemy. 
Dorn (a noted alchemist whom Jung studied in depth) referred to the 
end-product as coelum and described it as a "universal medicine (the 
panacea, alexipharmic, medicina catholica, etc) •.. the balsam and elixir 
, of life ... a 'living stone', a A.(-8-o~ £µ.q,uxo~ ... " (p. 539), a 
(stone that is not stone) (p. 536). The last 
description is a very successful characterization of a combination bet-
ween Nature and the Ego: a "stone that hath a spirit" which in fact 
"is not a stone" is indeed a 'conscious nature', the paradoxical 
description of a transcendental idea, viz. the Self. 
It was for this reason that Jung welcomed the alchemical treatises, 
as according to his reading of them they spoke in a symbolical language 
about the transcendent process, of the union of opposites in the form 
• 
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of active imagination. Their descriptions of the lapis left no doubt 
in Jung's mind that, ''considered psychologically", they were in fact 
referring to the archetype of the Self (1956, p. 544). The alchemical 
opus was, for Jung, definitely more than a mere physical juggling of 
peculiar materials. This should also become clear to anybody who reads 
any alchemical text. The fact that their attempts were not only 
aimed at the transforming the substances they were manipulating but 
transforming themselves too, is typically exemplified in Dom's dictum 
that 
"you will never make the One unless you become one yourself" 
(In Jung, 1956, p. 529). 
Therefore, having "translated" (p. 537) alchemy into psychology Jung 
observed the advantages of using the alchemical language. Not only did 
it represent the "typical" tendencies of the psyche but it also stored 
an enormous amount of experience accumulated "through the centuries" 
(p. 555) thus enabling the individual, researcher, analyst or analysant 
to enrich their understanding of their own experiences by placing them 
in the larger framework/language of alchemy. In alchemical terminology, 
a broad language offers the necessary vessel in which particular indivi-
dual experiences may be contained, i.e. acquire meaning and become 
intelligible by being adequately accounted for. Individual experiences 
must be placed against the collective background in order to be understood 
and cotmnunicated to others appropriately, otherwise,the painful confusion 
of insanity is imminent. Jung repeatedly made the point that both the 
understanding and communication of one's experiences (a division which 
ultimately might not exist) must be done according to a particular 
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language-system, where a "consensus of opinion" (1956, p. 549) exists . 
. However, his researches into various 'closed' language-systems (alchemy, 
e-astern and western religions, mythology, etc.) demonstrated something 
substantially radical in its implications: that the "consensus of 
opinion", very much like the Heraclitean "common logos" is not what 
everybody knows, i.e. an absolute statistical,· model of the nonnal curve 
of understanding of the population in general, but is more restrictive; 
it refers to any particular group of well differentiated concepts which 
developed dialectically fron and with the relevant experience. In other 
words, Jung's researches indicated that there are a great number of 
bodies of psychological representations expressing the same "typical" 
components of the human psyche and once one has the experiential 
background (which is common in its basic outline for all) he may be able 
not only to decode and translate one or several of them (depending 
on the depth and clarity of one's own experience and knowledge of their 
symbolic code) but also then find their common denominators which 
would then distii the essence of the human psyche. This is what Jung 
actually achieved himself. Thus, it is within this perspective that 
his explorations into the "mystical" areas of the "irrational" should 
be located and understood. One will, therefore, have to group all those 
who throw the "mystical" criticism at Jung (e.g. Glover, 1950; Reich, 
1972) and those who accuse him on the grounds that he "neglected the 
part of the rational ego" (Weigert, 1942, p. 359) into the same 
category with the "critical reader" whom Jung counselled to either 
drop his "prejudice and try to experience" what the language which he 
calls "eystical" conveys or "adnit that :1·e understands nothing". 
The Other-as-Archetype: 
Casting a fresh look at Figure 1.13 (p.315) the following additions 
and clarifications may now be made. Although the basic outline of 
direction of psychological development still remains the same, i.e. 
a horizontal line from Nature to the Ego, and an upward one from the 
Ego to the Self, Jung commented that: 
"The process of development proves on closer inspection 
to be cyclic or spiral" (1944, p.28). 
This may still be represented by the same diagram by modifying the 
straight lines from Nature to Ego and then to the Self, so that the 
model is depicted in three dimension as a spiral, where the Ego (E) is 
the farthest apex of the line and Nature (N) and Self (S) occupy the 
beginning and end of the spiral with the Self on a higher level than 
Nature but nevertheless on the same vertical plane, one directly above 
the other. This is depicted in Figure 1.14 (p. 368 ). 
·Although this refinement is important, for the sake of simplicity the 
earlier form (Figure 1.13) will be retained in the subsequent elabora-
tions on this basic diagram, which are contained in the discussion 
below: 
A significant innovation in Jung's ultimate language system concerns 
the development from the Ego to the Self. This direction does not 
take place in a vacuum. Jung showed how certain "typical" and 
identifiable tendencies from the unconscious (which may be personified) 
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actually guide, and lead this development. This is in fact the function 
and role of archetypes. Being collective and existing in the indiv-
idual in potentio they are present during the entire development of 
the Ego. However, during this development, archetypes assume a latent 
role, giving priority to the needs of adaptation to the external world 
and social reality, in short, to the Ego. It is only after sufficient 
development of the Ego that they become activated and commence their 
movement towards the fulfillment of the totality of the Self. The 
diagram may now thus be further modified to reflect this differentiation. 
Figure 1.15 (p. 368) presents what might be termed the 'cable model' of 
development. The transcendent pathway from the Ego to the Self is 
here initiated by isolated archetypes ( o:, ~, Y, & , e:, C,.) which 
gradually, one after another, start seeking their expression. Jung 
clarified the mediating role of archetypes when he wrote that 
II the transcendent function reveals itself as a mode of 
apprehension mediated by the archetypes and capable of 
uniting the opposites. By 'apprehension' I do not mean 
simply intellectual understanding, but understanding through 
experience ... " (Jung 1943, p. I 09 emphasis added). 
He further expounded that 
"An archetype ... is a dynamic image, a fragment of the 
objective psyche, which can be truly understood only if 
experienced as an autonomous entity•(Jung 1943, p.109)' 
and also that 
II the meaning and purpose of [the transcendent functio!il 
••• is the realization, in all its aspects, of the personality 
- 367 -
originally ~idden away in the embryonic germ-plasm; 
the production and unfolding of the original, potential 
wholeness .•. "(Jung 1943, p.110). 
when these are applied to the understanding of Figure 1.15 (p.368) they 
lead to some further modifications of the diagram which contain add-
:i:tional elements of the process of development depicted more accurately. 
To summarize; a) archetypes are fragments of the Self,(itself an 
archetype), which exist in potentio from birth and during the first 
half of development, i.e. from Nature to the Ego; and b) their autonomy 
is a significant aspect of their function in that they start to tend 
toward the wholeness of the personality, the Self, by distancing them-
selves from the Ego direction (which is depicted horizontally in the 
diagram), and separating themselves from the Ego contents of consciousness. 
In this way they appear as independent unconscious tendencies thus 
breaking the restrictive and self perpetuating sterility bond of 
Ego-consciousness. The Self, being the totality and wholeness repre-
sents the state of union of (ideally) all archetypes together. Hence, 
the more archetypes bending towards the Self, the closer that person-
ality is to achieving its wholeness. Not ·all archetypes are activated 
at the same time and they do not all move in the same direction at the 
same speed. 
This model was here named the 'cable model' because of its resemblance 
to a cable containing, and consisting of individual wires interwoven 
together. An effective fold of the cable depends on the greatest num-
ber of individual wires curved in the same direction, as shown in 
Figure 1.16 (p. 368 ). 
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In relating the last diagram (Figure 1.16) to the observed trends 
as depicted in the previous series of •liagrams (Figures 1. 9, 1. 10, 
P• 267; 1.11, and 1.12, p.268; and 1.13, p.315) which illustrated 
the emergence of the Self from the antithetical Anticipated Whole 
Others and smaller Fragment Others, certain new developments are 
evident. These will be followed below in the light of additional 
theoretical innovations that Jung made during this period. 
Firstly, the issue of the bipolarity of the archetypes should be 
incorporated in this model. Jung repeatedly emphasized that 
archetypes are bipolar entities. 
"All archetypes have a positive, favourable, bright 
side that points upwards, ... also they have one that 
points downwards, partly negative and unfavourable, 
partly chthonic .•. "(Jung 1948d, p. 226). 
"Archetypes ... are always bipolar: they have both a 
positive and a negative side ... "(Jung 1946b, p. 229). 
This bipolar quality has been discussed in a number of contexts 
(cf. Jung 1937b, p. 471; 1946b, p. 237; 1951, p. 267). In its 
graphical presentation the bipolarity of archetypes suggests that 
the transcendent direction from the Ego towards the Self, insofar 
as it is guided by specific archetypes, should not be restricted 
to only an upward movement but should include a downward one as well 
which would represent their counter pole. In this manner, Figure 1.16 
should be modified to depict more faithfully the bipolarity of arche-
types. This is depicted in Figure 1.17 (p.369). 
Secondly, a puzzle arises from the new figure: The bipolarity has 
given rise, in Figure 1. 17, to 'two' Selves. However, if these 
\ 
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seemingly 'two' Selves are accepted as representing two poles of one 
axis which at the same time also passes through the starting point, 
Nature, (Figure 1.18, p.369) one may appreciate that this clarifies 
in a more reliable manner Jung's understanding of the Self: in that 
the axis of the Self passes through Nature and thus reflects Jung's 
observation that "the self exists from the very beginning, but it is 
latent, that is unconscious" (1936b, p. 8ln). Moreover, it corresponds 
with Jung's comment that 
" •.. the Pole is the point round which everything turns -
hence {J_t ii} another symbol of the self ... "(1936b, p.188). 
Thus it is not a question of 'two Selves, but of an axis with two poles. 
Figure 1.18 represents a modification with marked improvements on 
figure 1.13 (p. 315) in that a) the mediating role of archetypes is 
graphically exhibited (in the cable model), and b) the bipolarity of 
archetypes is also taken into account. 
Continuing the development of the series of diagrams in figures 
1.9 - 1.13, the spheric representation of the totctlity of the personality 
may now be understood in a modified manner which incorporates Jung's 
later innovations: 
If the bipolar unfolding of archetypes is added to the earlier diagrams 
(and particularly that of _Figure 1.11, on page 268) the result would be 
an improved diagram (figure 1.19, on page 369) where the original begin-
ning point of Nature is represented as the centre of a sphere. 
From that central point the first phase.of development (that of the Ego) 
is depicted as a horizontal movement towards the periphery of the 
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sphere in directions covering the full spectrum of 360 degrees. 
This is represented in Figure 1.19 by the horizontal arrows emitted 
from the centre N (Nature) and extending to the periphery E (Ego). 
When the entire spectrum is taken into consideration, the effect can 
be represented by a disc consisting of the individual radials extending from 
the centre N and thus expanding the central core of Nature by reaching 
out to its periphery. Figure 1.19 portrays this disc in two dimensions. 
The upward and downward transcendent movements toward the Self would 
therefore begin to turn towards the axis of the Self once the Ego develop-
ment reaches its optimum growth. This is ·illustrated by the four 
arrows starting from the E and pointing towards the Self. In this manner, 
Figure 1.19 may be understood as a cross-section of the sphere that 
would be created when Figure 1.18 is spun around the axis of S, N, S. 
Figure 1.20 (p.370) represents the same diagram of Figure 1.19 but in a three-
dimensional fashion. The disc of Ego development is here depicted in 
a clearer way, as well as the spheric effect of the totality. Figure 
1.20 depicts a personality with a sufficiently developed Ego and near 
individuation, in that the arrows are closing the open gaps and reaching 
near the poles of the Self. In contrast to the unipolar movement of 
Figure 1.12 (p. 268) the present figure represents an improvement as it 
conveys the bipolar quality which was discussed above. 
Figure 1. 21 (p. 370) is another view of the same effect and is here offered to 
provide a clearer understanding. This time the three-dimensional 
sphere is viewed frcm above (or below) the pole of the Self. In this 
manner the Self is seen as a central point where all tendencies of 
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the personality converge. Jung's emphasis on the central and 
centering function of the Self is well documented (e.g. 1928, 
p. 238; 1950b, p. 357; etc.). 
Having completed the spheric representation of the Self as the 
totality of the personality, it now remains to explore one addi-
tional dimension: the collective and personal unconscious in rela-
tion to consciousness. Figure 1.22 (p.370) represents the collective uncon-
scious as the bvo inner cones which share the same basis. The area 
covered inside these cones depicts the inner core of personality, 
the collective part of the unconscious. It should be noted that this 
shows the unconscious basis of Nature as well as the unconscious be-
ginnings of early personality development (insofar as a line is drawn 
from the centre towards the Ego periphery along the disc of Ego 
development). The inner cone represents the collective unconscious, 
the outer cone the personal unconscious and the rest of the sphere, 
the conscious area of personality. This corresponds with Jung's 
understanding that the collective unconscious constitutes the nucleus 
and core of the personality, and that consciousness is an outer growth 
from the inner centre of the collective unconscious. 
A significant achievement of this diagrannnatical representation of the 
psyche is the depiction of the Self as an axis and central point of not 
only the collective unconscious, but also of the personal unconscious 
I 
as well as of the conscious part of the personality. Ultimately, the 
Self is not only the poles but the entire sphere. As Jung stated, 
"the wholeness" of the Self 
II 
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can be expressed by rounoness, the circle or 
sphere ... " (1940, p. 164) 
These graphical representations of the development of the personality 
and the constitution of the psyche should therefore be accepted not 
as an extraneous interpretation of Jung's psychology, not as a 
reading into Jung an understanding that is foreign to his thought, 
but indeed a reading of his work which enables the researcher to 
reveal and systematize the salient aspects of his thought. Finally, 
the warning sounded earlier in connection with the previous drawings 
(vide supra, p. 269) needs to be reiterated here: All models are 
approximations of what they model, and particularly when one attempts 
to model the highly complex reality of the psyche, however success-
ful the depiction of certain aspects of it might be it would ulti-
mately be impossible to achieve a comprehensive series of diagrams 
representing all elements, functions and processes of the psyche. 
These diagrams should therefore be accepted within their logical and 
graphical limitations. 
These diagrams offer a pictorial account and a distilled version of 
the process of individuation as well as the structure of the psyche, 
as discussed by Jung in his ultimate formulation of the problematic 
of the Other. In the following pages this formulation will be exa-
mined in greater detail, viz. tenns and insights that were mentioned 
earlier will be integrated with his latest positions within the frame-
work of his new and "right language" and related to his ideas con-
cerning psychopathology and particularly psychotherapy. Hence in 
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the ensuing discussion repetitions will be inevitable. Moreover 
these are intended to gradually reconstruct his fonnulation, 
in the light of his innovations, that will consecutively appear in 
th.is narrative. 
It would be now useful to examine compendiously the contribution of 
the archetypes in the development of the Self, the ultimate archetype, 
whose realization is the goal of the individuation process. This will 
off er a gradual unfolding of the last formulation of the dialectic Other 
(the Other-as-Archetype). Any such attempt should not overlook Jung's 
warning that archetypes cannot be ultimately explained because they 
precede the language in which they perforce have to be explained: 
"Not for a moment dare we succumb to the illusion that 
an archetype can be finally explained ... Even the best 
attempts at explanation are only more or less successful 
translations into another metaphorical language. (In-
deed, language itself is only an image). The most we 
can do is to dream the myth onwards and give it a modern 
dress ... " (Jung 1940, p.160). 
The archetype is an autonomous tendency with universal validity and 
applicability. It is essentially a transpersonal and "typical" 
"quality of psychic phenomena" (Jung 1946, p. 108). Insofar as it 
is an autonomous entity manifesting itself (in addition to any other 
fonns) within the personality it may be called an Other, according 
to the understanding developed in this present study. Jung assumed 
that the origin of archetypes could be explained in tenns of "deposits 
of the constantly repeated experiences of humanity". In other words, 
"archetypes are recurrent impressions made by subjective reactions" 
(1'943b, p. 69). These "deposits'' exist in myths, rites and other 
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collective cumulative representations of experiences. He further argued that the 
individual personality is a product of these ."quasi-personal" entities. 
" ••• Han derives his human personality only secondarily 
from what the myths call his descent from the gods and 
heroes; or to put it in psychological terms, his con-
sciousness of himself as a personality derives primarily 
from the influence of quasi-personal archetypes " 
(Jung 1952c, pp. 255-6). 
Therefore, archetypes "may be regarded as the effect and deposit of 
experiences that have already taken place, but equaliy thGy appear as 
the factors which cause such experiences" (1943, p. 95n); they are 
both the result of as well as the predisposition towards experiencing 
"typical" human themes. "The collective unconscious being the repository 
of man's experience and at the same time the prior condition of this 
experience, is an image of the world which has taken aeons to form" 
(1943, p. '95). 
Jung thus propounded the primacy of the Other. But before jumping 
to early conclusions and misplaced evaluations one has to examine care-
fully the qualifications to this statement. His notion of objective 
psyche represents "the psychic substratum upon which the individual 
consciousness is based" and which is "universally the same" (Jung 
193l•b, p. 179). Jung clarified that "the collective unconscious 
stands for the objective psyche, and the personal unconscious for 
the subjective psyche" (1943, p. 66). This 'universal' Other can 
.only be manifested in individually experienced forms: 
II since life only exists in the form of living units, 
i.e., individuals, the law of life always tends towards 
a life individually lived" (1934b, p.179). 
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Jung clarified that 
"although the objective psyche can only be conceived as 
a universal and uniform datum, which means that all men 
share the same primary, psychic condition, this objective 
psyche must ne7ertheless individuate itself if it is to 
become actualized, for there is no other way in which it 
could express itself except through the individual human 
being" (1934b, p. 179). 
In other words, the objective psyche is indeed the primary Other 
par excellence, the universal and global Other which includes the 
collective unconscious with its archetypes and out of which all 
individual consciousnesses are born. The relevance and precise role 
of the objective psyche is usually misunderstood: Because Jung 
spent a great deal of effort in developing this idea (of the objective 
psyche), it does not mean that he also considered it of greater 
significance than the conscious ego as far as the development of one's 
personality is concerned. Jung placed his emphasis on their dialectical 
interrelationship and not on one pardcular aspect of this successive 
strata of un/consciousness. Lack of such interrelationship results 
in pathology: 
"The neurosis is thus a defence against the objective, 
inner activity of the psyche, or an attempt, somewhat 
dearly paid for, to escape from the inner voice and 
hence from the vocation. For this 'growth' is the 
objective activity of the psyche, which, independently of 
conscious volition, is trying to speak to the conscious mind 
through the inner voice and lead him toward wholeness ••. " 
(Jung 1934b, p. 183). 
Therapy, insofar as it facilitates the "dialectical process of 
individuation" (1952d p. 665), should establish adequate channels for 
, 
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communication between the "subjective ego" ann the "autonomous con-
tents of the collective unconscious", the archetypes. Jung likened 
this objective psyche to the "Thou" of Martin Buber (cf. Buber 1947; 
1957) in the dialectical relationship of the "I and Thou" (Jung 
1952d, p. 6'65). The "most characteristic function" of the objective 
psyche is for Jung "the compensation of the conscious mind" (Jung 1'944, 
p.46), as shown in the early papers of this section. (Objec-
tive psyche and collective unconscious are for Jung synonymous 
~934c, p. 147; 1943, p. 66jj}). It may now be appreciated that the 
compensatory and healing function of the unconscious is performed 
through its archetypes. When activated they convey in an experiential 
manner the corrective objectivity of the unconscious and thus force 
the individual to differentiate himself from the collective Other. 
It is for this reason that Jung repeatedly emphasized the necessity 
for analysts to be well versed in mythology, ethnology and other 
bodies of "deposits" of the typical experiences of humanity (e.g. 
Jung 1958, p. 267). 
The dialectical process of individuation may now be fonnulated in this 
mo.dern garment: since consciousness develops from unconsciousness, 
the newborn infant is essentially constituted by the Other, i.e. the 
collective unconscious coupled with the equally objective, i~personal 
and universal instinctual and other biological forms of behaviour. 
(cf. vide supra, p. 151). From there (the Nature in the diagram, 
fig 1.13) he will move towards the other extreme, the Ego, where 
the differentiated consciousness which has been acquired is externally 
c;:onditioned ("the conscious mind allows itself to be trained like a 
, 
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parrot" Jung 19'44, p. 46). Although the ego by virtue of its con-
stitution, which is consciousness (1951 pp. 3-7) considers itself 
t_o be the centre of (and ror that matter the entire) personality, 
' 
such an assumption is but blind arrogance. By its very substance, 
consciousness excludes unconsciousness and thus any supposedly 
"self-knowledge" if only based on the ego is defective and illusory 
as it excludes its own very roots. This is what Jung called the 
hybris of ego consciousness (1934d, p. 408; 1945,p. 99;1954b
1
p. 260; 
and particularly 1956, p. '546). Consequently, the ego insofar as 
it is just an autonomous tendency within the broad totality of the 
personality, i.e. a comple~ (Jung 1926,p323f; 1935, p. llf, 
!948, p. 100), may be accepted as another Other. The dialectical 
process of individuation may now be appreciated as being a hazardous 
passage through the Scylla of the unconscious and the Charybdis of 
decentred consciousness, as well as their integration resulting in 
the superceding (aufgeben) third qual:i.ty, the Self. The characteri-
zation of the two oppodtions of the psyche as Scylla and Charybdis 
is indeed an apt one in that it suggests the perils of being thrown 
on either of these tHo lethal rocks, i.e. man has to pave his way 
through the dangers of an overwhelming unconscious which does not 
allow any conscious growth, and an overdominant consciousness 
which banishes its unconscious roots. 
Very careful consideration of the exact nature and identity of the 
Other is now demanded: Since both the Ego and Nature have been 
identified as being essentially Others, the real and true totality 
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of the personality of the Self, that which was earlier accepted as 
being the fruition of the ultimate Anticipated Whole Other at this 
moment reveals itself as the only entity comprising the total 
personality. As in the Septem Serrnones, the cosmic game plays its 
tricks (as does the lila in Sanscrit philosophy); where there was man 
now there is god and where there· ·wa; god now there is man (vide supra 
p. 301, and S.S.H. p. 34). What one usually understands by 'me' 
is nothing but the externally fashioned lenses through which the 
vision of what is considered 'me' and 'non-me' is determined 
(~f. Narcissus' eyes in the Introduction of this study). These 
lenses of consciousness, the ~go, is thus indeed an epiphenomenon, 
an Other. 
"Consciousness develops in civilized man by the 
acquisition of knowledge and by the withdrawal of 
projections" (Jung 19'54d, p. 92). 
Consciousness arises by differentiation 
"during the individual's lifetime. It seems to arise 
in the first place from the collision between the 
somatic factor and the environment, and, once estab-
lished as a subject, it goes on developing from further 
collisions with the outer world and the inner" (Jung 
1951, p." 5). 
The concept of differentiation in the psychology of child development 
has received much attention and validation. The essence of differentia-
tion is progress from a relative state of undifferentiation to a 
more articulated state in which the differentiated parts become more 
active and distinct. This development should, however, be balanced 
by an appropriate integration of the differentiated parts, otherwise 
-. . . . . . . . . 
.... ·:.· 
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one cannot talk about progress of the personality. (cf. Lewin 1935; 
Werner 1948; Witldn 1962). The ego is thus understood' as a refine-
ment of the unconscious objective psyche Other, in conjunction with 
the external environment., It is significant to note that in both 
cases it is a question of impersonal, transsubjective, and collective 
entities. This gives rise to pondering the idea of where the 'me' 
is coming from if all constituent elements are essentially non-
.personal. Jung wrote: "Hy idea of the ego is that it is a sort of 
complex" (1935, p. 11). He also defined the ego as 11 a relatively 
constant personification of the unconscious itself" (1956, p. 107). 
Moreover, it is the "centre of consciousness". On this relation. 
Jung wrote: 
"The important fact about consciousness is that nothing 
can be conscious without an ego to which it refers. 
If something is not related to the ego then it is not 
conscious. Therefore you can define consciousness 
as a relation of psychic facts to the ego (1935, p. 11). 
Jung distinguished three stages in the development of consciousness 
in the individual: 
a) Hhen the person (in fact small child) "recognizes" or 
"knows" something by merely "linking a new perception to an already 
existing context" (193lb, p. 390). This stage is characterized by 
the lack of "the feeling of subjectivity or 'I-ness"' (p. 390), and 
is thus "an anarchic or chaotic state" (p.391). 
b) When the person develops an "ego-complex" and becomes aware 
of his "I-ness" Jung calls this stage "monarchic or monistic" because 
the "ego-complex" reigns supreme, considering itself as the one and 
only agency of the personality. 
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c) When the person realizes his "divided or dualistic state" 
(p. 391) which results from the internalization of external limi ta-
tions to his "subjective impulses". These include both instinctual as 
well as any other demands that the "ego-complex" imposes on its environ-
ment. The internalized limitations become "ego-contents" and coexist 
"side by side" with the "ego-complex" gradually creating an "inner divi-
sion", a "division with oneself" (p.391). 
It is for this reason that Jung repeatedly said that consciousness 
"our Promethean conquest") has made "the psychic life of civilized 
man ••. full of problems" 
"Our psychic processes are made up to a large extent of 
reflections, doubts, experiments, all of which are 
almost completely foreign to the unconscious, instinc-
tive mind of primitive man. It is the growth of con-
sciousness which we must thank for the existence of 
problems; they are the Danaan gift of civilization. It 
is just man's turning away from instinct ... that creates 
consciousness. Instinct is nature and seeks to per-
petuate nature, ~vhereas consciousness can only seek 
culture or its denial. .. " (193lb, p. 388). 
Consequently, modern man longs to return to nature, to the original 
garden of Eden away from problems. The greater the differentiation, 
the larger the gap from nature: 
"By becoming conscious, the individual is threatened more 
and more with isolation, which is nevertheless the 
sine qua non of conscious differentiation. The greater 
this threat, the more it is compensated by the production 
of collective and archetypal symbols which are connnon to 
all men ... " (Jung 19'54, p. 301). 
Thus1 it is here that the archetypes, as the messengers from the 
unconscious, reach the conscious ego by means of their inarticulated 
.gestures and cries which try to shake the desperate ego out of its 
cul-de-sac. 
Jung understood the intervening function of the archetypes in terms 
of the essentially compensating role of the unconscious. When a 
particular area of psychological functioning reaches a state of 
sterility due to the lack of its corresponding input from the uncon-
scious then, according to Jung's tenninology, the relevant archetype 
is activated and makes its presence known by flooding the ego with 
unconscious material of a fascinating nature. Jung wrote that "it 
is very probable that the activation of an archetype depends on an 
alteration of the conscious situation, which requires a new fonn of 
compensation" Cll948e, p. 'lSln). This is how Jung conceived the 
function of psychotherapy: to facilitate this compensation 
II If ••. neurotic sy-mptoms appear, then the attitude 
of consciousness, its ruling idea, is contradicted, and 
in the unconscious there is a stirring up of those 
archetypes that were the most suppressed by the con-
scious attitude. The therapist then has no other course 
than to confront the ego with its adversary and thus 
initiate the mehing and recasting process .•• " (Jung 
'1956 ~ p. ·359 emphasis added) . 
As far as the activation of the archetypes is concerned, Jung 
maintained that it happens as a "compensatory" mechanism"under the 
influence of extraordinary psychic situations, especially life 
crises" and it takes the shape of "archetypal forms or images 
'spontaneously invading consciousness" (1953, p. 828). 
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In another context he wrote on this very topic: 
"There are as many archetypes as there are typical 
situations in life. Endless repitition has engraved 
these experiences into our psychic constitution, not 
in the form of images filled with content, but at first 
only as forms without content, representing merely the 
possibility of a certain type of perception and action. 
When a situation occurs which corresponds to a given 
archetype,that archetype becomes activated and a com-
pulsiveness appears, which, like an instinctual drive, 
gains its way against all reason and will, or else 
produces a conflict of pathological dimensions, that is 
to say, a neurosis" (Jung 1936, p'.48). 
But the compensatory and "healing" function of the archetypes was not 
restricted to the individual psyche. Insofar as archetypes are 
essentially collective entities Jung maintained that they compensated 
for "one-sidedness" of the collective, objective psyche as well. He 
found that this particular function is especially evident in artistic 
creativity: 
"The creative process ... consists in the unconscious 
activation of an archetypal image, and in elaborating 
and shaping this image into the finished work. By giving 
it ·shape, the artist translates it into the language of 
the present, and so makes it possible for us to find 
our way back to the deepest springs of life. Therein 
lies the social significance of art: it is constantly 
at work educating the spirit of the age, conjuring up 
the forms in which the age is most lacking. The unsat-
isfied yearning of the artist reaches back to the prim-
ordial image in the unconscious which is best fitted to 
compensate the inadequacy and one-sidedness of the present •.• " 
(Jung 1922, p.82). 
The activation of the archetypes would thus initiate a confrontation 
of the collective parts of an experience with the personal parts of it 
so that an appreciation of the latter in the perspective of the fonner 
I 
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could be effected. 
"We always find in the patient a conflict which at a 
certain point is connected with the great problems of 
society. Hence, when analysis is pushed to this point, 
the apparently individual conflict of the patient is 
revealed as a universal conflict of his environment and 
epoch. Neurosis is thus nothing less than an individual 
attempt, however unsuccessful, to solve a universal 
problem; indeed it cannot be otherwise, for a general 
problem, a 'question' is not an ens per se, but exists 
only in the hearts of individuals" (Jung 1912b, p.265). 
This confrontation if handled constructively and creatively would 
result in the wholeness of individuation, but if undertaken in a de-
structive spirit would then develop into a pathological disunion with-
in the personality. Since all psychological development is fundament-
ally a process of differentiation from the collective with an awareness 
of its context, a very frequent form of psychological function is the 
unconscious projection of collective forms of experience onto figures 
and situations of one's psychological environment, so that the collec-
tive contents become 'visible' and 'tangible'in order to be perceived 
and accounted for as such (cf. Harding 1965). This projection is··, by 
and large a similar process to the active imagination that was discussed 
earlier. Jung7however,noted that 
"the word 1projection' is not really appropriate, for 
nothing has been cast out of the psyche; rather, the psyche 
has attained its present complexity by a series of acts 
of introjection ... " (1954c, p.25). 
He elaborated on this process in his discussion on the specific archetypes. 
Although the number of archetypes is as many "as there are typical 
situations in life", Jung discussed only a limited number of them. The 
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obvious reason is that these were the most "typical". 
"Just as certain biological views attribute only a few 
instincts to man, so the theory of cognition reduces the 
archetypes to a few, logically limited categories of 
understanding" (Jung 191 9b, p. 135) . 
Among them, the mostly commonly encountered in the literature are 
anima and animus, persona, shadow and Self. Apart from the archetype 
of the shadow all the rest have already been discussed, to some extent. 
Jung had already encountered an image figure with shadow quality during 
his "confrontation with the unconscious". It had the form of a 
"brown-skinned savage" (M.D.R., p.205). By •shadow" Jung understood 
II the 'negative' side of the personality, the sum 
of all those unpleasant qualities we like to hide, 
together with the insufficiently developed functions 
and the contents of the personal unconscious .. ·." (1943 7 p.66n). 
But, insofar as unpleasant and negative qualities also exist outside the 
realm of the personal psyche, as in mythology, religion and so forth 
(e.g. as devils, demons etc.), the shadow also belongs to the collective 
unconscious. The shadow, Jung noted, is essentially a "moral problem 
that challenges the whole ego-personality, for no one can become 
conscious of the shadow without consider ab le moral effort" ( 1951, p. 8). 
At the same time, the recognition of the shadow is the sine qua non 
of self-knowledge. Jung observed that in the early stages of development 
the shadow is "projected" onto the "other person" '( 1951 , p. 9) • The 
negative qualities of one's own self being unconscious are only noticed 
once projected on the screen of the outside world; on persons, groups 
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of people , 'ideas etc. The first step is to appreciate that the 
negative aspects one hates in his neighbour are none other than one's. 
own unconscious shadow. 
II 
"The magical or daemonic effect emanating from our 
neighbour disappears when the mysterious feeling is 
traced back to a definite entity in the collective 
unconscious. But now we have an entirely new task before 
us: the question of how the ego is to come to terms with 
this psychological non-ego" (Jung 1943, p.97). 
This is the second step of integrating the shadow. 
"To confront a person with his shadow is to show him his 
own light. Once one has experienced a few times what it 
is like to stand judgingly between the opposites, one 
begins to understand what is meant by the self. Anyone 
who perceives his shadow and his light simultaneously 
sees himself from two sides and thus gets in the middle" 
. (1959' p. 463). 
The autonomous existence within the personality of a "non-ego" entity 
characterized by what the conscious ego-personality considers to be 
inferior and negative qualities poses a serious problem. 
"Confrontation with the shadow produces at first a dead 
balance, a standstill that hampers moral decisions and 
makes convictions ineffective or even impossible. Every-
thing becomes doubtful, which is why the alchemists called 
this stage nigredo, tenebrositas, chaos, melancholia .•• " 
(Jung 1956, p.497). 
This is understandable as the person finds himself in a "torn and di-
vided state" (pp.497-8), unable to decide whether to accept the burden 
of the shadow or not. An usual response to this painful dilemma is 
avoidance of the issue by a "trick" of the unconscious. This might 
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take the form of either a justification of oneself that "it is not so 
bad after all", or an exaggeration of one's "remorseful feeling" (Jung 
1959, p.468). In both situations the confrontation with the shadow is 
set aside while at the same time the person feels that he has indeed 
dealt with it. However, if one manages not to be seduced by the "tricks" 
of the unconscious and vigilantly stays face to face with the shadow 
II in the end this must lead to some kind of union" (1956, p.365). 
Since no rational solution exists (as rational would imply opting for 
one side of the personality), Jung argued that the resulting "union" 
although of an unpredictable outcome, wou Id have only one "certain 
thing": "both parties will be changed". This "union" would come about 
after "the struggle" has gone "on until the opponents run out of breath" 
(1956, p.366). 
One cannot fail to appreciate that this "union" of the two opposing 
entities is a dialectical synthesis which produces an outcome of an 
order higher than the previously antagonistic Others, in a seemingly 
paradoxical synthesis, which is the Self. Jung described this state as: 
II where I am indivisibly this and that; where I ex-
perience the Other in myself and the other-than""1tlyself 
experiences me ••. " (1954c, p.22). 
Such a state can indeed be very confusing if a strong sense of con-
sciousness is not maintained. The Self, according to Jung, is such a 
state where the paradoxical existence is firmly supported by a dis-
criminating consciousness. The ultimate awareness of oneself is in 
the proper perspective of the collective, the objective psyche. 
- 390 -
"No, the collective unconscious is anything but an in-
capsu lated personal system; it is sheer objectivity, as 
wide as the world and open to all the world. There I 
am the object of every subject, in complete reversal of 
my ordinary consciousness, where I am always the subject 
that has an object. There I am utterly one with the 
world ••• •(1954c, p.22). 
Jung called a person individuated if he could firstly survive in this 
state without losing his consciousness and the effectiveness of the 
ego, thus remaining adapted to the external physical and social world, 
and secondly, could maintain himself in this state over more than 
fleeting periods. The emphasis of the term individuation lies in the 
in-divisibility of the person; to be non-divided not only from one's 
own parts within the personality, but also from the collective, uni-
versal and objective aspects of one's existence. 
"I use the term 'individuation' to denote the process by 
which a person becomes a psychological 'in-dividual', that 
is, a separate, indivisible unity or 'wholeness"' (1939b, p.275). 
Jung understood this process as fundamentally dialectical (e.g. 1952d, 
p.665) in that it transcended the pairs of antithetical opposites: 
Conscious-unconscious, personal-collective, inner-outer, subject-object. 
The Self is a new quality in which both the ground of Nature as well 
as the epiphenomenon of the Ego are synthetically united in a state of 
'cons.cious nature'. The Self is the new entity in which all previously 
opposing Others unite in a supreme identity which is not a mere sum of 
the individual Others comprising it. Above all, what is of paramount 
importance is to develop an adequate language/system to account 
appropriately for these states so that correct discrimination is 
effected. As Jung constantly maintained, 
- 391 -
"Psychic experiences, according to whether they are rightly 
or wrongly understood, have very different effects on a 
person's development ••.• The pathological element only re~ 
veals itself in the way the individual reacts to them and 
how he interprets them ••• " ( l 950c, p. 351) . 
Thus it is necessary to have "an adequate understanding" (p.351), a 
discriminating consciousness systematized in a comprehensive and ob-
jective manner. Jung observed that religious systems (besides ful-
filling any other functions) ensure precisely this, i.e. enabling their 
followers to adapt to the external enviromnent while at the same time 
being rooted in the collective and objective unconscious psyche. They 
(religious systems) maintain this delicate balance by means of their 
intricate systems of experiential knowledge which, by referring to 
concepts, actions, and experiences, provide an "adequate understanding" 
of these paradoxical (to the ego consciousness) states , situations and 
relationships. Religions offer a person the opportunity to grasp these 
issues by means of rituals and other organized and defined activities. 
Jung singled out several such religious practices which he found to 
exist (understandably in varied form) in most religions. Perhaps the 
most significant of these was meditation (e.g. }9lf3b; 1937). The various 
meditative techniques, apart fran their religious and other functions, 
psychologically may be seen as frameworks in which the meditator can 
place and understand his experiences of the contradictory and fragmenting 
Others within his own personality as well as the experiences of the 
collective Other. 
Jung's searches into his problematic of the Other culminated in his 
understanding of the development of the personality from the thesis of 
Nature, with its undifferentiated, impersonal Others (e.g. instincts), 
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to the antithesis of the Ego, with its differentiated, individualized 
(personal) Others (various complexes), to the syrtthesis of the Self, the 
supreme totality of the personality in which all antithetical Others 
are harmoniously united in a new consciousness, a 'conscious Nature'. 
In a sense, all but the Self are fragmentary Others. From the perspec-
tive of Nature, the Ego as well as its tendencies may be seen as Other/s. 
From the perspective of the Ego, Nature and any of its tendencies may 
also be perceived as Other/s. The Self, which was until now accepted 
as an Anticipated Whole Other, may now be accepted as in fact the only 
non-Other, the only 'me' or1 I-ness~ the only real and whole 'me'; but 
with the great difference that now the 'me' is no longer defined in the 
· narrow confinement of the Ego consciousness in which the individual ls 
conceptualized as a separate, unique and totally independent existence, 
but rather as an indivisible existence, an instance, an expression of 
wholeness and unity. 
The linguistic relationship of the words unit and unity betray a similar 
kinship that was found in the discussion of the meanings of the word 
Other at the beginning of this study. Unit and unity have opposing 
meanings. Unit, unitary etc.denote the unique, the separate, the 
individual, the isolated particle, whereas, unity, union, refers to a 
collection, a gathering, a non isolation, a wholeness. It is a matter 
of perspective. If seen from the perspective of either the Nature 
or the Ego, the Self or any of its qualities or tendencies would be 
accepted as (an)Other/s to whatever ground was assumed to constitute/ 
the 'me', the subject. But from the perspective of the Self, only the 
Self may have the right to the real identity of the 'me'; in fact all 
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the preceding stages of .the personality are indeed Other fragments of 
the 'me' proper. Thus the only real subject that can be accepted is 
the Self. This is .!!£!a subject as defined from the perspective of 
Ego-consciousness, according to which a subject is opposed to an ob-
ject. The closest way of expressing this subject might be as a sub-
jective or individualized manifestation or expression of the wholeness. 
The Self is the supreme archetype and the ultimate Anticipated Whole 
Other which at the end of the process of individuation proves to be the 
only true non-Other. As far as other archetypes are concerned, it 
has been shown that they are instrumental in achieving the final goal 
of individuation due to their role of connecting all three realms of 
development (Nature, Ego, and Self). As such archetypes constitute an 
important link between all three stages of development. 
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TRANSITION 
The re-reading of Jung based on a developmental analysis which was 
provided in this entire chapter, has traced Jung's treatment of a 
problematic that was documented as being central to his development as 
a theorist, a psychotherapist, and a person. These three identities 
were closely interwoven. It has been shown that Jung formulated this 
problematic in a progressively more elaborated and complete way. The 
direction of his conceptualization of this problematic followed the 
broad lines of the diagram in figure 1.13 (vide supra p.315) from 
Nature to the Ego and from the Ego to the Self; from thesis to anti-
thesis and 1then to synthesis; from the undifferentiated unconscious to 
differentiated consciousness and then to their dialectical union; 
from a fusion with Nature to an individual entity and then to what 
might be called cosmic identity; from an analytical process to a syn-
thetic, transcendent process; from the goal of adaptation to external, 
physical and broadly defined, social reality, to an adaptation to the 
inner reality. 
The new reading of the successive reformulations of this problematic 
has revealed in a developmental approach Jung's gradual construction of 
an adequate, indeed a "right language" in his discourse on the Other. 
A number of progressions and refinements have been noted which portray 
the movement towards a more complete, comprehensive and precise language. 
The "unconscious intellectualityu in his dissertation (vide supra p. 138) 
which he postulated in order to account for the purposeful activity of 
the unconscious, was later termed uwish tendencies of the soul" in the 
Wandlungen (vide supra, p.286), and eventually was formulated in terms 
- 395 -
of the compensating and healing functions of the collective unconscious, 
The animistic language of his childhood was later replaced by the 
experimental language of his early psychiatric days, to be followed by 
the psychoanalytic terminology of Freud's, and finally it acquired its 
own adequate form to account for the paradox of the Self, which although 
being the ultimate Other, at the same time represents the only non-Other. 
It now remains briefly to scrutinize Jung's own references to the tenn 
Other in his writings, with special reference to the dialectical triad 
Nature/Ego/Self, before making certain closing observations. 
Firstly,~ Jung referred to his No.2 personality as the Other. Examined 
in the light of the above triad, it may be argued that No.2 personality 
was a combination of Nature and the Self. He was very close to nature 
and also had archetypal wisdom. No. 2 was definitely not an Ego 
personality. ·Jung's subsequent use of the term the Other mainly 
covered aspects of Nature, e.g. the unconscious, the undifferentiated, 
the instinctual and organic etc. Examples are the following: 
Writing about the technique of meditation as an "inner dialogue" by 
"which things pass from an unconscious potential state to a manifest 
one", Jung termed the inner interlocutor, with whom one should have a 
"living relationship", "the 'other' in ourselves, i.e. • .. the uncon-
scious" (Jung 1937~ p.274). Following the same suggestion Jung also 
regarded Paul as the "'other self' who dwelled in O:,aul'ri} bosom11 (l943, 
p. 35). Also, 
II the somatic man, the 'adversary' is none other than 
the 'other in me' ••• " (Jung 1'940, p. 77) . 
' 
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The accent in defining the Other was placed on anything th~t was anti-
' 
thetical to the Ego, to consciousness, to the accepted moral code that 
one espouses. Jung's views remained by and large the same as far as 
the place of the Other in the development of the personality was con-
cerned: the Other, similar to the rest of the psyche in Plato (vide 
supra, p.'15), had to be confronted, accounted for, integrated with the 
~of the personality in order to reach a state of wholeness: 
Also, 
"For nothing in us ever remains uncontradicted, and conscious-
ness can take up no position which will not call up, some-
where in the dark corners of the psyche, a negation or a 
compensatory effect, approval or resentment. This process 
of coming to terms with the Other in us is well worth while, 
because in this way we get to know aspects of our nature 
which we would not allow anybody else to show us and which 
we ourselves would never have admitted ••• " (Jung 1'956, p'.496). 
"The subtle process of self-knowledge often begins with a 
bomb-shell ••• The 'other' person we dream of is not our 
friend.and neighbour, but the other in us, of whom we prefer 
to say: 'I thank thee, Lord, that I am not as this publican 
and sinner'" (Jung 19'34c, p. 152). 
The opposition with the Other was a source of energy: 
And again1 
" ••• This 'other' personality is the very thing he ought 
never to lose sight of, for it is his own inner antithesis, 
the conflict that must be fought out again and again if life 
1 is to go on. Without this initial· opposition there is no 
flow of energy, no vitality ••• 11 (Jung 1934c~ p.169 emphasis 
added). 
"The 'other' in us always seems alien and unacceptable; but 
if we let ourselves be aggrieved the feeling sinks in, and 
we are the richer for this little bit of self-knowledge" 
(Jung 1928c, p'.486). 
If the Other is rejected the result will be psychological imbalance, 
one-sidedness, neurosis, thus, 
II the patient has not to learn how to get·rid'of his 
neurosis, but how to bear it. His illness is not a 
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gratuitous and therefore meaningless burden; it is his own 
self, the 'other' whom, from childhood laziness or fear, or 
fur some other reason, he was always seeking to exclud'e from 
his life •••• We should even learn to be thankful for it, 
otherwise we pass it by and miss the opportunity of getting 
to know ourselves as we really are. A neurosis is truly 
removed only when it has removed the false attitude of the 
ego. We do not cure it - it cures us" (Jung 1934, pp.169-70). 
It is interesting to observe two more usages of the Other employed by 
Jung: In his book on "A Psychological Approach·to the Dogma of the 
' Trinity" (1'948e), surveying trinity concepts in ancient Greece, Jung 
made ·some acute observations which have a direct impact on understanding 
his own syste~ of the dialectical triad as well. He maintained that 
"number one" is "not a number at all" in that it represents an indivisible 
unity. For him "the first number is two" as only with it "separation 
and multiplication begin, whicq alone make counting possible". 
"With the· appearance of the number two, another· appears 
alongside the one, a happening which is so striking that 
in 'many languages 'the other' and 'the.second' are expressed 
by 'the same word" (1'9 48e ~ p. l 18) • 
The "other" suggests 
" ••• something opposite and alien ••. Two implies a one 
which is different and distinct from the 'numberless' One. 
In other words, as soon as the number two appears, a unit 
is produced out of the original unity split into two and 
turned into a 'number'. The 'One' and the 'Other' form 
an opposition ••• The 'One' ••• seeks to hold to its one-
and-alone existence, while the 'Other' ever strives to be 
another opposed to the One. The One will not let go of 
the Other because, if it did, it would lose its character; 
and the Other pushes itself away from the One in order to 
exist at all. Thus there arises a tension of opposites 
betWeen the One and the Other. But every tension of 
'opposites culminates in a release, out of which comes the 
· 'th'ird'. In the third, the tension is resolved and the 
lost unity is restored ••• There is the unfolding of the 
One to a condition where it can be known - unity becomes 
recognizable ••• Three therefore appears a suitable synonym 
for a process of development in time II (Jung f948e~ PP· 
·118;...9; cf. also Jung 1956~ p'.462; as well as Plaut 1959). 
. . ~ .: . .. 
l 
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Jung used this "conceptual model" to interpret the Christian dogma of 
Trinity. H~ applied it in his understanding "'of the One as the Father, 
the Other as the Son and the Third as the Holy Ghost. He remarked 
that the Other's opposition to the One, which originally takes place 
·by "splitting off from it" (l948e, p.133), does not have to be understood 
in antagonistic terms, but should be comprehended as "supplementary" 
· (p. 1'34). He also noted that "out of the tension of duality life 
always produces a 'third' that seems somehow inconnnensurable or para-
doxical". In the case of the Holy Trinity, Jung observed that the 
Holy Ghost, the "third", "unlike Father and Son, ••• has no name and 
no character. He is a function, but that function is the Third person 
of the Godhead" (1'948e, p.159). 
Transposing this model onto the dialectical triad of Nature, Ego, Self, 
an exercise which is legitimate as this triad also represents "a process 
of developmerit in time", one may discern some revealing similarities: 
Nature, like the "numberless" One, is not "recognizable" as it possesses 
no consciousness and no discrimination (cf. Pleroma). The Other would 
correspond to the Ego (cf. Creatura) which is a "split off" from or a 
differentiated form of the One. It is both antagonistic, antithetical 
as well as supplementary to the One. This tension between the two 
leads to the "inconnnensurable and paradoxical 'third'", the Self, which 
represents a dialectical synthesis, a unity of a higher and different 
order from the other two, and it represents a "function", not a concrete 
form of existence with "name and character" but a state of constantly 
renewed synthesis. In this manner, the Self may be justifiably called 
a "function", a process and not a static given state. 
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"The self, ••. is absolutely paradoxical in that it 
represents i.n every respect thesis and anti thesis, 
and at the same time synthesis" (Jung 1'944, p.19). 
Elsewhere Jung referred to the Self (with reference to its quality of 
I 
. uniting the opposites) as a "transconscious process'' (1'956, p.381). 
The last meaning that Jung attached to the Other was the Self: This 
could have been inferred from earlier excerpts, such as the one in 
which he calls the Paul within Saul's bosom his "other self". Paul 
could be accepted as the Anticipated Whole Other of Saul. The Self is the 
"'Other', a 'non-ego' which has the conscious mind as 
its object. It is as if the subject-character of the ego 
had been overrun, or taken over, by another subject which 
appears in place of the ego" (Jung 1939c, p'.'546). 
It is clear f rQn the context of this passage that Jung does not refer 
to any split-off personality here, but rather to the "influence" behind 
an "empty" and "non-ego" consciousness. The search for this Other is 
the search for the "knowledge of the knower" (p'.'547) the source of 
consciousness beyond the Ego. Jung also mentioned Rudolf Otto's 
reference to the "tJholly Other" in his book "The Idea of the Holy"· 
(Otto 1917). According to Jung, the "wholly Other" (or "totally Other", 
from das ganz Andere) is the "perfect" Other "reality" outside man 
(Jung 1939, ~.482). For Otto, this Other could be named 
" ••• 'spirit' or 'daemon' or 'deva', or be left without 
any name. !Jar does it make any difference in this 
respect whether' to intc~r.pret and preserve their 
.apprehension of this 'other', men coin original 
imagery of their own or adapt imaginations drawn fran 
. the world of legend ••• " (Otto 1917, p. 27) • 
.. :.·.·:·· 
-· 400 -
This is precisely what Jung also remarked about the names and symbols 
of the Self (cf. Jung l936b; 1'940; 1'941; ·19·44; J'948f; 1951; l957b; 
'J'958b). 
It is therefore evident that Jung did not reserve the term Other for one 
particular entity or function, but used it to denote an antithetical 
position from whatever position he was taking at the time. In this 
sense, any one of the three points of the dialectical triad Nature-
Ego-Self could be assumed to be the Other of the point which is accepted 
as the thesis. In abstract tenns and in their developmental sequence, 
the Other is firstly the Ego, the differentiation of the One and 
indivisible Nature. From the perspective of the Ego, from which most 
of Jung's writings were based, the Other referred to either Nature 
(or aspects of functions of it), or the Self as an anticipated state 
of dialectical resolution of the opposites. According to the diagram 
(Figure 1.13, p.315), the Other from the "horizontal" perspective of 
consciousness (cf. Jung l958b, p'.408) is the Self which represents an 
"upward", movement of consciousness (J 9:34, p. 339). 
This multiplicity of meanings given by Jung to the term "the Other" 
should not lead to a state of confusion. Firstly, the present reading 
indicates that each definition depended on the given perspective from 
which Jung was referring to that particular Other. Moreover, of real 
importance, as has been repeatedly emphasized, is the formulation or the 
problematic of the Other, and not the mere definition of the singular 
term "the Other". It was through the successive re-formulations of this 
problematic that Jung developed his unique psychology which includes a 
tangible and experiential documentation of and towards psychological 
.. • .. 
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wholeness. 
C.P. Cavafy in his poem Ithaka which was used as the motto for chapter 
Two (p.119) of this Part understands Ithaka as a means: 
"When you set out for Ithaka 
ask that your way be long, 
fulv of adventure, full of instruction 
••• Have Ithaka always in your mind. 
Your arrival there is what you are destined for. 
But don't in the least hurry the journey. 
Better it last for years, 
so that when you reach the island you are old, 
rich with all you have gained on the way, 
not expecting Ithaka to give you wealth. 
Ithaka gave you the splendid journey. 
Without her you would not have set out. 
She hasn't anything else to give you. 
And if you find her poor, Ithaka hasn't.deceived you. 
So wise have you becane, of such experience, 
that already you'll have understood what these Ithakas mean. 
Similarly, Jung's problematic of the Other led him to the inner land-
scapes of the territory of the Other. What he actually discovered was 
that the only non-Other is the psychological wholeness of the Self. 
He also realised that there is no one and definite Other. The"splendid 
journey" however, offered him not only his own personal psychological 
development, but also the riches of the theoretical exploration. It 
was the reformulations themselves that provided the context as well as 
the main features of his psychological understanding. Some of the 
many gains he had "on the way" were the theories of complexes, symbols, 
archetypes, the universality of the collective unconscious • . • Without 
the initial problematic of the Other,Jung would not have set out· on the 
long and fruitful journey, towards the process of individuation. 
As for the final stage, the crowning of all previous efforts, the end 
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result of the individuation process, the achievement of the psycholo-
gical totality, the Self, Jung gave many indications of its phenomen-
ology and how it is approached, as well as some descriptions of the 
final state itself. But, as he characteristically confessed, the 
Self is a 
".,.term on the one hand definite enough to convey the 
essence of human wholeness and on the other hand indefinite 
enough to express the indescribable and indeterminable 
nature of this wholeness" (Jung 1'944, p.18). 
The ultimate journey cannot be reproduced in an exact manner so that 
anybody can follow the given steps and without any personal itnput 
also reach the final stage. Insofar as the Self is the transmutation 
of the existing personality, or the actualization of its potential sta. :e, 
it cannot be objectively expressed and one has to respect its indes-
cribable form. Jung ultimately knew that 
"How the hannonizing of conscious and unconscious data is 
to be undertaken cannot be indicated in the form of a 
redpe "(t 939b, p. 289). 
All psychological theories, descriptions and suggestions can be of 
help only in the early stages of individuation. Later these become 
redundant if not actually misleading. The person has to carry on his 
. 
crwn way. Discussions of whether Jung himself actually achieved the 
goal of individuation or not; or if he did, what 'proofs' of this 
exist, are indeed irrelevant. Jung wisely noted that 
".,.nobody has ever been able to tell the story of the 
whole way "(l950c, p.'348). 
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The descriptions of the process and of the dynamics of its dialectical 
unfolding should be sufficient for the initial steps. Then, like the 
Wit.tgensteinian ladder, the problematic of the Other, which provided 
all these descriptions, should be dropped. Having climbed the 
problematic of the Other, the centre shifts from the Ego to the Self 
(cf. Jung 1929, p.-45). And from the new centre of the Self being 
the ultimate unity and wholeness, no problematic exists anymore, nor 
for that matter an Other. 
Wittgenstein aptly expresses this twist at the end of his Tractatus: 
"My propositions serve as eiucidations in the following 
way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them 
as nonsensical, when he has used them - as steps - to 
climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away 
the ladder after he has climbed up it.) 
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see 
the world aright. 
What we cannot speak about we must pass over irt silence" 
(1921, 6.:54-7). 
' 
PART THREE 
Introductory note 
'\ 
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This Third and last Part of this study represents a final attempt 
at integrating all salient aspects of this investigation. In 
addition to integrating, this section also examines the problematic 
of the Other from a broad perspective. , The qualification "final 
attempt to integrate" is here pertinent as it reminds the reader 
that integrating attempts are to be found throughout this study and 
are not reserved exclusively for this section. 
The first three chapters of Part Three constitute a return to the 
three theorists in Part One in the light of the later findings that 
·emerged during the development of the dialectic of the Other in the 
Jungian discourse (in Part Two). Jhus, Heraclitus, Plato and Hegel are 
revisited and their relation to the problematic of the Other is 
brought into focus. 
In Chapter One (on Heraclitus) the concept of enantiodromia is intro-
duced, and in Chapter Two (on Plato) particular emphasis is given 
to the question of similarities between archetypes and forms, but 
this time in the perspective of the dialectic of the Other. In Chap-
ter Three (on Hegel) special attention is given to the puzzle that 
although, sane striking similarities were observed between the Hegelian 
and Jungian understanding of the Other, Jung himself had a strong 
negative attitude towards Hegel and his work. In this discussion 
Jung's negative views on philosophy in general are also explored. 
In Chapter Four the concept of the Dialectic is placed in 
the context of the formulations of Jung's problematic and 
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Jung's own references to this term are traced and discussed. 
Then, the modern. dialectical movement in psychology is briefly 
presented and juxtaposed to the Jungian discourse. Finally, in 
Chapter Five, a tentative idea of considering the Other in terms of 
language is proposed. In this chapter, Jung's references to language 
are brought in,in support of an argument which attempts to throw 
some new. light on the role of language in the development of Jung's 
problematic of the Other. Following this, certain aspects of the 
Lacanian discourse are investigated and compared with the Jungian 
.thought. 
Part Three is followed by an Epilogue in w~ich certain closing 
comments are made about the entire study • 
.. 
PART THREE 
Chapter One 
Heraclitus Revisited 
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The ever growing recognition of Heraclitus' relevance to (or even direct 
influence on) the early development of scientific thought (cf. Lloyd 1979; 
Moutsopoulos 1978), as well. as on the history of modern thought in general 
(cf. Axelos 1974; Kyriazopoulos 1973) represents a startling phenomenon 
in its own right. The Ephesian "Riddler" has been hailed, among other 
things, for "bridging the heights of the objective with the depths of 
the subjective" (Djuri~ 1979, p.17) and for using authentic philosophical 
language "in its original and authentic connection with being" (Seidel 1964, 
p.93) before logos slid down, degenerating into logic (Seidel 1964, p.93). 
Heraclitus' influence spread not only to Plato and the later Greek 
philosophers, but also to other European thinkers right up until recent 
times, including Hegel, and of course, Jung. The latter made considerable 
reference in his writings to Heraclitus,and held him in high esteem 
for his originality (e.g. Jung 1914d, p. 193; 1919b, p. 137; 1928b, p.53) • 
Jung acknowledged many similarities between Heraclitus' thought and 
medieval alchemy (e.g. 1936b, p.120; 1937, p.92; 1937b, p.229; 1951, 
p.250n; 1954c, p.33; 1956, p.195; 1958b, p.333) and gnosticism (e.g. 1951, 
p.219; 1954, p.310). Above all, Jung valued Heraclitus' theory of 
enantiodromia (e.g. 1921, p.96; 1931c, p.82; 1943, p.72). It seems almost 
certain that the actual term enantiodromia was never used by Heraclitus 
himself. Stobaeus attributed it to Heraclitus, and Jung accepted it as 
such. However, modern classicists judge the relevant fragment'where 
enantiodromia appears as not a genuine Heraclitean aphorism (Wheelwright 
1959; Kirk. 1954; Kahn 1979). Whatever the case might be, enantiodromia 
refers to the theory of "running counter to 1~and it is used to designate 
the play of opposites in the course of events - the view that everything 
r 
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that exists runs into its opposite" (Jung 1921, pp.425-6). 
This .indeed represents an.obvious and central Heraclitean motif .Jung 
made explicit his usage of the term when he wrote 
"I use the term enantiodromia for the emergence of the unconscious 
opposite in the course of time. This characteristic phenomenon 
practically always occurs when an extreme, one-sided tendency 
dominates conscious life; in time an adequate powerful 
counterposition is built up, which first inhibits the conscious 
performance and subsequently breaks through the conscious control" 
(1921, p.426). 
As shown in the development of Jung's problematic, this principle is 
of fundamental importance as it accounts for the dialectical movement 
of development from Nature to the Ego and from the Ego to the Self. 
The compensatory and healing functions of the unconscious could also be 
understood as an enantiodromic instance. In.fact the whole of the 
problematic of the Other, the inner opposition, could, in this light, 
be traced back to the Heraclitean opposition which was one of his 
pivotal axioms. Here some striking parallels are worth singling out: 
In both Jung and:Heraclitus the emphasis is on dynamic and constant 
becoming through a successive series of oppositions, rather than on 
static being of indivisible composition without internal and external 
strife and conflict. Moreover, the dialectical movement from a 'me' 
to the 'other' and then to a state of a higher 'other' which is suggested 
by Heraclitus would correspond to the Jungian triad: Nature, Ego, Self. 
These two theories are dissimilar in that Heraclitus, unlike Jung, does 
not have specific stages of development which would be the direct 
equivalent of Nature, Ego, Self. According to the Ephesian, the 
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movement of opposition and resulting change occurs constantly and 
has no crude identifiable milestones, except, of course, in the achievement 
of a _higher plane of existence in which a person would be established 
in the common logos after·abandoning his own private understanding. However, 
the elements of the development are similar. In Jungian terminology, 
the Heraclitean constant and harmonious flux, would consist of successive 
oppositions between Nature and the Ego. In the final analysis, this 
understanding would in fact not be so dissimilar from the Jungian 
approach, especially if one takes into consideration the less global and 
more function-type Others, such as the complexes, the Fragment Others, etc. 
Both authors also converge with their theories of the essentially 
transcendent nature of the "third" part of the triad. Both of them 
underlined the higher level of the Self or the person in the common logos. 
The Ego (or the 'internal other') has to be abandoned in order to reach 
the Self (or the· 'external other'). As loannides aptly noted: 
Similar· 
"The sharpness and depth of Heraclitus' logoi culminate in the 
differentiation of planes of reality. Every kind of tempor-
ality or historicity can be overcome easily by the person who 
is able to identify with the supreme Being • • • A reading of 
Heraclitus presupposes a differentiation of planes" (1977, p.27). 
to the Jungian Self, the Heraclitean higher Other, ih a true 
dialectical transformational twist, at the end appears as the inner core 
of the being existing there in potentio all the time before being realised. 
From the perspective of common logos, the higher Other, the constant 
~hanges are comprehended in their proper meaning: as necessary and 
integral aspects of development, as internal minute steps of opposition 
and not as disintegratirig forces destroying the ~ontinuity of the personality. 
' 
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It is this aspect of Heraclitean thought that made commentators refer 
to him as "prescientific" and "mythical". His writings demonstrate 
clearly the acceptance of _contradiction, the coexistence of the 
positive and negative, the positive enantiodromic function of negation 
and vice versa. It is in this light that he has also been compared 
to Eastern philosophers (cf. Aurobindo 1941; West 1971). He is the 
philosopher of antiquity par excellence in whom the opposites harmoniously 
unite, like the Chinese principle of the Yin and Yang. It is perhaps 
this aspect of the Heraclitean logic that disturbs many critics of Jung too. 
To the modern man trained in straightforward Aristotelian logic with its 
cardinal principle of contradiction, any attempts at dialectical logic 
in which the union of opposites is advanced are looked at with suspicion. 
Yet this particular aspect of Heraclitus has been hailed by philosophers 
of the stature of Heidegger as a unique moment in the history of philosophy. 
It may be argued that Heraclitus' language is not accidentai and irrelevant 
to the contradictions that it was referring to. In other words, the 
harmonious synthesis of oppositions is reflected in the very fabric of 
the Heraclitean language. This is what makes it 'paradoxical' and 
incomprehensible'to many. However,it should 
"not be at all paradoxical that Heraclitus' meditations are 
expressed in the form of aphorisms, which is a direct and ~ompact 
form, diametrically opposite from the form in which noA.u~1a-&E I.ct 
is articulated" (Bousoulas, 1970, p.96). 
According to the fragment, 
Fr. 26 
(Kahn 
"Much learnin~ £: 'TtOA.u~l~-&E I.a J does not teach understanding" 
1979, p. 37). / 
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Understanding comes from grasping the common logos and it has to be 
expressed in a manner suitable to its content. This is what Jung, 
perhaps, was attempting to develop. A "right language", a language which 
would adequately account for all aspects and processes of the dialectical 
triad. He also opposed any intellectual and dry theoretical elements 
in it, as he considered them products of one particular state of psycho-
logical development, i.e. of the Ego. Perhaps the emphasis on the unity 
of experience and language that Jung advocated and himself tried to achieve 
is a close parallel to the Heraclitean language. It is this unity that 
Heidegger marvels at: According to him, Heraclitus was the Western 
philosopher where an "essential bond between" logos and physis (nature) 
is maintained (Heidegger 1953, p.114). After him this bond gradually 
,weakened and logos degenerated into logic. Heidegger arrives at this 
argument by developing the meaning of logos as "gathering and togetherness";· 
then he writes that 
"Gathering is never a mere driving-together and heaping-up. 
It maintains in a common_ bond the conflicting and that which 
tends apart. It does not let them fall into haphazard dispersion. 
In thus maintaining a bond, the logos has the character of 
permeating power, of physis. It does not let what it holds 
in its power dissolve into an empty freedom from opposition, 
but by uniting the opposites maintains the full sharpness of' 
their tensiox:i" (Heidegger 1953, p.113). 
Kahn makes a similar remark but from a different perspective. ~ Starting 
with a comment on Fragment 16 (according to his translation it reads: 
"The lord whose oracle is·in Delphi neither declares not conceals but 
gives a sign") he writes that the 
"sign may be of different types: image, ambiguous wording, or 
the like'i (Kahn 1979, p.123). 
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It may be suggested that a better translation of crriµa: Cve: L would be 
to retain its literal meaning; the fragment would then read" ••• neither 
declares nor conceals but it signifies". Be that as it may, his acute 
perceptiveness and clarity of expression demand that he be quoted in some 
length. Professor Kahn also observes a bond between "the discourse of 
Heraclitus and the structure of reality" and continues: 
~~ •• this parallel between Heraclitus' style and the obscurity of 
the ·nature of things, between the difficulty of understanding 
him and the difficulty of human perception, is not arbitrary: 
to speak plainly about such a subject would be to falsify it in 
the telling, for no genuine understanding would be communicated. 
The only hope of 'getting through' to the audience is to puzzle 
and provoke them into reflection. Hence the only appropriate mode 
of explanation is allusive and indirect: Heraclitus is consciously 
and unavoidably 'obscure'. 
The point is not that Heraclitus's paradoxical style is designed 
to mirror the nature of reality ••• The paradox lies in any 
attempt to comprehend and formulate this structure in human 
terms: 'opposites are one, and conflict is justice'. It is 
not that reality as such is contradictory: what is reflected 
in the semantic difficulty of interpreting these utterances is the 
epistemic difficulty of grasping such a structure, the cosmic 
logos, as the underlying unity for our own experience of opposition 
and contrast" (Kahn 1979, p.124). 
The discussion by Heidegger and Kahn illuminate not only Heraclitus• 
language but also that of Jung; the Swiss psychologist tried essentially 
the same thing - to express, to "signify" opposing states and processes 
within a language which itself is a product of only one of these antithetical 
states (the Ego). The paradoxical style is thus inevitable and the only 
one in fact which has some hope of accounting adequately for what is 
referred to. The difficulty is that language, the product of the Other, 
if not the Other itself (cf. Part Three, Chapter Five) is expected to 
express a state where all Others are superceded, resulting in one 
psychological totality and wholeness, the Self. As Swami Venkatesananda 
states: 
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"All expressions [Pf Unity7 are inadequate and ••• dualistic ••• 
Unity cannot be expressed. When you utter the word 'one', you 
have divided that one into two ••• " (1976, p.33). 
PART THREE 
Chapter Two 
Plato Revisited 
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A systematic comparison between Plato and Jung could easily constitute 
a separate study on its own, and thus here, only the three aspects of the 
Platonic treasurehouse, those which were briefly sketched in Part One 
of this investigation, i.e. the Forms, or Ideas; the structure of the 
psyche, and the Dialectic, will be revisited in the perspective of 
· the discussion of the development of Jung's problematic of the Other. 
Much has been said about the relationship between archetypes and forms 
or ideas. Liliane Frey-Rohn states that ·Jung was "initially inspired 
by Plato" in his "attempt to elaborate the general formal structure of 
the archetype" (1969, p.94). This guarded comment implies that a) 
Jung did not borrow the concept from Plato (no argument in support of 
this claim could be considered seriously, especially in the light of 
the discussion on the organic development of the archetype in Jung's 
thought), and b) Jung used Plato as a reference point in formulating 
his own already conceived concept only in the initial stages of his 
attempt. Jolande Jacobi, (1957) mostly reiterating Jung's own comparisons, 
indicates some similarities and some differences between the use of the 
term by the two men, constantly emphasizing the em.pirical nature of 
Jung's archetype as opposed to the "metaphysical" concept of the 
Platonic forms (p. 49f). Her remark that archetypes are bipolar 
whereas ideas are unipolar and always 'good' has already been discussed. 
To counteract the romantic tendency of misreading Plato and perceiving 
the Forms as entities of only Beauty and Goodness (and at the same time 
not becoming involved in protracted and misplaced argument) it should be 
adequate to mention an example of some modern Platonists who accept Forms 
as "composed substances" ( ~l£ LX't~ oocrCa ) in which "inferior Ideas" 
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are synthesized together (Bousoulas 1974, p.129 and Rodier, .!.!!, Bousoulas 
1974). This reading of Plato makes archetypes and Forms more similar 
than usually considered. 
Jung's own references to this issue are varied. At times he considers 
them synonymous (Jung 1929b, p.9; 1954f, p.75).and analogous (1953c, 
p.517; 1954c, p.33). He also called archetype "an explanatory para-
phrase of the Platonic idea" (1954c, p.4). In a letter to Bernhard Milt 
in 1946, Jung sunnned up the discussion when he wrote: 
"I must leave it to the philosopher to hypostatize the archetype 
as the Platonic eidos. He wouldn't be so far from the truth 
anyway... In Augustine, who was still a Platonist, the 
archetype has absolutely the connotation of a primordial 
image, and so far as it is meant Platonically it does not 
agree at all badly with the psychological version. The old 
Platonic term differs from the psychological one only in that 
it was hypostatized, whereas our 'hypostatization' is simply 
an empirical statement of fact without any metaphysical colouring" 
(Idler 1973, p.418). 
Jung repeated several times his claim that Plato's forms were "meta-
physical" and "transcendental" whereas his own archetypes were empirical 
facts (e.g. 1919b, p.135; In Adler 1976, p.152) and characteristically 
wrote that 
"If I posited the archetypes ••• I would not be a scientist 
but a Platonist ••• " (In Adler 1973, p.329). 
·This candid admission reveals Jung's well known concern for not being 
labeled a metaphysician, philosopher, mystic or the like; he always 
wanted to firmly maintain the reputation of being a scientist. Thus, 
it is possible that Jung refused to acknowledge any stronger links between 
the forms and the archetypes because of the fear of being identified 
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as a "Platonist", a characterization which he obviously disliked. The 
fact however remains that he did accept that archetypes are "immanent 
- transcendent" (1952d, p.665), a qualification that Copleston aptly dev-
eloped in connection with the Platon~c Forms (vide supra, p.49). One may 
sympathetically note Jacobi's eagerness to correct any possible misunder-
standing arising from this admission of Jung's. She concedes that indeed 
archetype, like Form·, is transcendent, in that "it precedes all conscious 
experience" and warns that 
"Here of course 'transcendental' must be taken not as a 
metaphysical concept but empirically as signifying 'beyond 
consciousness' ••• " (Jacobi 1957, p. SO). 
Jung also found similarities between the Platonic Fornsand aspects of 
t~e alchemical opus (cf. 1937b, p.263; 1954e, p.191; 1956, p.153n; 352n; 
In Adler 1973, p.265). Moreover, he argued that the Self is a Platonic 
Form, a claim which in a sense is redundant as the Self is the archetype 
par excellence: 
" ••• the self, on account of its empirical peculiarities, 
proves to be the eidos behind the supreme ideas of unity and 
totality that are inherent in all nontheistic and monistic 
systems" (Jung 1951, p.34). 
Be that as it may, a conclusive treatise on the similarities and 
differences between these two important terms would have no place in 
this study. It would here suffice to sketch the main arguments and 
establish that as far as the problematic of the Other is concerned, both 
archetypes and Forms can with not undue justification and substantiation 
be considered as similar Other structures. Whether they are in fact 
identical or not, is a matter beyond the scope of the present investigation 
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and a matter of a separate philosphical concern. Ramfos (1978) maintained 
that 
"Platonic motion is a movement towards some other, which beings 
tend towards, [this othe!7' represents their destination or 
their idea" (p.47 emphasis added). 
This could equally be valid for the Self, or any archetype, for that 
matter, as long as this passage is understood as referring to the process 
of actualization and individualization of the archetype in terms of 
its realisation. 
In the discussion on the structure of the psyche, what has already been 
said may only be reinforced in the light of the unfolding of Jung's 
problematic. Both the Platonic and Jungian psyches are composed of a 
number of opposing Others within it, and both men accepted that a 
harmonious unity of all antithetical Others within the psyche represents 
the natural goal of development. Plato called this process justice 
(Cooper 1977) and his emphasis was on not doing violence to any part 
of the psyche by over- or under-actualizing it. Jung called it the process 
of individuation, where the accent was on achieving a state of in-
divisibility. But the similarity between the two theorists does not stop 
here. Both also argued that when this state of inner harmony is attained, 
when the inner Others are united in a new synthesis, the quality of 
being reaches an-o.ther higher state. The chariot of the Platonic psyche 
when all its parts function harmoniously in accordance with a common 
and united rhythm, is able to fly higher, realize its true nature and, 
in so doing, get closer to the realm of the Forms. But, if an inner 
disharmony occurs and individual horses follow their individual urges, 
then the entire psyche falls. According to Jung, the process of 
- 420 -
individuation leads to a higher state of psychic wholeness, the Selfhood. 
In the Self all opposing Others (both Fragment Others as well as 
Anticipated Whole Others) unite in a dialectical synthesis. The Self, 
according to Jung, is also an archetype existing in latency right from 
the infancy of a person. Moreover, once the inner Others are united, 
the higher Other paradoxically represents the ultimate wholeness not 
only of the inner Others but also of all universal and 'cosmic' Others. 
In other words, the higher state of inner wholeness shares a close 
kinship with the higher realm, the domain of Forms. 
It is worth noting the role that music and harmony had for Plato 
in the development of the psyche. Without entering into unnecessary 
details, and remaining within the framework of the present argument, 
the essentials of rhythm were the 11 -8-ECTL~ 11 (thesis = placing) and 
II CXpO"t.~ II (~ = lifting); the placing and lifting Of the foot in 
the steps which in· combination produces dance. The same principle of 
"on" and "off" was followed in the metre of poetry and music (cf. Ioannides, 
1978; Moutsopoulos 1959). Harmony is nothing else than a 'harmonious' 
combination of these series of 'theses' and their 'negations' (antitheses). 
Music and dance were central in the suggested educational programme of 
Plato's Republic because they helped to lift the psyche from its conflicting 
state of internal negations (read: Others). 
Professor Ramfos holds that the Platonic revolution consists in the intre-
duction of the "interior dimension" (1978, p.85) in ancient Greek thought 
by assuming that the psyche is a complex (in the meaning of 'composed', 
'synthetic', 'interwoven cluster') entity, made up of many "parts" and 
thus it may develop towards a state of harmony (among all its parts); 
or fall. He elaborates on this theme by adding the possibilities of 
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freedom, choice, immortality of the soul. and other psychological, ethical 
and epistemological issues which, according to him, ,Plato was able to 
introduce only after having accepted the complex nature of the human psyche. 
These motifs (naturally, in their psychological representations) were 
echoed in the Jungian opus as well. According to Jung, psychological 
disintegration is precisely the result of a disharmonious existence of 
all internal Others. 
The third aspect of Plato's work that was examined earlier was the 
Dialectic. Solmsen (1968) captured the seriousness of the role that 
the Dialectic played in Platonic thought when he wrote: 
"In one sense philosophy is for Plato identical with dialectic; 
in another it achieves its culmination in dialectic" (p.49). 
Sinaiko also succintly declared that 
"dialectic is the self-movement of the soul towards the ideas" 
(1965, p.118). 
Many parallels have already been indicated between the Platonic dialectic 
and Jungian thought. The Dialectic, as was repeatedly underlined 
in Part One of this study, was not an external technique which could be 
applied to situations or material unconnected to its very fabric. The 
Dialectic was not the methodos (~ = after; ~ = way, path) for the 
realization of the Forms, but the very path (odos, way) itself! In much 
the same manner Jung also declared that individuation is a dialectical 
process by its very nature. 
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Understanding the dialectical progression of consecutively challenging 
one's own assumptions (which are a product of one's existing state 
of being) within the context of the Jungian problematic, one may observe 
that there are two dialectical movements. The first deals with the 
minute internal oppositions within the personality, and the second with 
the dialectical progression of placing the Ego (which may be also 
understood as in opposition to and negation of Nature) in the perspective 
· of its Nature roots. In this way a discrimination of the "real" from the 
"apparent" will be achieved. The false reality of the Ego as the centre 
of the personality and indeed the only 'personality' at all, will be 
·exposed. The person would thus experience the narrow limits of the Ego. 
The Ego itself is not false at all. It is false insofar as it 
assumes the role of the entire being (P.ars pro toto). The Ego cannot 
become conscious of its own limitations as consciousness expresses itself 
in a manner which cannot threaten itself; Ego consciousness cannot go 
beyond its own limits, as a part cannot become aware of the whole. The 
limitations of the Ego have to be experienced. This understanding 
throws more light upon the issue of the language of the unconscious in 
Jung and his aversion to intellectual systems in support of experience is 
again brought into focus. Heraclitus, as has been indicated, as well as 
Plato, also had strong views on the significance of experience and a 
great impact on the language of the unconscious. Plato's doing of 
philosophy, as opposed to writing about philosophy has been stressed. 
"The abstract, verbal formula is not, and cannot be, philosophy 
of itself; only the 'living word' in the soul, the principle 
actually expressed through the pattern of man's.life, constitutes 
philosophical knowledge" 
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Therefore ( 
"to engage in philosophy involves above all else subjecting 
oneself to a real and "dangerous risk, a risk which most men 
are understandably not willing to face" 
wrote Sinaiko (1965, p.8) expressing the essence of the Platonic quest. 
Jung knew the truth of these words only too well! Philosophy, as the 
love of truth, had no place, according to Plato, for intellectual games 
about the truth (cf. de Strycker, 1966); that was sophistry. Learning 
was again not an intellectual, an Ego, activity. Many people may 
hear but few can learn, he claimed. Any Ego knowledge, if divided 
from the totality of the personality, remaining dry and intellectual, is 
harmful and does not promote the dialectical movement towards the realization . 
of the Forms. Ramfos convincingly argues that it is for this reason 
that Plato used so many myths in his writings, because 
"myth, ••• enables man to formulate the beyond without having 
to rationalize it" (1978, p.63). I 
The "beyond" here is not meant in any metaphysical manner, but merely 
refers to whatever consciousness cannot grasp, whatever the Ego cannot 
intellectualise because it falls outside the boundaries of its epistemol-
ogical competence. As Jung clarified (and one may not unduly discern a 
confessional tone in it) 
"Unequivocal statements can be made only in regard to immanent 
objects; transcendental ones can be expressed only by paradox" 
(1956, pp.501-2). 
More openly, he wrote in a letter in 1952: 
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"The language I speak must be ambiguous, must have two meanings 
in order to be fair to the dual aspect of the psyche's nature. 
I strive quite consciously and deliberately for ambiguity of 
expression because it is superior to singleness of meaning 
and reflects the nature of life •••• Clarity makes sense 
only in establishing facts, but not in interpreting them ••• " 
(.!.!!,Jaffe, 1967, P· 160). 
This admission sho~ld be appreciated within its proper context which is 
the dialectical development of psychological functions. These functions 
should not be considered as exclusively the property of the ego; this 
would lead to dangerous stagnation and a perpetuation of internal conflicts 
without the opportunity of their dialectical resolution, without the 
chance of their synthetic integration in a psychic wholeness. Moreover, 
those who raise a disapproving eyebrow to this bold statement by Jung 
should be reminded that "The virtues of vagueness in the language of 
science" is a topic of current discussion in philosophical circles. 
Professor Rosenberg, in his article with the same title, argues that 
"There are two ways to proceed when a theory comes into conflict 
with recalcitrant experience. One is to raze and construct anew. 
Sometimes this may be unavoidable, but only sometimes. It is 
difficult, costly and in its wholesale form rarely undertaken, 
even in times of crisis for normal science ••• Far easier 
than razing a theory is modifying it, patching it up, qualifying 
it. This is much the simpler, cheaper, and more reasonable 
way to proceed, if it can be done •••• However, ••• modifying 
a theory is harder to pursue when all the concepts of the theory 
are exactly defined ••• If we do not insist in this exactness 
throughout, we can avoid ••• difficulties and take greater 
advantage of the opportunities to modify, instead of pulling 
down our theoretical edifices ••• " (1975, pp.303-4). 
For an example of this debate the reader is referred to two more articles 
Korner (1975) and Rosenberg ( l 975b). These arguments are relevant for 
a better understanding of Jung's epistemological position as argued in 
the present study. 
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After Heraclitus, Plato further developed the "internal dimension" by 
articulating the dynamics of internal opposition as well as its natural 
self-development towards a dialectical resolution. In doing so, he 
broadened the gap between logos and being, the ego and its nature: this 
occured as the ego-consciousness had to adequately account for its own 
one-sidedness: itself an ironic and enantiodormic inevitable process. 
Jung, many centuries later, picked up the dismembered pieces of logos 
and tried to piece them together again in a harmonious whole. 
PART THREE 
Chapter Three 
Hegel Revisited 
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Unlike towards both Heraclitus and Plato, Jung had distinctly negative 
feelings towards Hegel. Reflecting back on the impact the great German 
philosopher had on him during the years of his youth, Jung wrote: 
"Hegel put me off by his language, as arrogant as it was 
laborious. I regarded him with downright mistrust. He 
seemed to me like a man who was caged in the edifice of his 
own words and was pompously gesticulating in his prison" 
(~, pp.87-88). 
This opinion did not change significantly in the years to follow. 
Jung considered Hegel "fit to bust with presumption and vanity" (In Adler, 
1973, p.332).and one of those "tender minded rationalists" who go 
"by principles ••• arranging everything in conformity with their preconceived 
system" (1921, p.502). Moreover, he called him a romantic in a derogatory 
sense (In Adler, 1973, p.194; 1976, p.249) whose "intuitive ideas" 
that "underlie his whole system" were in fact "subordinated to intellect" 
(Jung, 1921, pp.320-1). One of Jung's strong criticisms of Hegel was 
that he was a "psychologist in philosopher's garb" (1935b, p.772). 
He explained this in the following manner: 
"A philosophy like Hegel's is a self-revelation of the psychic 
background and, philosophically, a presumption. Psychologically 
it amounts to an invasion by the unconscious. The peculiar 
high-flown language Hegel uses bears out this view: it is 
reminiscent of the megalomanic language of schizophrenics, who 
use terrific spellbinding wprds to reduce the transcendent 
to subjective form, to give banalities the charm of novelty, 
or pass off commonplaces as searching wisdom. So bombastic 
a terminology is a symptom of weakness, ineptitude, and lack 
of substance (1954e, p.170). 
He also claimed that "when you examine carefully'1Hegel's writings, "you 
I 
- 428 -
see they are full of projected psychology" (Jung, 1960, p.14). According 
to him, Hegel 1 s "intellectual juggling" (Jung, 1954e, p.170) was the 
"gravest blow to reason" (1954e, p.169). Jung's tone of criticism is 
unusually strong. Yet, he also made some (admittedly superficial) references 
to the similarity between his own theory of archetypes and Hegel's 
"viewsi' (cf. Jung 1932, p.515; and in Adler 1973, p.61). 
The reader is thus faced immediately with a paradox: Although it appears 
(from all preceding chapters of this study) that the Hegelian system 
has by far the most striking similarities to the Jungian problematic, in 
comparison to those of Heraclitus and Plato, Jung was highly critical 
of Hegel, indeed almost to a point of insult. Before attempting to 
understand this paradox, it is indicated that these similarities be made even 
more explicit. 
To begin with, the very dialectic of self-consciousness in Hegel and 
Jung seem almast identical: Hegel's initial step of "simple existence 
for self", "undivided" and without consciousness of itself seems to 
correspond perfectly to Jung's initial state of Nature. Both these states 
are essentially undifferentiated and without individuality, and represent 
the thesis of the dialectic of self-consciousness. In a truly dialectical 
manner, an antithesis is then developed from the original position of 
"self-identity", and this new position is a negation of the first: self-
identity becomes, what might be called, 'other-identity'. Hegel emphasized 
that during this antithetical moment the original subject is lost in the 
other. This would again be similar to the Jungian Ego, where consciousness 
may assume the blind and arrogant attitude that it is an independent entity 
and not an antithetical continuation of its own Nature. Finally, the 
mediated self-consciousness, the Hegelian synthesis of a mature consciousness 
..... 
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is a state where the earlier opposing positions are overcome. It would 
not be a daring comparison at all to suggest that this kind of conscious-
ness would correspond to the consciousness of the Self according to Jung. 
In both cases it is a differentiated consciousness which, at the same 
time, incorporates and accounts for both its Nature and its Ego, its 
"self" and its "other'' in an adequate "recognition". In order to further 
illustrate the similarities between Hegel and Jung as far as the process 
of self-consciousness is concerned, it is almost irresistable to quote a 
description of an aspect of this process according to Hegel: 
"Hegel thus presents us with a situation in which the individual 
brings to awareness a neglected content of the psyche by first 
(at least vaguely) apprehending this content as objectively 
'other'. The more adequately this objective conte~t is 
grasped, the more the mind comes to grasp its subjective 
sice apart from which this content could neither be understood 
nor the understanding of it accounted for. It is when this 
subjective side is grasped that true objectivity is achieved" 
(Christensen 1968, p.370). 
Any additional attempt to compare this passage to Jungian thought is 
redundant. The similarities with Jung are so startling that it would 
not be an exaggeration if one was simply to replace the first name in this 
excerpt, 'Hegel', with 'Jung'. 
In addition, the following description of the dialectic of consciousness 
could accurately epitomize the approaches of both Jung and Hegel: 
"Consciousness, in bearing on the object, discovers that, as 
consciousness of an object, it is consciousness of self. It 
must pass through the other in order to attain itself. In this 
permanence of the same, it relates to the other without being 
lost or disappearing in it. What is marvellous about the 
relation is that neither is the object lost in the subject 
nor is the subject lost in the object, since it rediscovers 
itself there" (De Greef 1970, p.264). 
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In both accounts, the element of self-sacrifice is present. 'Self' here 
does not mean the Jungian Self, but the idea which the subject holds 
of his own identity at the time. The paradoxical statements of having 
to 'lose' oneself in order to 'find' oneself is in fact not paradoxical 
because the 'oneself' in the two situations does not refer to the same 
thing. The 'self' (or more precisely defined, the idea of one's own 
identity) is not a static entity but subject to dialectical development 
in time. Thus, no reason should exist for disputing the validity of 
the above statement, insofar as the understood 'self' in the first 
instance refers to the Ego and the second to the Self. This means that 
if the Ego considers itself as the goal and final stage, the telos of 
personality development, it would not abdicate this illusionary office 
in order to enter into confusing states, which, from its existing position, it 
judges as being destructive. And indeed these states are destructive of 
an Ego which is an independent, alienated and uprooted point; but this 
destruction, however, (as a dialectical negation) would lead to 
reinstating the Ego within its proper perspective of the Self. As Jung 
clearly insisted: 
"Only unreserved surrender can hope to reach such a goal" 
(1943, p.82). 
Another evident point of similarity between Hegel and Jung 'is their 
understanding of the collective nature of consciousness. Even Jung, as 
already mentioned, acknowledges this similarity. The Hegelian Geist 
is "objective" and universal and the source of all experience. Moreover, 
the entire dialectic is the evolution of the Geist itself. This, in 
addition to that which has already been stated in Part One, would suffice 
in supporting a positive correlation between Geist and the Jungian 
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"objective psyche". According to Jung this was the ground and source 
of all individual consciousness. 
A r.esearcher may discuss many more similarities in their respective 
theories. Although any further isolated comparisons would be beyond 
the scope of this investigation, a final suggestion could be made 
concerning their overall approach. Both Hegel and Jung did not consider 
·their writings to be mere theoretical speculations springing from one 
particular theoretical system or position, but essentially what might be 
termed, a "meta-commentary" on the existing reality: Hegel accepted his 
entire system as an attempt to describe the dialectical movement of the 
Geist in history (both individual and collective). Insofar as he 
described this movement in terms of the dialectical spiral of thesis, 
antithesis and synthesis, his own approach, according to him, did not 
represent part of this dialectic, but its description as well as a commen-
tary on it. He thus believed that this description lay outside the 
dialectical overcoming (aufhebung) as it was its very formula and principle 
according to which it unfolded (cf. Part One, Chapter Four). This 
evaluation gave him the sense of superiority that his own philosophy 
had an intrinsic truth in it and was eternal. It was the principle of 
change and thus it, itself, was not subject to change. 
Jung had similar thoughts about his own approach. Firstly, he considered 
his own psychology as standing outside, and indeed above, 'the Freudian 
and Adlerian psychologies because it constituted a superstructure which 
I 
(cf. interpreted the other two). Moreover, Jung believed that insofar 
as his psychology discovered the universality of the collective unconscious 
and documented its varied manifestations in various cultures, historical 
times, as well as in specific philosophical and psychological theories, 
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his own theory itself was not just like any one of those passive 
manifestations of the archetypal structures but a theory beyond time, as 
it constituted a description of the timeless. The alchemists, according 
to Jung, were not aware of their psychological projections into their 
opus, neither was Freud, nor Hegel for that matter. But his own 
psychology, being in fact an unveiling and description of these archetypal 
manifestations, represented their "metatheory". 
A poem by Vasko Popa illustrates this situation eloquently. 
entitled "A story of a story" and it is about a story whose 
" ••• heroes talked 
About some earth about some heaven 
They said all sorts of things 
Only they didn't say 
What they themselves didn't know 
I 
It is 
That they are only heroes in a story " (Popa 1969b, p.81). 
Similarly, both Hegel and Jung ~onsidered themselves as the story tellers 
and not as heroes in the story ••• The tragedy of misunderstandings, or 
perhaps the beauty of variety, in psychological and philosophical theories 
might lie in the fact that almost every theorist considers himself the 
storyteller and above all that all other theorists are only.the "heroes 
in the story" 
Professor J. Rychlak, shortly before Jung's death, addressed a letter to 
him (in 1959) asking him to comment on "the possible influence of the 
dialectic on his thought" and more specifically on some "parallels between 
••• Hegelian philosophy and Jungian thought" (1968, p.341). Professor 
Rychlak, a scholar with particular competence in the dialectic and philosophy 
of science in general as they apply to psychology, did not fail to observe 
~-~. 
,,,, ... 
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"parallels" in the writings' of Hegel and Jung. Jung's reply is 
published in full in Rychlak' s authoritative book on "A Philosophy of 
Science for Personality Theory" (1968). In that, Jung responded in,a 
manner which the reader by now might consider predictable: He dismissed 
Hegel again 
and stated 
" ••• In my very incompetent opinion [Hegel;J is not even 
a proper philosopher, but a misfired psychologist. His 
impossible language ••• denotes the fact, that his 
philosophy is a highly rationalized and lavishly decorated 
confession of his unconscious ••• "(!.n Rychlak, p.342) 
"I have never studied Hegel properly, that means his original 
works. There is no possibility to conclude to a direct 
dependence, but, ••• Hegel confesses main trends of the so-
called unconscious and can be called 'un psychologue rate'. 
There is, of course, a remarkable coincidence between certain 
tenets of Hegelian philosophy and my finds concerning the 
collective unconscious ••• " (Jung in Rychlak 1968, p.343). 
Rychlak, in his comments on the reply writes that although Jung rejected 
any direct influence from Hegel, he "accurately placed himself in the 
dialectical tradition". Moreoever, he reiterated that 
"Jung has, in fact, many similarities to Hegel in his tendency 
to stress the collective history of peoples, the play of 
supra-individual forces on a given life, the importance of 
a balanced existence, and an identical interpretation of the 
dialectic" (p.343). 
Rychlak has since expanded on the dialectical nature of Jungian thought 
(Rychlak, in press). Interpreting Jung's characterization of Hegel as. 
a "misfired psychologist'' Rychlak maintains that it 
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"evidences the compatibility he [.;iun'if sense-d in their 
views. Man is men on both positions, and can be properly 
understood only through an examination of historical 
(including mythological) background facts ••• " 
(p.343). 
However, Rychlak offers no explanation for Jung's negative vieW>on Hegel. 
An attempt will be made here to locate this strong dismissal in a 
hermeneutical context, not so much in order to ponder further the issue 
of the Hegel-Jung similarities (which is otherwise of secondary importance 
to this study) but in order to discuss some further char.acteristics 
of Jungian thought thus paving the way for the closing sections of this 
investigation. 
Jung's own negative comments on Hegel will be examined briefly in two 
stages: a) with regard to Hegel specifically and b) with regard to 
his reservations and mistrust of philosophy in general: 
a) It may be argued that Hegelian theories constitued the philosoph-
ical establishment in Europe at the turn of the century, during Jung's 
youth. Jung, espousing the approaches of Kant and Schopenhauer, placed 
himself in opposition to the Hegelian establishment. It might not 
be that far fetched to also assume that young Jung with his fiery 
temperament (he was known to his University and drinking friends as the 
Barrel cf. Oeri 1970) would have joined the vibrant antihegelian 
trend of the early twentieth century rather than identify with the 
Hegelian establishment which at the time had lost its vitality and might 
have reached Jung in the form of sterile and academic ramblings. 
b) On a more psychological and personal level, Jung might have had 
additional. reasons for disliking Hegel. A return to Jung's reference 
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to Hegel in his .autobiography is necessary and demands closer scrutiny: 
Jung writes about Hegel just after the telling passage quoted above 
(vide supra, p 427). 
0 Between my sixteenth and nineteenth years the (og of 
my dilemma fWith regard to No.1 and No.'J] slowly lifted, 
and my depressive states of mind improved. No.1 personality 
emerged more and more distinctly" (M~D.R., p.87) 
This indicates that i) Jung's judgement of Hegel was directly related 
to his own dilemma between No.J and No.2 personalities, and ii) that 
Jung had those strong feelings against Hegel even at that young age (sixteen 
to nineteen)? These, coupled with his later admission to Rychlak 
that he "never studied Hegel properly" force the independent researcher 
to stop and carefully reconsider this issue. Jung was usually so 
meticulous and careful in his comments which he. passed only after long 
and exhaustive research, and here, in the case of Hegel, he appears to 
have adopted a hasty and strongly negative stand. In a letter to 
the American psychologist Calvin S. Hall, he led a devastating attack 
on him for not reading all of his works before passing any judgement on 
them. Jung wrote that if one wanted, for example, to present, Plato's 
philosophy, 
"We in Europe should expect that •• /j:ieJ would read all 
of Plato's writings and not only barely half and chiefly the 
earlier part of them. Such a procedure would not qualify 
and could hardly be called responsible or reliable ••• 11 
(In Adler 1976, p.185) 
Yet this is what he admitted doing with Hegel. According to Jung's 
own criteria, his attitude towards the Hegelian opus can hardly be considered 
urespo~sible or reliableu. The intention here is not to judge Jung but 
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rather to establish that his stand on Hegel is indeed strange, and 
then, to try to understand it. Having presented sufficient substan-
tiation for the first, it now remains to continue with an hermeneutical· 
expioration: 
The context that has gradually been drawn throws into relief the possible 
exegesis, that Jung's rejection of Hegel might be a result of his own 
·problematic of the Other. Specifically it was at that early period, 
during which he formed his premature evaluation of Hegel, that Jung 
had just decided to ease his dilemma by opting for No.1 personality 
and avoiding the adventurous and seemingly unprofitable routes of No.2 
personality. He had just had a glimpse of the disastrous effects of 
abandoning the "little flame" of consciousness which No.1 guaranteed. 
Jung quite likely might have suspected that Hegel's "high-flown". and 
"bombastic" language could only come out of one source: the No.2 
personality. He had already experienced the pomposity of the archetypal 
world and subsequently (as mentioned here) had a number of opportunities 
to confirm the link between such language and the collective unconscious. 
If this is a reasonable hypothesis, (and Jung himself bears this out in 
the above quoted passage, p. 427), it would then follow that in rejecting 
Hegel, Jung was in fact turning away fron his own No.2 personality which, 
at that particular time, was threatening his own consciousness and existence 
with its luring fascination. Moreover, Jung held that Hegel was 
unaware of the infiltration of the unconscious in his theories. Thus, 
Jung's reaction to Hegel may be understood in terms of Jung's projected 
fears of his own unconscious. 
The understanding developed above would therefore suggest that Jung's. 
judgement of Hegel's work and his evaluation of their possible similarities 
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might have been tainted by psychological reasons related to his own 
problematic of the Other. 
This same puzzle of the discrepancy between the findings of the present 
comparison between Hegel's and Jung's writings and Jung's denial of 
their kinship, could also be looked at from a broader perspective 
which concerns his general mistrust of philosophy. This will be 
examined below under two separate sections, 1 the first: 
(a) dealing with Jung's championing of a psychology independent from 
philosophy, and the second 
(b) dealing with Jung's impression of what philosophy was. 
a) Jung started his career at the turn of the century and identified 
very strongly with the movement which aimed at freeing psychology from 
its philosophical background. His temporary participation in the psycho-
analytic movement strengthened his fighting spirit for the legitimization 
of the psychological. He considered philosophy, religion and medicine 
as hindering the development of the new science of psychology 
(cf. Jung 1948g, p.276; 1951b, p.122; l953b, p.355). Characteristically 
he wrote that 
"psychology is still a hybrid, inasmuch as the subject of 
experimental psychology is still in many institutions a very 
poor relation of philosophical psychology. The dogmatic 
nature of the latter is to blame for the manifold misunder~ 
standings be tween the two kinds of psychologist ••• " 
(1906, p.408), 
• .. 
1' 
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It may thus be accepted that in his attempt not to be considered as 
a philosopher or philosophical psychologist, Jung denied any similarities 
with Hegel's philsosphical system. 
b) The above may be clarified once Jung's views of what constituted 
philosophy and more specifically, philosophical methodology, are closely 
examined. According to him, philosophy was a purely speculative activity 
which forms its theories and impressions exclusively ex cathedra 
(e.g. Jung 1912b, p.245). He disliked the philosopher because he 
"more or less laid down the law as to what the human soul.-
had to be according to the premises of his particular 
philosophy ••• " (1946, p.65). 
This view of philosophy is very similar to that which Jung had of Hegel 
i.e., that he arranged everything in conformity to his preconceived system 
(Jung 1921, p.502). In sharp contrast to this, Jung considered himself 
above all an empiricist. He repeatedly proclaimed that he had no "system" 
at all and that his entire psychology was based on observable facts 
and working hypotheses (e.g. 1928. p.124; 1936b, pp.43-4; 1952d, p.666; 
1954, p.328; 1956, p.108n). The irony of the matter is that Jung 
was :accused of precisely the same things of which. he accused Hegel, viz. that 
~is system was speculative (e.g. Guntrip 1973, p.190), and that he used 
an unnecessarily fancy and strange vocabulary (e.g. Smith 1978, p.1060). 
Before initiating any further hermeneutical expedition into this new 
puzzle,"a brief revision of the previous paradox shoulci be undertaken: 
The present analysis revealed some marked similarities between the Jungian 
and Hegelian writings. Jung, in an unexpected manner, not only denied 
such conscious connections but he also had unusually harsh things to 
... '·~ 
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say against Hegel. A way of understanding this could be found in 
the hermeneutic context of four possible observations/hypotheses. The 
first two refer specifically to Hegel, the philosopher, and the other 
two to Jung's reaction to philosophy in general: Jung's dislike.of 
the Hegelian approach might be seen as a reaction to the academic 
establishment of the time which was by and large Hegelian. He might 
also have had reasons for this related to his own problematic of the 
Other, insofar as Hegel might have represented the threatening realm 
of the archetypal world. Jung's unusually abrupt reaction to Hegel might 
also be understood as part of his attempt to free psychology from philo-
sophy, especially because he thought philosophy was an unsubstantiated 
activity based on abstract and preconceived ideas. 
hand, considered himself a staunch empiricist. 
Jung, on the other 
It is therefore curious that he has also been criticized for not being 
that which he argued that he was, and for that which he himself criticized 
Hegel. Without attempting a comprehensive interpretation of the whole 
spectrum of criticisms levelled at Jung (which would fall beyond the 
scope of this work), the following salient points can be made as a 
way of understanding only the criticisms mentioned above. 
Firstly, it is possible that they expres~ nothing but a polemical 
attitude from a different ideological platform of rival theoretical 
schools. 
Secondly, it is possible that they are a product of the 'misunderstanding' 
that was outlined in the discussion of 'mysticism! (vide supra, p.354f). 
According to that argument, such criticisms might be the result of 
any one or more of the following three possibilities: 
-!"-
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i) that the critic did not have the same experiences that Jung 
was describing, 
ii) that the critic had the same experienc~but accounted for them 
through a different language and conceptual system, 
iii) that the critic had the· same experiences but was unable to 
translate his system into Jung's system (or vice versa), and he thus 
failed to see that they experienced the same things, and moreover accused 
Jung of talki~g about unsubstantiated abstract and speculative theories, 
which not only could not be 'objectively' proved, but their logical 
validity, independent from experience, could not be shown. 
lbirdly, it is possible that what Jung meant by e!npirical empiricism are 
not what the critics understood by this. In terms of standard definitions, 
by empirical one understands that which is "relating to experience" or 
lihaving reference to actual facts" (Runes 1974, p.89). But the terms· 
"experience" and "facts" are by no means noncontroversial, especially 
when one considers the question of psychic reality as constituting the 
facts in the analytical process (cf. Feyerabend 1970; Folse 1977; 
Hook 1959; Ricoeur 1977; Wallerstein, 1976). Moreover, empirical 
has often been accepted recently as referring to "experimental" (in the 
sense of laboratory manipulation of variables)" which some authors find 
an unacceptable restriction on the meaning of the term, especially when 
one speaks of an empirical "enterprise ••• (in the sense of taking 
publicly observable data as its epistemic base)" (Meehl 1973, p.106). 
One wonders whether Jung's understanding of "empirical" was not even 
different from the 'softer' definition offered by Meehl. Some critics 
accuse Jung's "empiricism" of not including "publicly observable data". 
The following passage illustrates this controversy and at the same time 
exemplifies Jung's indignation at being accused of not being "empirical"! 
And again, 
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"Curio,usly enough I have critics who think that I of all 
people want to replace the living psyche by intellectual 
concepts. I do not understand how they have managed to 
overlook the fact that µiy concepts are based on empirical 
findingsn and are nothing but names for· certain areas of ex-
perience. Such a misunderstanding would be comprehensible 
if I had omitted to present the facts on which I base my 
statements. My critics assiduously overlook the obvious 
truth that I speak of the facts of the living psyche and 
have no use for hiloso hical acrobatics" 
Jung l 5 , p. emphasis added • 
"My business is merely the natural science of the psyche, 
and my main concern to establish the facts. How these 
facts are named and what further interpretation is then 
placed upon them is of secondary importance. Natural science 
is not a science of words and ideas, but of facts. I am 
no terminological rigorist - call the existing symbols 
'wholeness', 'self', 'consciousness', 'higher ego', or what 
you will, it makes little difference. I for my part only 
try not to give any false or misleading names. All these 
terms are simply names for the facts that alone carry weight. 
The names I give do not imply a philosophy, although I cannot 
prevent people from barking at these terminological phantoms 
as if they were metaphysical hypostases" (Jung 1946c, pp.319-320). 
The difficulty, of course, arises from the different meanings attached 
to "the facts of the living psyche" by different epistemologists. The 
space and scope of this study regrettably prevents any further expansion 
on this issue, but before closing the matter, two further brief'connnents 
are here indicated: 
Firstly, it appears that what is in question here are different models 
of science. Jung repeatedly emphasised that his work was"scientific" 
according to a model of the natural sciences. This was a product of 
Jung's historical location as well as his own personal education. 
Yet, according to present day evaluations it could be said that he was 
in fact one of the early pioneers of the models more adequately suited 
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to the social sciences, such as the hermeneutical, phenomenological, 
structuralist or dialectical models. A lot of unnecessary confusion 
could be avoided if this distinction is made. 
Secondly, it is sad to obserye that with the exception of Professor 
L. Rauhala's work (1969; 1973; 1974; 1976), there is an almost complete 
absence of any studies examining the status of Jung's analytical psychology 
from a philosophy of science standpoint. By contrast there is an 
increasing body of research investigating Freud's positions (e.g. Cosin, 
Freeman & Freeman. 1971; Cioffi 1970; Ricoeur 1970). 
This is a pity as Jung seems to have anticipated a great deal of the 
present day debates and movements in the philosophy of science, (e.g.Coan 1973; 
Clark 1973; . Demos. 1955; Keen 1972; Read 1968; Stein 1958), 
It is an even greater pity to read that when Jungians today make pleas 
for a more "scientific approach" what they mean by this is in fact to 
"support our own convictions by statistical evaluations, 
as statistics are the closest we can come to the truth 
in psychology" (Meier 1971, p.284 emphasis added). 
PART THREE 
Chapter Four 
The Dialectic 
.... 443 -
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The kinship of the Jungian thought to the dialectical theories of 
Heraclitus, Plato and Hegel has already been examined, as well as the 
dialectical nature of Jung's treatment of his problematic of the 
Other. It now remains to investigate Jung's own references to the dia-
lectic and finally his whole dialectic in the light of more recent move-
ments in psychology. 
Jung above all called the individuation process dialectical (e.g. 1952d, 
p.665). This means that he acknowledged the dialectic root in both 
a) the development per se from Nature, via the Ego to the Self as 
well as b) the therapeutic process that this development facilitates 
Ultimately, both converge in the dialectic of the Other, insofar as both 
are essentially two perspectives of the same c~ntral process: the rise 
of the Other, the struggle with it and its final integration. That the 
dialectic runs through most of Jung's theories is evident from his 
position on the very nature of the "psychic energy" i.e. it is a 
product of "the play of opposites" (1931, p.337, cf. also 1921, p.202; 
1943, p.29; 1956, p.418). 
From there onwards, the dialectical process manifests itself in almost 
all other aspects of his theory, until the very goal of personality 
development, the Self, which for Jung itself as a dialectical product is realized 
(1946c, pp.318..:.;9). This consists in the "dialectical discussion between 
the conscious mind and the unconscious, a development or an advance 
towards some goal or end" (1944, pp.4-5). The aim of psychotherapy is 
for Jung to "compensate the onesidedness and narrowness of the conscious 
mind by deepening its knowledge of the unconscious" (1948h, p.316), 
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to bridge th~ gap between the antithetical tendencies of conscious and 
unconscious, "to narrow down and eventually abolish the dissociation by 
integrating the tendencies of the unconscious into the conscious mind" 
' (1952c, p.442). In other words, to integrate the opposing Others 
within a new synthesis. Insofar as this was, according to Jung, 
the very same telos of the psyche itself, (i.e. with enantiodromic 
interventions to compensate one-sidednesses in a healing manner towards 
creating a new harmony),_ psychotherapy was a mere facilitation of the 
natural development. This, in turn, implies that the dialectic of 
natural development and the dialectic of psychotherapy essentially 
coincide. The therapist would thus augment the dialectic process 
of overcoming the opposites in his patient. 
Jung defined dial_ectic as "the term for the process of creating new 
syntheses" (1935c, p.3). Psychotherapy was not "a method which anybody 
could apply in stereotyped fashion in order to reach the desired result" 
(1935c, p.3), neither a technique ''based on premises held to be generally 
valid11 (1946c, p.329), but a highly individualized relationship in 
which the "psychic systems 11 of both therapist and patient entered, "into 
reciprocal reaction" with one another. This means that 
"If 1 wish to treat another individual psychologically 
at all, I must for better or worse give up all pretensions 
to superior knowledge, all authority and desire to influence. 
I must perforce adopt a dialectical procedure consisting in 
a comparison of our mutual findings ••• " 
_(Jung, 1935c, p.5). 
A little further J~ng added 
"the prime rule of dialectical procedure is that the individuality 
! 
.. 
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of the sufferer has the same value, the same right to exist 
as that of the doctor" (p.10) • 
. In this climate a maximum reciprocal reaction of the two psychic systems 
would be ensured. This is what Fordham calls "open-system theory" as 
opposed to "closed-system" theories which allows "the patient and analyst 
••• to interact all the time" (1978, p.107), (Cf. also, Hochheimer 
1950' p.48). This reaction would also include aspects of the patient's 
·problematic of the Other: As shown earlier, the new synthesis would 
assimilate all opposites in the patient's psyche, or, according to the 
present terminology, all his Others. As the psychic interrelation in 
therapy would inevitably include the projection of some of the patients' 
Others onto the therapist, as part of the transference (cf. Jung 1946c), 
the integration of the Others would then become a dyatic process. These 
Others would at times be the Shadow (cf. Jung 1944, p.29), the 
animus/anima (cf. 1928, p.210), the unconscious in general terms (cf. 
1952d, p.664), or other specific archetypes (cf. 1952d, p.667). 
Another aspect of the dialectical procedure in psychotherapy was, 
for Jung, the relationship between the collective and the individual. 
Following very much the same line of argument that he advanced in 
connection with the development of individual consciousness from callee-
tive archetypal roots, and their dialectical relationship, Jung similarly 
discussed the same dynamics in psychotherapy. The patient has a unique 
individuality but at the same time he is also a member of the human race 
and thus shares in the commonness of the collective consciousness, 
in addition to many other characteristics. His individuality, or that 
which Jung called "qualitative differences" should be understood and 
accepted as well as his similarities and collective aspects and characteristics. 
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"In spite of the differences between people, we must recognize 
that there are a great many similarities. As long as the 
analyst moves within a psychological sphere that is similar 
in kind to the patient's, nothing of fundamental therapeutic 
importance has happened. He has at most laid the foundations 
of a mutual understanding, and this can be appealed to when 
he comes up against those essential differences in the 
patient to which the pathological process is always ready to 
return. These qualitative differences cannot be dealt with 
by any method that is based on premises held to be generally 
valid. If one wants to give a name to the process of coming 
to terms with them, one could call it a dialectical procedure 
- which means no more than an encounter between my premises 
and the patient's" (l946c, p.329). 
Finally, Jung also referred to his type of interpretation of "symbolic 
contents" which he adopted in his psychotherapy as dialectical 
(1935c, p.8). This is related to the method which he had earlier called 
"synthetic" as opposed to the Freudian method which he called "analytical~ 
reductive. Jung considered his own "synthetic-hermeneutic interpretation" 
dialectical as it did not reduce the meaning of symbolical material 
presented in the course of therapy by the patient to a set of precon-
ceived interpretations dished out by the therapist. Instead, Jung, 
advocating the principle of "multiple significance of symbolic contents" 
(1935c, p.8), allowed his patients to amplify by themselves on the pre-
sented material and gradually facilitate the unfolding of figures or 
images that would themselves lead the person to the unconscious meaning. 
This unfolding would happen in the framework of the dialectical interaction 
with the therapist, who would allow no overconcretization or one-sidedness 
to develop, thus destroying the meaning and intent of the unconscious 
tendencies. 
Jung's emphasis on a dialectical approach has preceded (and in a sense 
indeed pioneered) the modern dialectical trends in psychology. Having 
not witnessed the miraculous advances promised by Behaviourism, and after 
experiencing the (potential) sterility of her technological and positivistic 
models, psychology has recently left the limited and identifiable paths 
which she was following, and scattered in all directions looking for an 
adequate model and paradigm that would enable her not only to survive, 
but especially to respond to the expectations of the difficult times 
of today. In this state of crisis, some psychological systems represent 
typical defensive actions by ignoring the seriousness of the inner 
conflict and disorientation and concentrating instead on externally 
polished appearances, and instant and 'authoritative' solutions. 
Some others, are struggling to survive their own endless introspections. 
From the same dilennna, Dialectical Psychology has emerged recently with 
what seeIDS to be (for the titne being) a balanced vitality coupled with 
seriousness. A short discussion of this movement appears below. This 
is followed by an examination of Jung's work in relation to it. 
Professor Strozewski distinguishes at least "three f.undamental concepts 
of 'dialectics: ( 1) dialectics as a theory of reality, 
(2) dialectics as a method of cognizing reality, 
(3) dialectics as a research method" (1973, p.82), 
and Adler (1927) discriminates three aspects of the dialectical discourse: 
empirical, logical, and metaphysical (p.79). These two classifications 
correspond fairly well, in that Str6~ewski's l) would correspond to 
Adler's metaphysical, 2) to Adler's logical, and 3) to empirical. 
Although these appear to be integral aspects of the Dialectic, as Stack 
(1971) correctly states, 
uit is not necessary to embrace a universal metaphysics 
of dialectics in order to appreciate the use and value of 
the concept of dialecticii (p.290). 
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Professor Rychlak (1968; 1973; 1975; 1976; 1977; in press), who 
has been a pioneer in the introduction of the dialectic in modern psychology, 
draws the important distinction between the meanings of the dialectical 
versus the demonstrative approaches. He clarifies that demonstrative 
conceptions are based on the Aristotelean logic of the law of contradiction 
(A is not not-A) and follow the legacy of syllogistic reasoning. 
Aristotle '·s major concern in developing the logical form of syllogism was 
the "accuracy or inaccuracy of the original (major) premise". According 
to Rychlak's example, "all men are mortal", would be the major premis-e, 
"this is a man" the minor premise: "therefore, this is mortal", the 
' 
conclusion. Thus 
11 
•• if our major premise contains erroneous meaning relations 
(e.g., All men are hostile) then even if we reason soundly 
("logically") we can arrive at an incorrect conclusion" 
(Rychlak, in press). 
Dialectical reasoning, on the other hand, proceeds to contest the 
major premises as well, by means of a process in which "truth and error 
[are;] interlaced oppositionally (dialectically"). It also focuses on 
"the meaning of meaning" insofar as it concentrates on the "relational" 
rather than the "solitary features" of concepts and language. 
Demonstrative formulations are characterized by "unipolarity in meaningful 
denotation" (Rychlak, 1975, p.29) whereas dialectical formulations,by 
"bipolarity in meaning" (p.28). In this way 
"dialectical formulations have always been intrinsically 
related to dynamic accounts, for even when we have a resolution 
of opposition into a synthesis there remains that tension 
of contrasting meanings to threaten the delicate balance. 
Theories of change which take their motive power from conflict 
are likely to be dialectical in conceptualization" (p.28). 
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The distinction between these two modes of thought and theoretical 
formulation is very useful in understanding the structure of psycholo-
gical approaches and offers valuable insights in comprehending the 
Jungian thought. A further sample of modern remarks on the dialectic 
is offered below in order to sketch a more complete picture of its 
meaning in contemporary psychology and epistemology in general. 
The Yugoslav philosopher Mihajlo Markovi~ writes that the 
"essential characteristics of ••• the dialectical structure 
are: a systematic unity of its parts, a dynamic character 
of each system which is based on internal conflictual forces, 
the creating of new qualities as a result of the reorganization 
of its elements, the element of self-determination and self-
production, the progressive historical change of the whole 
system towards a direction. of a definite litnit" 
(Markovic et al., 1971, p.20). 
And Korsch (1976) also emphasizes the revolutionary structure of the 
dialectical thought in that it contains: 
"a) A detachment from the immediately given, radical split 
from whatever exists, an overturn, a new beginning, 
b~ The principle of opposition and negation, 
c) The principle of unceasing change and unceasing development -
of the qualitative leap" (p.61). 
Maurice Cornforth in his book 11't'he Open Philosophy and the Open Society" 
(1968) which he wrote in reply to Karl Popper's two volume study on · 
"The Open Society and Its Enemies" (1966) defines the dialectical approach 
as merely "to study 'interconnections' 11 (1966, p.6). He later adds that 
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"dialectic consists in following up the connections 
of opposite~, as discoverable in the real processes of 
nature and society." 
All three authors stress qualities of the dialectic which may be applied 
to societal analysis and action, as well as the philosophical pursuit. 
Without commenting at all ?n the political implications of such 
applications, it is important to note the versatility of the dialectic: 
In addition to an' understanding of man (e.g. Kvale 1978; Riegel 1975, 
1978, 1979), formulations may be made in connection with nature, 
society, science (e.g. Harris 1975), sex (e.g. Datan 1976; Firestone 
1971; Hefner et al 1975), logic (e.g. Kosok 1976; Riegel 1976), 
intellectual history in general (e.g. Riegel 1975), etc. As Professor 
Bahm concludes, "dialectic" is ultimately "a category of existence" 
(1974, p.209). All these approaches share that which Rychlak (1976b) 
considers to be the "core meaning in the dialectic". 
tr the idea of bipolarity, opposition or contradiction. 
To be true dialectic, one end of the bipolarity must 
directly imply the other. The opposition cannot be artificial" 
(p.14). 
This last description would be sufficient to place Jung firmly in 
the dialectical perspective. The bipolarity was a central theme of his 
work, e.g.: inner-outer, personal-collective, conscious-unconscious, 
abstract-concrete. In addition, the essential bipolarity of the arche-
types and the entire dialectic of development along the dimensions 
Nature-Ego, and Ego .. Self, should b'e recounted. 
Before leaving this discussion on modern dialectical trends, two further 
points should be made in order to appreciate Jung's position in, and 
contribution to the development of this approach. 
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The first one concerns the question of facts: Kvale (1976) in his 
article on "Facts and dialectics" rejects a sterile and distorting 
definition of facts according to a technological model which emphasizes 
an "objective'' and detached account of facts (cf. also Hudson 1 s book 
on "The Cult of the Fact", 19 72). 
"From a dialectic perspective, the absolutizing of facts 
as the access to reality comes to give a distorted one-
sided conception of human relations" (Kvale 1976, p.89). 
Instead, Kvale advocates an approach where facts and theory dialectically 
relate to each other, where psychological data "have their origin 
in the intentional behavior of a bodily subject in a material situation" 
(p.92); and are conside~ed within their societal and historical context. 
Such an approach prevents a "reification of consciousness" (cf. Gabel 
1975) whichis not ultimately unscientific but also destructive. 
In the light of this modern analysis, Jung's treatment of facts in 
the dialectical understanding of his problematic of the Other assumes 
an enviable position. 
The second point refers to the paradoxical use of language in dialectical 
formulations. Stack (19 71) writes 'that 
"Dialectical thinking bears an asymptotic relationship 
to what it describes simply because language universalizes 
what it is used to describe. Dialectical analysis of any 
I 
phenomenon must be concerned with extracting the fundamental 
form or structure of what Sartre has called 'indefinite 
multiplicity of reciprocities' which comprise the concrete 
world of human experience" (p.290). 
The difficulty is therefore, how to describe in language the "infinite 
multiplicity of reciprocities". Such a description would also have to 
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be infinite in its multiplicity. Joachim Israel (1977; cf. also Israel 
1979) examining the same dilemma argues that 
"conceptual analysis cannot be carried out in a 'dialectical 
way', because it is static and abstract. Therefore we cannot 
grasp dialectics through conceptual analysis. On the other 
hand we cannot understand dialectics without conceptual analysis. 
(We use the words 1grasp' and 'understand' according to the 
Hegelian distinction between 'Vernuft', i.e., reason and 
'Verstand', i.e., understanding). Thus we can reformulate 
our dilemma: in order to use dialectical reason, we have to 
understand the meaning of the concepts of dialectics. But 
in order to understand the meaning of its concepts we have 
to grasp dialectics. This is dialectics and at the same 
time it is what dialectics iS-about" (1977, pp.17-8). 
This is not sophistry. If followed carefully, these passages reflect 
the very same dilemma that Jung also faced in formulating his own problematic. 
The paradoxical nature of his formulations are a direct result of his 
efforts to account adequately for both the realms of the Ego, and the 
Self, as well as that of the ground of Nature - and yet, language is a 
product of the differentiated consciousness of the Ego. Jung's 
inclusion of imagination and fantasy, in his therapeutic treatment, 
his use of mythological and religious .'data' and 'facts' (in themselves, 
in a sense, a paradox); his emphasis on experience (versus intellectual 
logic), symbolic functions (which combine both the experiential and logical); 
and finally the very dialectical definitions of archetypes and Self 
as entities of integration of opposites (inner-outer, unconscious-conscious, 
personal-collective, abstract-concrete), all bear witness to his own 
particular dialectic. His own formulations should thus be appreciated 
in their historical perspective, at a time when not only were the present 
advances in the philosophy of science (the gradual acceptance of the 
limitations of logical positivism and idealistic empiricism) absent, but 
when psychology itself was struggling for its existence and recognition 
outside the disciplines of philosophy and medicine. 
- 454 -
Before examining the last implication of this study, the Other as 
language, mention should be made of some modern fonnulations of the 
dialectic of the Other in order to locate Jung in the contemporary 
p'erspective: 
As discussed in Part One, the question of inner division in its 
various forms and conceptions has interested many authors and artists 
at different times. It would be impossible to even attempt an 
outline of all of them or even arrive at any meaningful classi-
fication of them. Thus only a few instances will be mentioned. In 
modern times, this issue has received much attention in its parti-
cular psychological formulation of alienation as 2n estrangement 
from one's own nature (e.g.Holland 1977; Marcuse 1966; Meszaros 1970; 
Petrovic et al 1973). Professor Scharfstein (1973) observes that 
in addition to Jung both Valery and Sartre also shared the same 
problematic. He wrote that 
"Valery' s struggle over his own unity is the main 
theme of his v7riting0 (Scharf stein 1973, .p.86) 
and he referred to the struggle as his "crisis of self-division that 
he was afraid would end in madness" (p. 86). 
As far as Sartre is concerned, one may note his "self-division" 
and attempts at healing it appearing as early as during his ch:Udhood 
(cf. his autobl.ographyllLes Mots~ 1964). His theoretical fonnulation 
of it appears in his philosophical works, particularly in "The 
Transcendence of the Ego" (1937), and in the "Being and Nothingness" 
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(1943) where he divides the ego into an "I" and a "Me" and discusses 
their interrelationships in the perspective of self-consciousness. 
Much closer to the Jungian thought, the recent theories on "object 
relations" (e.g. Jacobson 1964; Fairburn 1952; Guntrip 1968) and 
particularly Donald Winnicott's work (e.g. 1971; 197lb) would offer 
most fruitful ground for exploring a psychology of the Other. The 
main preoccupation of this school is the development of personality 
through the scope and dynamics of the relations between the subject 
and the "objects" which might be inner or outer, or most usually, a 
combination of the two. Of particular interest to such an under-
taking would be the work of British analytical psychologists (e.g. Ford-
ham 1973; 1974; Plaut 1973; Moore 1975; Newton and Redfearn 1979). 
./. 
PART THREE 
Chapter Five 
The ·other as Language 
"Our words are many people's children. 
Sown, born like babies 
rooted in and nurtured by blood. 
Just like pinetrees 
retain the form of the wind 
although the wind is gone; not there any more 
the same with words 
retain the f orrn of man 
although man is gone,nnot there any more II 
Seferis 1972, p.290. 
-- 456 
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Throughout this study a number of references have been made to the 
role and function of language in various contexts. The purpdse of 
this brief chapter is to examine its overall meaning within the 
framework of the problematic of the Other, as developed above, thus 
offering a tentative conception of viewing the Other in terms of 
language. 
Without aspiring to develop here a (yet to be written) Jungian 
theory of language, it would still be a worthwhile exercise to examine 
certain salient features of his understanding of language, which 
will then be related to certain modern trends in this field. 
lnitially the researcher is faced with a puzzle: Language appears 
to belong to the realm of the Ego, insofar as it is "causal" and 
"conceptual" (Jung 1952b, p. 515) its inevitable quality of differ-
entiation would indeed place it within the context of "consciousness" 
(Jung 1954, p. 301), and would thus represent perhaps the charac-
teristic process of the "conscious mind" (Jung 1929, p. 28). 
Accordingly, in Freudian terminology, language would belong to the 
secondary process. In his distinction between two kinds of thinking 
in the Wandlungen, Jung located language in the context of directed 
thinking, along with '~logical", "conceptual", "abstract" and other 
differentiated functions of the psyche. ("The material with which 
we think is 'language and speech concept'' p. u. p. 7 or according to the 
Hull translation ••• ''language and verbal concepts" Jung 1952c, 
p. 12), Moreover, he called "directed thinking•i a' thinking with 
words" (P. U. , p. 8) • ln order to support these claims Jung quoted 
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Abelard's dictum 
"Sermo generatur ab intellectu et generat intellectum" 
(Speech is generated by the intellect and in turn 
generates intellect) (In P.U., p. 8) 
Yet, Jung also made extensive reference to the unconscious aspects 
of languagei First of all he accepted that the roots of language 
are to be found in the unconscious (P.U., p.8f), a claim which 
should be received with little surprise insofar, as according to 
Jung, the collective unconscious represents the fountain spring of 
all consciousness. Moreover, in his investigations into the phe-
nomenology and history of symbols, he found that a study of the 
history of language would be relevant in tracing the native land of 
symbol fonnation (cf. supra, p .197ff). He also wrote how "language •.••• 
. contains plenty •••• unconscious contaminations" (1921, p.113). 
In a significant passage where he wrote about the manner in which 
"we assign meaning" Jung maintained that 
"The forms we use for assigning meaning are historical 
categories that reach back into the mists of time -
a fact we do not take sufficiently into account. Inter-
pretations make use of certain linguistic matrices that 
are themselves derived from primo:¢ial images. From 
whatever side we approach this question, everywhere we 
find ourselves confronted with the history of language, 
with images and motifs that lead straight back to the 
primitive wonder-world" (1954c, p. 33, emphasis added). 
The far-reaching implications of this passage include an example of 
Jung's understanding of the primacy of language in the formation of 
meaningful relations with both the· inner world of the psyche as 
well as the outer world at large, in addition to a clear hint at the 
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fundamentally unconscious origin and nature of language. 
This puzzle, of the dual affiliation of language (to the conscious 
and the unconscious), might be accounted for, and temporarily solved, 
by accepting it not as a contradiction, but rather as an affirmation 
that Jung did refer to language both in terms of the conscious, and 
the unconscious. This formulation would pave the way to a 
broader understanding of the place of language in the Jungian discourse 
with particular reference to his problematic. 
Jung indeed differentiated two kinds of language. This is particularly 
evident when he referred to the necessity of translating "the 
language of the unconscious ... into proper language" (1939d, p.285). 
From the context of this quotation it becomes clear that by "proper" 
language Jung meant that language which was not unconscious, i.e. 
the language of consciousness, or the Ego language. Thus one may 
observe here the distinction between two languages and the immediate 
effort on Jung's part to find some way of relating them. One of these 
ways was translation of the one into the other. Translation is 
'only possible wherever there are both similarities as well as 
differences between two systems. That differences should exist is 
obvious. Otherwise no need for a translation is necessary. What 
usually is forgotten is the necessary presence of similarities 
between the two systems; without simil.arities and connnon ground in 
certain aspects,no translation is possible as no correspondence between 
the two systems would then at all exist. These similarities do not 
have to be in tenns of specific elements of the systems, i.e. in terms 
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of identical particles or processes. In the case of two languages, 
e.g. English and Arabic, one would not expect to find similar or 
common words or even phrases between them before undertaking a 
. 
translation of the one into the other. According to the present 
example, the similarities, or common ground between them would lie 
in their connnon grannnatical, syntactical or other structural simi-
larities, in addition to both being means of referring to a number 
of identical objects and processes. Hence, once there is talk of 
; 
translation between the languages of the conscious and the un-
conscious it would be imperative to examine not only their difference 
but also their common aspects. 
Jung's attempts at such translations have been documented throughout 
this study. Specifically, the "secret" language of his childhood, 
his interpretation of S.W.'s "mystical" language, and the poetical 
language of the Septem Sermones, may be accepted as ~uch attempts · 
to translate certain unconscious urges into "proper" language. His 
early researches into word~association might also be perceived as 
a similar attempt at reaching the unconscious by bypassing "proper" 
language , again essentially a process of trans lat ion. On all 
these occasions Jung connected the new "languages"(which represented 
the attempts at translation) with the Other: The secret language of 
his childhood was closely associated with the tendency in himself which 
a :little later was named No. 2 personality; Ivenes' "mystical 
language" was also the "language of the Other" insofar as Ivenes was 
S.W.'s Other; finally, besides the issue of the very authorshiP, of 
tne Septem Sermones (i.e. that it was supposedly written by 
Basilides of Alexandria), Jung made explicit reference in his 
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interpretation that the text "might have been" the product of 
Philemon (M.D.R., pp. 214-5); an already identified Anticipated Whole 
Other figure. 
However, a distinction should be drawn between a translating attempt 
and an invasion of the unconscious,,veiled in "proper" language. 
Without necessarily sharing Jung's evaluation, one has to remember 
Jung's unusual aversion to the Ilegelian language. Hegel as well 
as Nietzche were, according to Jung, examples of the latter, i.e. 
their language was expressing their uncontrolled unconscious impulses 
in hardly a disguised manner. In other words, they were haphazard 
formulation, at best bad translations and thus not only unreliable in 
terms of their content, but also examples to be avoided because 
they were in a way threatening the conscious functions. On the 
contrary, Jung must have considered his own attempts as careful 
and contained trials at developing a good translation, what he called 
a "right language". 
A second possible relation between the two languages(which does not 
exclude the first one~ which was the translation of the one into the 
other) is that one develops out of the other. It has already been 
mentioned that Jung considered the conscious language a differentiated 
form of the unconscious one, the latter one being that which he 
considered "primitive language": 
"The language of the unconscious is particularly rich 
in images, as our dreams prove. But it is a primi-
tive language, a faithful reflection of the colourful, 
ever-changing world" (1918, p.17) •. 
• 
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According to Jung's positions, which he developed in the Wandlungen, 
the development of consciousness in the individual corresponds to 
the evolution of human consciousness in general. Thus, it follows 
logically that when he ref erred to the "language of infancy" of 
a person he also '"Considered it as "mythological" (1928, p.227). 
(CF. also supra, p. 151). This correspondence was not of mere 
academic interest to Jung. He employed it in his analysis of dreams: 
"To make the language of dreams intelligible we need 
nlllllerous parallels from the psychology of primitive 
and historical symbolism, because dreams spring essen-
tially frcrn the unconscious, which contains remnants of 
the functional possibilities of all preceding epochs 
of evolution" (1943, p.85). 
This understanding of the evolutionary sequence of the two languages 
open.s up new vistas to this issue: All that has been said about 
the collective unconscious, especially with reference to it being 
the matrix of mythopoeic imagination (vide supra, p. 271), would have 
its parallel in the understanding of the unconscious language. The 
peculiarity of the language of the unconscious lies in its reference 
to more primitive, less differentiated and non-integrated material. 
Cotnmenting on the fundamentally unconscious nature of glossolalia, 
Jung wrote to Professor Tenney: 
"It is probable that the strangeness of the unconscious 
contents not yet integrated in consciousness demands an 
equally strange language .•• " (In Adler 1976, p.227) 
.,. . 
But this strangeness is not a n2gative effect in itself. It is 
inevitable. Once this is accepted as such, and not confused and 
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thought to refer to the external reality, the richness and unlimited 
potentiality of the unconscious language which is "more fundamental" 
than conscious language is revealed: 
"We have only to discard the dependence of dream 
language on environment ••• in order to arrive at the 
more universal and more fundamental language of 
mythology. This gives us access to the primordial 
images that underlie all thinking and have a con-
siderable influence even on our scientific ideas" 
(1954b, p.289). 
This insight was reached by Jung as early as 1912., when in the Wand-
lungen he quoted extensively Baldwain's similar views which he 
later developed further in the 1context of his own theories and pro-
blematic. Some examples are the following: 
"Language grows, therefore, just as thought does, 
by never losing its synnomic or dual reference; its 
meaning is both personal and social ••• Language is 
the register of tradition, the record of racial con-
quest, the deposit of all the gains made by the genius 
of individuals •.• The social 'copy-system' thus 
established reflects the judgmental processes of the 
race, and in turn becomes the training school of the judge-
ment of new generations ••• In language, therefore, 
to sum up the foregoing, we have the tangible - the 
actual and historical - instrument of the development 
and conservation of psychic meaning" (In Jung 1952c, 
p. 15) • 
Thus, unconscious language may be accepted as the treasure house for 
·the conservation of collective psychic meaning. As such, it also 
serves as a "training school" for the infant, who, by entering into 
language acquires the accumulated psychic meaning. In this way, 
language represents a particularly significant instance of what was 
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earlier termed collective psychological representations (vide supra, 
p.270). In 1905 Jung wrote that 
"The process in the world at large is repeated in the 
smaller world of language" (p.101; vide supra, p.142); 
The crucial question, however, is how does an individual make use 
of this "deposit" of meaning. Although the language of the conscious 
springs from the collective pool of the unconscious language, their 
relationship remains problematical. This is because the one is not 
comprehensible to the other (as was shewn above) and a translation 
is necessary in order to make the connection at all possible. As 
long as no such translation is available, conscious language ignores 
and rejects its unconscious predecessors in whatever manifestation 
they might appear, as they are indeed "strange" and incomprehensible. 
This creates an opposition between the two languages. 
It is this tension and antithesis between the twp languages that 
might be accounted for as the third possible kind o:t= relation 
between them. However, this antagonism in view of the preceding 
chapters, should be understood as a dialectical opposition and not 
as destructive and futile friction. The dialectical "third", the 
Other of these antithetical kinds of language would be found in their 
dialectical synthesis. It is this Other language that Jung pursued 
throughout his problematic, and it is this one which he called 
"right language". This is the language of the Self. This is what 
Jung repeatedly called "personal myth" (e.g. M.D.R., p.224) •. Logically, 
a personal myth is a contradiction, insofar as myths are coeective 
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representations of psychological meaning. By personal III)lth Jung -
meant the "living and lived myth" (1940, p.180) which enables the 
individual to re-establish contact with his "psychic origins" in 
a manner which would not be detrimental to the integrity of the 
individual. 
A personal myth would indeed represent the dialectical union of the 
preceding opposing Other language: the language of the lived, past 
and now unconscious psychic meanings, as well as the language of 
the living actuality through which a conscious meaning is created 
and accounted for. The realisation of the Self which represents 
the goal of the individuation process, cannot be achieved in a 
vacuum. It may be argued that Self-realization is possible only 
in language, within, and through language. It may further be 
argued that this is what Jung himself suggested when, for example, 
referring to a good philosopher he wrote 
''He alone is a philosopher who can transmute a vision 
born of nature into an abstract idea,thereby trans-
lating it into a universally valid language" (1916b, 
p.272); 
From the context of this passage it is evident that Jung's intention 
was not :simply to establish clear cut criteria for a good philo-
sopher. A little further, Jung wrote of the same effect, this time 
in terms of the goal of self-realization which was for a person to 
"assimilate his unconscious self and keep himself fully conscious" 
(1916b, p.273, emphasis added). 
These quotations support the argument that the process of individuation 
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consists in a dialectical unity of the unconscious with the conscious 
language. A "vision born of nature" is an aspect of the unconscious 
.language. The language of the unconscious, as has been shown, 
can only "speak" in mythical, visionary, dreamlike, and similar 
' other forms. However, the acceptance of this unconscious content 
should be done with the utmost care, so that both languages 
retain their truth and yet at the same time lose it in the new Other 
language of the Self. It is for this reason that Jung uses the 
verb "assimilate" in order to approximate the meaning of this 
essentially paradoxical language: Paradoxical because it expresses 
the Objective Psyche of the collective unconscious, the primitive 
and mythopoeic Other in a manner that is personally relevant to the 
individual. (Cf. Gordon 1977). 
Another aspect of this view of the role of language is the under-
standing of Jung's insistence on the congruent relationship between 
experience and language in terms of the dialectical union of the two 
languages. It has been indicated that since Ego consciousness 
cannot correct itself by overstepping its own limitations and viewing 
itself from a different perspective, the compensating and healing 
energy of the unconscious reaches consciousness through all kinds of 
devious messages. These messages insofar as they are not composed 
in the language of consciousness are incomprehensible, and the only 
way for them to be translated is through experience. Thus, Jung's 
repeated claims that his own language was grounded ~n exper_ience 
may be accepted as an expression of the dialectical union of language 
proposed here. Jung's insistence on the baptizing and naming 
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of the unconscious tendencies and image figures may further be 
understood in the context of the present argument. A mere nebulous 
'understanding' or 'appreciation' or 'intuition' of them was not 
sufficient for Jung. He demanded that they be externalized and 
their unconscious language be forged into a single language with the 
conscious language. Writing, or speaking about them was necessary. 
Even when they were expressed in an artistic form, they still had 
to be expressed in a certain language form, that of the relevant 
art. They had, ultimately, to be articulated in any form which 
Jung called "universally valid language". 
Only through the dialectical.union of the two languages, was any 
progress and creative movement possible; otherwise, the opposition 
between them would neutralize any positive impulse in that it would 
be either not recognized at all or if noticed it would be mis-
understood and its message ignored. This is what Jung perhaps 
meant when he wrote about the "alive" language which "can therefore 
change" (1954b, p.223). Alive language would be the language that 
ensures an open and reciprocal connnunication between language and 
experience, between the conscious and the unconscious. 
Thus, an individual, born in language acquires the stored meaning by 
personally relating to it and making it his own experiential reality. 
He then becomes individuated if the unconscious experiences which 
appear to him personally are understood (read: translated) and 
expressed in a "universally valid language". If this is not achieved, 
he will remain captive to his "private understanding" (Heraclitus) 
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having not developed their common Logos. Thus remaining in a state 
of internal stri e where meaning between the two languages cannot be 
translated, his psychic chariot (Plato) cannot remain in flight but 
will inevitably fall. A harmony and common logos between the parts 
of the personality is necessary in order that the psychic system in 
its totality reaches the heights of the Selfhood. As in the dialectic 
of self-consciousness of Hegel, language is the necessary mediator 
through which a person may realise himself. 
Such a reading of Jung's problematic of the Other in terms of language 
finds itself in close association with modern theoretical trends 
in the fields of language, symbolism and semiology. The eminent 
Cambridge theorist of language George Steiner (1973) noted that 
II the whole question of the Freud-Jung quarrel is 
a much bigger one tpan an incident in the history of 
psychoanalysis ••• Until now we had only the dirty 
washing and the gossip of a great quarrel. We have 
lacked the philosophical substance. I think that one 
day the quarrel may relate to the Plato-Aristotle 
argument. It looks like one of those great divisions 
of the way you think about meaning and truth, which 
comes again and again in the history of Western 
culture ••• Plato would join hands with Jung, and 
Aristotle with Freud ••. " 
and added that 
"it looks as if Jung, more deeply than Freud, understood 
the whole problem of the nature of universality ••• 
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in the way that language creates fictions, creates 
life lies, creates complex symbols. The problem 
with Jung is going to be to separate the best work 
from the very odd and often repellent fringe ••• " 
(p .67). 
The present study does not aspire to provide either the "philosophical 
substance" of the Freud-Jung differences, or the separation of Jung's 
I 
"best work" from the "odd" and "fringe" work. It is not concerned 
with the latter in that it does not constitute an evaluation of his 
work; and to systematically develop the fonner would represent a 
serious deviation from the main aim of this study, which remains 
a new reading of Jung's work in which his problematic of the Other 
emerges prominently. However, this reading has indeed offered a 
number of suggestions for understanding the Freud-Jung differences in 
a broader perspective which is not devoid of philosophical impli-
cations. Steiner's positioning of Jung next to Plato, as well as 
emphasizing his (Jung's) grasp of the role of language, have also 
been dealt with, to some extent, in this investigation. 
Steiner is one of the very few modern theorists who have acknowledged 
these implications of the Jungian opus. This is in sharp contrast 
to the enormous interest that Freud's, psychoanalysis hts received 
I 
in. recent years (e.g. Edelson 1975; Mahony and Singh 1975; Peller 
1966). The pioneer of this revived interest in Freudian theories from 
the perspective of language is the French psychoanalyst Jacques 
Lacan,Wio, although his writings stretch back to as early as 1931, only 
recently received the attention of the English speaking world. 
Apart from an address to the British Psychoanalytical Society in 195i 
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(which was published in English in 1953)and two translations of 
his .articles (Lacan 1966b; 1968b) Lacan' s work remained almost 
unknown outside France and the Continent in general. Although 
Lacan, or better, the phenomenon of Lacanism, had been the centre 
of heated controversies in European intellectual circles for the 
last thirty years, the first serious study on his discourse to appear 
in English was only in 1968, when Anthony Wilden translated and 
introduced his "Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage en 
psychanalyse" under the title "The Language of the Self" (Lacan 
1968). Since then three more books invaded the fairly settled 
understanding of Freud held by the Anglophone academics and clinicians: 
"The Four Fundamental Conc(;!pts of Psychoan.alysis" (Lacan 1977), 
0 Ecrits: a Selection" (Lacan 1977b), and Anika Lemaire' s "J.g,cques 
Lacan" (1977). During this time a limited number of reviews (e.g. 
Althusser 1971; Holland 1977; Leavy 1977; Miel 1966; Roussel 1968; 
Ysseling 1970) brought to the English speaking readers aspects of the 
Lacanian mess~ge. 
One of the main difficulties that any review of Lacan's theories 
faces, stems from his strong emphasis on the avoidance of compartment-
alization. He is identified as an exponent of structuralism, a movement 
which underlines the essential interrelatedness of elements within 
structures and their contexts (Broekman 1974). Lacan himself refuses 
to define crucial terms of his discourse, advocating that his readers 
(or preferably aud,tence) should develop an appreciation of them in 
the course of their use. Moreover he scorns any efforts by others 
to explain or interpret his work, and considers them as udenaturing". 
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' In front of this dilennna, as Papadopoulos (1978) suggested, the 
reviewer is thus left with three possible choices: (a) to initially 
present Lacan's entire system (a possibility too absurd to even be 
considered), (b) to translate Lacan's system into another smaller 
and explanatory structure, or (c) to attempt to capture the spirit 
of the Lacanian discourse with thick impressionistic brush strokes. 
The last would be the only endeavour acceptable to Lacan himself, 
and it is this that will be followed here in order to observe 
a number of similarities between his approach and that of Jung's as 
far as the issue of the Other as language is concerned. Thus, a 
presentation of the Lacanian views is here undertaken with full 
knowledge of its inherent limitations, and its vulnerability to 
criticisms. 
Lacan has been advocating a return to Freud by attacking the psycho-
analytical establishment first of France and later outside its 
boundaries (Lacan 1973, pp.7-17) for abandoning the original Freudian 
discourse and opting for the pragmatics of adaptation (a legacy of 
the Ego Psychology). His plea has been for a reading, a proper reading 
of Freud which would reveal Freud's own problematic. The irony for 
him was that psychoanalysts fell into the very same trap that Freudian 
psychoanalysis was exposing,i.e. "reading into" Freud whatever 
they themselves desired. This lead to Lacan's expulsion from the 
psychoanalytic movement leaving him to follow his own (read: 
Freud's) path in firm determination. 
However, it was not only Lacan' s urging for a return to Freud that 
created that unfavourable climate against_ him. His very style still 
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remains a matter of vivid controversy. He feels that he has no 
responsibility towards his audience~ or readers' difficulties in 
understanding him. (He actually makes no effort at all to even be 
audible during his famous seminars in Paris). Absorbed fully in his 
,own language, he feel entirely free to coin new tenns, tell idio-
syncratic jokes, venture into esoteric excursions, in all, weaving 
a tapestry of meaning in innovative patterns. Some find him non-
sensical or arrogant (e.g. Pichon 1941) while others most poetic. 
It might be paradoxical that in reading Freud, Lacan makes use of a 
f 
number of approaches which certainly did not exist during Freud's 
lifetime: First of all, structuralism as developed in the works of de 
Saussre (1974) and Jacobson (cf. Culler 1976; Hawkes 1977), Mauss 
and Levi-Strauss in anthropology (Shalvey 1979);.also a combination 
of modern theories which incorporate aspects of the philosophies of 
Heidegger and Sartre, existentialism and phenomenology, as well as 
mathematics and semiological literary criticism (cf. Coward and Ellis 
1977; Macksey and Donato 1972; Markides 1977). Lacan does not see 
any paradox in this. "Return to Freud" means to return to the 
"meaning of psychoanalytical experience" (1968, p. 30). Once this is 
accomplished, the "routinization" of the psychoanalytic terminology 
will cease, and a meaningful reference to the experiential substratum 
will be enabled. It is therefore possible to remain true to the 
original Freudian word even if recent theoretical insights are utilised 
enabling more adequate expression. As Lemaire (1970)put it, 
"Lacan has literally rejuvenated psychoanalysis by 
rethinking it within the framework of contemporary 
thought" (p. 24 7). 
,_ 
.. 
.. 
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Lacan claims that his approach can redeem the scientific character 
of psychoanalysis: Psychoanalysis is a distinct scientific dis-
cipline as it has a distinct subject matter: the unconscious. His 
contribution becomes more evident when one examines his proposals 
for the methodology of this allegedly new science. Here Lacan takes 
a bold step when he proclaims that the proper method of studying 
the unconscious is in terms of structural linguistics and since the 
scientific credentials of this approach are not in question there 
should be no argument against accepting psychoanalysis as a science. 
The suggestion to study the psyche through the established methods of 
analyzing linguistic structures might be received with scepticism 
and the connections between these two fields might be queried. 
However, Lacan claims that, first of all, all analytical material 
should be considered as verbal in the sense that it belongs to a 
language. Even when tne patient is talKing about life conflicts or 
instinctual drives he is in fact offering no other data to his 
analyst than his speech (Lacan 1968, p.17). Moreover, Freud himself, 
as well as Saussure and Lacan demonstrated the equivalence of certain 
linguistic processes (metaphor. and metonymy) to the mechanism of 
unconscious dreamwork (condensation and displacement). Finally, 
another similarity between the unconscious and language should be 
appreciated: Both constitute a certain level of abstraction. The 
unconscious represents the undifferentiated and non-specific and 
individual aspects of reality in the same manner as language is a 
universal tool. Both refer to some collective structures within and 
through which the individual realizes himself. It is for these 
three brcadly sketched reasons that Lacan (e.g. in 1966; 1972) declared 
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his famous dictum: The unconscious is structured like a language. 
Miel sunnnarizes this position: 
"Linguistic analysis is thus the method appropriate to 
the scientific study of the 'UUConscious, not just 
because psychoanalytic material is verbal, but because 
linguistics can be shown to offer us the best available 
model to account for the structures and laws of that 
material" (1966, p.108). 
One of the main themes of Lacanian thought is what constitutes the 
subject (e.g. Galanes 1979; Laplanche and Leclaire 1966; Mannoni 1970; 
Veltsos 1978). In the Carthesian view, the subject is located in his 
thinking. Using that as a point of departure, Lacan discusses the 
Freudian innovations which were introduced with the theories of the 
unconscious, and underlines the fundamental "decenteredness" of the' 
Freudian subject. The primary order for Lacan is that of language. 
This lies outside the subject: 
"The law of man has been the law of Language" 
(Lacan 1968, p. 35); 
Man is constituted by language as his very awareness of himself is not 
outside the order of language~ "The subject is spoken rather than 
speaking" Lacan repeatedly states. Many of his insights have a 
dist~.nct paradoxical slant and this contributes to his negative 
reputation. However, this might be an unavoidable price he has to 
pay when discussing in language the intricacies and levels of language 
itself. On the question of the subject's identity he wrote: 
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"It is not a question of knowing whether I speak 
of myself in a way that confonns to what I am, but 
rather of knowing whether I am the same as that of 
which I speak ••• " (1966b, p .135); 
\ 
·The problem for Lacan is the disentang~_ement of the levels of language 
and signification in order to arrive at the truth of the subject. 
"It is therefore always in the relationship of 
the subject's moi to the je of his discourse that 
you must understand the sense of the discourse in 
order to achieve the dealienation of the subject" 
(1968, p.68). 
This suggests that a differentiation of the individual from the 
collective is essential in avoiding the alienation of the subject 
which would be unavoidable if his identity was lost in the collective 
structure of language. This teaching is extremely close to the 
Jungian positions discussed earlier. Moreover, Lacan in discussing 
the transindividual nature of language and of the unconscious, 
according to the reading of the present study, places himself even 
closer to Jung. 
II The Word confers a meaning on the functions of 
the individual; its domain is that of the concrete dis-
course, insofar as this is the field of the trans-
individual reality of the subject ••• " (Lacan 1968, p.19) 
Gimeno (1973) sununarizes the Lacanian position with regard to the 
transindividuality of the unconscious when he wrote 
"The relative stability of meanings in everyday speech 
can only be explained by the existence of an unconscious 
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chain of signif icantia produced by repression" 
(p.136). 
The last explanation as to the role of repression betrays the fact 
that Lacan argues from what he considers to be a Freudian position. 
Not only does Lacan not see similarities between his views and those 
of Jung's but, perhaps because he considers himself a loyal member 
of a "rival party", occasionally attacked Jung. As far as it is known, 
only Maffei (1976) and Papadopoulos (1979) dtt!w parallels between 
the theories of these two eminent psychologists. The theoretical 
~ 
kinship between Jung and Lacan might further be exemplified in a more 
specific examination of the Lacanian understanding of the Other and 
its relation to the Jungian positions developed above: 
Kallias (1978) in a terminological note on La.can aptly observes that 
the tenn Qther is "loaded with philosophical traditions" stretching 
back into antiquity and he includes both Plato and Hegel in them 
(p.65). Fages (1971) writes that for Lacan the Other is the order of 
language which constitutes the ttansindividual culture and the 
unconscious of the subject (p.113). Leavy (1977) however, discerns 
that "the concept 'Other' has a sh if ting meaning for Lacan"; Sometimes 
it refers to the "locus of the unconscious", 
0 But Lacan also means that: l. the unconscious talks , 
about the other persort •••• , and 2. perhaps most idio-
syncratically of ll11, the unconscious o]'."igi,nates in 
the other person ••• 11 (p. 210) ; 
Lacan himself often stated that "the unconscious is the discc.urse of 
'. 
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the Other." 
It would be beyond the scope of the present study to undertake a · 
detailed investigation of all definitions of the Other given by Lacan 
along with their specific nuances of meaning. However, it might be 
suggested that (regardless of their developmental sequence) they may 
all be understood in tenns of the Jungian Objective Psyche or the 
collective unconscious. Indeed the collective unconscious, according 
to Jung, represents the product of other persons throughout history, 
and also italks' about them insofar as it contains their cpllective 
experiences. 
It thus appears _that Jung would have had no objections in accepting 
that the liOther is the locus of the unconscious" nor that the Other 
is the order of language. According to Steiner again, Jung had 
strong similarities with another structuralist, the French anthro-
pologist Levi-Strauss, in that both their studies 
" ••• affirm that symbolic representations, legends, 
image-patterns,are means of storing and conceptualizing 
knowledge, that me.ntal processes are collective 
because they reproduce fundamental structural identities ••• " 
(1967, pp.271-2); 
Levi-Strauus is responsible for demonstrating the parallels between the 
structure of language and the structure in family relations in society 
as well as other socia~ laws (cf. Levi-Strauss 1963; Shalvey 1979). 
D'Aquili (1975) also emphasized the Jungian elements in Levi- Strauss' 
thought and moreover argued that that was a result of a direct influence 
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from Jung. D'Aquili underlines ''what appears to be a major influence 
of C.G. Jung on the thoughtof Levi-Strauss and on the subsequent 
course of French Structuralism in general" (p.41). 
It might therefore be considered sufficient to accept these tentative 
views on the similarities between the Jungian understanding of the 
role of language in relation to the Other and a corresponding view 
held by structuralist psychologists (cf. Lacan) and anthropologists 
(cf. Levi-Strauss). Jung showed a keen appreciation for the role of 
language in his psychology, and offered a number of significant in-
.sights in his writings. Modern developments in the structuralist 
study of language and psychology (with its interdisciplinary approach) 
have contributed substantially to an increased awareness of the 
relationship between the organisation of the psychological and inter-
personal structures and that of language (cf. Harre 1976), and as 
Steiner (1972) argued, 
i'The whole future of psychology is bound up with that 
of linguistic study, with our deepening grasp of 
man's unique speech status. Psychology can no longer 
be separate from our realization of how radically a 
particular language, a specific linguistic world-
image, conditions the life of the mind" (p.88); 
As quoted earlier (vide supra, p. 458 ) Jung was well aware of this, 
when he wrote about the manner we "assign meaning" as well as language 
being the treasure house where "psychic meaning" is stored (vide 
supra, p. 463). 
Before closing this discussion, bne remark concerning a seemingly 
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substantial difference between Jung and Lacan is indicated: it 
concerns the very meaning of the unconscious as the Other. 
Lacan (1968) writes: 
"The unconscious is that chapter of my history which 
is marked by a blank or occupied by a falsehood: 
it is the censored chapter. But the Truth can be 
found again: it is most often already written down 
elsewhere. That is to say: 
- in monuments: this is my body - that is to say, the 
the hysterical nucleus of the neurosis where the hys-
terical s)rmptom reveals the structure of a Language 
and is deciphered like an inscription which, once 
recovered can without serious ·1oss be destroyed ••• " 
(p. 21); 
He go.es on to enumerate a number of such places where "the Truth 
can be found", among them are 
"- • • • my childhood memories •••• 
- in semantic evolution: this corresponds to the stock 
of word::; and acceptation of my own particular vocabulary, 
as it does to my style of life and to my character, 
- in traditions as well, and not only in them but also 
in the legends which, in a heroicized fonn, transport 
my history ••• " (p.21). 
A superficial reading of this passage, which is indeed characteristic 
of and faithfully represents the Lacanian views of the unconscious, 
might lead to an erroneous conclusion based on an interpretation tha_t, 
for Lacan; the unconscious is the very "blank" itself, or the "falsehood" 
of one's psychological Truth. This might in turn be contrasted to a 
Jungian position according to which the unconscious, as the objective 
psyche par excellence; represents the very Truth itself. The inference 
might be drawn that for Jung the unconscious represents the subject's 
general and overall history, if not the history of mankind at large 
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(to remain within the phraseology of the above quoted excerpt), whereas 
~or Lacan the unconscious is only the censored chapter of that history. 
_This interpretation might indeed be correct. A detailed discussion on 
its merits would deviate from the scope of the present.study.' What 
should nevertheless be clarified here is that such an interpretation 
should not lead to the conclusion that the views of Lacan and Jung differ 
here radically. The hasty impression that would lead to opposing 
these two theories in terms of usually accepted categories applied in 
the case of distinguishing between the Freudian and Jungian approaches 
to the unconscious, (i.e. that Freud attributed an essentially negative 
meaning to the unconscious whereas Jung viewed it positively as.being 
the source of all creative forces) should be resisted in this case. 
The argument should proceed by examining more closely the places where 
Lacan claims that the censored Truth is to be found. He mentions 
pathological symptoms within a person as well as collective represent-
ations ("traditions", "legends"). This might lead to a certain degree 
of suspicion. Of what kind of history is Lacan talking, after all? 
Is it personal of collective history? It in fact appears that talking 
from a structuralist position, Lacan was not concerned with such a 
distinction between the two insofar as both are structured in the same 
way. Both are structured as language. It should be bornein mind that 
one of the essential characteristics of the structural laws governing 
language, psychological experience as well as social relations, were, 
according to Levi-Strauss the principle of binary opposition, i.e. of 
the tendency to organize material in opposing pairs. In studying myths, 
for example, Levi-Strauss observed the universal occurrence of antimonies 
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(in terms of young-old, male-female, etc). He maintained that such 
structural laws have no historical dimensions in that they are 
manifested in all cultures, all places and in all times, regardless 
Qf __ the_ actual content (e.g. Levi-Strauss 1963). Similar laws were 
found to exist irt the structure of language (cf. Wilden 1977). Thus, 
the places where the truth is found are not static treasure houses 
with .i?P~~if:i.c! contefit!'l but rather in dynamic structures which create 
meaning ceaselessly. Such an interpretation; which in fact corresponds 
with the central tenets of the structuralist approach renders futile 
the preceding direction of the argument and opens up new vistas of this 
issue. 
Having accepted the fundamentally .p()tenti11l nature of the 'truth, which 
i~ recreated through structures, a proper, more adequate reading c;f 
Jung is now ertabled. !t fiow becomes apparent that this position co-
incides with Jung's understanding of the objective psyche. Although 
Jung did not use expressions such as treasurehouse; and storehouse to 
tefer to the collective unconscious; these should be taken as fig-
urative terfiis and not as revisions of his main theory in. which 
archetypes ate struct_u_r_al prJncipies and cbnvey no specific 
content in themselves but only in potential form. This was often 
misunderstobd and Jung had tb repeatedly reiterate it. In the last 
wbtk before his death Jung emphasised this again and it wouid be 
necessary to quote it in iength: 
i'My views about the 'archaic remnants,' which l'. have called 
'archetypes 1ot 'primordial images,' are constantly criticized 
by people who lack ~. sufficietit knowledge both o_f the rsycho-
lbgy of dreams ahd Of mythology. The term •archetype is 
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often misunderstood as meaning a certain definite mythological 
image or motif. But this would be no more than a conscious 
representation, and it would be ·absurd to asstmte that such 
variable representations could be inherited. The archetype 
is, on the contrary, an inherited tenden,,SY. of the human mind 
to form representations of mythological motifs - representations 
that vary a great deal without losing their basic pattern ••• 
One finds these representations collectives practically every-
where, characterized by the same or similar motifs. They 
cannot be assigned to any particular time or region or race. 
They are without known origin, and they can reproduce them-
selves even where transmission through migration must be 
ruled out"(Jung 1961, p.228). 
Thus archetypes are rtO_t "inherited ideas 0 , but mere tendencies, and 
possibilities for psychological meaning. Jung also made at least two 
references to more precise structural laws in language which would 
positively correspond to modern structuralist theories. The first one 
has already been discussed and refers to his utilization of Finck's. 
hypothesis about the structure of language in his preliminary under-
standing of psychological types (1913b). According to this hypothesis ' 
there are mainly two types of linguistic structures represented by the 
transitive and intransitive verbs respectively. Jung expanded this 
to refer to two types of movement of the libido (Part Two, Chapter Five), 
thus proposing an intrinsic relationship between the structure of 
language and the structure of psychic energy and in broader terms 
psychological disposition at large. The second one reads: 
"Through the migration of language the meaning of a word 
is transformed into its historical opposite" (Jung 191lc, p.443). 
Although Jung does not expand much on this hypothesis it nevertheless 
represents yet another instance of his affinity to the structuralistic 
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understanding of psychology. Finally, once the bipolarity of arche-
types is brought into the present discussion, one may argue that Jung 
did make sane attempts towards comprehending the very structure of the 
objective psyche as manifesting in different contexts. 
The last comparative discussion does not exhaust the potentially re-
warding exercise of examining the interrelations between Jungian 
psychology and modern structuralist approaches and one can only hope 
that their intrinsic kinship will soon receive serious attention thus 
enabling a fuller exploration of the present tentative formulation of 
understanding the Other irt terms of language. 
484 ~ 
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These closing remarks constitute neither a summary of the entire study 
nor a conclusion on its findings. A nlllllber of Transition points have 
provided sufficient cohesion of the material presented, thus rendering 
any overall surmnary redundant. Summaries are possible and necessary 
where specific research findings may be neatly classified and codified. 
This investigation, as has been repeatedly emphasized, represents a 
new reading of the Jungian psychology, and as such it does not have 
major data in isolated and independently identifiable fonns, outside 
of their structural context, to report on. It does not aspire to 
either prove or refute the Jungian opus. As an attempt at understanding 
Jung and his work within the framework of the dialectic of the Other, 
its value lies in the coherence of the arguments and directions 
presented, its ability to account adequately for Jung's writings and 
life as a whole in their developmental evolution, and the rewarding new 
vistas which such a reading of Jung unfolds. 
In this investigation certain Jungian contributions were either in-
sufficiently dealt with or not included at all (e.g. the principle of 
synchronicity, his theory of dreams). 
the unavoidable limitations of space. 
The basic reason for this was 
An adequate treatment of them 
would have demanded further extensions to this already big volume. 
References to the extensive Jungian literature (i.e. studies on Jung 
by Jungian authors) were intentionally kept to a minimlllll to facilitate 
the impact of the new reading. 
The central theme of the Other has received relatively little attention 
in psychology outside the structuralist approaches (cf. Bakan 1966, 
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Jarret 1979; Lustman 1972; Rank 1914). James Hillman emphasized that 
"perhapsu Jung's "tnain contribution lies not so much" in the ideas of 
·psychological complex or the archetype, "but in his radical, personified 
formulation of them" (1975, p.20). 
The progressive refonnulations of the Other led Jung to the only non Other, 
the Self. Without creating an abstract and systematic treatise on the 
Other, Jung gradually developeq an experiential as well as a theoretical 
understanding of the Other, which in fact includes a comprehensive account 
of its aetiology and origins, its teleology; with clinical as well as 
broader cultural implications. At this time when Jung's psychology is 
approached fran a wide variety of perspectives, e.g. politics (Odajnuk 1976), 
aesthetics (Philipson l 963), e-co1ogy (Gelb 1974), literary criticis:n (Allen 
l 973), anthropology (Blake-Palmer l 962) etc, the inclusion of a considera-
tion of his treatment of the dialectic of the Other would only mutually 
enrich both the Jungian thought as well as the field concerned. 
Placed in the developmental context of the theorists of the Other, 
from the Ephesian Riddler to Hegel and the modern structuralist "riddlers", 
Jung occupies a central position in that he provides an essential bridge 
by canbining his predecessors and anticipating his successors. Fully 
aware of the value of his contribution Jung wrote with humility: 
"When people say I am wise, or a sage, i cannot accept 
it. A man once dipped a hatful of water fran a stream. 
What did that amount to? I am not that stream. I am 
at the stream, but I do nothing ... (M.D.R., p. 388). 
This is a rather different approach from that of Narcissus, who instead 
saw his own external image in the water ... 
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